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Abstract
In 1928, a small forest uprising in Terengganu, on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, 
became a Holy War.
The rebels—shifting cultivators from the Terengganu River system, coalesced 
under an Islamist leadership of rubber smallholders, mosque functionaries and Islamic 
scholars. They were responding to a power struggle between two elite forces within the 
colonial government after 1919—represented by the Sultan and the British Adviser. 
These two forces were engaged in a contest to subject the hinterland’s landscape and 
population to government, resulting in overlapping claims to the Terengganu forest. 
These claims prevented forest-based smallholders from cultivating rice or rubber—their 
two main crops.
Aggrieved by displacement from their swiddens, hundreds of cultivators began 
to defy government forest regulations. They attacked forest guards and police officers, 
accusing them of being kafir—unbelievers. Then on 21 May 1928, rebels occupied a 
police station in Kuala Berang, a regional administrative centre. From this police station 
and its surrounding government offices, the colonial government exercised its claim to 
exist as the sole regulator of land and forest use in the hinterland.
Yet the rebels’ defiance was not based solely on their land and forest counter­
claim. They raised the red flag of the Ottoman Caliphate over the police station, 
generalising their local demands into one for sovereignty as Muslims. In doing so, the 
rebels demonstrated their location in a set of regional and global connections beyond 
their local environment. They were building on a series of Islamising political 
precedents. These precedents, established by Islamic scholars, responded to a larger 
territorial contest—between Britain and Siam for control over the Malay Peninsula.
The contest for the peninsula drove a logic of territorial delimitation which 
bounded Terengganu and the states around it—formerly Siamese tributaries. A series of 
treaties signed over the nineteenth century eventually culminated in the 1909 Siam- 
Malaya border, locking Terengganu on the British side. Terengganu was colonised in 
1919, and was incorporated into the emerging Malayan geo-body. Yet Islamic scholars 
from the Siamese tributaries were not locked in place, continuing their patterns of
mobility around the region, and between Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Together, 
these scholars forged a political solidarity with the global community of Muslims—the 
umat. They began to authorise a politics of Holy War against Britain, using Islamic 
metaphors to create a political language which the Terengganu rebels later used.
In this intensely Islamic political climate, the Terengganu rebels wove their 
local land and forest claims into a bold defence of the umat. In doing so, they 
momentarily negated the logic of the territorial bounding to which they were being 
subjected. The uprising became a Holy War, not only for the Terengganu forest, but for 
the umat against the kafir colonisers.
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Sources, Spelling and Transliteration
The main body of primary sources used for this thesis, namely files from the collections 
of the Terengganu State Secretariat (SUK T), the Commissioner of Lands, Terengganu 
(CoL), and the Terengganu Supreme Court (MBT), was for the most part handwritten in 
Jawi, or Arabic script modified for Malay. In transliterating terms for use here, I have 
adopted current colloquial Malay spellings in every possible case.
In addition, I have used current Malay spellings for all proper nouns, and not 
1920s British transliterations in use in English-language sources, such as the Straits 
Settlements: Original Correspondence series (CO 273) or the Federated Malay States: 
Original Correspondence series (CO 717). For example, I have elected for Terengganu, 
not Trengganu, and Kuala Berang, not Kuala Brang. In quotes or titles of original 
documents, however, I have retained the spelling in use at the time, for example ‘Report 
of the British Agent, Trengganu’.
Where there are two acceptable alternatives in contemporary use, I have 
followed choices reflected in the original Jawi text. For example, the choice to use hulu 
and not ulu when referring to the upriver hinterland reflects the spelling in the Malay- 
language files. I have also elected for the spelling Dato’ and not Datuk for all relevant 
courtly titles, as both are currently in use and Dato’ better reflects the original Jawi. In 
electing for Dato’, I am making no comment on present-day differences between the 
two titles. I have, however, used Tok and not To’, as the latter is no longer current.
All transliterated Arabic and Persian terms have been rendered in their current, 
colloquial Malay spellings, and no diacritics have been used. For example, I have 
elected for syariah and not shun’a, umat and not ummah, and Naksyabandiyah, not 
Nakshbandiyya.
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Figure 2: The Terengganu, Marang and Dungun river systems.
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Introduction— Terengganu’s Holy War
The trouble is believed to have originated in a dispute over jungle-felling rights, 
which certain leaders attempted to turn into a religious outbreak.
Reuters, 15 June 1928.1 2
In 1928, a small forest uprising in Terengganu, on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, 
became a Holy War in defence of global Muslim sovereignty against colonial rule.
The uprising itself lasted just one day—21 May 1928. It was quickly ended by 
police fire. At its heart was a conflict over forest access. The uprising was the 
culmination of a six-year movement by shifting cultivators in the hulu (upriver) sections 
of the Terengganu River system.^ These cultivators and their Islamist leadership refused 
to cooperate with new land and forest regulations which denied them forest access. The 
new regulations were implemented by the colonial government—a hybrid structure 
composed of British administrators and the Terengganu Malay elite—and administered 
by a local staff of forest guards, police and local officials.
The uprising’s brevity and local concentration exceeded both its fleeting, 
momentary nature, its origin in a resource conflict, and its particular concentration in 
one river system in a single Malay state. It displayed a universalising reach, invoking a 
global community—the Muslim umat (community of believers)3—in whose name it 
made its political claims. The uprising generalised a small resource claim into a political 
challenge to both British colonial rule and Terengganu’s hereditary ruler, Sultan 
Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah (r. 1920-1942).
The Terengganu rebels built an Islamist challenge to state authority around a 
dispute about the use and meaning of forest resources. In doing so, they built a radical 
political and environmental subjectivity, opposed to that which the colonial government
1 Untitled newspaper clipping, 15 June 1928, London Times Intelligence File— Siam, Malaya, Indochina, 
Vol. 4. Also appended to C0717/6L52432: ‘Disturbances in Terengganu’.
2 The term hulu, or ulu, is used to refer to areas upriver from the coast, and is the opposite of hilir, 
downriver. ‘The hulu', as used in this thesis, refers loosely to the upriver reaches of the Terengganu and 
its tributaries, unless particular tributaries are specified.
3 Umat is a Malay derivation of ummah, an Arabic term for the entire community of Muslim believers, 
regardless of their ethnic, regional or national origin.
was imposing on them. They brought Islamic metaphors of pious land management, 
government, subjecthood and sovereignty into the centre of their vision for their own 
political destiny. In Islam, a source of authority external to the claims of the colonial 
state and its environmental management techniques, the Terengganu rebels found an 
alternative source of identity, community and legitimation.
The Terengganu rebels, completely self-consciously, asserted themselves both 
as shifting cultivators entitled to forest access, and as members of a much larger 
struggle—that of Islam against the biggest imperialist power on earth. Their symbols 
reflected their audacious move. On 21 May, a group of rebels occupied a police station 
in Kuala Berang, at the confluence of the Terengganu, Tersat and Berang rivers in the 
Terengganu hinterland. As they did so, they invoked for themselves the power of the 
Ottoman Caliphate itself, by raising its red flag on the adjacent riverbank. The Caliphate 
may have recently been abolished, but this did not prevent the Terengganu rebels from 
deploying its global symbology. Their symbolic appropriation of the greatest Muslim 
power they had known demonstrated their claim to political agency and power.
Their actions wove a local claim for forest access with a soaring—universal— 
narrative. They also proposed an alternative system of rule in Terengganu which would 
both remove the British and depose the Sultan. Their narrative of power, agency, 
resistance and revolt, within which they placed themselves, had been honed through 
debates that emerged in mosques and prayer halls. Carried in person and by letter, these 
debates raged in villages up and down the Terengganu River system. Opponents of the 
government’s land and forest regulations focused on their illegality in syariah (Islamic 
law). They also denounced any cooperation with a government of unbelievers at all. By 
May 1928, the movement was prepared to denounce all government officials, even 
those who were both Malay and Muslim like the rebels, as kafir (unbelievers).
The uprising’s audacious claims, its ascent into universal homily, and its reach 
beyond its small, bounded territory lasted only for a specific historical moment. After 
all, the movement was produced by a diverse group of people, socially and historically 
embedded, and with cross-cutting interests and agendas. All protagonists, both for and 
against the uprising, were collectively and severally caught up in a variety of processes
2
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in which Terengganu society was enmeshed. Rebels were competing with each other, 
colonial officials and the royal family for status and authority, and land and forest 
resources. For this reason, even in its moment of unity, the uprising demonstrated 
contradictory intent, clashing calls for change, and much jostling for position.
A political leadership emerged, consisting of an Islamist layer of Hajis and 
mosque functionaries, all also embedded within the forest economy of the Terengganu 
hinterland. It also involved two Islamic scholars of special note—Haji Drahman and 
Sayid Sagaf. Both were scions of a powerful and renowned spiritual genealogy whose 
influence linked the Terengganu hinterland with past Islamic scholars, especially their 
mentor Tokku Paloh, once based in the royal court on the coast. Together these scholars 
also linked Terengganu itself to routes of trade around the Malay Peninsula, the Gulf of 
Siam and the South China Sea. They were also connected further still, to the centre of 
Islamic scholarship in Mecca, and the learned and prosperous Hadhrami Arab diaspora 
which established itself in Southeast Asia.4
These scholars and Islamists were especially skilled in deploying Islam’s 
narrative resources, within which they emplotted the cultivators’ actions and 
grievances—along with their own. Members of this group were respected as teachers 
and spokespeople, both in their own villages and beyond, and together they constructed 
the movement and its aims as specifically Islamic. They narrated the cultivators’ 
grievances, both to the government and to the cultivators themselves, as a struggle to 
defend the umat. Associating themselves with the Ottoman Caliphate, they placed 
Terengganu shifting cultivators on a global map of Muslim responses to colonialism. At 
the same time, however, they remained entangled in local, particular relationships and 
contests. They, like the cultivators, were embroiled in the competition that emerged 
from the titling and demarcation of land in Terengganu. The most prominent among this 
group commanded large tracts of land as well as great spiritual and political authority. 
They also used this store of authority to sometimes mobilise cultivators by less 
ideological means, including through cor\>ee (kerah)—a request for unpaid labour by 
elite landowners to their labour force: the cultivators.
4 The Hadhramaut is located in contemporary Yemen.
3
On the other hand, the cultivators, mainly referred to as rakyat, were not 
simply coerced, incited or duped into attending the Islamists’ uprising. Rakyat and 
Islamists were often the same people. Many o f the Islamists were forest-based shifting 
cultivators, as were their relatives and associates. In addition, many rakyat outside the 
Islamist leadership group also seized whatever opportunity they could to speak for 
themselves. They were angry at being impeded from accessing their customary lands, 
now bounded within state forests or the private concessions of the royal elite. Many 
who complained depended on growing padi on their forest plots for food. They also 
gathered forest products, including from fruit trees which they had raised themselves, 
for household use and trade. Prevented from accessing these non-market sources o f food 
and goods, these rakyat were forced into the cash economy.
Yet not all rakyat were subsistence pr/t/z'-growers, angry due to increased 
poverty. Many, including the Islamists, grew cash crops, using their customary lands to 
raise rubber or coconut for market, either alongside or instead o f rice. These rakyat were 
angered because they were losing market opportunities. All the rakyat, however, were 
affected by the land and forest regulations— which differentiated forested from 
cultivated land, prohibited forest tree-felling, and demanded fixed quit-rent payments. 
In the Islamists who emerged as the movement’s leadership, other rakyat found 
organisers and articulate advocates. They could speak for the movement, intimidate 
government officials, and insert the movement into a larger, global solidarity. In Haji 
Drahman, the movement also gained a scholar capable o f representing arrested rebels in 
court. Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf were also visible, high-profile individuals, behind 
whom others could hide their own participation, reducing the risk of rebellion.
The Terengganu uprising therefore displayed a shifting, ambivalent quality. 
Islam elevated the struggle’s meaning, emplotting it within a global grand narrative of 
sovereign Islam against the colonial onslaught. Rebels did not advance their claims as 
members of a small national or ethnic community. They universalised their objectives, 
organised their struggle as one for the whole umat, producing meanings from it that 
unified their economic, religious and political objectives. At the same time, Islam was 
also strategically deployed by actors to advance their own interests in a local struggle
4
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for particular claims. The rebels, by actively weaving their actions into Islamic 
metaphors, addressed both the universal—rights, justice and Muslim sovereignty; and 
the particular—resources, livelihoods, land and forests. The uprising was therefore 
neither a political and economic struggle for livelihoods and environments, nor a violent 
Islamist expression of religious and cultural difference. It was both these things 
together, because all these concerns were deliberately—if momentarily—brought 
together by the rebels’ actions, and their narration of their own global place.
The Uprising and History
The uprising has been addressed, or at least mentioned, in several histories since the 
1960s, authored by Malaysian and ‘international’ scholars writing in English or Malay. 
These histories exist in three broad categories, notwithstanding the broad range of 
perspectives and methods that they represent. The first category consists of early, 
pioneering work which sought to discover, or recover, aspects of Terengganu’s pre­
colonial and colonial experience for the first time. Relying mostly on colonial accounts, 
this work has treated Terengganu as an individual Malay state and not sought to fit the 
state into national histories. So historians in this category have either recounted 
Terengganu’s pre-colonial political history in broad outline, or selected as their focus 
specific aspects of the state’s colonisation, such as legal reform. Mubin Sheppard, a 
former colonial official in Terengganu, produced the first of these works.  ^ Other 
scholars since—Chan Su Ming, John de Vere Allen and Heather Sutherland—have also 
produced a small number of articles or book chapters.5 6 These histories have all referred 
to the uprising, but not addressed it in any detail.
5 Sheppard, M.C. "A Short History of Trengganu." In Papers Relating to Trengganu, edited by Mubin 
Sheppard, 1-74. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1983.
6 Chan Su Ming, "Kelantan and Trengganu, 1909-1939," Journal o f the Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society 38, no. 1 (1965), John de Vere Allen, "The Ancien Regime in Trengganu, 1909-1919," 
Journal o f the Malaysian Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society 41, no. 1 (1968), Heather Sutherland, "The 
Taming of the Trengganu Elite," in Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches through Social Histoty, ed. 
Ruth T. McVey (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1978), Heather Sutherland, "The 
Transformation of the Terengganu Legal Order," Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (1980).
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The second and third categories consist of work which has paid more 
significant attention to the uprising itself This work has also made substantial use of the 
Terengganu state archive, mostly handwritten in the Malay language in Jawi (modified 
Arabic) script. The second category—consisting of only one monograph and one PhD 
thesis—has sought to connect Terengganu’s local experience of colonisation to much 
larger, global developments. These developments are conceived in terms of epochal 
‘transitions’ created by outside forces which reached Terengganu with the British. The 
first example was authored by Shaharil Talib, based on his Monash University PhD 
thesis, and published in 1984. 7 Shaharil has described Terengganu’s colonial 
incorporation within a broader narrative of capitalist penetration in Terengganu’s 
hinterland, and the state’s subsequent incorporation into the world system. The uprising, 
then, was the rakyaf s response to being refashioned as a class of landless peasants, 
exposed to the cruelties of the world market. Shaharil, influenced by dependency theory 
and a particularly economistic Marxism, has explicitly constructed the rakyat as 
subsistence cultivators, aggrieved by capitalist transformation and the actions of 
Terengganu’s comprador ruling class.
More recently in 2001, Shahridan Faiez bin Mohideen Abdul Kader has
o
addressed Terengganu’s experience in his Cambridge University PhD thesis. Like 
Shaharil’s work, this thesis treats Terengganu as a discrete Malay state brought into a 
global transition through colonial contact, this time to ‘modernity’ rather than 
‘capitalism’. Yet Shahridan, unlike Shaharil, has emphasised the rakyafs diverse 
economic activity, albeit while still characterising them as Malay peasants. Yet 
Shahridan also argues that even before the British arrived, the rakyat were integrally 
involved in the forest product trade between the hinterland and the coast—and therefore 
between Terengganu and the world market. Shahridan has therefore recognised that the 
rakyat were not simply impoverished subsistence cultivators.
7 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image: The Trengganu Experience 1881-1941 (Singapore, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984).
s Shahridan Faiez bin Mohideen Abdul Kader, "Mapping Modernities in Trengganu: Nature, Islam and 
the Colonial State, 1850-1930" (PhD, Cambridge University, 2001).
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The third category of work has explored Terengganu’s story in terms of its 
proto-national or national significance. Authored in Malay, this work has remapped 
Terengganu, changing it from a small state facing global transformation on its own into 
a state of Malaya/Malaysia experiencing a national awakening. This work was largely 
pursued as part of a local history push in the seventies and eighties, evidently designed 
as a corrective to the geographically-limited national histories of the past. These past 
histories had typically characterised ‘politics’ as national politics, and so generally 
focused on telling the story of the Malay nationalist movement. Yet this movement was 
largely concentrated in the Straits Settlements, Johor and Selangor. 9 States like 
Terengganu, lacking nationalist organisations or publications until much later, had 
always existed on the sidelines. Yet the new history incorporated the Terengganu 
uprising into a new national narrative, by characterising it as political, and a 
‘nationalist’ movement in its own right. These histories have also made extensive use of 
interviews with descendants of rebels or royal figures, albeit sometimes with tenuous 
links to the action.
Even as a corrective, this local drive was in effect a reassertion of the primacy 
of nation and nationalism as the authorised framework for histories of the peninsular 
Malay states. By casting the uprising as a previously-unrecognised nationalist 
movement, this group of historians has reduced Terengganu’s history to the history of 
the Terengganu branch of the Malaysian nation. Indeed, the earliest published short 
monograph in this category was authored by Timah Hamzah, a committee member of 
the Malaysian History Association—Terengganu Branch.10 Timah focused solely on the 
uprising and Haji Drahman’s leadership of it. Other historians in this category include 
Misbaha, who attempted a nationalist recovery of Terengganu’s obscure past, believed 
to be lost because o f ‘outsiders who entered Terengganu’.* 11 Misbaha (an acronym for
l) For example, refer to William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1967).
1(1 Timah Hamzah, Pemberontakan Tani 1928 Di Trengganu: Satu Kajian Ketokohan Dan Kepimpinan 
Haji Abdul Rahman Limhong, Siri Kajian Sejarah Setempat (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 
& Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1981).
11 Misbaha, Terengganu Dari Bentuk Sejarah Hingga Tahun 1918 (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 
1978), 31.
7
Haji Muhammad Salleh bin Haji Awang), a Terengganu religious school teacher and 
religious affairs inspector, wrote the first Malay-language history of the pre-colonial 
state, from its pre-history to 1918. " Another nationalist historian, Haji Buyong Add, 
tried to revive ‘traditional’ courtly historiographical practice, organising his work not as
1 T
a narrative, but as short accounts of the reigns of individual Sultans. The Universiti 
Malaya History Department also played a major role in creating this nationalist local 
history model, supervising a cluster of Honours and Masters theses on Terengganu. 14
Of the cohort of students involved, one emerged as most prominent—Abdullah 
Zakaria Ghazali, who completed his Masters thesis on Terengganu in 1976. Zakaria has 
explicitly characterised the uprising as an expression of ‘traditional’ Malay customary 
values, portrayed as underpinning Malay nationalism. Zakaria, in his 1996 and 2000 
monographs on Terengganu,15 has argued that Terengganu society in the 1920s was 
organised around one main political cleavage: united Malay natives (pribumi) and 
European colonisers (penjajah) u1 For Zakaria, pribumi share a set of distinctly Malay 
customary (adat) values, embedded in their experience as poor, economically naive 
cultivators. They could not reconcile these values with the changes introduced by 
penjajah, resulting in conflict. Such characterisations of Malays as non-market peasants 
have been essential to Malay nationalism, from its inception to the present. 17 
Contemporary exhortations to Malays to unite politically to advance their ‘special 
rights’, such as those made by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), rely
12 Ibid.
13 Haji Buyong Adil, Sejarah Trengganu (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1982).
14 Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, "Kekacauan Dan Kebangkitan Trengganu 1921-1928" (MA Thesis, 
Universiti Malaya, 1976), Alias bin Mat, "Peranan Tok Ku Paloh Dalam Perkembangan Islam Di 
Terengganu" (Honours Thesis, Universiti Malaya, 1992), Mohamed bin Endut, "1928: Penderhakaan Di 
Trengganu" (Honours Thesis, Universiti Malaya, 1970).
15 Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, Kebangkitan Terengganu: Gerakan Menentang British 1922-1928 
(Kuala Terengganu: Jawatankuasa Koleksi Terengganu, Perbadanan Perpustakaan Awam Terengganu, 
2000), Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, Terengganu: Tokoh, Pentadbiran Dan Perjuangan (Kuala Lumpur: 
Persatuan Muzium Malaysia, 1996).
16 This cleavage is most clearly established in Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, "Pribumi Dan Penjajah: 
Gerakan Tentangan Di Malaysia," Malaysia dari Segi Sejarah 23 (1995).
17 Refer to Joel S Kahn, Other Malays: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Malay World 
(Singapore; Copenhagen: Asian Studies Association of Australia; Singapore University Press; NIAS 
Press, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2006), Introduction.
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on ideas of Malay adat. They also construct Malays as traditionally non-market people 
who continue to require economic uplift.
Across the final two categories of scholarship, works by Shaharil, Shahridan 
and Zakaria constitute the only literature that attempts to deal with the uprising in any 
detail. While Shaharil and Shahridan each devote only a chapter to the uprising itself, 
these three authors’ studies together form the only existing debate on its political 
character. The differences in these authors’ positions hinge on how the rakyat is 
characterised, and, based on these characterisations, what the uprising could have 
meant. So Shaharil and Zakaria, despite their differences, both portray the rakyat as 
subsistence-oriented, poor and isolated. Yet their arguments are diametrically opposed 
in one crucial way—by describing how the Terengganu elite participated in capitalist 
transformation, Shaharil shows that Malays there were not naturally united by race or 
adat. Shahridan, whose rakyat is engaged in diverse economic activity, also undermines 
this tenet of the Zakaria nationalist narrative.
Shahridan does not use the language of racial or national entitlement. He does, 
however, make a different sort of argument which subtly bolsters Malay nationalism. 
His portrayal locates the rakyat's diverse economic practices in a realm of meaning 
regulated by adat, which he constructs as a syncretic blend of Islamic and pre-Islamic 
beliefs. Guided by adat, the pre-colonial rakyat responsibly managed their sophisticated 
resource use regime, despite their distance from the state’s purview, which did not 
extend to regulating resource use. This characterisation brings the Terengganu rakyat 
out of the harder nationalism espoused by Zakaria, and into line with a softer, 
internationally accepted, discourse of indigeneity. This discourse characterises peoples, 
claiming indigeneity in a particular territory, as guardians of that area’s environmental 
resources. Shahridan, making this claim on the Terengganu rakyat's behalf, therefore 
asserts a claim based on indigeneity just as much as Zakaria.
18 See Jamie Seth Davidson and David Henley, The Revival o f Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The 
Deployment o f Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism, Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series; 14. 
(Abingdon, Oxon; N.Y.: Routledge, 2007), Tim Forsyth and Andrew Walker, Forest Guardians, Forest 
Destroyers: The Politics o f Environmental Knowledge in Northern Thailand, Culture, Place, and Nature.
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Zakaria’s argument has won the day in Malaysia. His view is reflected in the 
dioramas in the National History Museum, and in the high school curriculum. For 
example, one history textbook for Form Three students argues that the Terengganu 
uprising inspired later Malay nationalists to ‘restore the sovereignty of the [national] 
people’ (mengembalikan kedaulatan bangsa).19 This construction of rebels as Malay 
nationalists is also evoked by Arifin Ngah’s racially-charged Islamist-nationalist novel 
for adolescents, Tangisan Bangsaku (Tears o f my People), which portrays the conflict as 
one between poor, pious and traditional rakyat and the orang putih (white people). Any 
possibility of an alternative Malay position, including that of elite Malays or staff in the 
colonial government, is reduced to their own bad faith. Here, Malays on the government 
side are portrayed as willing to set aside their religiosity to accept British inducements 
designed to divide Malays. Tangisan Bangsaku was awarded a prize for literature in 
2004 by PELITA (Terengganu Writers’ Association) and GAPENA (Federation of 
Malay Writers’ Associations). Its portrayal of the uprising emphasises the rebels’ 
Islamic identity to a greater extent than the existing high school curriculum.
Differences in influence aside, all three authors, Shaharil, Shahridan and 
Zakaria, deploy the uprising as evidence of a linear process—from feudalism to 
capitalism, tradition to modernity, or pre-national to national Malay consciousness. The 
three studies therefore share a teleological method which can only understand the 
uprising as one episode in a larger, pre-determined journey. In this vein, Shaharil has 
even referred to the uprising as the ‘dying wail’ of the peasantry. ~ There has been no 
room for competition between rebels, ambivalent participation in the uprising, or for 
recognising rebels’ agency in constructing their own, non-national but anti-colonial, 
subjectivity. In all this work, the end—modernity, capitalism or nationhood—has been 
pre-determined. The uprising has therefore had its importance underestimated even by
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, 
Development and the Practice o f Politics (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2007).
19 See Johari Mohamad, Smart PMR Sejarah (Petaling Jaya: Preston Corporation, 2004), Chp. 18.
2(1 Arifin Ngah, Tangisan Bangsaku (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publishing, 2004), 35.
21 Shaharil Talib, After Its Chvn Image, 145.
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those who have attempted to recover its story. By constraining the uprising within 
national or other transition frameworks, historians have elided the rebels’ own politics.
Islamism and the Environment
What were the rebels’ politics, and to what extent did they reflect their agency as 
subjects? This question is best posed with reference to how the rebels fused their 
environmental claims with a radical Islamist politics. How could shifting cultivators’ 
grievances over land and forest access become generalised into a political challenge to 
the colonial government? How did a conflict located in forests around one river system 
escalate into a universalist Holy War for the wnat against the kafir? No transition 
history of the uprising has reflected on how such audacious claims could have emerged, 
relying instead on assumptions about rebels’ politics. If ‘politics’ is national politics, 
then the Terengganu hinterland was a political backwater, and only local adat could 
have informed the rebels’ nationalism. Alternatively, as Terengganu was even more 
distant from the global centres driving transitions to capitalism or modernity, the 
rakyafs grievances must have reflected their difficulty in adapting.
Yet in their own words and actions, Terengganu’s rebels were not concerned 
with these transitions and did not position themselves in terms of nationalism, 
modernity or capitalism. Throughout the 1920s, the rebels’ political expectations were 
not at all aligned with the map of an emerging Malayan geo-body, or with global maps 
of modernity or capitalism. The Terengganu rebels were connected to routes of religious 
and political exchange which connected the hulu to the coast, to Johor and Patani, and 
to Mecca. Imaginatively, they also connected themselves to the Ottoman Caliphate, 
which they portrayed as the umaf s political centre, a connection they evoked by raising 
the Ottoman flag as their symbol. By speaking in the name of the umat, they politically 
identified themselves with it as their imagined community. By locating themselves 
politically in this way, Terengganu’s rebels could appeal to a much larger solidarity than 
that afforded by nationalism or adat.
Transition histories have emphasised the Terengganu rakyaf s local character, 
presenting it as reluctantly drawn into global processes to which it lacked exposure.
1 1
Indeed, the rakyat was being gradually immobilised and peasantised by colonial land 
and forest regulations. Yet membership of the umat did not correspond to a stable 
territorial location.““ In fact, given the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate some years 
before the uprising, the umat did not possess a stable territorial referent at all. Through 
identifying with the umat, however, the rebels could express their political agency and 
audacity, and to answer how the rebels’ claims could have emerged, they must be 
located politically as they located themselves. Transition historians have noted that 
Islam was a major factor in the uprising’s politics,“ but transition historiography is not 
alert to the rebels’ Islamic spatial awareness.
Identification with the umat was created, reproduced and reinforced in 
Terengganu by Islamic scholars and Islamists possessed of significant narrative 
resources. These resources were gained through their mobility and experience in the 
Muslim world beyond Terengganu. Haji Drahman, for example, was extremely mobile, 
embodying the travel and exchange that enabled him to identify with a wider umat. The 
Haji also possessed sufficient religious authority to narrate that identification 
convincingly to others. The other Islamists, shifting cultivators like the rest of the 
rakyat, also moved, this time around the hulu's villages, rivers and forests. Further, 
many had migrated to Terengganu from other areas to pursue economic opportunity. 
They were not subsistence-oriented but attuned with global rubber markets. Some were 
Hajis themselves, having travelled to Mecca and returned to villages in the hulu. 
Through the narrative agency of these rebel leaders, the rakyat's grievances were 
translated into an Islamic discourse of pious land management and livelihood. These 
Islamists defended shifting cultivation not as an aclat practice, but an Islamic one. In this 
way, rakyat from the Terengganu River and its tributaries were narrated into the global 
Muslim community, and colonisers and Malay collaborators were constructed as its 
kafir enemies.
22 Refer to Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in 
Latin America (Routledge, 1996), Chp. 1.
22 See Shahridan Faiez bin Mohideen Abdul Kader, "Mapping Modernities in Trengganu", Chp. 5.
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The teachings of these scholars and Islamists urged resistance to kafir land and 
forest regulations. In the years before the uprising, these mobile leaders systematically 
delivered their teachings to mosque congregations and community gatherings in the 
hula. With their urging, a unified and combative rebel identity as Islamist political and 
environmental subjects was briefly constructed. Assertions of customary entitlement 
were expressed in Islamic terms, and the vocabulary of the rakyaf s resource claims 
shifted out of the language of adat into an Islamic discourse of the correct use of God’s 
resources. The uprising was therefore also a radical challenge to adat-based 
understandings of the rakyaf s own practices, Islamising the claims of both subsistence 
and market-oriented cultivators. This Islamisation remained uneven, however, and even 
Islamists continued to use customary modes of authority, such as corvee, to build the 
movement’s numbers.
In the Terengganu uprising, political and environmental visions and 
subjectivities radically coalesced within a language of Islamic metaphor—an Islamist 
environmental subjectivity had been created. Its creation revealed, in concentrated form, 
the cross-cutting social and political processes at work in Terengganu which enabled its 
articulation. These included processes unleashed by the colonial encounter, including 
intense elite competition for land and forests, the colonial government’s claim to be 
entitled to manage forest resources, and accompanying colonial moves to peasantise the 
rakyat by discouraging shifting cultivation. Yet Terengganu’s rakyat had not yet learned 
to see themselves as peasants. Further, these processes, ‘internal’ to Terengganu, were 
embedded within a larger one, in which Terengganu was bounded and included in an 
emerging Malaya. This was the formation of the Siam-Malaya border, resulting from 
competition between Britain and Siam for territorial domination of the Malay Peninsula. 
Yet Terengganu’s Islamists continued to identify with the umat, not Malaya, and looked 
to Mecca and Istanbul as lodestars of identity. Cultivators’ anger with colonial land and 
forest regulations were drawn into their narratives of the umat versus the kafir.
Uncovering this political ferment in Terengganu has required historiographical 
methods which do not seek to emplot the uprising within a transition narrative. Rather, 
the rebels’ narrative, into which they emplotted their own struggle, has been placed at
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the centre of this history. Colonial files in English and Malay, relating directly to the 
uprising and the movement which produced it, have formed the main archive for this 
narrative. The words the rebels uttered have been highlighted here in their own narrative 
context for the first time. Further, the archival material which reveals the actions and 
decisions the rebels took has been read against the grain to provide a window through 
which to observe the world of the rakyat hulu. Their complicated social environment, 
and the political ferment which characterised it, is also highlighted. Lifting the uprising 
out of transition narratives has also allowed for a history sensitive to the rebels’ location 
at the ‘margins of the nation’,24 and for the connections leading outward from the 
uprising, into larger webs of solidarity and identity, to be revealed.
The Uprising and its Narrative
The Terengganu uprising’s character—both intensely local and audaciously global— 
was produced by this cross-cutting set of social and political changes. Chapter One of 
this history will explore the rebels’ world, and locate their lives and livelihoods within 
their overlapping connections to the region and the world. The chapter will first narrate 
the events of 21 May, drawing from statements made by officials and rebels themselves, 
then introduce the British land and forest regulations which so angered the rakyat. It 
will then seek to connect the individuals involved to the local forest economy in which 
they gained their livelihoods, and demonstrate its connection with the world market for 
rubber. It will demonstrate the Terengganu Islamists’ interest in rubber.
The chapter will also trace the provenance of the rakyat's claim to hulu land in 
the origin of the Terengganu Sultanate, itself the product of wider regional contests. It 
will also situate British interest in Terengganu within a contest between Britain and 
Siam for control of the Malay Peninsula. It will then locate the Islamist argument
24 Thongchai Winichakul, "Writing at the Interstices: Southeast Asian Historians and Postnational 
Histories in Southeast Asia," in New Terrains in Southeast Asian History, ed. Abu Talib Ahmad and Tan 
Liok Ee (Athens, Ohio & Singapore: Centre for International Studies, Ohio University & Singapore 
University Press, 2003), 12.
2:1 See Tony Ballantyne, "Rereading the Archive and Opening up the Nation-State: Colonial Knowledge in 
South Asia (and Beyond)," in After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, ed. 
Antoinette Burton (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2003).
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against both adat and British forest management within the turn to Islamic scripturalism 
by Mecca-returned scholars, as exemplified by Tokku Paloh and Haji Drahman. Finally 
the chapter will show that British actions, too, were connected with wider global 
concerns, including the development of a specifically colonial mode of forest 
management.
Chapter Two will first explore the competition for the hulu at the elite level, 
between Terengganu’s royal family and British officials, before and after the imposition 
of a British Adviser in 1919. It will demonstrate that as the Sultan began to understand 
that a colonial takeover was looming, he began to consolidate land under the control of 
his family and associates. The chapter will then introduce the dynamic of competition 
from 1919 onwards, between British officials on the one hand, and Sultan and his 
advisers on the other. It will show how this elite-level competition, expressed as a 
contest for the power to territorialise the hinterland and subject it to government, began 
to push rakyat off their customary lands. The chapter will also demonstrate how, as 
shifting cultivation became increasingly difficult, the rakyat themselves gradually 
joined the contest for the hulu. To do so, the chapter will draw on a less economistic, 
‘cultural politics’ mode of political ecology“ and methodological discussions of 
‘observing the economy’27 and ‘reading against the grain’.28 It will also demonstrate the 
extent to which rakyat expressed their grievances in their own terms, and the extent to 
which these grievances became translated into a grammar of Islamic metaphor by 
scholars and Islamists.
Chapter Three will step back from Terengganu in both scale and time frame, to 
situate the contest tor the hulu within a larger contest for peninsular power. The chapter 
will show how this contest, waged between Britain and Siam from 1786, created a logic 
of bordering and bounding territory to delimit each power’s claims and jurisdictional 
reach. It will also demonstrate how Terengganu became a bargaining chip in this
26 Amita Baviskar, "Introduction," in Contested Grounds: Essays on Nature, Culture, and Power, ed. 
Amita Baviskar (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008).
27 C.A. Gregory and J.C. Altman, Observing the Economy (London; New York: Routledge, 1989).
Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects o f Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1983).
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contest, and found its own territory bounded, bordered, and defined negatively as the 
only non-British space south of the Siam-Malaya border until an Adviser was imposed 
in 1919. The chapter will also contrast this process of splitting, bordering and bounding 
with the border-crossing mobility of Islamic scholars and rebels, including from Patani 
and Pahang, who sought refuge in Terengganu because of its continued independence. 
The chapter will consider the mismatch between the scholars’ experience of study and 
pilgrimage in Mecca, and the political imaginations enabled by them, with the regulated 
zones created by bounding on the peninsula. It will also address these scholars’ role in 
attacking Malay adat as part of their project of urging Malay Muslims to join a larger 
Muslim umat, united by religious values stripped of cultural accretions.
Both chapters, Two and Three, will reflect on how Terengganu people did not 
identify politically with the new, bounded communities created around them. The work 
of mobilising the umat as the primary political community, and the practice of takfir, or 
describing opponents as kafir even if they were Muslim, gave political license to 
challenging the colonial government over land and forest access. Both chapters 
therefore explore how relationships between people and resources were being 
transformed by the translation of adat practices into Islamic terms. Together, then, 
Chapters Two and Three set out the spatial techniques of govemmentality, which 
Gregory has described as the ‘gaze, grids and architectures’,“ established by the 
colonial government. Colonial techniques of territorialisation established structured 
spaces in which land and forests could be more effectively ordered, controlled and 
managed. They also set out the makings of a political response specific to the 
Terengganu River system and its villages, which drew shifting cultivators into translocal 
networks of Islamic revivalism.
Chapter Four continues one theme found in the previous two, in that it
t  r v
addresses the connections between ‘power, knowledge and spatiality’. Yet it addresses 
these in another way, this time by foregrounding the alternative conceptualisation of 
place, territory and identity that the rebels themselves created. This chapter shows how
29 Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Oxford: 1994), 28.
30 Ibid., 33.
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the Islamic networks and language around which the rakyaTs political lives were 
organised allowed them to live, imaginatively, in a space other than bordered and 
bounded Terengganu. This alternative political space was the Islamic world, symbolised 
by the rebels’ use of the Ottoman flag, which they flew over the Kuala Berang 
government buildings when they occupied them. In this action, the rebels also drew on 
an alternative sense of community, the umat, an alternative to the Terengganu polity 
which had been bounded and incorporated into Malaya. In holding up the Turkish 
caliphate as their symbol, rebels expressed their desire for a political centre, all the more 
important imaginatively because of the abolition of the Caliphate on earth, and a larger 
cause to which to hitch their defence of shifting cultivation.
Chapter Five again represents a shift in scale, first returning to a close view of 
Kuala Berang on the day of the uprising. It elaborates how knowledge about the 
uprising was created, transmitted and manipulated by rebels and British officials. The 
chapter describes the information networks created by officials in Kuala Terengganu, 
and the penghulu, District Officers, informers and spies who worked within it. It also 
considers the rebels’ own use of this information network, and rebels’ own possible 
inability to reconcile differences in the movement. It also demonstrates that from the 
moment the uprising took place, and also in its aftermath, rebels displayed ambivalences 
of purpose, grudges against each other, and a desire to save themselves from 
imprisonment. After climbing to the heights of political audacity by speaking in the 
name of the umat under the Ottoman flag, rebels returned to their local concerns. The 
initiative in narrating and emplotting the uprising was then taken by the British, who 
used the flag, in particular, to tell a radically different story of the Terengganu uprising.
Throughout this history, it must be remembered that the religious and political 
dimensions of the rakyaf s struggle gave the uprising its sense of global reach. This is 
therefore a history of Islamism and Islamic scholarship in Southeast Asia. Unlike most 
such histories, however, this work is not primarily focused on Islamic scholars, their 
networks and their texts. It is most certainly not focused on terror. This narrative 
discusses scholars, networks, texts and violence in order to demonstrate their influence 
on mass politics, mobilisation and the genuinely political nature of ‘agrarian’
17
experience. It also seeks to show how scholars and Islamists were connected not only to 
each other across the globe, but also to ordinary cultivators at home, whose own politics 
incorporated the global perspectives they brought. This history is therefore focused on 
the long- and short-term political dynamics of building and mobilising a Holy War.
Further, in addition to its discussion of Islamic mobility and the global politics 
of the Caliphate, this narrative is also a history' of a local environmental struggle over 
Terengganu’s forests. It attempts to foreground the rakyafs own grievances; rooted in 
their ideas about their livelihoods, their customary land, and their lives lived along the 
Terengganu River and its tributaries. It also includes, as much as possible, their words, 
names and whatever glimpses are available of their own, complicated motivations. This 
history also discusses ideas of environmental management in Malaya and sometimes 
further afield in the British Empire. Yet this discussion does not seek to highlight the 
careers of British officials and the history of their environmental thinking; rather, it uses 
these discussions to contextualise the changes taking place in Terengganu.
The Terengganu uprising was not a resource clash deflected into a religious 
conflict—it was not an environmental struggle which instrumentalised religiosity and 
religious identity. It was a religious struggle; in the sense that the rebels’ demands to use 
resources on their own terms existed within an Islamic discourse of umat, sovereignty 
and rights. It was also an environmental struggle; in the sense that the rebels’ claim to 
Muslim sovereignty sprang from a conflict over forest access, and claims to 
membership of the umat emerged as a means by which to defend shifting cultivation. In 
short, a claim to represent the umat against the kafir was bound up with the politics of a 
local forest claim. The political and environmental subjectivities represented by the 
uprising were intertwined, and driven by an Islamist vision for a new political future. 
The uprising’s very claim to local environmental access was built on a claim to identify 
with a global umat. The idea of the forest rebel as a representative of the umat was 
narrated repeatedly, and rebel unity forged among ambivalent and compromised actors. 
All were involved in complex negotiations with each other, from their various, 
overlapping positions within patterns of Malay mobility, colonial territorialisation, and 
religious and political exchange. The imagining and production of this sense of umat
18
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solidarity, within these social, territorial, and political processes, is the main subject of 
this history.
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Chapter One— Antecedents: Terengganu and its World
Stop, all o f you! Do not come forward if  you want to save your lives! Our party 
[has come] from the government to assuage your desires. It is desired that you 
stop first and think, and whatever you voice will be answered. We together, with 
the royal command of the most illustrious Sultan Sulaiman Badrul A lam Svah, 
[are here to] deliver you; restrain you from bringing treason upon his head. We 
all together are Muslims. Do not come forward any more if you want this to end 
well. I f  you proceed, assuredly the order to shoot will be given, and your group
will be stopped from committing treason against him.
Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja, Dato’ Panglima Dalam and Dato’ Pahlawan, three royal officials 
from the Terengganu Sultan’s court, confronting the crowd rushing toward them at 
Kuala Telemong on 22 May 1928.31
Sabilillah!
At around noon on 21 May 1928, “ a large crowd of men, several hundred strong, 
arrived at a field called Padang Kacung, near the police station in Kuala Telemong. 
They arrived by river— on rafts and boats, and on foot along the banks. Kuala Telemong 
was a small town and regional administrative centre in the hinterland o f Terengganu, 
one o f the five so-called Unfederated Malay States of British Malaya. The men were 
well-armed, carrying as weapons the various tools they used daily as forest-based 
shifting cultivators, such as golok.33 Some carried weapons, such as spears and keris,34
31 Statement by Dato’ Panglima Dalam, Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja and Dato’ Pahlawan, 3 Zulhijjah 1346 [23 
May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346: ‘Report Forest Guard berkenaan orang-orang hendak melawan kerajaan 
di Terengganu’.
Berhentilah kamu sekalian! Jangan mara ke hadapan kalau kamu-kamu sekalian berkehendak selamat 
dirinya kamu! Ialah saya sekalian pihak mengamankan dari kerajaan apa-apa kehendak kamu.
Hendaklah kamu berhenti dahulu berkira, dan apa-apa suara kamu hendaklah memberijawab. Ialah 
saya sekalian dengan titah perintah Yang Maha Mulia Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alah Syah pada 
menyelamatkan, menahankan kamu daripada menderhakakan kepalanya. Ialah kita-kita ini semuanya 
orang Islam. Jangan kamu ke hadapan lagi kalau kamu hendak baik. Kalau kamu ke hadapan juga 
nescaya didapati hukum tembak dihentikan kamu kumpulan derhaka kepadanya.
32 For consistency, all date conversions have relied on ‘Takwim’, a computer application for converting 
Malay and Islamic dates, courtesy of Dr. Ian Proudfoot at The Australian National University.
33 A golok is a heavy chopper with a curved blade, sometimes as long as a machete but often shorter.
34 A keris is a kind of short, engraved and often heavily stylised Malay short sword. Invested with 
mystical powers, the keris has been linked both with Muslim and pre- or non-Muslim Malay spiritual 
practices. Today it also serves as a symbol for Malay nationalism. See Farish A Noor, Pity the Poor Keris: 
How a Universal Symbol Became a Tool for Racial Politics (2006 [accessed 30 March 2008]); available 
from http://www.othermalaysia.org/content/view/56/65/.
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Still others also carried rifles which they had seized from the police station in Kuala 
Berang, an administrative centre further upriver. Up to a thousand men had occupied the 
Kuala Berang complex o f government buildings at around two that morning, raising 
their red flag— the Ottoman flag—on the nearby river bank. Wan Mahmud, the Kuala 
Berang District Officer, had stood in the dark some distance away with a few 
policemen, forest guards and clerks, all terrified and sure they could hear gunshots. 
After a couple o f hours, these government men fled downriver in a motorboat towards 
the coastal capital, Kuala Terengganu, saying to each other, ‘There are too many o f 
them!’ and ‘They want to kill us! ’35
Part o f the crowd that arrived at Padang Kacung had begun their journey that 
morning, fresh from this victory in Kuala Berang, and led by a man called Abu Bakar, 
from Kampung Ceting. They had first stopped in a village outside Kuala Telemong, at 
the house o f Haji Karia, another man known to the police. Before proceeding, they had 
met similarly-armed reinforcements waiting there. After leaving Haji Karia’s house, 
they arrived in Kuala Telemong early—too early to combine with another group which 
was also on its way. These men were rebels against the colonial government, and they 
had been marching on the Kuala Telemong police station and government complex 
when they were stopped by a line of police and government officials on Padang 
Kacung. The police were well prepared, having arrived there at ten that morning. There 
they had encountered a man called Tahir, friendly to the government, and asked him to 
walk ahead to see how far away the rebels were. He saw the crowd near a Chinese 
rubber kebun,36 including several men he later identified to the police. He also helped
T 7the police clear the field o f weeds and evacuate people from nearby houses.
35 Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 21 Zulhijjah 1346 [10 June 1928], SUK T 1432/1346: 
‘Berkenaan dengan hal derhaka: kenyataan Tuan Dalam bin Syed Ahmad.’
36 A kebun is an agricultural plot, garden or crop estate.
37 Statement by Tahir bin Sulaiman, 25 June 1928, H.W. Thomson, ‘Report on the Recent Disturbances in 
Trengganu’ [Thomson Report], 30 June 1928, p. 44, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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The crowd was chanting loudly, performing a ratib, a group litany, Tike the 
sound o f waves crashing’.3* Officials could only vaguely make it out— it sounded like 
‘d a ’u, d a ’u \  or ‘b e ’d a u 9 Subsequently, the Muslim affirmation o f faith, La ilaha il 
Allah, was plainly heard, 40 and some were shouting Sabilillah!— declaring a Holy 
War.41 All the while, people kept arriving from the direction of the Chinese kebun, led 
by one Mat Zin,42 whom Tahir, the informer, disliked. Police and government officials, 
led by Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja, a loyal member o f the Sultan’s entourage, called out to 
the crowd five or six times to put down their weapons and talk to them instead.4. When 
they did not do so, the police appealed to their identity as fellow Muslims, and one of 
them called out, ‘We are all Muslims!’ Tahir, not to be outdone, also joined in, leaping 
about with his knife drawn .44 A man in the crowd called Mahmud, dressed in white 
robes and turban, waving a red flag45 and armed with a pedang46 and a keris, ordered the 
crowd to continue their march and pay no heed to the officers’ remonstrations. 
Mahmud, who was Mat Zin’s assistant, 47 urged them to kill the infidel Sergeant 
Drahman from Kuala Berang, whom he had singled out for threats from among the
48 Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad. 21 Zulhijjah 1346 [10 June 1928], SUK T 1432/1346.
Dato’ Panglima Dalam identified the phrase as abda’u, an Arabic term which starts a didactic verse 
which Snouck Hurgronje noted was popular with Malay pupils at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Statement by Dato’ Panglima Dalam, 25 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 41, C 0 7 17/61:52432. See also 
C.V. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, trans. A.W.S. O'Sullivan, vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1899), 188- 
89.
40 ‘There is no God but God’. The second part of this affirmation is ‘And Muhammad is his messenger.’
Statement by Dato’ Pahlawan, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 73, C 0 7 17/61:52432; Statement by 
Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 10 June 1928, SUK T 1432/1346; Statement by Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja, 27 
June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 70, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
41 Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 10 June 1928, SUK T 1432/1346.
Sabilillah, or more fully, jihad fi sabilillah, is an Arabic term for struggle ‘in the way of God’. In Malay, 
armed jihad  is also commonly referred to as perang sabil, a colloquialism for ‘Holy War’. For more 
details, see C.E. Bosworth and Doris Behrens-Abuseif, "Sabil," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Second 
Edition, ed. P. Bearman, et al. (Leiden: Brill Online, 2008).
42 Report by Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja, Dato’ Dalam and Dato’ Pahlawan, n.d., SUK T 1295/1346.
44 Report by Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja, Dato’ Dalam and Dato’ Pahlawan, n.d., SUK T 1295/1346.
44 Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 21 Zulhijjah 1346 [10 June 1928], SUK T 1432/1346.
48 Statement by Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 70, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
46 A pedang is a long sword with a cross-guard.
47 Statement by Dato’ Panglima Dalam, 25 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 42, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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officials.4S Another man, Tok Janggut,44 appeared with an offsider carrying a yellow 
paper umbrella over his head, ‘like a raja’ .50
The crowd continued its advance. Sergeant Drahman yelled, requesting orders 
through the commotion. Eventually Dato’ Lela called the order to fire. The first round 
o f bullets did not stop the crowd. Someone in the crowd shot back.M The police kept 
firing, killing eleven, wounding one in the leg, and causing the rest to flee. Later, an 
examination o f the dead bodies and the litter left behind on Padang Kacung turned up 
evidence that many o f the rebels were carrying spare clothing and provisions o f food. 
Government officials feared that they would have continued to attack and occupy 
government buildings all the way downriver to Kuala Terengganu if they had not been 
stopped. Tok Janggut was among the dead. “ The injured man was entrusted to the 
government doctor, Mr Morris, to whom he recounted that Mat Zin had threatened to 
kill him if he had not joined the uprising. The police and the Kuala Telemong penghulu, 
the head o f a cluster o f surrounding villages called a mukim, organised for trenches to 
be dug. Then Dato’ Lela prepared the police for a long evening guarding Kuala 
Telemong. That afternoon, gunshots were heard from upriver. The police, however,
4S Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 10 June 1928, SUK T 1432/1346; Statement by Dato’ 
Pahlawan, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report p. 74, C0717/6L52432; Statement by Tungku Abdullah bin 
Tungku Abdulrahman, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 76, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
Yellow umbrellas form part of the royal regalia in many Southeast Asian polities. A century before the 
uprising, the use of any type of umbrella by non-royals was reported to be proscribed by Terengganu 
sumptuary laws. If this remained the case in 1928, carrying this umbrella could have been a subversive 
act of symbolic appropriation. See Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munsyi, "Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah Bin 
Abdul Kadir Munsyi Dari Singapura Sampai Ke Kelantan," in Karya Lengkap Abdullah Bin Abdul Kadir 
Munsyi, ed. Amin Sweeney (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia; Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 
2005), 112.
44 This was not the same Tok Janggut who led the 1915 Kelantan uprising in Pasir Putih. Tok Janggut is a 
common nickname, whose meaning approximates ‘Grandfather Longbeard’. This Terengganu man was 
also known as Lebai Drahman, but Tok Janggut is used here to avoid confusion with Haji Drahman and 
Sargeant Drahman.
50 Statement by Dato’ Pahlawan, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 73, €0717/61:52432; Statement by 
Tungku Abdullah, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 76, C0717/6E52432.
51 Report by Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja, Dato’ Panglima Dalam and Dato’ Pahlawan, n.d., SUK T 1295/1346.
52 Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 21 Zulhijjah 1346 [10 June 1928], SUK T 1432/1346.
53 Mukim are sub-district level administrative divisions, also mosque districts. In 1920s Trengganu, these 
were basically populated minor river valleys, and were generally named after the river concerned. Some 
were named after important villages on rivers.
23
were called back to the capital by the nervous authorities there, and the Kuala Telemong 
police station was locked and abandoned behind the empty trenches. The uprising was 
over.
That evening, officials in Kuala Terengganu took steps to protect other police 
stations between Kuala Telemong and themselves. Over the next few days, they made 
arrangements to guard the palace and patrol the town. On 25 May the Sultan, Sulaiman 
Badrul Alam Syah, issued a public notice, stating that due to the derhaka (treason) 
committed by the rebels against himself and the Terengganu government, he was 
instituting a curfew. No-one, other than government men, could move around Kuala 
Terengganu town between nine at night and five in the morning. The penalty was arrest, 
or in the case o f resistance, shooting on the spot.54 Arrest raids were quickly organised 
by Terengganu police and a contingent of reinforcements from the Federated Malay 
States (FMS). Numbers of rebels or suspected rebels were rounded up and brought to 
Kuala Terengganu for questioning by a committee o f officials.
Disturbances in Terengganu
The uprising that officials and police had just suppressed was the culmination of a mass 
challenge to government authority in the huliCs forests. Six years before the uprising, in 
1922, rakyat had begun to protest against new strictures on their forest-based 
livelihoods. The primary cause o f the rakyat's discontent was a set o f new regulations 
for managing land tenures and forest access, introduced by the colonial government in 
stages through the 1920s. Over this decade, there were several indications that the rebels 
had generalised their specific forest grievances into a call for political change in 
Terengganu. Further, they had not only claimed for themselves a right to protest, which 
they did, in their thousands, against colonial forest and land management. They had also 
claimed an entitlement to challenge the suitability o f the Sultan himself.
Both these generalisations were enabled by the Islamist politics key rebel 
leaders espoused. On the day of the uprising, four indications o f this political 
generalisation were apparent. One o f these indications was mass participation. There
54 Tengku Amar Diraja, Pemberitahu, 5 Zulhijjah 1346 [25 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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were large crowds o f armed men, numbering in the thousands, converging from separate 
directions on towns between the hulu and the capital. The second indication was the 
obvious pre-meditation and coordination involved—the uprising was very complex, 
with numerous meeting points, leaders, groups and convergences planned for the day. 
The third was the accusation that government officials were kafir, unbelievers, and not 
just oppressive managers o f forest land. The fourth was the rebels’ appropriation of 
symbols o f royal and religious authority.
The British-led land and forest ‘reforms’ began in 1921. First, the government 
introduced a category o f land called government land, which covered Terengganu’s 
entire forested area. The government also introduced a system of Land Office Permits. 
These were passes for the temporary occupation o f government land. Maintaining a pass 
required an annual payment o f fifty cents per acre by any rakyat who wished to clear 
and utilise forest land for shifting cultivation. Clearing without a permit was punishable 
by a fine o f $100. To put the fine into perspective, it would have been costly even for a 
government employee with a secure and regular cash income. Monthly wages for forest 
rangers, for example, amounted to $20,55 while those o f a khatib (a mosque official) 
were $18, and a government punkah (fan) puller earned only $10.56
Further, no area o f forest older than seven years would be permitted to be 
cleared at all. As the British Adviser, J.L. Humphreys, made clear, these regulations 
were specifically designed to ‘control the indiscriminate clearing o f forest for gardens of 
hill padi and other non-permanent crops [swiddens]’57— that is, to curb the practice of 
shifting cultivation. Cooperating with the regulations was difficult and burdensome for 
rakyat living in the upper hulu. For rakyat living upriver from Kuala Berang, the site o f 
the nearest government offices, travel downstream was onerous. The government
55 J.L. Humphreys, 'Report on Certain Matters Relating to Haji Drahman of Trengganu’ [Humphreys 
Report], 24 November 1922, p. 1, C0717/6L52432.
?<l Terengganu Estimates, 1341, p. 2, CO717/30: 50417: ‘Trengganu Estimates for 1341’. All amounts of 
currency referred to in this text are in Straits dollars.
57 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 1, C0717/6L52432.
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introduced new measures for enclosing livestock, which would no longer be allowed to 
move through forested areas. There was also a new tax, levied per head o f livestock.
By 1922, it was apparent that large groups o f rakyat were willing to 
purposefully refuse to comply with these regulations. In July, a group o f 43 rakyat was 
charged with clearing forest land without TOL passes in the Telemong river valley. The 
authorities suspected that they were led by Haji Drahman, who was known to have 
thousands o f disciples in the hulu region. The Haji soon came forward to represent them 
in court, having gained a licence as a wakil (representative).
On the day o f the trial in the Court o f the Second Magistrate, up to a thousand 
armed rakyat from both Kuala Terengganu and the hulu district attended the court. 
Humphreys considered their presence a show of intimidation. In the trial, Haji Drahman 
‘overwhelmed’ the Forest Guard who was leading the prosecution’s case with 
references to Arabic texts, whose main argument constituted ‘The earth is the Lord’s not 
the State’s and the State has no right to land-rent.’38 The case was dismissed, but the 
Land Office appealed to the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Besar). Again, Haji Drahman 
based his defence o f the rakyat on Islamic jurisprudence, asking ‘such questions as 
“What is the nature of Government”, “What is the nature o f dead land?” and a string o f 
quotations from the Koran.’39 Humphreys cancelled Haji Drahman’s wakil license, but 
the court’s decision was postponed repeatedly, and no outcome was ever reported.
Later, in 1923, a group o f 350 rakyat in the Telemong valley was arrested, 
again for clearing land without passes. Again, Haji Drahman intervened, this time 
paying $250 to the Land Office to cover their fines. However, the Haji asked that the 
payment not be recorded as revenue but kept in trust, as the rakyat claimed they owned 
the land they were clearing. He insisted they were not squatting on government land as 
the Land Office claimed.60 In 1924 another large confrontation ensued. Up to 2000 
rakyat in total were called together by Mat Zin, characterised by Humphreys as Haji 
Drahman’s ‘right-hand man’, through his clerk, Wok bin Mamat. These men, camping
58 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 1, C0717/6L52432.
59 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 2, C0717/61:52432.
<>0 J.E. Kempe to SUK T, 9 January 1924, SUK T 599/1342: ‘Wang yang dikirim oleh Haji Abdul 
Rahman berkenaan dengan pas menebang hutan’.
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on Mat Zin’s land, cleared 400 acres of nearby government land. They also cleared land 
which had been alienated to a group of Chinese men, but which was claimed by Tengku 
Nik Haji. Tengku Nik, the sister of Sultan Sulaiman, asserted it had been a gift to her by 
her father, Sultan Zainal Abidin III (r. 1881-1918), before the colonial regulations were 
introduced.
The challenge this action posed to the colonial government, which claimed the 
entitlement to regulate land use in Terengganu, was explicit. Mat Zin’s men, however, 
did not stop there. They had evidently boasted that they would summon together ‘the 
whole state, from Kelantan to Kemaman’, to drive out the kafir British altogether. They 
also asserted they would reinstall Sultan Sulaiman’s predecessor, Sultan Muhammad 
Syah II (r. 1919-1920), who ruled after Sultan Zainal Abidin III tor only two years. 
During that time, Sultan Muhammad appeared to have done his best to stall formal 
British control over Terengganu. It was during his rule, however that Terengganu was 
formally colonised. Mat Zin’s followers also claimed that Haji Drahman, who had 
advised Sultan Muhammad and who also opposed the British presence in Terengganu, 
would be appointed as his Chief Minister.61 In 1924 it also became clear that another 
religious teacher, Haji Musa Minangkabau, was travelling to villages up and down the 
Terengganu river system, urging villagers in the Telemong and Berang valleys against 
making any payments for government passes.
In 1926, the 1921 category of government land was incorporated within a new 
set of land regulations, now decisively re-issued. These regulations introduced the 
Torrens System of land title in Terengganu, and the Sultan appointed a Commissioner 
of Lands to monitor their carriage, assisted by Collectors of Land Revenue. The new 
category of government land was elaborated. In addition, privately-occupied land would 
be subject to a quit-rent (cukai hasil tanah), payable in cash and due in full on the first 
of Muharram, the first day of the first month of the Hijrah calendar. Land title 
documents would have to be acquired by any rakyat claiming ownership of land, for a
61 J.W. Simmons, ‘Report’ [Simmons Report], 10 July 1925, C0717/6L52432; M.L. Wynne, to British 
Adviser, Terengganu, 6 May 1925, C 0717/61:52432; Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, 
appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C0717/61:52432.
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fee o f $2.50. Any older land title documents in existence were ordered to be 
relinquished to the Land Office for abrogation.
Further, all claimed land would be required to be surveyed by the Pejabat 
Ukuran Kerajaan (Government Survey Office) at the land claimant’s expense. Non- 
compliance with any aspect o f these new regulations was punishable by four months’ 
jail or a $100 fine. Squatting or felling forest trees on what was now government land, 
or gathering forest products— usually timber, leaves, seeds, resins or fruit gathered for 
trade or domestic use— was punishable by six months’ jail or a $500 fine. As a result, 
forest gathering, shifting cultivation, and the customary ownership o f non-contiguous 
forest plots on which swiddens could be cleared, were all significantly curtailed.
Grievances over both sets o f regulations began to fuse together, and in 
April 1928, incidents o f organised protest escalated dramatically. As forest guards and 
policemen visited hulu villages, they now found themselves confronted by groups o f 
armed men, denounced as kafir, and even attacked. Haji Drahman and a second Islamic 
scholar, Sayid Sagaf, were now attracting considerable government suspicion. The 
authorities had come to know that Mat Zin and his associates frequently visited them 
and mobilised groups o f rakyat in their names.
In May Sultan Sulaiman travelled to Kuala Berang to hold a mass audience 
with rakyat, allowing them to air their grievances before him. The Sultan forbade any 
British presence at this gathering, citing the risk o f violence against them if the crowd 
was angered. Around 3,000 rakyat turned up. A number o f rakyat spoke of the 
difficulties they faced in complying with the regulations and reporting to government 
offices on demand. Many also criticised District Officer Wan Mahmud for his treatment 
o f them.63 Yet separately, before G.A.C. de Moubray, the Commissioner for Lands and 
Mines, other rakyat had also expressed anger at members o f the royal family and their 
land concessions. These concessions had been granted by Sultan Zainal Abidin III
62 Undang-Undang Tanah Kerajaan Terengganu 1344 [1926], MBT 864/1344: ’Undang-Undang Tanah’.
63 The statements are all contained in SUK T 1295/1346.
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before the colonial takeover, and had led to the private alienation of much of the 
rakyaf s customary lands.64 On 21 May, the uprising took place.
Rebels and Islamists
In the transition literature, the uprising is characterised as a defence of adat. The idea of 
adat in Terengganu, however, was unstable, and reflected the social and political flux of 
Terengganu’s world. Nor was the uprising an expression of a natural Malay unity, as the 
political basis for the call to unity, nationalism, had not yet been forged in Terengganu. 
Nor did the uprising reflect the autochthony of the Terengganu rakyat because the 
rakyaf s origins were in fact diverse. Rather, the uprising and the movement that led to 
it briefly unified participants who embodied the diversity of interests, origins and 
practices existing in Terengganu. Cultivators’ claims to Terengganu’s land and forests 
did, however, reflect their influence by processes of social change with long antecedents 
in the Malay world.
First, the claims made by the various parties involved in the uprising were 
shaped by the political history of Terengganu and the other Malay states—in particular, 
Johor and Patani—during the region’s incremental colonisation. The rakyat’s claims to 
forested land, and their sense of entitlement to practice shifting cultivation, stretched 
back to the formation of the Terengganu sultanate itself. The sultanate was bom from an 
alliance between Johor and Patani. This alliance, in turn, emerged as a response to a 
Malay-Dutch-Bugis struggle for the peninsula. During this struggle, Terengganu 
became a location for strategic retreat for one line that claimed the Johor throne, 
unwittingly laying the basis for some of the rakyat hitlif s land claims in 1928.
The line that ruled Terengganu in 1928, and which continues to the present 
day, established its control there in a rupture with Terengganu’s older past. Who ruled 
Terengganu before this present line is obscure. Misbaha’s account has it that 
Terengganu may have been ruled by a dynasty bearing the title Megat in the fifteenth 
century. The Megat line was made famous when its scion, Megat Panji Alam, was killed
64 G.A.C. de Moubray to SUK T, 28 Zulkaedah 1346 [18 May 1928], SUK T 1376/1346: Untitled.
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by the loyal laksamana (admiral) o f Melaka, Hang Tuah, on behalf o f his Sultan. The 
Sultan o f Melaka had desired Tun Teja— Panji Alam’s fiancee and the daughter of the 
bendahara (commander-in-chief) o f Pahang— as his wife.65
During the same period, aristocrats with the title Telanai were also prominent 
in Terengganu. Misbaha recounts that this title is described in the Sejarah Melayu 
{Malay Annals), which describes its endowment to Demang Lebar Daun, a scion of 
Palembang, when he was crowned Raja o f Bintan. Later, when Melaka gained control 
o f Bintan, one Tun Telanai was appointed envoy to Siam. Later in 1478, a Telanai from 
Terengganu visited Melaka.66 Yet the origin o f the Megats and Telanais is not known. 
Before them, only one fragment of Terengganu’s political history exists, engraved on 
the Terengganu Stone {batu bersurat), discovered near Kuala Berang in 1902. The stone 
describes the advent o f Islam in Terengganu and is the earliest record demonstrating the 
presence of Islam on the Malay Peninsula. The stone refers to a Raja Mandalika, 
thought to be a local ruler or district chief based in Kuala Berang, who was responsible 
to converting Terengganu’s rulers— whoever they might have been— to Islam.67
Only these traces remain, and two hundred years o f contest ensued before the 
present royal line was founded in the eighteenth century. Two Malay historical texts, the 
Sejarah M elayu68 and the Tuhfat al-Nafis {The Precious G ift),69 describe the 
complicated situation. These are supported by a small number o f Malay-language local 
histories which collate histories narrated orally.70 After the Portuguese conquest o f 
Melaka in 1511, the Melaka sultanate relocated to Johor. In 1644, the Johor Sultan, 
Abdul Jalil III, married his youngest son to Raja Kuning, queen of Patani. In this way, a
65 Misbaha, Terengganu Dari Bentuk Sejarah Hingga Tahun 1918, 18.
66 Ibid., 24.
67 Ibid., 25.
68 A. Samad Ahmad, ed., Sulalatus Salatin (Sejarah Melayu) (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 
2000) .
69 Raja Ali Haji ibn Ahmad, The Precious Gift (Tuhfat Al-Najis), trans. Virginia Matheson and Barbara 
Watson Andaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).
70 Part of this story was also narrated by Hugh Clifford, the British Resident of Pahang, in 1895. See 
Hugh Clifford, Report o f an Expedition into Terengganu and Kelantan in 1895 (Kuala Lumpur:
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1992), 58-59.
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Johor-Patani alliance was created,71 and Terengganu, which had been a dependency
7?(jajahan) of Patani, was granted to Johor as a gift. Later, Tun Zainal Abidin, who was 
the son of Tun Habib Abdul Majid, bendahara of Johor from 1677 (or 1688 ), travelled 
to Terengganu and Patani.74 After arriving in Patani, Tun Zainal Abidin was apparently 
adopted by Raja Kuning, eventually marrying a relative of hers, Nang Rogayah. Tun 
Habib Abdul Majid died in 1697, at which time his son, Tun Zainal Abidin’s elder 
brother, Tun Abdul Jalil, was made bendahara. At this time, Terengganu was granted to 
Tun Zainal Abidin.75
In 1699, the chain of succession in the Johor royal family was plunged into 
crisis, when the reigning Sultan, the heirless Mahmud Syah II, was killed. Bendahara 
Tun Abdul Jalil was crowned as his replacement, as Sultan Abdul Jalil IV, resulting in 
the bendahara line replacing that of the Sultan’s.76 On this development, according to 
Terengganu local histories, Raja Kuning sent Tun Zainal Abidin to Terengganu with 
eighty Patani families. She, alongside the Johor officials who administered Terengganu, 
crowned Zainal Abidin as Sultan with a sword and a long keris— ‘keris panjang nang 
chayang,77—at Tanjung Baru, Kuala Berang, in around 1700. Later, the now Sultan 
Zainal Abidin I moved his centre to Kampung Pulau Manis and then Bukit Keledang in
1 Haji Buyong Adil, Sejarah Trengganu, 12, Ibrahim Syukri, History o f the Malay Kingdom o f Patani 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1985), 36.
1 Ibrahim Syukri, History o f the Malay Kingdom o f Patani, 36.
73 Misbaha, Terengganu Dari Bentuk Sejarah Hingga Tahun 1918, 91.
74 Haji Buyong Adil, Sejarah Trengganu, 12. Misbaha offers a series of competing oral narratives of how 
Tun Zainal Abidin ended up in Terengganu and Patani. One such account describes his unwitting 
involvement in a courtly scandal surrounding Wan Abdul Rahman, the father of a close friend who rose 
too fast in the courtly hierarchy. Jealous courtly officials devised a fitnah (slanderous claim), accusing 
him of a relationship with one of the Sultan’s concubines. To avenge his misdeed, the Sultan orchestrated 
a pursuit of Wan Abdul Rahman one day when he was at sea with his son, Wan Abdullah, and his son’s 
friend, Tun Zainal Abidin. The three fled up the east coast. Wan Abdul Rahman was caught. Tun Zainal 
Abidin escaped and arrived in Patani as a result. Another account states that he was invited to Patani by 
its ruler, Raja Kuning. Refer to Misbaha, Terengganu Dari Bentuk Sejarah Hingga Tahun 1918, 91-111.
75 Haji Buyong Adil, Sejarah Trengganu, 14.
7(1 Raja Ali Haji ibn Ahmad, The Precious Gift (Tuhfat Al-Nafis), 46-60 and Introduction 1-4.
77 Raja Kuning’s Siamese title, granted by Siam in pursuit of closer control over Patani, was phra nang 
chao yang, and the name of the long keris was derived from that title.
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Kuala Terengganu. The eighty families who formed his entourage were accommodated 
in the new Kampung Patani, near Kuala Terengganu.78
As Misbaha points out, however, the Tuhfat al-Nafis tells a different story o f 
the Terengganu sultanate’s foundation. In the Tuhfat, Tun Abdul Jalil’s promotion to 
Sultan Abdul Jalil IV was contested by a Minangkabau prince, Raja Kecik, who came 
forward as the son o f the murdered Sultan Mahmud Syah II. He attacked Johor with the 
support o f the orang laut (sea people o f the Riau Archipelago), who did not accept the 
new royal dynasty. Raja Kecik became ruler of Johor for some time, demoting Abdul 
Jalil back to hendahara status. Abdul Jalil retreated to Terengganu for protection, 
spending three years there at one stage, before attempting to reassert himself in Johor 
from Pahang, a Johor tributary.
Abdul Jalil was eventually killed by Raja Kecik’s men in Pahang. Meanwhile, 
a party o f Bugis who had settled in Linggi,74 a Johor territory, led by the five Opu 
brothers, Daeng Marewah (Kelana Jaya), Daeng Parani, Daeng Celak, Daeng Kemasi 
and Daeng Menampuk, intervened against Raja Kecik and drove him back to 
Minangkabau in 1722. These Bugis, in an alliance with Johor Malays, reinstalled the 
hendahara line— into which they had married Daeng Parani— in the person of 
Sulaiman, Abdul Jalil’s son. In return, the Bugis won great power in the Johor 
sultanate. In this version, it was Daeng Menambun who went to Terengganu to 
appoint Tun Zainal Abidin as Sultan there.81 The story in the Tuhfat, therefore, is 
different but does not necessarily contradict that in the histories of Terengganu which 
emphasise links to Patani. Indeed Zamberi, in his history o f Patani, unifies the two 
narratives by asserting that Daeng Menambun attended the coronation organised by 
Raja Kuning.82
7X Haji Buyong Add, Sejarah Trengganu, Chp. 2, Ibrahim Syukri, History o f the Malay Kingdom o f 
Patani, Chp. 2.
19 Later one of the Negeri Sembilan.
x" Raja Ah Haji ibn Ahmad, The Precious Gift (Tuhfat Al-Nafis), 46-60 and Introduction 1-4.
81 Ibid., 70.
x“ Mohammad Zamberi A Malek, Umat Islam Patani: Sejarah Dan Politik (Shah Alam, Malaysia: Hizbi, 
1993), 91.
32
Chapter One— Antecedents: Terengganu and its World
In this conflicted and complicated genealogy of the Terengganu royal line lie 
the origins of at least some of the rakyat living in the hulu. The dynasty itself, therefore, 
played a strong role in creating a constituency with interests in the hulu region’s land 
and forests. Whether it was Raja Kuning or Daeng Menambun or both who installed 
Sultan Zainal Abidin I, it appears that a retinue of settlers (‘eighty families’) went with 
him to establish his sultanate in Kuala Berang. The settlers might just as easily have 
gone there from Johor instead. Indeed, some of the rakyat claiming customary land in 
Kuala Berang claimed that the eighty families came with Sultan Zainal Abidin I from 
Johor, and that they were their descendants.83 According to their claim, these Johor 
people settled alongside other hulu people, already there. Of the people who were 
already there, nothing further is described of their origins. It would, however, be a 
mistake to assume that they simply emerged from the Terengganu soil, especially given 
the known historical ruptures in the settlement and control of the area.
Whatever their early origins, by 1928 the rakyat displayed diverse roots, and 
were well-connected to other places on the Malay Peninsula’s east coast. The 
Terengganu state archive is peppered with hints of this diversity, mentioned in passing 
in police or surveillance reports, or by arrested rebels. In these documents, three 
important aspects of the forest movement emerge. First, many of the movement’s 
leading Islamists were not bom in Terengganu, having migrated from elsewhere. Their 
diversity puts into question the isolation of the Terengganu rakyat, and suggests that 
rebels were not bearers of an authentic adat specific to Terengganu. Second, it seems 
that most of the Islamists were examples of Kahn’s ‘Other Malays’, having migrated to 
Terengganu to access economic opportunity. Many of the arrested or surveilled rebels 
were forest-based shifting cultivators, both of rice and of rubber—a major cash crop.
It is not possible to reveal from archival records the true extent of economic 
differentiation between those who grew rubber and those who grew rice. It is therefore
xx Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid to Commissioner of Land, Terengganu, 2 Rabiulawal 1342 [13 
October 1923], SUK T 599/1342.
X4 Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid to Commissioner of Land, Terengganu, 2 Rabiulawal 1342 [13 
October 1923], SUK T 599/1342.
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impossible to gauge if the Islamists emerged from a specific and wealthier rubber­
growing social layer. Nevertheless, having arrived from elsewhere, the leading Islamists 
lived and gained their livelihoods among the other rakyat in the movement. Third, many 
of the Islamists embodied Islamic prestige at the village level, but gained this prestige 
from journeys abroad. Many of them were Hajis and many mosque functionaries, 
bearing titles such as lebai (religious teacher), khatib (mosque preacher), bilal (reciter of 
the mosque call to prayer) and imam (leader o f the mosque congregation). Not only 
were they bearers o f Islamic authority, these men also exemplified the very definition of 
Islamist as offered by Sayyid—they placed Islam ‘at the centre o f their political 
practice’, and used ‘the language o f Islamic metaphors to think through their political
85destinies’. These men ‘[saw] in Islam their political future’.
Mat Zin was the most prominent o f these Islamists. His full name was 
Muhammad Zain bin Muhammad Amin. Mat Zin owned land in Kuala Telemong, and 
had emerged as the ‘Chief Captain’ o f the group clearing Tengku Nik Haji’s land in 
192 5 . 86 He lived in Kampung Batu Besar87 on land owned by Tengku Nik Haji.88 He 
was also known to be a rubber cultivator. It appears that his experience of trying to 
comply with Terengganu’s new land regulations had ended in some bitterness. He had 
applied for two acres of land in Bukit Jong in Kuala Berang, had it surveyed, and paid 
85 cents per acre for permission to clear the land. Hoping to plant rubber, intercropped 
with vegetables, Mat Zin had experienced delays caused by the Land Office not
85 S Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence o f Islamism, 2nd ed. (London: Zed 
Books, 2003), 17. Sayyid’s definition is the most flexible and captures these leaders’ narration of the 
rakyat's grievances into an Islamic discourse. It also escapes becoming mired in the many competing 
typologies describing kinds of political Islam. Here, I have described Mat Zin and his associates as 
Islamists, and, for differentiation, Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf as Islamic scholars. Yet the categories 
‘Islamist’ and’ rakyat’ necessarily overlap.
86 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
87 Mat Zin bin Mat Min to Collector of Land Revenue, Kuala Berang, 20 Rabiulakhir 1346 [17 October 
1927], CLM 171/1346: Title Unknown.
88 Statement by Haji Zakaria bin Haji Mohamed Hasan, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 89, 
C0717/52432.
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replying to his application. He brought a petition before the Collector of Land Revenue 
in Kuala Berang in October 1927.84
Evidently not a subsistence cultivator, Mat Zin had also previously applied for 
two acres of land in Kampung Tanggol, below Kuala Berang on the Terengganu River, 
in September 1926. That time, he had again applied to plant rubber, and the request had 
been granted subject to receipt of the relevant fees, but Mat Zin had not paid anything 
and the application was filed.40 Bom in Telemong, he was forty years old in 1925, at the 
time this information was provided to the government.41 He was not an Islamic 
functionary but a disciple of Haji Drahman, and was known to organise prayer meetings 
in a bctlai (hall) at his house.
Although Mat Zin was illiterate, a literate, Pahang-born twenty-year-old acted 
as his ‘clerk’. This was Wok bin Mamat, who had moved to Terengganu with his 
parents in around 1910. Other leaders included Che Man Pendekar (‘the Champion’) 
and Tengku Mat, two Terengganu-bom men, also aged forty in 1925. Still others 
included Tok Janggut or Lebai Drahman, then sixty years old and bom either in 
Kelantan42 or Patani.4’ He had been living in the Telemong area for twenty or thirty 
years. Haji Karia, then aged 35, was bom in Pahang. Abdul Hamid, then aged thirty but 
illiterate, was a Banjarese.44
There were also other Islamists in this leadership layer. Haji Tahir was Mat 
Zin’s son. 95 Haji Karia, or Haji Zakaria bin Haji Mohamed Hassan, was bom in Lebar,
X9 Mat Zin bin Mat Min to Collector of Land Revenue, Kuala Berang, 20 Rabiulakhir 1346 [17 October 
1927], CLM 171/1346.
1,(1 Collector of Land Revenue, Hulu Terengganu, to Hulu Terengganu Land Office, 23 Safar 1345 [2 
September 1926], CLM 171/1346.
1.1 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
1.2 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
1)3 Mustaffa bin Chik, "Gerakan Tasawuf Oleh Ulama-Ulama Di Zaman Pemerintahan Sultan Zainal 
Abidin III Di Terengganu" (Honours Thesis, Universiti Malaya, 1991), 104.
94 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
95 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 2 Zulkaedah 1346 [22 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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Pahang, but lived in Kampung Plang in the Telemong valley. He, like Mat Zin, was a 
rubber planter.96 Another Islamist, Abu Bakar bin Drahman, known as Abu Bakar 
Ceting after his village o f residence in the Tersat valley, referred only to padi and not to 
rubber.97 Likewise, Mamat Tok Pitas.98 One more man, Penghulu Salleh, always 
described as “Penghulu” Salleh in British reports, from Kampung Pasir Nyior, led an 
attack on two Forest Guards in his village on 20 April 1928."
These Islamists, who emerged as leaders o f the movement at various times 
among its six-year history, embodied the rakyaf s diversity o f origins. They also 
embodied the diversity o f the rakyaf s economic practices. The rakyat hulu grew 
swidden rice, garden vegetables, fruit and also, in many cases, rubber for market. It is 
possible that the Islamist leaders emerged from particular, market-oriented social strata 
among the rakyat. After all, many reports frequently referred to rakyat only as padi 
planters, and many o f the arrested mentioned only padi and not rubber. Regardless, 
many o f the Islamists, and some other vocal rakyat present at the mass audience with 
the Sultan, did mention rubber. In doing so, they revealed that at least they were 
exposed and oriented to production for world markets. Some rakyat also referred to 
their coconut orchards. Coconut had already emerged as a second, key smallholder cash
crop, and by 1917, such smallholders held around two-thirds o f land on which coconut
100was grown.
For this reason, these rakyat should not unthinkingly be subsumed into the 
vague and elusive category of ‘peasant’, a strong trope in Malay nationalist 
historiography as well as ‘peasant studies’ or ‘agrarian studies’ models o f
% Statement by Haji Zakaria bin Haji Muhammad Hasan, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 89, 
C0717/6L52432.
97 Statement by Abu Bakar bin Drahman, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 91, C 0 7 17/52432.
98 Statement by Mat Pitas bin Mohamad, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 93, C 0 7 17/52432.
99 Mahmud bin Piah and Abdullah bin Ali to District Officer, Kuala Berang, 29 Syawal 1346 [20 April 
1928], SUK T 1295/1346: ‘Report Forest Guard berkenaan orang-orang hendak melawan kerajaan’.
100 R.E. Elson, The End o f the Peasantry in Southeast Asia: A Social and Economic History o f Peasant 
Livelihood, 1800-1990s (London; New York: Macmillan; St Martin's, 1997), 101.
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scholarship. 101 As Kurtz has pointed out, the term 'peasant’ generally means much more 
than simply ‘rural cultivator’, yet scholarly assumptions about shared practices and 
social relationships are not the same from one case study to another. “ Kurtz cites 
scholarly constructions of peasanthood which rely on diverse definitions, of which some 
criteria may include control of the land they cultivate, cultural distinctiveness as a 
community, and social subordination to a ‘dominant rural class’. 03 In studies of 
Malaya/Malaysia, the term ‘peasant’ tends to imply that all rural cultivators are settled 
smallholders who grow subsistence rice, and are perpetually under threat by markets 
and their agents. The special characteristics of the shifting rakyat hulu before their 
enforced settlement, including their mobility, participation in cash crop production, and 
diverse origins, are therefore not even entertained as a basic sociological reality.
The discourse of peasanthood in the Malayan/Malaysian case knowingly or 
unwittingly reinforces the notion of the ‘peasant’ used by contemporary nationalists and 
reflected in the politics of Malay ‘special rights’. Yet the Terengganu rakyat lived 
within rather more complicated webs between their local communities and global 
relationships. The Terengganu rakyat hulu more resemble Elson’s peasants, whose 
peasanthood was being created by historical forces, most notably colonial rule. These 
people became peasants, living in settlements that were increasingly stable as they were 
slowly drawn into state administrative structures. Yet at the same time that states 
became more effective in regulating these new peasants’ lives, their local subsistence
101 See, for example, Michael Adas, "From Avoidance to Confrontation: Peasant Protest in Precolonial 
and Colonial Southeast Asia," in Colonialism and Culture, ed. Nicholas B Dirks (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1992), David Arnold, "Gramsci and Peasant Subaltemity in India," in Mapping 
Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial, ed. Vinayak Chaturvedi (London; New York: Verso, 2000), 
Cheah Boon Kheng, The Peasant Robbers o f Kedah 1900-1929 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988), Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects o f Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant 
Resistance in the Himalaya (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), James C Scott, The Moral Economy 
o f the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1976), Ken Young, Islamic Peasants and the State: The 1908 Anti-Tax Rebellion in West Sumatra 
(New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1994).
102 For a discussion of how difficult it is to compare between groups of people referred to as ‘peasants’ in 
studies of peasant resistance, refer to Marcus J Kurtz, "Understanding Peasant Revolution: From Concept 
to Theory and Case," Theory and Society 29 (2000), 93-104.
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orientation was also being undermined by participation in market-based production, 
distribution and exchange. Therefore, even as Southeast Asian hinterland populations 
were finally being drawn into peasant relations, the very basis of peasanthood was 
already being undermined.104
In Terengganu in the 1920s, the rakyat hulu seemed to have been experiencing 
all these changes at once. Their mobility was being restricted by the new regulations, 
but whatever local outlook they may once have had was now changed by their exposure 
to market-oriented production. At least some members of the rakyat were already 
shedding subsistence production for smallholder cash-cropping. For this reason, and 
although much of the literature on rural unrest in Asia is framed in terms o f ‘peasant’ or 
‘agrarian’ studies, it is important to state that these are not the peasants found in Malay 
nationalist discourse. Quite unlike the subsistence-oriented, rice-growing and custom- 
bound peasants of nationalist and dependency narratives, this rakyat was already 
actively seeking out global exchange.
Further, this market-orientation was not a new phenomenon. Terengganu’s 
forest products were already traded around the South China Sea, with the keen 
participation of Terengganu’s rulers. As a result, the practice of own-production for 
own-consumption may have been undermined over a very long time, if it had ever been 
central. Indeed, as early as 1719, visiting traders reported that Terengganu people did 
not prefer to cultivate the ground, and in 1883 traders noted explicitly that subsistence 
rice was not much grown in Terengganu, ‘the Malays being little disposed to 
agricultural occupation’.1(h As Shaharil himself has pointed out despite his portrayal of 
the rakyat as subsistence rice producers, pepper and gold were exported from 
Terengganu from the eighteenth century, along with sugar, coffee and tin.106 This trade 
was influenced by the increasingly formalised European trade domination of the region, 
even before Terengganu’s entry into the British Empire, and by the expansion of
104 Elson, The End o f the Peasantry in Southeast Asia: A Social and Economic History o f Peasant 
Livelihood, 1800-1990s .
105 Refer to extracts from English-language sources on Terengganu trade in Khoo Kay Kim, "Kuala 
Terengganu: International Trading Centre," Malaysia in History 17, no. 2 (1974).
106 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 48-49.
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European trade with China from the eighteenth century. In Terengganu, Kathirithamby- 
Wells has pointed out that forest products like rattan and wax were also traded on a 
large scale.107 Hugh Clifford, British Resident in Pahang in 1895, pointed out that hulu 
Terengganu damar resin was sold to district heads on a large scale but for a ‘uniformly
1 ORlow price’, along with gambir, camphor, gum-benzoin and ivory.
Later, under Sultan Zainal Abidin III, forest products were cultivated and 
traded intensively, brought to the coast by hulu rakyat and taxed for export.109 This was 
one reason for the Sultan’s push for greater control over the interior,110 which British 
officials continued. As Shahridan has pointed out, the pre-colonial notion of forest 
products included products purposefully cultivated by shifting cultivators, not only 
naturally-occurring plant products gathered from the forests.* 111 Many rakyat, already 
accustomed to clearing forest to grow rice and raise fruit orchards, added growing 
rubber to their repertoire, becoming the smallholders of ‘jungle rubber’ that colonial 
officials condemned. Through rubber, rakyat hulu were connected to the world. 
Globally, rubber was an increasingly important crop, required for the mass production 
of cars “ and electrical goods. For Malaya, intensely attuned to rubber’s global rise, 
rubber grew to more than eighty per cent of agricultural exports in the early twentieth
. 114century.
In this context, rubber presented a new economic opportunity for Malayan 
rakyat smallholders, and by 1922, over one million hectares of Malayan land was 
devoted to the crop. By this time, 400,000 hectares of this rubber was produced by
107 Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, Nature and Nation: Forests and Development in Peninsular Malaysia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 14.
108 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 74.
I()1) Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 62.
110 Ibid., Chp. 4.
111 Shahridan Faiez bin Mohideen Abdul Kader, "Mapping Modernities in Trengganu", 80.
112 William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, Environment and Empire (Oxford University Press, 2007), 238.
112 Paul Kratoska, Honourable Intentions: Talks on the British Empire in Southeast Asia Delivered at the 
Royal Colonial Institute 1874-1928 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), 3.
114 Beinart and Hughes, Environment and Empire, 243.
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smallholders, as compared with only 20,000 hectares in 1910.115 So, for example, the 
1914 revenue figure for the state of Terengganu was $21,000, of which $15,000 came 
from export duties on rubber. This revenue was created not only by large-scale 
commercial rubber estates, but also by cash croppers like the Terengganu Islamists.116 
As a result, the Terengganu rakyat was not growing sufficient rice for its own needs. 
Indeed, in 1913, so little rice was grown in Terengganu that it was imported from 
Annam and Cochinchina in Chinese junks, leading Humphreys to comment that ‘if it 
were not for these junks, Terengganu would be hard up for rice.’ 117 Terengganu 
cultivators’ reticence in growing subsistence rice may well have resulted from the 
profitability of growing rubber instead. The late 1920s was a period of growth in rubber 
prices, in between the price busts of 1920-1922 and 1930-1932.118 Indeed, high rubber 
prices contributed to the Malayan Haj boom of the late 1920s, in turn helping to create a 
new generation of Hajis and Islamic scholars.114 A report from the Political Intelligence 
Bureau in Singapore confirmed that in 1927, Haj numbers were at a record high, and the
1 7 0Singapore port was ‘literally packed with pilgrims waiting for passages’.
Given this well-established participation in the rubber market by smallholders, 
there is no reason to believe, as Shaharil did, that market-orientation in Terengganu was 
a ruling-class preserve. There is therefore also no reason to portray Terengganu’s rebels 
as locally- or subsistence-oriented, as some transition narratives have. Kathirithamby- 
Wells has argued that many Malays engaged in such practices after being dislocated 
from the forest economy. “ Shaharil, in turn, has waved away the rakyat's involvement 
in rubber as a ‘reorientation’ from subsistence activities, forced by Terengganu’s new
115 Ibid., 239.
116 J.L. Humphreys, Report of the British Adviser, Trengganu, October, November, and December 1916, 
C0273/459: 8172: ‘Affairs of Trengganu.
117 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, December 1913, 4 January 1914, p. 5, 
00273/409:7545: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
1IH Beinart and Hughes, Environment and Empire, 243.
119 Mohammad Sidik Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman, The Malays in the Middle East 
(Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2000), 11.
120 Malay Pilgrimage Officer to Political Intelligence Bureau, 13 August 1927, SUK T 722/1346: ‘Report 
Pelayaran Haji dan Tafsir 1927’.
121 Kathirithamby-Wells, Nature and Nation: Forests and Development in Peninsular Malaysia, 126.
40
Chapter One—Antecedents: Terengganu and its World
private landholders. 122 Dislocated, reoriented or otherwise, rebels like Mat Zin 
demonstrated an active and purposeful involvement in market-oriented production. At 
least some of Terengganu’s rebels were therefore well-attuned to market opportunities, 
and not at all like the economically na'ive peasants of the nationalist narrative’.
The Colonial Advance
However representative these market-oriented Islamists were, they and the rakyat from 
which they emerged were embroiled in a long and incremental process of colonisation 
in Terengganu. The British government’s interest in Terengganu, as in Siam’s other 
Malay tributaries, was driven by its strategic aim to reduce and contain Siam’s 
southward reach over the Malay Peninsula, and gain control of all contiguous territory 
south of Siam’s limits. Since 1786, when the British East India Company (EIC) was 
first granted control of Penang Island by the Kedah sultanate, British agents had become 
involved in negotiations to push back Siamese influence over its southern tributaries and 
fix the limits of its control further north. In the negotiations for Penang, EIC Captain 
Francis Light promised the Sultan of Kedah protective assistance against Siamese and 
Burmese military intervention in Kedah.124 Kedah agreed, hoping to use Britain as its
125own strategic counter against Siam.
The northern Malay states were entangled within complicated and shifting 
relationships of tribute and protection with Siam. These small polities, including Patani, 
Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, sent tokens of tribute to Siam in the form of bungct 
mas, and labour and military corvee at times. These states used these gestures to ally 
themselves with Siam for strategic protection against the expansive designs of other
122 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 129.
124 Refer to Kahn, Other Malays, 144.
124 Virginia Hooker, A Short History o f  Malaysia: Linking East and West (Allen & Unwin, 2003), 86.
125 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History o f the Geo-Body o f a Nation (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai'i Press, 1994), 86.
12(1 The term bunga mas literally means 'golden flowers’. These engraved and stylised floral gold 
sculptures were sent by Terengganu to Siam every three years as tribute.
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polities in the region more powerful than them. “ In Terengganu’s case, this 
relationship began after 1720, when Kuala Terengganu was burnt by Bugis 
raiders. Additionally, Kedah, in particular, occasionally also made gifts to other 
powerful polities like Britain to gain their protection from its too-powerful Siamese 
protector.124 Terengganu, during the reign of Baginda Omar (r. 1839-1876), had become 
very close to Siam. As Gullick points out, Baginda Omar had taken control of 
Terengganu’s throne in 1839 with Siamese support. 130 This situation, however, 
appeared to British officials to be too ambiguous, and ambiguity of control was 
unacceptable to Britain. The British government sought a clear monopoly of influence 
over its ‘protectorates’ in Malaya, and desired separate and discrete spheres of 
suzerainty for itself and Siam which did not overlap.
Over the nineteenth century, therefore, the EIC and the British government 
entered directly into a series of treaties with Siam aimed at delineating British and 
Siamese spheres of influence on the peninsula. The first of these treaties was the Burney 
Treaty of 1826. “ Mostly confined to protecting British trade access, this treaty allowed 
Siamese influence to remain in the northern Malay states. From 1869 onwards, 
however, with the signing of the Knox treaty, Britain began expanding its territorial 
reach from Penang into Kedah to establish Province Wellesley. In this way, a logic of 
bounding Siam’s southern influence was established.134 By 1902, Terengganu was itself 
constituted as a parcel of territory, and formally declared a ‘dependency’ of Siam.135 In
177
127 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 88.
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1909, Britain and Siam signed another treaty under whose terms Siam now surrendered 
to Britain its suzerainty over Terengganu, along with Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and 
Langkawi Island.
By the terms of the same agreement, Siam solidified its territorial control over 
Patani and a number of smaller Malay states nearby. Terengganu’s serving ruler, Sultan 
Zainal Abidin III, the head of what he understood to be an independent polity which 
paid tribute to Siam, had not been consulted. The practice of hegemonic powers 
granting tributary states to each other, as though they formed parts of their own 
territory, had not previously been an element of power bargaining on the peninsula. A 
British Agent, W.L. Conlay, was soon appointed to his court in 1909, and began the job 
of reporting events in Terengganu directly to the High Commissioner for the Malay 
States in Singapore. Conlay was replaced by E.A. Dickson in 1913, who was succeeded 
by J.L. Humphreys in 1916.
Humphreys’ reports listed a litany of poor government practices, and in 1918, 
the Bucknill Commission was convened, to investigate ‘maladministration’ in 
Terengganu. The Commission’s interest in territory was obvious in its report, which 
referred to the granting of mining concessions to Japanese firms, and the royal family’s 
land concessions. It recommended greater British control over Terengganu—effectively 
outright colonisation, and recommended a British Adviser for Terengganu, with much 
greater power than the British Agent.1’6 In 1919 under Zainal Abidin’s successor, 
Sultan Muhammad Syah II, the court accepted the British Adviser, ‘whose advice must 
be asked and acted upon in all matters affecting the general administration of the 
country and all questions other than those touching the Muhammadan Religion’. The
137Adviser would also control the ‘collection and disbursement’ of all state revenues. 
This step marked the beginning of Terengganu’s formal incorporation into the British 
Empire. It was the last polity on the Malay Peninsula to accept British rule.
136 See C0717/61: 6947: ‘The Trengganu Commission’.
137 ‘Agreement between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Trengganu’, 24 May 1919, 
Maxwell and Gibson, eds., Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, 113-14.
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Aware of the threat o f colonial takeover, and the subsequent limitation of their 
freedom of action, successive Terengganu sultans had undertaken pre-emptive measures 
to reorganise their polities so that they could control their resources and territories on 
their own terms. For Shaharil, this meant the royal family reformulating its relationship 
with ‘income-extracting devices’, such as land-ownership, revenue farms, merchant 
trade, plantations and mining.1’8 Shaharil has described ‘the economic opportunism of 
the Trengganu ruling families’, which focused on ‘acquiring wealth in order to consume 
it rather than in order to put savings to productive use.139 Other changes also took place. 
For example, Baginda Omar had centralised royal authority over penghulu in every part 
o f Terengganu except for Besut and Kemaman.140
Under Sultan Zainal Abidin III, this centralisation was reinforced. Fie allocated 
all revenue-raising powers over all o f Terengganu’s territory to himself, members of his 
family and close entourage (kerabat). These people, except for those who controlled 
Besut and Kemaman, lived in Kuala Terengganu and despatched envoys to collect their 
revenues.141 District authorities therefore no longer emerged from within the districts 
themselves, but relied on authority from the capital, which stemmed from their display 
o f the Sultan’s cap (seal).142 Later, before 1910, when Terengganu accepted a British 
Agent into its court, territorial control was formalised into land concessions covering 
Terengganu’s mineral-rich areas, granted by the Sultan to his kerabat. This transfer of 
ownership allowed them to assert private territorial control over Terengganu’s 
resources, ensuring continued decision-making power even if the British gained formal 
control over the state.143 Some of these land concessions continue to exist today, 
including the Cenderong concession in Kemaman. Cenderong was initially granted to 
Tengku Nik Maimunah by her brother the Sultan, but returned to the state for religious 
uses after Malayan independence.
138 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 5.
139 Ibid.. 3-4.
140 Gullick, Riders and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920, 148.
141 Ibid.
I4“ Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 23.
143 Ibid.. Chp 4.
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Immediately on Terengganu’s entry into the British Empire, structures of 
political power in the state were reorganised again by the State Council, composed of 
the Sultan, his key advisers, and the British Adviser. Before the threat of colonial 
intervention, royal power in Terengganu had been centred on a coastal royal capital, 
Kuala Terengganu. This power dissipated in rough concentric circles along rivers from 
the capital until it faded in the landed interstices between Terengganu and its 
neighbours. Terengganu’s various other coastal towns and villages, and inland village 
settlements, were accessible either by travelling along the coast, or by using a system of 
several rivers which ran through Terengganu’s loosely-defined territory into the South 
China Sea.
The further one travelled, the further these centres appeared from control by 
the capital, and the more district heads and penghulu appeared to operate autonomously. 
From the reign of Mansur I (r. 1733-1793), Terengganu had maintained a high degree of 
practical independence by reinforcing its alliances with both Johor and Patani 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and paying tribute to Siam.144 At the 
same time, Terengganu had participated in a culture of trade and religious learning 
which was shared by the East Coast Malay states. Terengganu’s encirclement by 
Britain, however, achieved by the incorporation into the empire of the adjacent 
territories of Pahang in 1890 and Kelantan in 1909, signalled the end of this loose 
system of tribute. British officials viewed tributary relationships as unacceptable ‘shared
, |45sovereignty .
On its entry into the empire, Terengganu, like other Malay states, took on a 
hybrid political structure. As Gullick has pointed out, Terengganu’s rulers had had thirty 
years during which to observe the bureaucratic transformations taking place in the FMS, 
and they took the opportunity when it arose.146 Terengganu’s new structure preserved 
the forms of pre-colonial Malay courtly rule and kingship, but also took on some of the 
‘modernising’ changes made by Sultan Zainal Abidin III. These changes included the
144 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 59.
145 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 84-88.
I4(’ Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920, 3.
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establishment of a Land Office in 1912, modelled on that of Johor.147 Colonial officials 
also grafted on these forms a further bureaucratic complement of civil service 
departments and a decision-making State Council. The council was made up of the 
British Adviser, who was the senior colonial official in Terengganu; the Sultan; senior 
courtly figures; and one or more senior religious advisers. Religious advisers, drawn 
from the extensive Terengganu network of Islamic scholars (ulama), had won courtly 
positions close to the Sultan before the British arrived, and worked closely with 
successive sultans since Baginda Omar’s reign. Under the colonial system, however, 
their powers were reduced to administering ‘Malay religion and custom’, concerns 
which had been separated from all others relating to governing Terengganu’s territory 
and population.
The new structures also centralised tax collection and district administration. 
District officials lost their personal capacity to tax populations under their jurisdiction in 
cash, kind and cor\>ee labour. Taxation was regularised, amounts and taxable activities 
fixed and payable in cash, and tax collection became the duty of salaried government 
officials. The new state’s power of surveillance over the territory and population it 
controlled also underwent a process of standardisation. Outlying areas were brought into 
view by the selection of certain strategically-located towns as designated government 
centres. Government offices and police stations were built in these centres so that staff 
could act more effectively on the central government’s behalf. Further, the central 
government and its Land Office began to fix resource and land allocation more 
precisely, and to bring these aspects of social life more firmly under the regulatory 
capacity of the government.
Terengganu’s Islamic Scholars
On the eve of colonisation, religious advisers in the court of Sultan Zainal Abidin III 
vigorously opposed any possible moves towards cooperating with the British. The most 
senior religious adviser, bearing the title of Shaykhul Islam, was Tokku Paloh, or more 
properly, Sayid Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad al-Idrus. Tokku Paloh claimed to be a
147 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 103.
I4S Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920, 148.
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scion of the foremost Hadhrami family in Terengganu, the al-Idrus, whose forebears 
arrived in the eighteenth century as traders and religious teachers. His connection to the 
Sultan had been multifarious. He was the Sultan’s adviser, spiritual mentor, brother-in- 
law, and a strong influence in Islamising Terengganu’s courtly political culture in 
general. Tokku Paloh had written to the Sultan opposing the installation of a British 
Agent. He also drove the creation of a founding document for kingship in Terengganu 
in 1911, immediately after the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 and an Anglo-Terengganu 
Treaty in 1910.
This document, given the Arabic title Itqanul Muluk hi Tadilis Suluk 
(<Convincing Kings of the Blessings o f the Path),149 was partly modeled on the new 
constitution created for Johor, but it varied in one very important respect. The 
Terengganu document allowed for the removal of any Terengganu Sultan who 
cooperated with foreign powers. This bold move by a religious scholar to politically 
license the removal of a Malay Sultan formed an important political precedent. It was 
also an outcome of Terengganu scholars’ participation in a global renewal of Islamic 
scripturalism, to which they gained access in Mecca, where Tokku Paloh studied for 
many years before returning to Terengganu. The Itqanul Muluk was an outcome of 
Terengganu scholars’ participation in a new Islamist politics in colonised Muslim 
territories.
Tokku Paloh’s role in Islamising Terengganu’s political culture is generally 
overlooked in histories of Islamist politics in Malaya/Malaysia. This is partly due to 
their narrow focus on the Straits Settlements and FMS, which they share with histories 
of the nationalist movement. Further, such histories generally accept the rhetorical claim 
of certain self-styled groups of Muslim thinkers to be ‘modernists’, or Kaum Muda. 
They also accept the Kaum Muda claim that only they were bearers of a new and up-to- 
date Islamic or Islamist thinking in Southeast Asia. Highlighting their connections with 
the Middle East, the Kaum Muda characterised ulama attached to royal courts as
l4,) This title is generally translated as The Constitution o f the Way o f Illustrious Sovereignty. For further 
details, refer to the section Political Precedents from p. 142 of this thesis.
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‘traditionalists’, or Kaum Tua.150 The debate hinged around questions of the individual, 
reasoned interpretation of Islamic texts (ijtihad) versus the acceptance of the edicts of 
ulama on questions of doctrine and practice (taqlid).
In early twentieth century Malaya, the Kaum Muda side of this debate was 
embodied by Sayid Shaykh al-Hadi, an Islamist author and journalist who headed the Al 
Imam newspaper from 1906 to 1908 and the Al Ikhwan magazine from 1926 to 1930 in 
Singapore. Al-Hadi, who styled himself after a new generation of anti-colonial Islamists 
based in Cairo and Istanbul, portrayed as new centres of Islamic thinking and ijtihad, 
poured scorn on the Riau royal family and their courtly ulama for being rosary­
counting, amulet-selling longbeards—incorrigible proponents of taqlid as this bolstered 
their standing in the kerajaan. Their membership of the Naksyabandiyah, a Sufi tarekat 
(mystical order) was a particular target for al-Hadi.151 Accepting the way in which al- 
Hadi framed the debate results in accepting that the kerajaan succeeded in keeping its 
courtly contenders in its thrall, stifling development in Islamic thinking. If al-Hadi’s
argument about two opposing schools of thought were accurate, and not a rhetorical 
device, then ulama in Terengganu and the other Malay states whose kerajaan structures 
remained in place were ‘traditionalists’.
Tokku Paloh was certainly the type of figure that al-Hadi was mocking, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly. Al-Hadi himself had been punished by his parents by being 
forced to attend a religious school in Kuala Terengganu as a child. In addition Tokku 
Paloh was an Islamic scholar ensconced in the Terengganu court, an offshoot of Johor 
just as Riau was. He was also a self-declared member of the Naksyabandiyah. By the 
logic of the Kaum Muda—Kaum Tua debate, Tokku Paloh should have been peddling
150 Anthony Milner, The Invention o f Politics in Colonial Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), Roff, Malay Nationalism. For an account of the debate that acknowledges that 
the use of the labels ‘Kaum Muda’ and ‘Kaum Tua’ reflected the discursive tactics of parties to it, see 
Michael Francis Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds 
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
151 For more details refer to Syed Alwi al-Hady, "The Life of My Father," in The Real Ciy o f Syed Shaykh 
Al-Hady, ed. Alijah (Shirle) Gordon (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1999).
152 For a fuller explication of this position, refer to Milner, Invention o f Politics , Roff, Malay 
Nationalism .
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false beliefs and cultural accretions (bidah) in the name of blind loyalty to the Sultans. 
Yet under his influence, Sultan Zainal Abidin III agreed to his own ouster by the ulama 
if he failed to resist colonial rule. Tokku Paloh and Sultan Zainal Abidin III, his 
erstwhile patron whom he had just brought down a peg, both died in 1918.
Their resistance thus ended, Sultan Muhammad Syah II took the throne, and 
continued the practice of surrounding himself with religious advisers who opposed 
cooperation with the British. It seems that he was particularly close to Haji Drahman, 
Tokku Paloh’s leading disciple. Sultan Muhammad’s reign, however, ended in 1920 
when he abdicated, and a British Adviser was immediately appointed. Tokku Paloh had 
left behind 23 children with his thirteen wives, many of whom possessed Islamic 
scholarly credentials of their own. Some of his children ended up joining the new 
colonial religious affairs department. Two of his important disciples, however, chose to 
remain outside the colonial structure, refusing all cooperation. One of these was Haji 
Drahman, who rejected government overtures and defended the rakyat involved in the 
uprising. The other, Sayid Sagaf, Tokku Paloh’s son, remained an ambiguous figure 
throughout the 1920s. He seemed neither scholarly nor particularly religious, yet 
attracted all the veneration of his father. He was implicated in the uprising in several 
ways, but there was insufficient firm evidence of his direct involvement.
The cash-cropping Islamists around Mat Zin were closely connected to both 
these figures. Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf were important players in Terengganu. 
They were more mobile and connected than the Islamists, and the Islamists often sought 
to ‘borrow’ their authority, for example by signing letters in their names. They were 
also wealthy and possessed significant religious prestige. The rubber-growing Islamists 
were among their disciples, and seem to have acted as organizers for them, connecting 
them to the hulu villagers who lived around them. Mat Zin, for example, was described 
in one official report as the ‘right hand man of Haji Drahman’, and Che Man Pendekar 
apparently took orders from Sayid Sagaf.154 Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf were the
153 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, xix.
154 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0717/61:52432.
49
focuses o f a great deal of official anxiety in connection with the uprising, and many 
suspected them of secretly organising the unrest.
Haji Drahman, whose full name was Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid, 
was an Islamic teacher of renown, as well as a prominent land-owner and trader. He was 
a market-oriented entrepreneur, with coconut orchards, houses, padi fields, rubber 
holdings, and large motor boats o f his own in which to conduct his trade. As a teacher, 
Haji Drahman therefore travelled all over Terengganu to instruct his disciples, including 
Mat Zin and his associates, in Islamic teachings and practices. He lived in various 
places, including Kuala Terengganu, Limbong on the coast near Paka, Kemaman on 
Terengganu’s southern stretch o f coast, where his son, Che Leh, also lived, and 
Kampung Beladau Kolam. As a trader, he regularly travelled to locations around the 
Gulf o f Siam and South China Sea to conduct his business.1:0 Bom in Terengganu1 in 
Kampung Beladau Kolam, Haji Drahman was the son of Haji Tun Muhammad Zain, 
and studied as a child in a small religious school (pondok) under one Haji Ya’kob in 
Paya Bunga, Kuala Terengganu.157 Later, he studied under Tokku Paloh and began 
travelling around Terengganu to teach in his own name. Mat Zin used to accompany 
him in his boat on these journeys.158
It is not clear when Haji Drahman travelled to Mecca for the Haj, but on his 
return he had gained significant authority, prestige and a following of disciples. Many 
people believed him to be keramat (thaumaturgic), possessing special powers, including 
the ability to vanish from Kampung Pulau Manis and appear in the same hour in Kuala 
Terengganu 159 His prestige was demonstrated by his ability to gather hundreds or 
thousands o f people around him. For example, in November 1922, on Maulid (Mawlid 
an-Nabi, the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday), hundreds o f men and women ‘thronged’
155 Refer to SUK T 1442/1346: ‘Pesanan Haji Abdul Rahman Limbong berkenaan dengan harta dan 
hutangnya’.
156 Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid, ‘Surat Wakil Kuasa’, 29 Jemadulawal 1347 [13 November 
1928], SUK T 1442/1346.
157 Mohamed bin Endut, "1928: Penderhakaan Di Trengganu", 30.
158 Ibid.
159 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 4, C0717/6L52432.
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his house and its grounds, to hear him reading the Qur’an and other texts. His house and 
surau (prayer hall) formed places where large gatherings of rakyat frequently took 
place, including at key moments of conflict against the colonial government.
Humphreys, for one, thought the Haji sometimes sought to pressure the 
government by demonstrating how many people he could gather together. He wrote of 
how, in 1922, the Magistrate’s Court set a hearing date for the rebels the Haji had 
represented in court. Haji Drahman selected the same date to celebrate the circumcision 
of a Chinese convert to Islam, and planned to bring 1,000 rakyat hulu to Kuala 
Terengganu to celebrate. The convert would be paraded through the town, and ‘four 
buffaloes and four hundred fowls’ would be killed for a feast. In response, Humphreys 
asked the new, colonial Shaykhul Islam, Tuan Embong, to call the Haji to his office. 
Together, Humphreys and Tuan Embong explained to the Haji that his wakil license was 
now cancelled and he was prohibited from holding the feast in Kuala Terengganu. Haji 
Drahman held the feast at Kampung Pasir Pulau Babi instead, and at the time 
Humphreys passed the gathering, ‘several hundred’ people had already arrived, three 
buffaloes had been slaughtered, and ‘boats full of people [were] still arriving from every 
direction’.160
Not only was he able to organise large numbers of people, the Haji was 
suspected of leading the forest conflict because he had previously led resistance to a 
government-organised vaccination campaign, by confronting medical officers while 
they attempted to vaccinate children.1(11 The authorities had realised that Haji Drahman 
possessed sufficient authority in the hulu to compete with the colonial government, and 
so they attempted to co-opt him by employing him as a salaried religious teacher in a 
mosque. The Haji, however, refused, responding that he could not keep the work routine 
that the Religious Department stipulated, and so ‘the efforts of the Religious 
Department to harness Haji Drahman came to naught’. “ Haji Drahman also frequently
160 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, pp. 8-9, C 0717/61:52432.
I(>l See SUK T 1269/1342: ‘Orang-orang Telemong tidak mengikut peraturan kerajaan dengan ajaran Haji 
Abdul Rahman Limbong’. The disease the vaccinations sought to prevent is not specified.
162 Simmons Report p. 6, C 0717/61:52432.
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travelled to Beserah, on the Pahang coast, where a group called the Syarikat Islam had
i o
registered itself with the Pahang authorities. A group o f the same name had attempted 
to establish itself in Terengganu in 1923 but was denied permission.164 Nevertheless, 
after the uprising, membership lists were found at Mat Zin’s house.165
Figure 4: A turban belonging to Haji Drahman, courtesy of the National History Museum, Kuala 
Lumpur.
Haji Drahman’s associate, Sayid Sagaf, was the son of Haji Drahman’s mentor, 
Tokku Paloh. More properly called Sayid Saqaf bin Sayid Abdul Rahman al-Idrus, 
Sayid Sagaf also bore the title Engku Kelana. His name also came up repeatedly in 
connection with the movement against land regulations, and with the Syarikat Islam.166 
Sagaf, however, was not known tor any special religious talent, and his prestige appears
163 Refer to BRP [British Resident, Pahang] 1382/1923: ‘Sharikat al Islam at Beserah’.
164 Refer to SUK T 1033/1342: ‘Pakatan Syarikat Islam’.
165 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 32, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
166 Refer to Exhibits P-S, Thomson Report, pp. 137-140, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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to have been derived from his famous parentage, descent from a Hadhrami family 
renowned in Terengganu, and his title, sayid, which indicates a claim to descent from 
the Prophet Muhammad himself Due to his prestige, people in the hulu region made 
him offerings of rice, and sometimes also of their own land. Evidently, they sometimes 
also made cash gifts to him, which Sagaf was suspected of exploiting for his own 
enrichment.167 Sagaf was certainly wealthy—enough to indulge his interest in motorised 
vehicles. He owned a motorcycle, and a car, branded Grey, which would have cost as 
much as $3,500.164 He was also a landowner, and was given a grant of land in the 
Telemong Valley by the royal family, on which he grew rubber. This grant was 
contested in court by one Penghulu Mamat on behalf of rakyat who claimed it as their 
customary land.170 He was also known to have established a ‘club* 1 called Iliran, which 
is reported to have ‘clashed1 with another club, Losong, in Kuala Terengganu.171 *
Environmentalism, Extraction, Islam and Adat
Haji Drahman appeared to have been involved in arguing against adat beliefs and 
practices in favour of scripturalist Islam. The Haji himself defended the rakyat, and the 
shifting cultivation they practiced, in terms of the correct Islamic custodianship of land 
and forests, never in terms of Malay adat practices. British officials, however, brought 
with them ideas of forest and land management which were completely at odds with the 
Haji’s ideas and with Malay adat. British foresters, by 1928, managed every type of 
forest in the world, and reserved forest to serve several ends across the British Empire, 
including industrial development, building government revenue and environmental
l(’7 J.L. Humphreys, Report of the British Agent, November 1917, 18 December 1917, p. 9, C0273/461: 
10804: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
u,s J.L. Humphreys, Report of the British Agent, November 1917, 18 December 1917, p. 9, C0273/461: 
10804.
169 Statement by Muhammad Yusuf bin Salleh to Terengganu Magistrate’s Court, 11 Syaban 1347 [23 
January 1929], MBT 73/1347: ‘Berkehendakan wang harga sebuah motorkar dan belanja-belanja 
berjumlah $573 bagaimana dakwanya’.
1 1 Refer to file notes in CLM 162/1347: ’Syed Sagaf Hulu Telemong (Kampung Pasir Simpul)’.
Unfortunately, the file’s contents are missing.
171 J.L. Humphreys, Report of the British Agent, November 1917, 18 December 1917, p. 9, C0273/461:
10804. Iliran is the name of one town in which Sayid Sagaf was known to live, and Losong is another
town in Terengganu.
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Conservation. Reserved forests required a new kind of management apparatus, one of 
whose aims was to keep populations of unauthorised forest users, including shifting 
cultivators, out. By 1928, the British Empire’s 1,200,000 square meters of revenue­
generating forests had become ‘a global environmental laboratory with innovative 
strategies and new management techniques’, managed by fifty separate forest 
departments, 1,500 officers, and tens of thousands o f ‘native’ officers.172
As Barton has pointed out, two developments in European forest-management 
thinking coincided in the creation of an ‘empire forestry’ model across the British 
Empire. One was that forests would be valued in market terms, to prevent forest-users, 
traders and government officials from undervaluing them, ‘reaping a short-term profit
1 *71
that undermined the value of merchant timber and varied forest products’. To realise 
the market value of forests, however, ‘the forest itself had to be proclaimed, 
demarcated, regulated and policed’.174 The special value of the forest had to be imposed 
on native populations who relied on forest access, and foremost, on shifting cultivators. 
British officials took a more benevolent view of permanent cultivation, as it could be 
kept separate from official forest. Barton has described the development in India of a 
British system under which land belonged to its cultivators if it was proven to be 
permanently cultivated. All other land, including fallow swiddens, became state 
property. Permanent cultivation was encouraged in all settings, as the very mobility of 
shifting cultivators became a threat to the orderly management of forests. Gradually, a 
‘complicated attitude’ grew to govern customary use rights, under which these rights 
were acknowledged where they did not clash with state prerogatives, but where they 
entailed shifting cultivation, they were to be stamped out.175
The growth of forestry as a professional discipline in colonial holdings was 
linked to the deepening and intensification of state control over territory in hinterland
172 Gregory Allen Barton, Empire Forestiy and the Origins o f Environmentalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 1-4.
173 Ibid., 74.
174 Ibid., 75.
17:1 Ibid. For further details of how forest departments in Malaya were constituted, refer to Kathirithamby- 
Wells, Nature and Nation: Forests and Development in Peninsular Malaysia, Chp. 1.
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areas. Forestry departments’ management of forests therefore only partly consisted of 
‘applied biology’, and forest management was also ‘political, economic and even a 
cultural undertaking’ . 176 Forestry departments and forest guards constituted an extension 
of state surveillance into the hinterland and represented colonial states’ urge to order 
landscapes and populations. Their claim to large areas of territory, however, was the 
most contentious aspect of their practice. It caused friction with other government 
agencies, and with other forest users who possessed a pre-existing claim to the forest. 
Government offices were built to lead the work of keeping shifting cultivators out of 
forests, like the one British officials established in Kuala Berang. The government 
complex there represented both the colonial government’s claim to exclusive 
entitlement to forest territory, and its increased capacity to realise revenues from land, 
timber and non-timber forest products.
The Kuala Berang offices also represented the Malayan authorities’ wish to 
concentrate food production by Malays in lowland irrigated rice (sawah) cultivation. 
There were several reasons for this policy, including the perceived need to ensure rice 
self-sufficiency. Further, British officials wished to concentrate rubber holdings in large 
British enterprises, and a range of smaller Chinese ones, by eliminating Malay swidden 
rubber. This policy, combined with a racialised British vision of Malays as fixed, rice­
growing peasants, came together to put serious pressure on shifting cultivation as a 
livelihood source. Shahridan has referred the Terengganu government’s effort to stamp 
out shifting cultivation as ‘disciplining the land’ . 177 For British officials, Terengganu’s 
forested hinterland was imagined as a wild and disorderly space which needed ordering, 
not as a zone of cultivation and resource access as the rakyat viewed it. The interests of 
forest-oriented cultivators, and their rush to grow rubber in forested areas, clashed 
irrevocably with the colonial government’s claim to forest management.
In implementing their forest-management priorities, British officials in Malaya 
also recognised that Malaya’s forests were full of human activity, mostly organised
176 Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Lee Peluso, "Empires of Forestry: Professional Forestry and State 
Power in Southeast Asia, Part 1," Environment and History 12, no. 1 (2006), 35.
177 Shahridan Faiez bin Mohideen Abdul Kader, "Mapping Modernities in Trengganu" .
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around the rivers that flowed through them. For example Clifford, the British Resident 
in Pahang who had great experience of the East Coast’s forests, referred to these rivers 
as ‘[njature’s macadamised road[s]\ Even unnavigable streams served as tracks, 
followed on foot until they became navigable by raft or boat, such as the track he found 
which led from Terengganu to Kelantan through the dense forest.174 These rivers and 
tracks were essential to shifting cultivators seeking to access customary forest sites and 
to transport goods to market.
In the 1920s, a number of British officials were also aware of the principles by
which many Malay shifting cultivators approached forest use. The principles which
guided cultivators had previously consisted of a syncretic mix of adat and Islam, as
were the principles which governed land ownership and use rights. By the 1920s,
however, these principles were being increasingly Islamised by ulama who frowned
upon adat. So W.G. Maxwell, a naturalist and Chief Secretary of the FMS, wrote in
1925 that Malays, although Muslim, continued to ask forest spirits for protection,
observing ‘due ceremony and incantation’. He also noted that such practices were
• • 1 8 1looked upon with ‘disfavour’ by Hajis and Arab shaykhs as ‘heathen superstitions’. 
Haji Drahman’s defence of the Terengganu rakyat must he understood in terms of this 
trend, in which he was an active participant. Eager to both argue against British claims 
to Terengganu’s land and forests, and to demonstrate his authority over the rakyat and 
Islamists, the Haji steered the movement towards Islamism. Islam became the political 
basis for defending shifting cultivation, and adat was granted no political place 
whatsoever. The Terengganu uprising was produced from the clash between British 
priorities and the Islamised defence of forest access that Haji Drahman and the Islamists 
were now mounting.
178 Hugh Clifford, In Court & Kampong (BiblioBazaar, LLC, 2009), 11.
179 Ibid.
180 George Maxwell, In Malay Forests (Edinburgh; London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1925), 1 1.
181 Ibid., 145.
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The people in the Tersat also complained of delay in the issue o f passes at Kuala 
Berang, and of having to wait therefor two or three days... “Penghulu " Salleh 
said that the peasant was being fleeced to make the Raja rich. The people up 
there struck me as very poor, and I think the collection of these fees is a 
hardship. They have no rice, except what they plant after Sakai fashion. 
“Penghulu ” Salleh complained that Government took no care of the rayat
there...
Hugh Patterson Bryson, Collector of Land Revenue and former Settlement Collector,
182reporting his experience in the Tersat River valley, 1928.
Even eating is not as important as getting a pass.
Haji Tahir, Imam, Hulu Berang, speaking of his grievances caused by colonial forest 
regulations at a meeting with the Sultan, Kuala Berang, 19281X3
Statemaking
The Terengganu uprising emerged from a complicated contest for Terengganu’s land 
and forests, making the hulu a focus for British officials and the Malay royal family. 
Beginning in the 1890s, these two groups engaged each other in a series of moves and 
counter-moves to gain control over the hulu. Their actions ultimately encroached on the 
rakyaTs access to their customary swidden sites, rubber plots and orchards in the forest. 
Later, in the 1920s, the rakyat hulu themselves became players in the contest, rebelling 
against government regulations in greater numbers as the decade progressed. Before 
1919, however, the contest was played out at the elite level, and focused on realising 
sufficient power to subject the hulu to government. Both sides wished to subject the 
hulu to a ‘government of the environment’, which would enable the victor to direct 
how forest resources would be understood, organised, accessed, divided and utilised. In
182 Statement by H.P. Bryson, 26 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 52, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
183 Statement by Haji Tahir bin Mat Zin, n.d. [probably 4 May 1928], SUK T, 1295/1346.
184 Arun Agrawal, Environmental ity: Technologies o f Government and the Making o f Subjects (Durham; 
London: Duke University Press, 2005), 159.
doing so, they would also need to govern people, that is, to implement a ‘calculated 
direction of human conduct’1X5 in the hulu.
Just as Sivaramakrishnan has observed of colonial Bengal, realising the power 
to govern Terengganu’s environment was constituted as an exercise in boundary 
drawing at two levels: over the landscape, and between the state and its subjects. At 
the level of the landscape, boundary-drawing in Terengganu related to competing efforts 
to explicitly subject the state to ‘internal territorialisation’, a modem technology of 
power by which states ‘divide their territories into complex and overlapping political 
and economic zones, rearrange people and resources within these units, and create 
regulations delineating how and by whom these areas can be used.’ British officials 
worked to attain sufficient power to set boundaries between delimited zones of 
Terengganu’s land area. These boundaries were to separate forested from cultivated 
space, government land from privately-owned land, and one landowner from another. 
These boundaries would constitute an important technology of govemmentality, 
enabling the exercise of rational and technocratic government over the hulu. 
Conversely, their opponent, Sultan Zainal Abidin III, worked to preserve his own power 
to draw such boundaries on his terms.
The Sultan responded by establishing his own system of formalised 
documentary land title. Yet the logic which drove his exercise in boundary-making was 
different to that which drove the British. The Sultan’s priorities were not so much about 
delimiting land by use category, and he only did this to alienate land to private mining 
or agricultural interests. More central to his motivation was alienating land to his family 
and kerahat, so this group could retain its control over Terengganu’s resources. This 
remained the Sultan’s objective even if his move to formalised land title changed the 
basis on which this control was organised-—formalising land title marked a sharp break
IX:i Mitchell Dean, Govemmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London; Thousand Oaks; New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), 2.
IX(l K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental Change in Colonial Eastern 
India (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), Chp 1.
1X7 N. L. Peluso and P. Vandergeest, "Genealogies of the Political Forest and Customary Rights in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand," Journal o f Asian Studies (2001), 762.
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with the existing practices of both royals and rakyat in Terengganu. Nevertheless, for 
British officials and royals, gaining sufficient power to draw these boundaries was the 
main objective of the contest for landscape.
Related to bounding the landscape was drawing boundaries between state and 
subject. Before 1919, this boundary-drawing effort related to relationships within 
Terengganu’s hybrid colonial government, in which successive British Agents or 
Advisers shared power uncomfortably with successive Sultans. This arrangement had 
resulted from Terengganu’s phased colonisation, in which British officials inched 
themselves in to government incrementally. It was also a result of the British practice of 
‘indirect rule’ through Sultans and their State Councils, composed of royal and colonial 
advisers. This structure in Terengganu allowed the colonial government itself to remain 
a site of competition between British officials and the Sultan, until two important 
developments tipped the balance of power towards the British. These developments 
were the death of Sultan Zainal Abidin III in 1918, and the subsequent abdication of his 
successor, Muhammad Syah II, in 1920.
These events marked key points in a phased process by which British officials 
established formal colonial rule in Terengganu. Under the first phase, which began in 
1910, Sultan Zainal Abidin III had been pressured into accepting a British Agent in his 
court, officials described as holding powers ‘similar to those of a Consular Officer’.188 
The second phase began in 1919 after his death, and was defined by the presence in 
Terengganu of a British Adviser. The changed nomenclature for Britain’s representative 
in Terengganu reflected a greatly increased measure of power for Britain within the 
colonial government. The Adviser’s powers were established in a 1919 agreement 
between Britain and Terengganu, which established that his ‘advice must be asked and 
acted upon in all matters affecting the general administration of the country and all 
questions other than those touching the Muhammadan Religion’. The agreement also
188 ‘Agreement between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Terengganu’, 22 April 1910, 
Maxwell and Gibson, eds., Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, 112-13.
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allowed the Adviser the power over the ‘collection and disbursement’ of all state
189revenues.
In the move from Agent to Adviser, Britain’s representative gained the power 
to establish and enforce a boundary between himself, as administrator, and the 
administered, namely Terengganu’s populations, including its royal family. The Sultan 
could now be pressed to relinquish his power to territorialise. Restricting the royal 
family’s capacity to block British measures in the hulu empowered the British Adviser 
to establish government there in Britain’s name. British officials’ increased power to 
draw boundaries at both levels—over the landscape and between themselves and the 
Sultan—enabled the process Sivaramakrishnan has described as ‘statemaking’. An 
inherently spatial process, statemaking is ‘a matter of organising political subjection 
within a defined territory...and imbuing this subjection with legitimacy’.190
The demarcation of territory and the demarcation of power were both essential 
to British control over the hulu, and rationalised their capacity to extract and exploit 
mineral, timber and other forest resources. Competing tor, and winning, the power to 
delimit Terengganu’s territory into specific parcels therefore constituted a primary act 
of agency for British officials in Terengganu. The gradual assumption by the British of 
the power to territorialise Terengganu therefore also marked the gradual expropriation 
of this power from the Sultan and his successors. This expropriation, however, was not 
straightforwardly achieved, and the steps both sides took within this contest together 
began to increase the pressure on the rakyat hulu.
The Sultan’s Gambit
As Sutherland has noted of the period before 1909, Terengganu’s royal family was too 
well-connected and well-informed not to see ‘the writing on the wall’191—the British 
were coming. Recognising the threat of colonial rule, the Sultan moved to categorise
189 ‘Agreement between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Trengganu’, 24 May 1919, 
Ibid., 113.
90 Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental Change in Colonial Eastern 
India, 8-9.
191 Sutherland, "The Transformation of the Terengganu Legal Order," 6.
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and delimit land use and ownership. No formal system of land alienation existed in 
Terengganu, but nineteenth century Sultans had previously moved to tighten their 
control over the hulu by replacing district chiefs with ‘appointed officials sent from 
Kuala Terengganu’. 192 Now Sultan Zainal Abidin III introduced a system which 
bypassed hulu chiefs altogether, and consisted of grants of concessions to private 
interests, mainly his kerabat. The Sultan quickly alienated large areas of land in this 
way, dividing up much of Terengganu’s hinterland before a British Agent was 
appointed. As the Agent’s powers were nominal, the Sultan continued to grant 
concessions until his death in 1918. From 1919, British Advisers found many of these 
concessions interfered with their territorial aims, which reflected technocratic resource 
management aims.
The Sultan’s pre-emptive counter-territorialisation was therefore a primary act 
of territorial contestation by Terengganu’s elite, and not only a means of securing 
independent incomes for kerabat, as Shaharil has argued. The Sultan’s actions 
contributed to British officials’ view that land reform was urgent. Indeed, land reform 
became a defining early challenge for colonial officials seeking to establish government 
over Terengganu. The new land use regime they formulated, however, could not be laid 
over a blank, unregulated territorial surface. Instead, it was initially established as a 
secondary layer of regulation, around the private concessions. British officials were 
forced to attempt to supersede the royal system without successfully extinguishing it, 
creating two co-existing and competing systems of land alienation.
Before the Sultan’s rush to formalise royal territorial control in the hinterland, 
the royal circle’s power to develop mining or commercial crop areas was exercised by 
simply issuing royal commands (titah). On this basis, an earlier sultan, Baginda Omar 
(r. 1839-1876), developed tin mines in Kemaman district, whose output he sold through 
Chinese middlemen.194 Later, Sultan Zainal Abidin III continued to use titah to open
192 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 70.
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Ibid., 75. 
Ibid., 69.
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pepper plantations in Kemasik.195 As Shaharil has argued, therefore, it was only under
the sultan’s new concession system that documentary title emerged as an instrument
enabling land management.196 Zainal Abidin began issuing concession deeds in 1889,
licensing concession holders to develop lands under lease in any way they saw fit, with
very few restrictions as occasionally deemed necessary. As Shaharil has pointed out,
1
during this phase the Sultan was mostly granting concessions to overseas interests, 
including Messrs Guthrie and Company— a Singapore-based British company which 
ran mines in Bandi, Kemaman, and the East Asiatic Company— a Danish plantation 
enterprise which also controlled the east coast cargo trade.199
Precisely during this period, Britain made its interest in the distribution o f 
Terengganu’s land resources explicit to its ruler. In 1902, Britain and Siam signed an 
agreement which established that Terengganu was no longer an independent tributary of 
Siam, but a dependency under its formal control.200 This agreement was aimed at ending 
the uncertainty o f tributary relationships, but importantly, it was also directed against 
Zainal Abidin’s freedom to independently allot land to private parties. To this end, 
Article III explicitly limited the Terengganu ruler’s ability to grant land concessions to 
foreigners without first gaining consent from Siam, the power now granted sole control 
over Terengganu’s territory by the agreement. The agreement, however, did not 
prevent the Sultan’s next move.
Sultan Zainal Abidin III immediately responded by accelerating the grant o f 
concessions, in perpetuity this time, and primarily to his family and kerabat. In this 
fashion, by 1910, more than twenty concessions were issued. There were two types, the 
first called cap zuriat (seals o f bequest, denoting inheritance), which he gave to his
195
196
197
198
199
Ibid., 70. 
Ibid., 71. 
Ibid., 72-73. 
Ibid., 73-74. 
Ibid.
200 ‘Declaration and Draft Agreement, 1902. Kelantan and Trengganu’, 6 October 1902, Maxwell and 
Gibson, eds., Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, 85-87.
2111 ‘Declaration and Draft Agreement, 1902. Kelantan and Trengganu’, 6 October 1902, Ibid.
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family members; and the second called cap kurnia (seals of munificence, denoting 
gifting) tor his kerabat. These concessions bounded and alienated more large sections of 
Terengganu’s forested hinterland before the British gained the opportunity to assert 
their own control. Concessions were not bounded by area and could simply refer to 
entire river valleys.
In 1909, Britain and Siam signed a new treaty which reversed the position 
established in 1902. In the new treaty, Siam transferred ‘all rights of suzerainty, 
protection, administration, and control whatsoever’ over Terengganu directly to 
Britain.'"02 This transfer of control marked a new phase in the struggle for territorial 
control over Terengganu’s hinterland, which continued to rage with greater ferocity than 
ever. W.L. Conlay was appointed as British Agent in 1910, and he immediately gained 
the Sultan’s signature on a treaty which prevented him from granting mining 
concessions of more than 500 acres, or other land concessions of more than 3,000 acres, 
‘to any person other than natives and subjects of Trengganu’. The Sultan had 
therefore retained the power to alienate land, but Conlay had succeeded in limiting 
grants by area, and continued to work to bound them in duration. After the treaty 
Conlay authored a report which recommended preventing ‘concessions of indefinite 
area’ from exceeding a duration of ten years. After ten years, he recommended that 
concessions be limited to ‘the area actually under cultivation’, with the remainder 
reverting to the government, and re-issued for 99 years. He also recommended that 
boundaries be determined on all concessions, and land rent be paid on areas still under 
concession after ten years. He also recommended a cap on the size of concessions for 
natives and subjects.204
No formal agreement was achieved to adopt Conlay’s recommendations. 
Instead, concessions continued to feature repeatedly in the reports of British Agents as 
an issue of contention. Further, the personal enrichment enabled by the concession
2(12 Treaty between Great Britain and Siam, 10 March 1909, Ibid., 88-94.
203 ‘Agreement between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Trengganu’, 22 April 1910, 
Ibid., 112.
204 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 82. Refer to Shaharil also for a detailed discussion of the grant 
and development of mining and agricultural concessions by commercial interests in Terengganu.
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system led to land alienation taking on a speculative quality. In 1914, apparently even 
the beach near the British agency had been fenced off for coconut plantations. ' This 
land had provided a football field and a golf and horse-riding course for the Agent’s 
guests. In 1916, the serving British Agent, J.L. Humphreys, reported that 
‘[development is hindered by the huge areas given out in concessions’. By May 
1916, the ‘land-grabbing mania’ had advanced to include the Raja Muda (Sultan’s 
successor, later Muhammad Syah II), ‘uprooting both Muhammadan and Chinese 
graves from private land in the Town’. 207
Successive British Agents had, by this stage, adapted their attempts to wrest 
distributive power over territory for themselves. They also attempted means other than 
negotiating directly with the royals. For example, a Land Office had been established in 
1912, under a courtly official, Tengku Chik Ahmad, as Commissioner of Lands. The 
Land Office, however, often continued to grant land to the Sultan’s family and kerabat, 
and two of the Sultan’s sons-in-law were taken to court for the fraudulent acquisition of 
land in this way.“ Further, as Shaharil has pointed out, by 1916, the Land Office had 
issued very few planting and mining leases, which it was specifically empowered to 
perform, and the Sultan’s kerabat also continued to be granted land outside the Land 
Office’s auspices.2<)g In one case, in 1917, a Japanese man called Kendo, the Sultan’s 
Medical Attendant, was granted 20,000 acres o f mining land, and the Sultan’s brother- 
in-law, Tengku Abu Bakar, was granted an unspecified area in Dungun. According to
Humphreys, who experienced some trouble gaining information on the land transfers,
210these grants were conducted ‘with some secrecy’.
205 J L Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, May 1916, 31 May 1916, p. 7, C0273/445: 
32544: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
206 J.L. Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, October, November and December 1916, 
10 January 1917, p. 1, C0273/459: 8172: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
207 J L Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, May 1916, 31 May 1916, p. 7, C0273/445: 
32544.
208 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 103.
209 Ibid.
210 J.L. Humphreys, ‘Report of the British Agent, Trengganu, for December 1917’, 10 January 1918, p. 3, 
C0273/471: 14021.
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Yet even after the Sultan’s death, his concessions were still successfully 
preventing British land grants as concessions to other private interests. This obstruction, 
at times, and depending on the disposition of the concession-holder, could hold up the 
production of commodities for export, a major problem for the colonial government, 
intent on developing Terengganu’s resource-extraction economy. Concessions delayed 
the development of the mining industry in Kemaman, at Terengganu’s southern end, 
where the Bandi, Sungai Ayam, Tebak, Kajang and Cenderong tin and wolfram mines 
were located. It was impossible to expand mining further, however, because of six very 
large concessions to royal family members which covered five-sixths of Kemaman’s
total area. 211 In 1918, Humphreys reported that ‘[t]he enormous ruling house
212concessions in Trengganu are a serious danger to the welfare of the state.’
British officials’ moves to gain sufficient power to implement their territorial 
strategies had resulted in no more than a tenuous capacity to act. Aside from the issues 
surrounding concessions, even the site for the British Agency in Bukit Losong, Kuala 
Terengganu, was contested. This site became subject of lengthy negotiations between 
Humphreys and Haji Ngah, the Sultan’s secretary.213 Yet the prerogatives of colonial 
land and forest management necessitated this drive to delimit and give territorial order 
to Terengganu’s landscape. One further impetus to this push for territory in Terengganu 
was the British government’s interest in sourcing mineral resources from its colonial 
possessions to further its efforts in the First World War. Associated with the power to 
grant and delimit concessions was the power to extract minerals and control their use. 
The conflict over territorialisation and the mining associated with it came to a head in 
1918, with the Bucknill Commission, launched to investigate the general 
‘maladministration’ of Terengganu.
211 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, 86-93.
212 J.L. Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, November 1918, p. 2 December 1918, 
C0273/474: 6941: ‘Journal of British Agent, Trengganu’.
212 J L Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, May 1916, 31 May 1916, p. 7, C0273/445: 
32544.
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The commission was headed by Sir John Bucknill, the Chief Justice of the 
Straits Settlements, and assisted by H. Marriott, the Acting Colonial Treasurer, and 
F.M. Elliott, head of the legal firm Messrs Bodyk and Davidson, also a member of the 
Straits Settlements Legislative Council.214 Questions of land and resources dominated 
proceedings. Sultan Zainal Abidin III was asked to defend his decisions relating to 
several concessions, including that for the Bandi Mine in Kemaman, where ‘gambling, 
adultery, [and] quarrelling’ were rife, interrupting tin supply from the mine at a time 
when ‘the production of tin was of utmost importance to the British Empire for the 
furtherance of the War.’215 Along the same lines, the Sultan was questioned about the 
grant of mining concessions to Japanese interests, including to his Medical Attendant 
Kondo, whom he had permitted to export ores and minerals without restriction as to 
destination. This contradicted his instructions to District Officers in Terengganu to only 
export minerals to Singapore during the war, especially tin and wolfram.
It also emerged that Kondo had been granted a large agricultural concession in 
addition to his mining concession.^ The Sultan was also asked to defend his grant, this 
time to himself, of 20,000 acres of non-contiguous and unbounded land, which he 
would personally select for himself anywhere in Terengganu, on top of 30,000 acres in 
Kemaman. Under this grant, the Sultan selected land in the Jengai River valley, rich in 
wolfram, closing off the area to others, but undertook to lease land to other prospectors 
and gain an income from ‘premia, rents and export duty’. The Commission concluded 
by recommending that the British Agent in Terengganu have his powers upgraded to 
those of a British Adviser as soon as possible, but no agreement to this effect was 
achieved. British officials had therefore not yet won the power to determine how 
Terengganu would be territorialised.
214 L. Guillemard to Colonial Office, 23 December 1918, C0273/474: 6947.
215 ‘Notes of an Interview at Government House given by His Excellency the High Commissioner to His 
Highness the Sultan of Trengganu’, 18 July 1918, pp. 1-2, C0273/474: 6947.
216 ‘Notes of an Interview at Government House’, pp. 5-6, C0273/474: 6947.
217 ‘Notes of an Interview at Government House’, pp. 7-8, C0273/474: 6947.
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In 1918, the Sultan died and was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Syah II. 
British officials in Singapore immediately invited the Sultan to visit them, and began to 
pressure the new Sultan to accept a British Adviser in his court. One official wrote of 
‘convincing’ the Sultan to ‘see the wisdom of asking for the appointment of a British 
Adviser’ himself.218 Yet it was also recognised that Sultan Muhammad was also
219‘exposed to very strong domestic pressure’ to refuse to cooperate with the British.” 
Soon Sir Arthur Young, Governor of the Straits Settlements, wrote that Sultan 
Muhammad refused to ‘voluntarily’ ask for an Adviser himself. Sultan Muhammad 
had attempted to stall as much as possible on the issue, citing ill health as a reason not 
to attend negotiations in Singapore. When he finally arrived in Singapore in April 1919, 
he brought with him four advisers, ‘who had been consistently against his accepting a 
British Adviser’.
After negotiations of several days, however, an Adviser was imposed, ‘who 
would regulate the administration of the Land Office, Courts and Treasury’. ” As 
Shaharil has outlined, Humphreys, who became Terengganu’s first British Adviser in 
1919, assumed responsibility for regulating the Land Office within two days of his 
appointment. Even before this, while still a British Agent in 1918, he had reported that 
he was in the process of drafting ‘Forest Rules and Procedures for the Issue of Land 
Grants’. 222 The urgency Humphreys showed reflected British officials’ need to define 
the colonial government’s territorial agency, and their need to finally wrest control from 
the Sultan of the ability to act as the prime arbiter of Terengganu’s forest resources.
With his new powers as Adviser, and with the Land Office now brought more 
firmly under his control, Humphreys was empowered to begin claiming Terengganu’s 
forests for the government. Further, in 1920, Sultan Muhammad Syah II abdicated, and 
was succeeded by his younger brother, Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah (r. 1920-
218 File notes, C0273/474: 6947.
219 File notes, C0273/474: 6947.
220 Arthur Young to Colonial Office, 4 June 1919, C0273/487: 39802, ‘Administration of Trengganu’.
221 Arthur Young to Colonial Office, 4 June 1919, C0273/487: 39802.
222 Refer to "Annual Report of the British Adviser, Terengganu," (Singapore: Government Printer, 1918).
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1942). J.W. Simmons, British Adviser from 1925 to 1927, characterised Sultan 
Sulaiman as ‘weak, uneducated and effeminate’, in addition to being unpopular with his 
subjects, not to mention ‘too effete and fatuous to earn their admiration’. Sulaiman, 
however, was useful to the British, as he allowed their agenda in Terengganu to be 
implemented.
Despite Sulaiman’s cooperation, the royal concessions created by Sultan Zainal 
Abidin III had nevertheless not simply disappeared, and British officials had not secured 
their abolition. The situation that ensued was therefore extremely complicated. British 
officials continued in their drive to delimit by introducing regulations which imposed 
distinctions between forest space— for resource management and conservation, and 
cultivated space— for growing rice and cash crops. They also introduced the Torrens 
System, under which the state would retain a central register of landholdings, which 
would not be permitted to overlap.
These two changes proceeded together, and their effects were not always easy to 
separate. Now there were two sets o f measures transforming land use in the hulu—royal 
concessions and British regulations. These measures combined began to transform 
relationships between the rakyat hulu and the forests from which they gained their 
livelihoods. The rakyat hulu experienced this time o f competition, and the ascendance 
of colonial land and forest management, as a serious pressure on their livelihoods. 
Every move and counter-move by either side limited opportunities for shifting 
cultivation. In addition, the rakyat hulu experienced the 1920s as a time of increased 
visibility to the state, and o f the increased presence o f the state in their lives.
Kuala Berang, Torrens and Political Forests
The colonial government, now characterised by a new balance of power between British 
and royal officials, moved quickly to establish its presence in the hulu. The government 
began to push further up the Terengganu River, to Kuala Berang and the Terengganu’s 
tributaries upstream from it. Kuala Berang had once been a location of great prestige. In
223 J.W. Simmons, 22 October 1928, appended to Sir H. Marriott to Colonial Office, 6 December 1928, 
C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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the eighteenth century, under Sultan Zainal Abidin I, it had been the seat of the 
Terengganu sultanate. Before the sultanate’s establishment, it had been a source of 
Islam in Terengganu and the peninsula, its arrival engraved on the Terengganu Stone. 
Now, in the 1920s, Kuala Berang was transformed by the British into a regional 
administrative centre. The British, like previous rulers, could see that Kuala Berang was 
special. It was very strategically located, consisting of a group of settlements at the 
kuala (confluence), of the Terengganu and two of its tributaries, the Tersat and the 
Berang. It was therefore a very good position from which to increase the rakyat hulu’s 
visibility to the state’s operatives, and its integration into the state’s structures. In 1921 
it was proposed to establish a commissioner’s office there, to carry out the 
government’s work among the rakyat who lived along these rivers. The presence of the 
office would reduce speculation over exact population numbers in the area, and would 
rectify a lack of administrative capacity which was hampering the government’s success 
in collecting land revenue.
The commissioner was to be vested with the powers of a magistrate, would 
look after a small treasury, and land and forestry offices and a police station could be 
co-located with his office. Revenue collection and the issue of permits for various 
activities could then be enforced more effectively. A Kuala Berang office would mean 
that the estimated 13,339 rakyat in the area would not have to travel so far to meet their 
obligations to the state.224 By 1923, the government’s efforts to increase land revenue 
collection, such as this initiative in Kuala Berang, were already working: whereas in 
1922 only $21,664 had been collected in land revenue, estimates foreshadowed a land 
revenue total of $57,000 for 1923. Kuala Berang was also important to the 
government as a collection point for forest products. The management and exploitation 
of these inland resources, and their transportation to the coast and subsequent trade 
abroad, formed a major objective of colonial rule in Malaya.“  Forests around Kuala
224 Deputy Chief Minister to British Adviser, 22 November 1928, MBT 203/1340: ‘Hendak diadakan 
pesuruhjaya di Kuala Berang’.
22’ Terengganu Estimates, 1341, p. 2, CO717/30: 50417: ‘Trengganu Estimates for 1341’.
226 T.N. Harper, "Forest Politics in Colonial Malaya," Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 1 (1997), 31.
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Berang were also the site of unregulated and mobile rice and cash crop production by
227the rakyat hulu.
The Office of the Commissioner, Kuala Berang, was required to help in the 
effort to extend government into the hulu. Extending the state’s ambit was central to the 
government gaining the capacity it desired to enforce its regulations uniformly over 
Terengganu’s entire land surface. The office, and the complex around it in which forest, 
district and police officers were stationed, became instrumental in enforcing the new 
regulations which British officials simultaneously introduced. This complex of offices, 
including a houseboat and a rifle store, became a key instrument for clearing the hulu's 
forests of cultivators. This formed one of the new forest regulations’ main objectives. 
Through the offices, the government could also monitor work to attach the rakyat to 
fixed plots separate from the forest over which they could now claim title. This was a 
central objective of the Torrens System. Through these means, therefore, the forest 
around Kuala Berang, as in other areas of the Malay Peninsula, would become subject 
to a ‘total monopoly of the forest’ for the colonial government. This process, which 
Kathirithamby-Wells has described as ‘appropriating the forest’,22t) proceeded very 
quickly, without official debate. Terengganu’s experience of forest appropriation 
mirrored previous experiences in Selangor and Perak, where shifting cultivation had 
been banned as early as the 1880s  ^ to aid the creation of ordered forest zones for 
plantations, mining and logging. The British template for governing Terengganu’s 
forests, therefore, had already been perfected elsewhere.
The instruments of this appropriation consisted of a series of legislative 
enactments, pushed through by British Advisers who were now much more confident of 
having their reforms accepted by the Sultan. Even before the formal colonial takeover in 
1919, however, the British Agent, J.L. Humphreys, was ready. In 1921 he introduced a 
set of regulations, ‘brought into force to control the indiscriminate clearing of forest for
227 Refer to SUK T 1295/1346, which contains a number ofpengaduan (statements of grievances) by 
rakyat who referred to felling forest to grow rubber, not padi.
228 Kathirithamby-Wells, Nature and Nation: Forests and Development in Peninsular Malaysia, 59.
229 Ibid., Chp. 3.
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1 T 1gardens of hill-padi and other non-permanent crops’. The enactment was profoundly 
challenging to the rakyat, creating new understandings o f the role of land and forests in 
Terengganu’s social life. As Humphreys described, the regulations included the 
following:
(1) That a Land Office Permit for temporary occupation, with an annual 
payment of 50 cents an acre, was required o f all future clearings; and
(2) That no forest o f more than 7 years’ growth was to be felled.
These regulations obviously took direct aim at those who cleared areas o f forest 
for their livelihoods, centred as they were on preventing shifting cultivation. The 
legislation also created a new category o f land, ‘tanah kerajaan’ (government land), 
which could be in towns or rural areas, and automatically included all rivers and 
streams, tributaries and canals. It also covered forests, making reference to ‘hutan 
kerajaan’ (government forests), located on tanah kerajaan. This government land could 
then be leased to parties with the issue of a permit— the passes that the rakyat hulu 
would be required to apply for to clear swiddens. Any party found to be squatting on 
government land without such a pass, felling government forests on government land, or 
gathering any o f the products available from it, could be fined up to $500, or jailed for 
up to six months, and all their structures and cultivated plants destroyed.“'^ As Zahir has 
pointed out, the same regulations were issued twice, first in 1921 and later in 1926, as 
the Land Enactment 5/13 44.233
The new policy requiring passes for forest felling mirrored the system of 
Temporary Occupation Licenses (TOL), which already operated in all the other Malay 
States on the peninsula, and allowed the temporary use o f government, mining or 
reserve land. Freely-available land which had been appropriated by the government 
could now be leased back if it was not being used for some other purpose at the time of
231 Tan Sri Datuk Mohamed Zahir, "Land Laws in the Unfederated Malay States to 1966," in The 
Centenary o f the Torrens System in Malaysia, ed. Tan Sri Datuk Professor Ahmad Ibrahim and Judith 
Sihombing (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 1989), 63.
232 Undang-undang Tanah Kerajaan Terengganu, MBT 864/1344: ’Undang-undang Tanah’.
233 Tan Sri Datuk Mohamed Zahir, "Land Laws in the UMS," 63-64.
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application for the license. Under this system in Terengganu as elsewhere, rakyat 
clearing swiddens would now be squatters in government forests unless issued with a 
pass. The system of passes enabled the creation of what Peluso and Vandergeest have 
referred to as ‘political forests’ in Terengganu— forested spaces in which state 
authorities came to ‘supersede the rights, claims and practices o f people’ who interact 
with them.234 In Terengganu as in other colonial contexts, the state took this action 
against the resistance o f forest users.235
The rakyat hulu occupied a special position in relation to Terengganu’s political 
forest. Terengganu’s forested hinterland was distinct from areas closer to the coast, on 
which stable, wet-rice cultivation {sawah or bendang) was much more likely to be 
performed. Shifting cultivation (huma or ladang) was performed by the rakyat hulu 
specifically. Further, as observed by H. Clifford, the British Resident in Pahang in 1895, 
the rakyat hulu also collected freely-available forest goods to ‘supply large quantities o f 
jungle produce’ to local chiefs, using a network o f narrow jungle paths. This trade 
was encouraged by royal officials in Kuala Terengganu and their hulu representatives, 
who bought it from the rakyat for very low prices, sometimes in a form of taxation 
known as serah [surrender of goods]. These goods were transported to Kuala 
Terengganu for export.237
Closer to the coast, however, the population was denser, with villages located in 
close proximity, and rice was generally grown in permanent, ploughed plots. The 
coastal population could also access other economic opportunities, especially fishing,
234 Peluso and Vandergeest, "Genealogies of the Political Forest and Customary Rights in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand," 762.
235 Examples of histories of forest resistance in South and Southeast Asia include Ramachandra Guha, 
The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), and Nancy Lee Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and 
Resistance in Java (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
236 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 73.
237 Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, Chp. 2.
238 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 89.
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manufacturing and boat-building.240 The rakyat hulu, however, lived in sparsely- 
scattered villages linked only by river, and used the forest as their primary livelihood 
zone. The sparse hulu population was noted by Clifford in 1895, and continued to be 
reflected in a 1935 Terengganu map created by the FMS and Straits Settlements Survey 
Department.241 They therefore constituted a small minority among Terengganu’s Malay 
population, occupying a forest niche which the rest of its population did not. For the 
rakyat hulu, unlike others in Terengganu, cultivation and other forms of economic 
activity were inseparable from the forest.
A further notable feature of rakyat hulu is that it is consistently characterised in 
archival sources as Malay. None of these shifting cultivators appear to have been 
Semang Batek,242 or a group Dickson referred to as Pangang243—members of non- 
Malay and non-Muslim population of hunter-gatherers now known to live in peninsular 
hinterlands. Indeed, in the 1920s, none of the groups now known collectively as Orang 
Asli were realised to be present in Terengganu at all. This was reflected in the 1921 
Malayan census, which reported Terengganu’s population as 95 per cent ‘Malay’. Two 
qualifiers are required in interpreting this census data. First, counts more closely 
reflected the colonial logic of racial classification in use rather than precise numbers or 
self-declared classifiers.244 Second, counts were certainly less accurate in Terengganu 
than in other states owing to its very recent colonisation, and the very new presence of 
colonial government in the hinterland. In any case, only 32 individual Orang Asli were 
reported to be present in Terengganu at all, and their ethnonyms were subsumed under 
the derogatory label ‘Sakai’.245 The Malay rakyat hulu were therefore constituted as the 
only group of people who regularly used the forest. As the only known hulu population
240 Ibid., 89-96.
241 Ibid., 70, and Maps, pp. x above. Maps in this thesis are based on this 1935 map, the earliest map 
available in the National Library of Australia which displayed the hulu villages.
242 Lye Tuck-Po, Changing Pathways: Forest Degradation and the Batek o f Pahang, Malaysia 
(Lexington Books, 2004), 5.
242 E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, May 1914, 3 June 1914, pp. 7-9, CO 273/411: 
26297: ‘Trengganu Affairs’.
244 For a fuller discussion of the racial logic of the census, see Kahn, Other Malays, 44-55.
24:> Refer to Nathan, "The Census of British Malaya," 125.
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and as a minority in Terengganu, the rakyat hulu were caught up in a ‘politics of 
location’,246 in which they emerged as the singular targets o f the forest regulations.
The separation o f forest from cultivated space, however, was not the only 
strategy o f environmental and territorial governmentality which would affect the rakyat 
hulu. Colonial land reform constituted a second, more general process of change, which, 
while it also affected the rest o f Terengganu’s rakyat, combined with the forest 
regulations to directly limit the rakyat hulu*s particular mobility. Under the Torrens 
System, pioneered in colonial South Australia, the state holds a central register o f land 
holdings, in which title is recorded. The idea was new to Terengganu. The absence o f a 
‘tenurial relationship’ between the Sultan and the population in the peninsular Malay 
States meant that the rakyat*s land-ownership was not formally recorded by a 
centralised state.“ Access to land, especially in sparsely-populated areas away from the 
capital, was relatively free, and individuals and their families could simply use any land 
that had not already come under the possession o f others, or which had not been 
cultivated for three years. Land was therefore owned and inherited without state 
intervention to register that ownership, although it did regularly demand corvee labour 
and a proportion of the produce grown or gathered by the landowner—probably one- 
tenth as in other Malay states.
The Torrens System was introduced in 1926 with the reissued 1921 
regulations. In this respect also, this legislation changed how land would be understood 
in Terengganu. First, boundaries would be centrally-managed— with this enactment the 
colonial government empowered itself as the party entitled to finally determine all land 
claims and land boundaries in Terengganu. The Land Office was also granted the power 
to oversee the demarcation of land-holding boundaries, issue land ownership titles, and 
collect cash revenues on private land. For the government to establish itself in this 
territorial capacity, it empowered itself to appoint agents to make determinations on
24(1 Steve Pile, "Introduction: Opposition, Political Identities and Spaces of Resistance," in Geographies o f 
Resistance, ed. Steve Pile and Michael Keith (Routledge, 1997).
247 David S.Y. Wong, Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1975), 14.
248 Refer to W. E. Maxwell, "Memorandum on the Introduction of a Land Code in the Native States in the 
Malay Peninsula," (Singapore: Office of the Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements, 1894).
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claims and boundaries for it, namely a Commissioner of Lands and a number of 
Collectors of Land Revenue. Owners of land under customary entitlements, or adat, 
were cast in the position of claimants—of land they asserted was theirs—from the 
government.
The government’s agents could direct these claimants to obtain land title 
documents (surat keterangan milik), from the Land Office. If the land claimant failed to 
obtain a document, he or she could be taken to the Terengganu Supreme Court 
(Mahkamah Besar). The court could overrule any claim to ownership of that land. 
Second, the legislation also brought with it the concept of revenue for all land 
smallholdings in Terengganu. This was achieved with the imposition of a quit-rent, a 
form of tax on leased, non-alienated land which British administrators imposed across 
most of their imperial holdings. It was due annually on 1 Muharram. The legislation 
also separated ‘land’, as a category, from anything which might have grown on, or been 
contained under, that land, therefore creating land itself as a commodity, separate from 
the commodities it contained or supported. For this reason, the entitlement to extract 
any timber, stones, sands, clay, or any goods fashioned from these materials, was not 
included in the idea of ownership as expressed in the surat keterangan, and no mining 
was permitted on any land without special permission.
The legislation also introduced technologies privileged by the Torrens System 
to enable centralised determinations of boundaries and ownership, including central 
registers and the techniques and practices of cadastral surveying. Tampering with these 
tools became a punishable offence. Changing or destroying registers, books or 
documents created to enact the legislation, whether by a member of the public or an 
official of the Land Office, carried a maximum sentence of seven years, a $1,000 fine, 
or both. Further, all land in Terengganu would now need to be surveyed, for which the 
land claimant was required to pay all costs. Lodging a dispute with the Land Office over 
a boundary determination would require further surveying, for which the aggrieved 
party would again be required to pay.
Surveying had already been carried out in Terengganu for some years
previously to 1921, with limited success. In 1915 the Land Office began conducting
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survey work,249 but it did not proceed smoothly. Dickson, the British Agent, wrote in 
1915 that ‘[a]s the survey staff consists of one native demarcator, it is obvious that the 
[government] is not in a position to embark on any genuine survey scheme’. To his 
disappointment, he also noted that there was unsurveyed land ‘within 100 yards of the 
land office’ itself.250 By 1921, the situation had improved, but not by very much. The 
1921 Malayan census reported the presence of just eleven ‘consultant engineers and 
surveyors’ in Terengganu—and with meticulous racialist precision it was reported that
? 5 1of these, three were European, five Malay, one Indian, and two ‘Other’.
Surveying work did take place gradually, however, and also proceeded in the 
hulu region, managed from the Kuala Berang government offices. The work often 
proved extremely slow and difficult during the intense rainy season between November 
and January each year, but by October 1924, there were reports that all jetties at 
which rice was landed along the Telemong River had been surveyed. Further, it was
9 0
announced that the surveying of settlement land could proceed within two months. 
The category of settlement land had been created by the 1924 Settlement Enactment,2^ 4 
which enabled the government to order any lands to be demarcated and settled.“ As 
Zahir has described, the Settlement Enactment reinforced the role of surveying in the 
government of Terengganu’s environment, by also requiring boundary marks and 
permanent title documents. ~ Landowners were required to maintain all boundary 
marks with care, and tampering with these was an offence. In 1925 a State Surveying
249 Shahridan Faiez bin Mohideen Abdul Kader, "Mapping Modernities in Trengganu", 149.
250 E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, February 1915, 9 March 1915, p. 6, 
C0273/425: 19310, ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
2?l Nathan, "The Census of British Malaya,"264-321.
252 File note, SUK T 599/1342.
253 ‘J.E.M’, file note, SUK T 599/1342.
254 Tan Sri Datuk Mohamed Zahir, "Land Laws in the UMS," 64-66. No legislation before 1926 was 
available to me at the Arkib Negara Malaysia in 2004.
255 Ibid., 64-65.
256 Ibid., 64-66.
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Department (Jabatan Ukur Negeri Terengganu) was established, and in 1926 it joined 
the all-Malaya Surveying Department as a state branch.257
Figure 5: Candidates for surveyors’ positions receiving instruction from Queensland surveyors, 
Malaya, 1929.258
Surveying was intended to subdue unrecorded and unruly customary claims by 
giving the government the technical capacity to govern ‘a given territory and [control] 
its various apparatuses’.259 British officials’ preference for Torrens was consistent with 
their policy across their colonial possessions, and they held that the Torrens System, by 
vesting land title in private ownership, created ‘security of tenure and the contentment 
that come[s] of the issue of valid titles to land’. To the extent that Torrens created 
security, however, it also presupposed immobile cultivation. British reforms pressured
257 Jabatan Ukur dan Pemetaan Terengganu. “Sejarah JUPEM Terengganu”, JUPEM Maklumat Korporat, 
www.iutr.gov.my (accessed 14 March, 2008).
2 >x Department of Natural Resources and Water, Surveyors Overseas (Queensland Government, 2007 
[accessed 27 Nov 2008]); available from
http://www.nrw.qld.gov.au/museum/articles_complete/surveying/overseas.html .
25l> Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 3.
260 JAR Marriott, High Commissioner, Malay States, to LCMS Amery, MP, Colonial Office, 6 December 
1928, C0717/6E52432.
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the rakyat hulu to select fixed sites for cultivation to which they could gain legal title, 
effectively surrendering their mobile access to the open forest in return for limited plots. 
In the hulu, therefore, Torrens worked together with the forest regulations and the royal 
concessions to push the rakyat off their customary forest swidden sites. In this way, the 
elite contest for the power to territorialise came to be marked by the expropriation of 
territorial power from the rakyat hulu.
The pressure on the rakyat hulu, and their emerging resistance to the effective 
extinguishment o f their customary land entitlements, began as early as 1914, when the 
grant o f royal concessions in the hulu began creating grudges. As Shaharil has pointed 
out, this early territorialisation and alienation gave rise to land disputes. The rakyafs 
participation in these disputes was expressed by simply continuing to clear land for 
planting, regardless o f whom it had been granted to. In 1914 the British Agent reported 
that 200 acres in Kemaman, granted to the Paka Coconut Company, were cleared ‘by 
Malays who insisted] on cutting down jungle land when they found out the company 
wanted it’. Further, the land granted to one Captain Johansen between Paka and 
Kretai continued to be cleared even after his concession was formalised in 1914.“ “ In 
1915, ‘certain small scattered plots o f abandoned pepper land’, or cash crop swiddens, 
were included in the East Asiatic Company’s lease in Kretai.263 Even at this early stage, 
the Sultan’s concessions were already contributing to a climate o f grievance and 
contestation. The rakyat may have been seeking to plant land they understood to be 
theirs; they may also have been positioning themselves to claim concession land later. 
In either case, free access to forest was no longer available.
2<>l E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, June 1914, 15 July 1914, p. 5, CO 273/411: 
30299, ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
202 E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, March 1914, appended to Journal of the 
British Agent, Terengganu, February 1914, p. 7, CO 273/410: 13347: ‘Journal of British Agent, 
Trengganu’.
263 E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, March 1914, appended to Journal of the 
British Agent, Terengganu, February 1914, p. 7, CO 273/410: 13347.
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Land, Law and Authority
It was British land and forest reform, however, that was challenged most openly, in the 
form of unauthorised land clearing. In 1922, the Terengganu River valley emerged as 
the prime site for mass refusals to accept the government’s claim to manage land and 
forest resources. Many rakyat began to refuse, quite openly, to comply with the 
regulations which they felt as restrictions on their economic behaviour. In July and 
August 1922, the government came to know of illegal land clearing in the Telemong 
River valley. The Land Office immediately suspected the rakyafs actions were 
instigated by Haji Drahman. The Land Office summoned 43 men to the Court of the 
Second Magistrate on the charge of clearing land without permits, subject to a $100 
fine.
This point marked Haji Drahman’s most open and vocal intervention on the 
rakyat’s behalf. He acquired a licence as a wakil (legal pleader) to represent the accused 
at the hearing. Tengku Bijaya, the Commissioner of Lands, entrusted a Forest Ranger 
with the prosecution case. What Haji Drahman argued at the hearing amounted to a 
complete rejection of the government’s very claim to possess the authority to manage 
land and forests. Here, it emerged that the rakyaf s resistance was being conceived, at 
least by Haji Drahman, in terms of an Islamist challenge to the colonial government of 
the environment. It was here that Haji Drahman began to narrate the rakyaf s non­
cooperation in terms of Islamic principles relating to land use, and translate these to 
apply to Terengganu’s forests. He was so confident in performing this defence that he 
simply did not acknowledge the authority of the court at all, arguing his case in terms of 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and not British law, which he rejected.
According to Humphreys, who summarised the hearing in November 1922, 
Haji Drahman, "who is very learned in all the Law and the Commentaries’, argued that: 
‘The earth is the Lord’s not the State’s, and the State has no right to land-rent’. 
Apparently the hapless Forest Ranger, leading the prosecution’s case, was 
‘overwhelmed...with Arabic texts’. 264 The Haji’s argument was perfectly consistent
264 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 1, C0717/6L52432.
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with theories o f land management under fiqh— in which the state acts only to administer 
the orderly claim and use o f land. Yet land is ultimately the creation and possession o f 
God alone. The state’s land management practices, therefore, are required to be based 
on principles in fiqh  based on the Qur’an and Hadith,“ ~ the collection of narratives 
which record the tradition o f the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Hadith form 
an important source o f Islamic exegesis and jurisprudence, and establish in syariah that 
land management cannot be conducted in the name o f any authority other than God. So 
thorough was Haji Drahman’s rejection o f British authority that Wan Mahmud, the 
Magistrate and District Officer, was no longer able to conduct proceedings in terms of 
British law, but ended up asking the prosecution to ‘prove that the land was State land’. 
As Humphreys described, ‘the Forest Ranger admitted that he could not cope with this 
demand; and the case was dismissed for want o f evidence’.
The Land Office appealed the verdict to the Supreme Court, and a second 
hearing was organised on 31 October 1922. The appeal was led by a Land Office 
Process Server. Again, Haji Drahman’s case did not even acknowledge the political and 
legal basis o f the Supreme Court’s authority. Again, his argument was based on an 
alternative framework, authorised by a power the court could not cut down to its size— 
God. In this vein, Haji Drahman asked the court questions such as ‘What is the nature of 
Government?’, and ‘What is the nature o f dead land?’ referring to a ‘string of quotations 
from the Koran’. These questions struck at the heart o f the government’s claim to power 
over Terengganu’s land resources. The matter o f ‘dead land’ is central to land regulation 
under fiqh. Under fiqh, and also as adopted in Malaya as Malay adat practice,267 the 
concept of land tenure is linked to land use, a link which, in theory, prevents the 
speculative and unproductive hoarding o f land.268 The idea o f dead land (mawat in 
Arabic, or tanah mati in Malay) refers simply to land which is not ‘used or owned by
265 Siraj Sait and Hilary Lim, Land, Law and Islam: Property and Human Rights in the Muslim World 
(London: Zed Books, 2006), 8.
266 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, pp. 1-2, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
267 Wong, Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States .
268 Sait and Lim, Land, Law and Islam: Property and Human Rights in the Muslim World, 11.
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anyone’, and it can therefore be claimed and ‘enlivened’ (ihya in Arabic), based on the 
Hadith that ‘he who turns dead land into life becomes its owner’.269
This land can therefore be appropriated by any individual who first puts it to 
use, and retained by that individual so long as the land shows signs o f his or her 
labour.27(1 Some authorisation or coordination o f ihya by state agencies is often 
practiced, but not necessarily, depending on the school o f fiqh  to which believers in the 
area subscribed In Terengganu, as in other Malay states, it was probably penghulu and 
other officials who oversaw and mediated land claims and conflict." " Under fiqh, there 
is also a clear notion o f public land or commons, including ‘forests, pastures, rivers, and 
mines and everything found in the sea’, and forest products or trees, like fish or other 
resources gained from common land became the owner’s property." These resources 
were now subsumed under, or contained within, the category ‘government land’— but 
for Haji Drahman, the government could not claim the entitlement to declare it so.
In the Malay States, under this hybrid Islamic-adat practice, clearing forest 
land for cultivation was therefore entirely permissible. The abandonment o f land for 
three years rendered it dead again, at which time it could be claimed and cleared by 
someone else.274 The yields gained from cultivation were taxed by Malay rulers, and the 
rakyat was also compelled to provide periodic corvee labour, but no rent was charged 
for occupying the land itself." Again, those conducting the hearing could not reconcile 
arguments based on fiqh  with those it was expected to make based on British law. 
Again, no result was reached, and the case was postponed to 6 November 1922.
Humphreys characterised the Haji as preaching:
269 Ibid., 170.
270 Paul Kratoska, "The Peripatetic Peasant and Land Tenure in British Malaya," Journal o f Southeast 
Asian Studies 16, no. 1 (1985), 20.
271 Y Linant de Bellefonds, "Ihya," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, et al. 
(Leiden: Brill Online, 2009).
~12 Wong, Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States, Chp 2.
~74 Sait and Lim, Land, Law and Islam: Property and Human Rights in the Muslim World, 12.
274 Wong, Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States, 10.
275 Ibid., 13-16.
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a Tolstoyan doctrine of prayer and agriculture, whose leading tenets are: that 
the land belongs to the people, that Government claims on it are contrary to 
Muhammadan law, and that Government itself is a superfluous vanity.276
It was, however, Humphreys’ government, and its claim to manage land and forests, 
that Haji Drahman was denouncing as illegitimate. In its place, Haji Drahman was 
espousing a government of the environment based on syariah. In Haji Drahman’s 
political message, delivered there in the court itself, land was not the peoples but God’s, 
and ideas of dead land and enlivened land were essential to how it should be managed 
by government on God’s behalf. To Haji Drahman, therefore, the colonial government’s 
claim to possess sufficient authority to authorise a court at all was a lame conceit. Haji 
Drahman was himself building a case for a government of the environment—based not 
on a technocratic environmental governmentality, but on an Islamic govemmentality. 
This was an alternative environmentality, a series of techniques of environmental
277government and the construction of environmental subjects which correspond with it.“ 
For the Haji, therefore, resource management was required to be performed in the name 
of God, not a technocratic rationality.
Importantly, Haji Drahman’s argument for an Islamic environmentality was 
narrated to another audience simultaneously. This audience consisted of the rakyat 
themselves, many of whom were present at the hearing. In addition, for several days 
before the second hearing on 31 October 1922, Haji Drahman had held a series of 
gatherings of his murid (disciples). On the day of the hearing, the court precinct was 
filled with 800 or 1,000 Malays, ‘of whom about one-half came from upriver and one 
half from the Town and neighbourhood.’ Apparently, ‘the courtroom, staircases and 
approaches [were] so packed that there was danger of a collapse of the building.’ In 
Humphreys’ view, Haji Drahman was intimidating the court by demonstrating his 
sizeable following. Mr Cheers, the Commissioner of Police, forcefully cleared the court 
of the crowd, arresting several men for carrying weapons. When questioned, some of 
these men answered that they were there to present a show of numbers (meraimakan
27<1 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 4, C0717/61:52432.
277 Agrawal, Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making o f Subjects, Clip 1.
278 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 2, C0717/6L52432.
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bicar a), and two arrested men reported that they brought their weapons because they 
had been asked to by Haji Drahman.279 Far from simply being deployed as a crowd, 
however, the rakyat were also listening—to the Haji sanctioning their practices. This 
sanction was granted not only terms of adat—small, local and specific, but in terms of 
Islam—large, global and universal. Further, it was authorised in the name of an 
authority far more powerful than the British, also sanctioning resistance.
Haji Drahman continued to perform to his main political audience—the 
rakyat—on 1 November 1922, the festival of Maulid. The festival was marked by 
hundreds of men and women attending Haji Drahman’s house, one of the very few 
occasions on which the participation of women was noted in the Terengganu archive. 
Here also, Haji Drahman read the Qur’an and other texts to the crowd. Humphreys 
clearly perceived the display of power here, and understood it as a threat to British 
control. The display of power was also useful, however, in binding the rakyat to an 
Islamist political understanding of their own practices. It seems there was also a martial 
arts performance, described by Humphreys as the Haji having ‘worked himself up into a 
high excitement, which ended in an exhibition of sword-dancing—as an earnest of his 
powers if it came to violence.’ At nine the next morning, the day of the hearing’s 
reconvention, Cheers sent a constable to summon the Haji to attend, but he refused. 
Cheers then attended personally with Sub-Inspector Said Harun, and threatened the Haji 
with arrest if he continued to refuse.281 According to Humphreys’ report:
Haji Drahman then stood up with his followers, commenced the sword 
dancing and fencing attitudes rehearsed overnight, and defied Mr. Cheers to 
lay hands on him; in a few moments he was posturing and shouting in the
state of frenzied excitement known as majzub—the religious frenzy of the
282fighting Muhammadan inviting martyrdom.
Said Harun, fearful of being killed, was forced to drag Mr. Cheers away to 
prevent him making the arrest. Humphreys later tried another method instead, asking the
2?l) J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, pp. 2-3, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
2X0 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 5, C0717/6L52432.
2X1 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 5, C0717/61:52432.
2x2 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 5, C0717/61:52432.
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Sultan’s Shaykhul Islam, Tuan Embong, Sayid Sagaf s elder brother and one o f the 
ulama the government had convinced to join the new religious department, to persuade 
him to attend his office. Tuan Embong, however, sent Wan Mahmud, the Second 
Magistrate, to convey the message, and Haji Drahman finally attended a meeting with 
Humphreys and some royal officials. Here, the Haji denied organising resistance to the 
trial. Humphreys attempted to argue to him that ‘resistance to the Government 
amounted to treason to the Raja—the most serious offence known to a Malay’. This 
argument was based on the notion, historically propagated by Malay sultans and seized 
upon by the British as an essentialised notion o f Malay political behaviour, that Malays 
do not betray their Sultans.283 Haji Drahman was not charged, due to the politically 
heated situation, and the court appeal, which reconvened on 6 November 1922 under the 
Assistant Commissioner o f Lands, was postponed again until 20 November. Haji 
Drahman’s wakil licence was revoked to prevent him from representing the rakyat 
again, but this did not afford the British any greater success. The appeal was postponed 
yet again, and there is no record o f it ever reaching a conclusion.
Outside the court system, Haji Drahman continued to intervene vocally as a 
mediator between the rakyat and the government. In 1923, Commissioner o f Lands J.E. 
Keefe found that 350 rakyat had cleared land in the Telemong River valley, over which 
they had not applied for passes. Before they could be fined, however, Haji Drahman 
wrote to the Land Office and enclosed payment of $250, promising another $50 at a 
later date. In his letter, he argued that the money should not be accepted as payment for 
permits, but instead kept in trust (amanah). He further stated that he had discovered that 
the rakyat were concerned that applying and paying for passes would undermine their 
claim that the land in fact was their inherited property (pusaka), bequeathed to them 
tenurially under adat. They did not wish to confirm their status in the government’s 
eyes as squatters on government land. How much the Haji had himself encouraged this 
thinking is not clear, nor was the extent to which he translated his discussion with the
283 This argument remains central in contemporary Malaysian politics, which has emphasised building 
racial political blocs, based on exhortations to Malay ‘loyalty’ and ‘unity’ under their leaders.
284 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 6, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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rakyat into his own terms. In his own letter, Haji Drahman clearly chose the language o f 
flqh  as his framework, within which to advance the rakyat's claim.
The Haji’s explanation demonstrated a convergence of several issues which 
complicated the rakyat's refusal to gain passes. One o f these was the failure of minor 
officials working for the government to differentiate between land which belonged to 
the rakyat and government land. Here, the Haji showed that he did not accept that this 
difference no longer existed after the 1921 land regulations, under which the rakyat only 
owned land for which they had gained surat keterangan. Another complicating factor, 
in the Haji’s own words, was the imbecility (kebebalan) o f the rakyat. Due to their 
stupidity and confusion (kesamaran), which caused their fear o f extinguishing their own 
adat entitlements, hundreds o f rakyat had simply not planted on their own swidden 
sites.285 Many households owned four or five areas of up to three acres, which they 
cleared as swiddens on a rotating basis. Many o f these were now covered in secondary 
growth (belukar), and must have lain within areas o f government forest. Yet due to their 
hunger, resulting from their fear o f planting, rakyat were clearing land and planting padi 
within and around their fruit orchards, much smaller than their swidden sites.
On the other hand, other members o f the rakyat had decided to comply and 
obtain permits because they needed to plant, and therefore paid for passes to plant their 
own land. The Haji also reported that there was some opportunistic land grabbing taking 
place, with still others quickly obtaining passes to plant sites which belonged to other 
rakyat— fallow swiddens covered with belukar. Evidently, the situation had opened up 
the opportunity for others to plant others’ land with impunity, provided they were 
willing to pay for passes. Therefore, according to Haji Drahman, non-cooperation with 
government was not always resistance, it was also sometimes caused by fear. Yet 
everyone was also afraid o f hunger if their padi was not planted during its proper 
season. The fact that many of these people had been summonsed (kena saman) and
Sebah takutkan pas tumpangan itu apabila diambil tinggallah hak miliknya.
‘Because they were afraid that gaining squatters’ passes would give away their rights of possession’.
Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid to Commissioner of Land, 2 Rabiulawal 1342 [13 October 1923], 
SUKT 599/1342.
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fined or jailed (kena lokap) for clearing was only adding to their difficulties. The Haji 
continued in his letter that he was therefore intervening on their behalf, to demonstrate 
that they were not always wilfully refusing to cooperate.
Haji Drahman also explained the basis o f the rakyat's adat claims to the Land 
Office, pointing that several types o f claims applied in the Terengganu, Telemong, 
Berang, Tersat and Nerus River valleys. Some rakyat were descended ‘from the soil’ o f 
Terengganu itself (anak-anak bumi Terengganu), and their claim was straightforward. 
Others, however, traced their origins to Johor. They claimed their ancestors arrived with 
Tun Zainal Abidin when he was installed as Sultan Zainal Abidin I of Terengganu (r. 
1725-1733), and established the Terengganu sultanate at Tanjung Baru, Kuala Berang. 
Rakyat descended from those eighty families therefore possessed a special link to the 
origin o f the kerajaan itself, and to the land they were granted. They also owned fruit 
orchards and other trees in the forest. Again, however, and despite the strong adat claim 
these rakyat possessed and which Haji Drahman explained, the Haji did not simply 
argue their claim on adat terms. Instead, he stated that their cultivation of this land was 
fitting with the Hadith. It was therefore ‘permanent, and could not be disturbed by any 
party which did not possess the right to do so’.286 As a final note, the Haji argued it was 
also ‘valid since ancient times appropriate under the old Raja’s a d a f .287 For this reason,
the $250 he paid was not a payment for passes, which would extinguish the rakyat's
288special claims.
Claim and Counter-Claim
Haji Drahman displayed a certain ambivalence about the rakyat. On the one hand, he 
was their ardent defender, challenging the government and its claim to authority on the
286 Maka milik mereka itu berkekalan, tidak boleh diganggu oleh yang bukan punya hak.
Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid to Commissioner of Land, 2 Rabiulawal 1342 [13 October 1923], 
SUK T 599/1342.
287 Milikperintahnya itu sah bagi silam dan lulus bagi adat Raja yang dahulu.
Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid to Commissioner of Land, 2 Rabiulawal 1342 [13 October 1923], 
SUK T 599/1342.
288 Haji Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid to Commissioner of Land, 2 Rabiulawal 1342 [13 October 
1923], SUK T 599/1342.
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rakyafs behalf. On the other hand, however, he was quite willing to refer to the rakyat 
as imbeciles in his correspondence with that same government. This was not surprising, 
as Haji Drahman was not, in fact, a consistent defender of the rakyat and its interests. 
Rather, he was a figure around whom a number of shifting interests coalesced— 
interests which collaborated and competed with each other all at the same time. There 
was a movement of opposition to the colonial government emerging around him which 
represented all these interests, all of which sought to deploy Haji Drahman’s 
considerable authority to their advantage. In May 1925, when yet more rakyat became 
involved in mass, illegal land clearing, this began to become plain. This time, the rakyat 
involved were not clearing land they claimed themselves. Rather, they were working 
under corvee, in a show of defiance to the government. This time, the mass land 
clearing revealed that a group of Islamists had coalesced around Haji Drahman—the 
Islamist cultivators led by Mat Zin, the shifting cultivator of rubber who was a close 
disciple of Haji Drahman. At this time, these Islamists were revealed to be working in 
collaboration with a royal cap zuriat claimant, and also with Sultan Muhammad, who 
had abdicated after two years, installing Sultan Sulaiman on the throne.
On 3 May 1925, a group of 300 to 500 rakyat was reported to be assembled at 
Kampung Luboh Merbau, Kuala Telemong, clearing land which the government had 
alienated to some Chinese landowners. These men, from the Belimbing, Tersat, Berang 
and Nerus River valleys, had been called together by letters circulating through their 
villages. The letters were circulated by Mat Zin’s group of Islamists, bearing Haji 
Drahman’s signature. According to J.W. Simmons, however, they were actually written 
by Wok bin Mamat, Mat Zin’s clerk, as Mat Zin himself was illiterate. Mat Zin, when 
approached, reported that Tengku Nik Haji, a sister of Sultan Sulaiman who claimed the 
land was hers, had asked him to send them so the land could be cleared for planting. 
Tengku Nik Haji claimed the land had been gifted to her under a cap zuriat from Sultan 
Zainal Abidin III, her father. Mat Zin intimated that he had used Haji Drahman’s name 
to convince members of the rakyat to attend—effectively a royal call for corvee labour, 
augmented using the Haji’s authority. Here, a royal claiming to hold a concession, the 
Islamist cultivators, and the aggrieved rakyat hulu would appear together in a kind of
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alliance. The rakyat had each brought one gantang~' o f rice with them as provisions, 
and Tengku Nik Haji provided the rest (leading some rakyat to complain that they were 
not fed enough).290 Mat Zin built the nine large huts that accommodated the rakyat on 
government land near the Chinese-owned land.291
The news reached Kuala Terengganu on 4 May 1925. J.L. Humphreys, the 
British Adviser, left the following day for the hulu, taking along Tengku Bijaya, now 
the head o f the Religious Department. Tengku Bijaya’s presence was a necessity, as by 
this time Haji Drahman would not talk to any Europeans, refusing to deal with them at 
all. He was so difficult for government authorities to contact that M.L. Wynne, the 
Police Commissioner, reported that he did not even know his face. “ Further, just who 
was behind the land clearing was not simple to ascertain. When Tengku Bijaya spoke to 
Haji Drahman, the Haji claimed that his name was used on the letters without his 
consent. All the rakyat questioned, however, claimed to have answered the call for 
corvee because it was delivered in his name. Yet when Tengku Bijaya asked Haji 
Drahman to persuade his disciples that the land regulations were in their interest, he 
agreed with him.293
On 6 May 1925, Wynne reported that only 100 rakyat remained at the clearing 
site, and the tension was dissipating, allowing the situation to be resolved. Having 
discovered Tengku Nik Haji’s part in the matter, Humphreys asked Tengku Bijaya and 
Tengku Setia, the State Secretary, to approach the Sultan with a request that he stop his 
sister from issuing calls for corvee labour, and to send the rakyat back to their 
villages.294 On 8 May 1925 the Sultan made the request to his sister, and also discovered 
that the Chinese landowners had not taken up their land because they were afraid o f 
conflict, presumably referring to the rakyat and the Islamists. Tengku Nik Haji wrote to
284 A gantang is approximately 2.8 kilograms.
290 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0717/61:52432.
241 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0717/61:52432.
242 Simmons Report p. 2, C 0717/61:52432.
243 ‘Report by Dato’ Mentri’, appended to Simmons Report, C 0717/61:52432.
244 M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0717/61:52432.
88
Chapter Two—Statemaking and Resistance: Land and Forests in Terengganu
the government about her land claim, which was eventually disallowed, as it turned out 
to have been based on a verbal gift, not a cap zuriat. Ironically, clearing the land 
actually improved its value for the Chinese landowners. Humphreys, for his part, sought 
to co-opt Haji Drahman as a salaried religious teacher in a mosque, but he refused to 
cooperate, stating that the work routine would not suit him.295
The nature of the alliance of interests that the episode demonstrated, however, 
remained mysterious. Three years later, in 1928, Dato’ Amar, the Chief Minister, 
recalled that Mat Zin and the others had been punished for the episode when it had 
really been organised by Haji Drahman.2% Yet the only record of how the rakyat had 
been persuaded to attend was compiled by Wynne, who had interviewed one Penghulu 
Abdullah. Abdullah was not an official penghulu, but was clearly identified by the 
rakyat as a government man. He was about fifty years old and had been living in 
Pahang at the time of the British war against the Pahang rebels from 1890 to 1895.297 It 
was Abdullah’s statement that convinced Wynne to recommend against violent 
intervention against those who led the land clearing. Wynne wrote in his report:
However desirable it might be to attempt to clear the air by a show of force 
it is in my opinion quite out of the question to try and do so with any hope 
of success.
Diplomatic methods employed through the Head of the Religious 
Department offer the best chance of successfully dispersing the unlawful
O Q O
assembly by the same agency through which it has been called together.
The reason for avoiding violence was the information Wynne received from 
Abdullah about the motivation and organisation of the Islamists. Abdullah had told him 
about the Islamists around Mat Zin—Tok Janggut, Wok bin Mamat, Haji Karia, Abdul 
Hamid, Tengku Mat and Che Man Pendekar. Abdullah had heard these men make the 
following claim, that:
295 Simmons Report p. 5, C0717/61:52432.
296 Statement by Dato’ Amar Diraja, 24 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 35, C0717/61:52432.
297 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C0717/61:52432.
29S M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C0717/6L52432.
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[T]hey have only just begun mobilisation and are preparing to ‘krah’ [kerah, 
corvee] the whole State, from Kelantan to Kemaman, and they are 
determined to take a defiant attitude and force the issue with Government 
because they feel confident that they can get the whole country behind them 
and so drive out the British influence and restore the ex-Sultan Mohamed 
who is a brother of Tengku Nik and install Haji Drahman as his Chief 
Minister.
Further, it was not only the Islamist leadership that was saying this. Abdullah had heard 
it from the rakyat also:
Some of the men said they had orders to go to the Kuala (Trengganu) in 
order to fight a ‘Holy War’ against the State Council and the British 
authority. Others said they had received three letters in their village, one 
from ‘Haji Drahman’—their own ‘Raja’, one from Tengku Nik and one—a 
summons—from the Government (Supreme Court).299
These revelations described a well-organised movement in the hulu. In 
addition, Abdullah informed Wynne that Mat Zin possessed a double-barrelled gun, and 
many of the rakyat had with them spears, keris and other weapons. Further, the numbers 
involved were far greater than those actually present, as rakyat were replacing each 
other constantly, at intervals of a couple of days. This meant that 2,000 rakyat were 
really involved. Abdullah also informed Wynne that the Chinese landowners had been 
present on their property until the last minute, actually fleeing only when the clearing 
began.300 Abdullah’s informers had also reported to him that Wok bin Mamat possessed 
a book containing the details of more than 2,000 men who responded to the corvee call.
A picture of the movement and its main actors was building up, if it remained 
somewhat blurred. Wynne’s desire to find out the ultimate force manipulating the 
situation, however, was not satisfied. Abdullah stated he was unable to answer how far 
Haji Drahman’s influence extended outside the Terengganu River valley. He was also 
unable to say who was financing the movement, and therefore could not expose the 
former Sultan Muhammad as the background mover. Tengku Nik Flaji was the only
299 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C0717/61:52432.
300 Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C0717/6L52432.
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royal he could say for certain was supporting the rebels, and she had threatened 
Penghulu Abdullah by letter in connection with the land, which he passed on to the 
District Officer in Kuala Berang. On the other hand, she could not have been 'behind if, 
as the rice she provided to the rakyat under corvee was not enough, nor could she afford 
the rice she did provide. Abdullah felt that funds were ‘probably’ coming from Sultan 
Muhammad. Even Haji Drahman had not signed the letters, and so may not have been 
‘behind if. He was, however, encouraging the rebels, but Abdullah had only heard this, 
not seen it:
I am told that he no longer restricts [his religious meetings] to religion but 
freely mixes politics in his speechifying, the main theme of which is to join
301his party so as to help to drive out the infidel.
The Islamic environmentally that Haji Drahman had argued for during the trial 
appeared to have become the basis for a movement espousing mass forest clearing 
against British prohibition. The movement also appeared to espouse overthrowing the 
government, and may have been linked to the former sultan and Haji Drahman, working 
together to position themselves at its head. For the British, however, focused on finding 
the ‘ringleaders’ behind the movement, again there were no conclusive answers. 
Further, the situation was too tense for the colonial government, barely a power at all in 
the hulu, to force a conclusion of any kind.
More reports of Islamist hostility towards British officials in the hulu region 
filtered in to Kuala Terengganu. On 21 August 1925 J.W. Simmons, British Adviser, 
visited the Telemong River valley with the Commissioner of Lands. There he met Mat 
Zin and Tok Janggut, who ‘made a gesture of warding off our presence and sniffed and 
spat as if the sight of Infidels caused him pain.’ He asked Simmons if he knew how long 
it would be before the Mahdi came, and when Simmons replied that he did not know, 
answered that in two years the Mahdi would arrive and put an end to Simmons’ religion. 
This threat of the arrival of the Mahdi was made only once. The Mahdi is the ‘rightly-
,()l Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0717/61:52432.
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guided’ Caliph who some Muslims, especially Sufis and Shias, believe will emerge to 
rule Islam and end oppression.
Subalterns Also Speak
Surprisingly, given the challenges to government various Islamists had openly 
verbalised in 1925, no reports of activity appear to have filtered in to Kuala Terengganu 
until 1928, when the movement suddenly surfaced again. The action remained 
concentrated in the tributaries of the Terengganu River system, belying the Islamists’ 
claim that they could really bring together rakyat from Kelantan to Kemaman. 
Nevertheless, the open defiance of government intensified. A flow of increasingly 
threatening reports of discontent was reaching the colonial government in Kuala 
Terengganu. Delivered to the capital by hulu officials, these reports began to indicate 
unprecedented levels of activity and organisation.
Further, several reports also made it clear that the rakyat hulu's refusal to 
cooperate with forest regulations was being vehemently stated in terms of Islamist 
resistance to the government’s authority over the forests. The Islamist cultivators were 
authorising their own actions in Islamic terms, and exhorting others to join the action in 
these same terms. By May 1928, it was becoming clear that the movement in the hulu 
was building up towards an armed confrontation. At this time, the government moved to 
mollify (memuaskan hati) the rakyat hulu by attempting to persuade them that the forest 
regulations were in their interest. Here, the colonial government tried to make use of the 
split at its centre between British and Malay personnel, to hide the reality that the 
colonial government consisted of an interracial assortment of officials.
In this vein, the government decided to send Sultan Sulaiman to the hulu, and 
organised a large public meeting on 4 May. The meeting was conceived as an 
opportunity for the aggrieved cultivators to voice their concerns to the Sultan in person, 
as though Terengganu were a ‘traditional’ Malay polity and not a part of the British 
Empire. A crowd was called together at Kampung Buloh, on the shore of the Berang
302 W. Madelung, "Al-Mahdi," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, et al. (Leiden: 
Brill Online, 2009).
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River at Kuala Berang. The location was chosen so as to avoid provoking a mass 
confrontation in Kuala Terengganu. The rakyat who gathered there were not to be 
disturbed by the palace authorities, only watched ' by officers reporting to Dato’ Lela 
Diraja.
The Sultan had requested that no European officers be present at the meeting, 
to avoid risking potential violence against them sparked by the rakyat's anger and 
religious ‘fanaticism’. 304 The Acting British Adviser, Millington, had also received 
strong advice from the Dato’ Menteri [who] that no European should confront Haji 
Drahman, as he was a ‘very holy man with a very big influence and very generous to the 
raiat [rakyat]'. This advice confirmed Millington’s judgment that ‘in certain districts it 
has been necessary for Europeans to get their influence in very gently’. Kuala Berang 
was one o f these districts, and no European officers were present there at all. As he 
explained after the uprising, ‘[T]he idea was to give the idea that the Trengganu 
Government and Trengganu officials were looking after their affairs, and that there was 
no idea o f the “kafer” [kafir] interfering.’305
The Sultan himself took every precaution. He was ceremonially accompanied 
(diiringi) by no minor entourage: thirteen courtly and government officials, including 
the Assistant Police Commissioner,306 on top of the extra officers under Dato’ Lela. 
This was probably wise, given the extraordinary turnout o f 3,000.1,17 Aided by hindsight 
after the uprising, British officials noted that the turnout was suspiciously large, 
indicating there was more to the numbers than the government had understood. The size 
o f the assembly was remarkable, but the hearing was also extremely important because 
official scribes recorded a range o f grievances expressed by individual members o f the
303 Dato’ Amar to Tengku Nara and Dato’ Lela, 23 Zulkaedah 1346 [13 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
304 Statement by W.M. Millington, 22 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 5, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
305 Statement by W.M. Millington, 22 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 3, C0717/6L52432.
306 SUK T to District Officer Kuala Berang, 12 Zulkaedah 1346 [2 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346. The 
officials were: the Dato’ Syahbandar, Tengku Setia, Tengku Muhammad (Assistant Commissioner of 
Police), Dato’ Andika, Panglima Dalam, Tengku Bendahara, Engku Abdul Qadir, Dato’ Indra Guru, 
Dato’ Bija Sura, Dato’ Bentara, Sayid Aqil, Dato’ Pahlawan and Dato’ Seri Amar Diraja.
307 Thomson Report, p. 1, C0717/61: 52432.
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rakyat directly—in their own words, without Haji Drahman or other Islamists speaking 
for them.
The series of pengaduan [expressions of grievances] taken and recorded at 
Kuala Berang comprise a record of the feelings of individual rakyat, speaking for 
themselves about the pressures the passes and other restrictions were creating in their 
efforts to pursue their livelihoods. Therefore, while the Terengganu materials require 
reading against the grain to discover aspects of the rakyat’s political lives, they do not 
only consist of the records of ‘counter-insurgency’. Thanks to the pengaduan, the 
Terengganu archive conveys a clear sense of political contest, retaining a coherent 
record as to the causes of the rakyat’s discontent and the targets of their anger.
One frequently-voiced grievance was that the passes had seriously disrupted 
the rhythms by which the rakyat’s lives were organised. Many chafed at being forced to 
present at government offices to gain permission to perform their normal work. The 
requirements were onerous, expensive, and required travel by river to Kuala Berang, or, 
in the case of those who attended from the Dungun River system, Kuala Jengai. The 
rakyat was also forced to endure seemingly obstructionist additional delays, caused by 
officials who were operating on a completely alien sense of bureaucratic time, which the 
rakyat could not afford while plots of land remained uncleared and crops unplanted. The 
bureaucracy demanded pass payments by a fixed date, 1 Muharram, but did not 
entertain the rakyat’s own timing needs. Daulat bin Muhammad, from Kampung Jongak 
Batu along the Dungun River, poignantly voiced his frustration with the delays:
...it’s really difficult to get a pass. You turn up once, and they say come 
back tomorrow. When you go back tomorrow, they say there’s too much to 
do. It’s this tomorrow business that really hurts.309
308 Guha’s 25-year old discussion of colonial records, which reveal rebels’ motives in fragments and in 
ways which assimilate them into a discourse of counter-insurgency, remains entirely relevant to 
discussions such as this one. Apart from these pengaduan, Guha’s method of reading against the grain has 
proven essential in piecing together the politics which informed the uprising. See Guha, Elementary 
Aspects .
309 Statement by Daulat bin Muhammad, Kampung Jongak Batu, Hulu Dungun, n.d. [around 4 May 1928], 
SUKT 1295/1346.
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The fact that the pass payment constituted a cash sum for clearing land that was 
due before crops had been planted also greatly aggrieved Wan Ahmad, from an 
unspecified village along the Dungun. Wan Ahmad, who had organised to plant rubber 
on a forest patch he had cleared, viewed the payment as an impost, and was aggrieved 
that the Land Office expected payment before he had even planted his crop, let alone 
realised his harvest:
A number o f us intend to apply to plant rubber. In five years’ time, when the
T 1 0trees have grown, then you can ask us for a tax on the crop.
He elaborated, blaming the Land Office kerani [clerk] in Kuala Jengai, also apparently
called Mat Zin, for not respecting his sense o f urgency:
It’s very tough getting a pass. Kerani Mat Zin doesn’t hand them over for 
four or five days. Sometimes, we also have to pay to put on a feast for him 
before we’re given our passes.311
Wan Ahmad also stated a second address at Kampung Kuala Celah along the 
Kelmin River, which meets the Dungun below Kuala Jengai. He had also been seriously 
affected by Kerani Mat Zin’s lack o f concern for his time and energy. He had also 
encountered another official, Wan Muhammad, the penghulu in Kuala Jengai, who may 
have taken his money on behalf o f the Land Office without actually gaining him a 
permit with which to proceed. Wan Ahmad related a long story o f wasted time and 
money, and further, the eventual effective seizure o f what he understood to be his land:
It’s about my application to plant rubber. On 27 Syaban 1346 [19 January 
1928], I went to...M r. Wan Muhammad in Kuala Jengai, to request land on 
which to plant rubber— 140 acres. He said yes, and I asked if I could clear 
the land. He said yes, so I handed over $54.60. He said he’d have to send a 
letter to Kuala Terengganu first. On 10 Ramadan 1346 [2 March 1928], I 
went to inform him that I planned to clear the land. He said I couldn’t; I 
would need a squatter’s licence so I could plant whatever I liked, and I 
would have to pay $2.20 for twelve acres. So I paid, meaning that I’d spent 
$56.80 in total. He said I could clear the land and plant, and the permit 
would be granted. I cleared the land.
310 Statement by Wan Ahmad, 10 Zulkaedah 1346 [30 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
311 Statement by Wan Ahmad, 10 Zulkaedah 1346 [30 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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Suddenly on 3 Syawal 1346 [25 March 1928], Kerani Mat Zin travelled 
upriver to check on me, and the land I’d cleared with Wan Muhammad’s 
permission. I answered him as I just described. He said there would be a 
ruling on the land matter on 11 Syawal [2 April], Sergeant Sulung from 
Kuala Jengai ordered me to travel downriver to the Kuala Jengai police 
station, and so I did. Sergeant Sulung investigated. I told him whatever I’d 
told Mat Zin. I was ordered by the Sergeant to travel down to the Kuala 
[name unspecified]. When I got there, I was told to go back up to Kuala 
Jengai. On the date I was required to be in Kuala Jengai, I went, but nothing 
was being ruled there at all. He told me the official was on his way but 
hadn’t arrived yet. I asked for permission to go back to Kuala Berang, and 
he granted it.312
Wan Ahmad turned out to be a large-scale cash cropper— a rubber planter who
planted 140 acres at a time— as well as a /?ar//-cultivator. Other than casting significant
doubt on histories which assume that the rakyat were all impoverished padi planters,
Wan Ahmad’s pengaduan also belies assumptions that the rakyat occupied a unified
economic and political position.313 He confirmed Haji Drahman’s argument from 1923,
which noted that the permit system was allowing some rakyat to take over the land o f
others. Because all forest land was now government land, and any rakyat who wished to
plant any part o f it required a pass, anyone could apply for one over anyone else’s land.
In this way, Wan Ahmad’s padi land ended up divided up among others:
As many as six pieces o f my padi land was given to other people, that is two 
pieces to Abdullah bin Masah and one piece to Zaki bin Masah. Abdullah 
bin Rahman was given two pieces. Dris got one piece, and my coconut 
orchard, with more or less 25 trees on it and other plants that I planted 
myself, was also given to someone else— Mr. Wan Muhammad bin Man.
My durian orchard was given to Mr. Wan Muhammad too while I was away 
in Hulu Berang.314
Mat Zin bin Ali, from Kampung Limau on the Penih River off the Berang also 
spoke up. He told o f his land being taken by Penghulu Mat Arifin, who had been
312 Statement by Wan Ahmad, 10 Zulkaedah 1346 [30 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
313 Refer to Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, "Kekacauan",--------- , Terengganu: Tokoh, Pentadbiran Dan
Perjuangan, Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image, Shahridan Faiez bin Mohideen Abdul Kader, "Mapping 
Modernities in Trengganu". As discussed in the Introduction to this study, these histories are very 
different from each other. However they all rely on notions of Malay peasanthood based on these 
assumptions.
3,4 Statement by Wan Ahmad, 10 Zulkaedah 1346 [30 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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T 1 C
enforcing the land regulations in the Penih valley. Daulat bin Muhammad had also 
spoken of his fruit orchard, which appears to have only partly fallen on government 
forest land, while the other part seems to have been granted under Torrens to someone 
else. At least part of this orchard was claimed by Wan Ali during a land census {band). 
These band were carried out periodically to update state registers of claims to land and 
trees, primarily in situations where smallholders were not accustomed to registering
'y 1 /:
their own formal or informal title. To make matters worse, Wan Ali had announced 
that the fruit growing on trees that fell within government forest could be taken by those 
who planted the trees, that is, Daulat himself. Those fruit which grew on the land which
T 1 7he had managed to claim as his own, on the other hand, remained his.
Dollah bin Muhammad, from Kampung Jongak Batu on the Dungun, also 
blamed surveyors and their shoddy work for allowing land-grabbing to take place. 
Surveying work was still taking place in the Tersat River valley, and presumably
T 1 O
elsewhere in the hulu, in April 1928, and there were later reports that Sayid Sagaf 
had instructed the rakyat to pull out boundary posts.314 Dollah’s comments reveal that 
Wan Ali, who had claimed Daulat’s land, was probably the official conducting the 
surveying, which must have been conducted under the auspices of the band. Dollah 
complained that in cases in which the landowner was not present at the time the survey 
was conducted; Wan Ali simply assigned the land to anyone in the area who came 
forward to assert a claim to it.320
Other rakyat spoke of their frustration with the new frequency with which they 
were now required to deal with state government officials. Every time any individual 
wished to enter the forest to gather forest products, he or she was now required to gain 
permission; even if those ‘forest products grew on trees they planted themselves. At no
315 Statement by Mat Zin bin Ali, Kampung n.d. [around 4 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
316 Kratoska, "The Peripatetic Peasant and Land Tenure in British Malaya," 25-26.
317 Statement by Daulat bin Muhammad, n.d. [around 4 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
318 Mahmud bin Piah and Abdullah bin Ali to District Officer, Kuala Berang, 29 Syawal 1346 [20 April 
1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
319 Statement by Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 103, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
320 Statement by Dollah bin Muhammad, n.d. [around 4 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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previous time had they been required to follow such rules, and at times the products 
were only required for routine household maintenance. Mat Hasyim, from Kampung 
Lubuk Periok, along the Penih, had also attended the hearing. He had heard that Daud 
bin Mat Amin had been required to pay $1.10 for the bark o f each tree he had gathered 
it from, just to repair the walls o f his house.
To make matters worse, he himself had been prevented from collecting 
screwpine (mengkuang) leaves and sago from the plants he had raised himself, because 
they were located in territory now marked off as ‘forest’ and were therefore classified as 
forest produce. If he had collected these items regardless, he would have been deemed 
to be collecting without a permit, and reported to the police. ’21 Mat Zin bin Ali from 
Kampung Limau also reported that he had heard that collecting leaves from the kawar 
and palas plants, and other leaves used to make atap [thatched] roofs was now 
forbidden without a pass, and rakyat collecting wood for fence posts were limited to 
taking only fifteen logs, or they would be reported. “
Haji Tahir, from Kampung Baru on the Berang, was one o f the Islamists and 
Mat Zin’s son. He also participated as a frequent and insistent speaker, but this time did 
not bring up Islam or the syariah. He even seems to have spoken first, and then not 
only for himself but for many others too. Acting as a spokesperson o f sorts, he 
summarised that the rakyat could no longer maintain their own needs with materials that 
were previously freely available in the jungle without facing this bureaucratic burden.324 
As he put it, ‘Even eating is not as important as getting a pass. Wan Ahmad from 
Dungun agreed, stating that even the rakyat’s own land, which they had inherited and to 
which they maintained claims, could no longer be felled without a pass if it lay in the 
forest:
Statement by Mat Hasyim bin Abdullah, n.d. [around 4 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346. 
222 Statement by Mat Zin bin Ali, n.d. [around 4 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
323 Group statement by rakyat hulu, 11 Zulkaedah 1346 [1 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
324 Group statement by rakyat hulu, 11 Zulkaedah 1346 [1 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
325 Statement by Haji Tahir, n.d. [around 4 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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In Dungun it’s also just like what Imam [Haji] Tahir said, and worse. We 
can’t even clear land over which we possess ownership.
The new rule that forest older than seven years could no longer be felled at all was also 
annoying Wan Ahmad:
We’re not allowed to fell large forests to plant padi—that’s not allowed. We
T? 7can only fell young forests, but even for that we have to apply for passes!
These statements provide several insights into the politics of the uprising, at 
least in terms of the rakyat who participated, if not the emerging Islamist leadership. 
From the glimpse they reveal into the lives of the rakyat who spoke, a picture emerges 
of a common set of grievances held at least by the most vocal—and most diligently 
recorded—members of the crowd. These grievances focused on the ways in which the 
new pass system for clearing and collecting forest products limited their economic 
options, which, importantly, did not only involve growing subsistence rice crops. 
Further grievances focused on the ways in which the new pass system for clearing and 
collecting disrupted their livelihoods, required the payment of punitive and fixed sums 
of cash, and entangled the rakyat in onerous dealings with penghulu and other colonial 
civil servants. However, no existing historical treatment of this uprising has reported 
these words in any detail, and instead the rakyat's words have been smoothed over in 
transition narratives. But at moments such as this hearing, through these words, 
however brief and partial, these vocal members of the rakyat speak for themselves, and 
push their way into the narrative of the uprising as self-representing agents, their words 
standing alone.
While the entire proceedings of the hearing are not included in the file which 
contains them, these pengaduan are ostensibly presented as recorded, unmodified by a 
discourse of counter-insurgency surrounding them on the page. These words 
demonstrate that the work of discovering new voices in the historical records remain 
relevant to the work of historians of Malaya—not every voice has already been
326 Statement by Haji Tahir, n.d. [around 4 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
327 Statement by Wan Ahmad, 10 Zulkaedah 1346 [30 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
32x See discussions in John Beverley, Suhalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory 
(Durham; London: Duke University Press, 1999) and Guha, Elementary Aspects .
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discovered. ~ In addition, the pengaduan made by the rakyat reveal the tension 
between adat understandings of land ownership and use rights, and the translation of 
these understandings into Islamist terms by Haji Drahman and his associates. The 
rakyat who spoke, however, like Haji Drahman, did not accept the government’s 
authority to manage their forests, firmly asserting their claim that they were the owners 
of the land and trees that were now contained within government forest. Wan Ahmad’s 
use of ketuanan, a term indicating something like ‘ownership’ or ‘control’, to describe 
his ownership of land he could no longer clear without a pass is indicative of this kind 
of claim.330
The rakyads words also demonstrated that they had sized up the situation with 
precision. Whether they were shifting subsistence padi growers, small-scale cash- 
croppers, or large-scale rubber growers like Wan Ahmad, the new regulations made 
their staple economic activity, forest cultivation, extremely difficult to sustain. As Haji 
Tahir realised, for the colonial bureaucracy, gaining a pass was indeed more important 
than eating. Or, more precisely, particular ways of gaining livelihoods were being 
penalised through the pass system, with the aim of making other forms of economic 
activity more attractive. By financially penalising forest cultivation, the colonial 
government was attempting to engineer a population-level shift—to settled agricultural 
cultivation on measured, fixed, bounded and titled lands on which the rakyat could be
329 The claim that ‘other voices are not somehow already out there waiting to be discovered and narrated 
in a scholarly text’ is made by Kahn, Other Malays, xv. Perhaps the Terengganu uprising is a rare 
example and certainly only a fraction of the hearing’s proceedings could have been recorded. But the 
rakyat's words are not lost, and their certain mediation by scribes, authors, officials, and this author do 
not negate what they reveal of social life in Terengganu.
330 Ketuanan is a term which, in contemporary Malaysian civil and political life, is a term richly steeped 
in ‘rights’ and ‘entitlements’ discourses, known most notoriously in its application in the phrase ketuanan 
Melayu. A recent debate in Malaysian media sources considered whether this phrase means ‘Malay 
sovereignty’ or ‘Malay supremacy’.
The 1994 Kamus Dewan contains this ambiguous explanation: ‘hak menguasai dan memerintah sebuah 
(negeri, daerah, dll)’.
See, for example, Ong Kian Ming and Oon Yeoh, "Ketuanan Melayu a Double-Edged Keris," 
Malaysiakini, 29 May 2008, and other articles on the subject in Malaysiakini since the 2008 general 
election.
See also Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kamus Dewan (Kuala Tumpur: Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia, 
1994), R. O. Winstedt, An Unabridged Malay-English Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Kuala Lumpur; Singapore: 
Marican & Sons, 1965).
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expected to remain permanently. Created as an instrument to achieve this end, the pass 
system functioned as a regulatory device for limiting mobility, thereby removing the 
territorial basis for claims to customary usufruct rights and cultivation methods. After 
the mass audience with the Sultan, the government granted the rakyat certain 
concessions to reduce the risk of political violence. It allowed rakyat to clear swiddens 
on government land if they notified a District Officer, who would arrange for staff to 
visit them to issue passes. They were also allowed to collect timber without passes.
The Russian Revolution
Using these strategies and tools, and by asserting the power to use them, British officials 
in the colonial government claimed the entitlement to manage Terengganu’s land and 
forests. This does not, however, mean that only the British were willing to prevent the 
rakyat from accessing and planting their own adat land. The British-led land regulations 
and the British themselves therefore formed only one provocation to the rakyat and the 
Islamists. The other serious provocation to revolt came from the other side of the 
competition between the royal family and British officials tor the power to deal out 
parcels of Terengganu’s resources. This other side consisted of the royal family 
members and kerabat who had inherited cap zuriat and cap kurnia from Sultan Zainal 
Abidin III, which had still not been extinguished. Throughout the 1920s, it is most 
likely that the rakyat was also being prevented from accessing their customary land 
alienated under these concessions, just as they were prevented from planting what was 
now government land.
These conflicts—between the rakyat and royal concession holders—were, 
however, rarely recorded in the Terengganu archive. Nevertheless, the royal 
concessions demonstrated that the royal family was also willing to launch an epistemic 
and economic assault on rakyat land claimants in Terengganu. The royals, therefore, 
added to the climate of severe restriction on the economic activities previously 
performed by the rakyat without fear of sanction. The inheritors of these concessions 
also demonstrate that historical narratives which describe the land-use clash as one
331 ‘Exhibit D \ Tliomson Report, p. 128, CO 717/61:52432.
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between the fixed interests or values o f the colonisers and colonised “ are severely 
reductionist. They do not explain the ways in which multiple Malay interests and 
positions actually furthered Terengganu’s internal division into bounded parcels of 
lands, both in competition and collaboration with British efforts. It is therefore 
important to note that the royals made the first move in beginning Terengganu’s internal 
territorialisation, and they were still capable of, and willing to, dispossess the rakyat o f 
their land even while forest rebellion raged around them, mostly directed at the British.
Some evidence does exist o f the rakyat being motivated to rebel because o f 
their treatment by royal concession-holders. The rakyat, however, did not complain 
about the royal family to the Sultan. Before him, they only complained about the 
British. On the other hand, the rakyat were perfectly willing to complain about the royal 
family and courtly officials before the British. They did exactly this on 18 May 1928, 
just three days before the uprising broke out. These complaints show that the climate of 
grievance relating to land in 1920s Terengganu was complicated, and not simply anti- 
British. Indeed, members of the rakyat expressed their rage with the royals to 
Settlement Collector H.P. Bryson and Commissioner for Lands and Mines, G.A.C. de 
Moubray. Bryson’s experience came in April 1928, when he travelled to villages in the 
Tersat River valley. There, he met ‘Penghulu’ Salleh, who said that The peasant was 
being fleeced to make the Raja rich’.3' 1 De Moubray also travelled to the Tersat valley, 
having heard a secret report that groups o f people from several villages around Bukit 
Payung were assembling in the hulu Tersat. These people were reported to be enraged 
(murka) at the Tengku-tengku (members of the royal family, bearing the title Tengku), 
and the orang besar (aristocrats, lit. big people).
On hearing this, de Moubray visited the Bukit Payung and Telemong areas. 
Here, he discovered to his alarm that in Kampung Pak Madak, the majority o f villagers 
had not managed to plant enough gambir, a large vine from which a resin is produced, 
to sell on the market. Nor had they planted enough rice for their families’ subsistence. 
He heard from the marriage celebrant in Kuala Terengganu that these rakyat usually
332 Abdullah Zakaria bin Ghazali, Terengganu: Tokoh, Pentadbiran Dan Perjuangan .
333 Statement by H.P. Bryson, 26 June 1928, Thomson Report, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
102
Chapter Two—Statemaking and Resistance: Land and Forests in Terengganu
cleared swiddens on land contained in the concession o f Tuan Embong, also known as 
Sayid Abu Bakar, the brother o f Sayid Sagaf.” 4 For the last three years, however, Tuan 
Embong had not allowed the rakyat to plant on his land, and the majority no longer had 
access to any land on which they could plant padi. Most were forced to buy beras guni, 
or ‘sack rice’, a euphemism for rice bought at market prices o f at least $40 per bag. It is 
most likely that they raised the money for this rice by gathering and trading forest 
products, now also illegal.
The rakyat attested that the land in Haji Embong’s concession was their 
birthright (waris). It had been granted in a cap kurnia to someone from Kampung 
Baduh Periok, and the grandson o f that person had later sold half o f it to Haji Embong. 
Apparently the rakyat were furious (panas, lit. hot) at the orang besar who came to 
possess their land in that way. Further, none o f them could access the forest to collect 
firewood, because Dato’ Andika, a royal official, claimed the forest between the village 
and the main road. On discussion with the Settlement Officer, however, de Moubray 
discovered that Dato’ Andika had seized much more land than he had been granted in 
concession— he was claiming 7,000 acres when he had in fact been granted only 2,000.
From Kampung Pak Madak, de Moubray travelled through Kampung Rawa, 
and stopped in Kampung Alor Limbat. Here, he found that the rakyat in fact possessed 
very little land for secondary crops in the compounds around their homes (tanah 
taburan or tanah kampung). Those who lived in the village usually cleared swiddens in 
a concession owned by the Sultan himself, and also in another, once owned by Sayid 
Mustafa. This man was another brother o f Sayid Sagaf and Tuan Embong, and he had 
left his land to Tuan Embong. Like the villagers in Kampung Pak Madak, these villagers 
also claimed that the land in Tuan Embong’s concession was their tanah waris. Now, 
however, they were not allowed to clear swiddens on that land, and they could no longer 
plant padi or gambir as they used to, or gather wood for household repairs or burning. 
They were therefore extremely angry with the Sultan himself, along with Tuan Embong. 
De Moubray also heard from one Mr. Hasyim, who had visited the area at one time in
314 This Haji Embong is probably Sayid Abu Bakar, a local sayid from the prominent family of Tokku 
Paluh, and the brother of Sayid Sagaf. See Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image .
103
the past, that all the rakyat in the village had plans to travel to Kuala Berang to confront 
the Sultan.
It was not only a question o f access for the rakyat concerned, however. Even 
where they could access land, they found they were being subjected to extreme 
economic pressure by Tengkus who were extracting as much profit as they could from 
their concessions. Some o f Dato’ Andika’s concession, for example, was being used to 
grow rubber. This crop was planted under the pawah system, under which the 
landowner, Dato’ Andika, and planters, the rakyat who were effectively planting their 
own, appropriated land, split the crop in two between them. Pawah usually involves the 
planters taking the proceeds o f half or two thirds o f the trees they planted, or even up to 
90 per cent o f the trees if the landowner had not personally invested any money into the 
crop. The rakyat also claimed they had been cheated by another official, Dato’ Bali, 
who had forced them to sign an agreement which specified that from 1,000 rubber trees, 
the Sultan would collect the proceeds from 100, the rakyat only 260, and Dato’ Bali 
himself would take the rest.
Over time, Dato’ Bali altered the agreement further, so the rakyat were taking 
the proceeds o f only 88 from 1,000 trees, and even those were required to be sold to 
Dato’ Bali himself. As the price he offered was inappropriate, some rakyat had held out 
from selling to him. The remaining 34 planters, who had sold to Dato’ Bali, received 
only $449 for their efforts in planting and raising 11,020 trees. This is despite the fact 
that the rakyat knew that Dato’ Bali had sold just one-third o f another rubber grove to 
one Lok Cheng Yook for a princely $3,000. From that payment, however, he paid the 
planting rakyat only $226.30. The rakyat involved, who, again, were perfectly willing 
to complain about the royals to the British, appealed for assistance by taking their 
grievances to the British Adviser in 1927. They had, however, received no reply, and de 
Moubray was attempting to locate the correspondence concerned at the time o f his 
report. Dato’ Andika had also planted rubber under the pawah system with the rakyat 
from Kampung Bukit Kenanga. The land involved in this scam was owned by one Tuan 
Rudi.
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Confronted by this situation, de Moubray had intervened to prevent a 
confrontation over the Tengkus’ inflated land claims. He granted the rakyat permission 
to clear swiddens on royal concessions, and placed a Settlement Officer in the field to 
monitor planting. In Kampung Bukit Kenanga, he described the rakyat hulu as 
emboldened by their hunger [berani kurus]. Tuan Teri, a surveyor who had travelled 
with him, reported that he had never seen people who looked so much like they were 
used to being hungry. De Moubray also allowed the rakyat in Kampung Tapu to gather 
sufficient mengkuang leaves to make mats for their personal use.
Later, De Moubray returned to Kuala Berang, where thepenghulu heard that he 
would be spending the night. The penghulu approached de Moubray while he had the 
opportunity. He informed de Moubray that half the rakyat's orchard land near Kampung 
Sungai Ular had been included in a concession owned by Tengku Dalam, who had not 
directly prohibited the rakyat from clearing their land there, but whom the rakyat did 
not dare to confront by doing so. These rakyat were now hungry because they lacked 
rice to eat. De Moubray found more concessions owned by Tengkus in Pulau Manis, 
Kampung Naga, and a variety of other villages, where he heard similar stories. He 
reported:
Everybody in villages bordering concessions has no idea, and no plans for 
their livelihoods [rezeki], and feels much pressured by the orang besar and 
their concessions.
Describing the anger and hunger experienced by the rakyat, de Moubray also 
sounded the following warning:
In my view the situation in Terengganu at this time is similar to that in 
France 150 years ago and the situation in Russia twelve years ago, that is, 
close to a time of great disturbance by their rakyat. Just beforehand I 
described these matters to the Dato’ Menteri Besar [Chief Minister], that is, 
how the people rose up in warfare and burnt and killed people in the towns,
[and] killed the King and Queen. Fortunate were the orang besar who 
managed to save their lives.
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To salvage the situation, de Moubray recommended abolishing all the concessions
• *3 i  c  .
immediately. ' W.M. Millington, the British Adviser, also responded by permitting 
land clearing for padi swiddens in government forest in the Terengganu, Tersat, 
Telemong, Berang and Dungun River areas, provided that the District Officer was 
notified and a fee paid for temporary occupation. The removal o f timber from 
government forests was also permitted. Private land would remain off-limits.336
The rakyat expressed their grievances in strategic ways, in keeping with their 
approach of appealing to the Sultan against the British and appealing to the British 
against the royals. This was not surprising, given that each side was competing with the 
other for the power to claim land for itself, determine who else could access land, and 
determine for what purpose. In Scott’s terms, the British sought the power to make 
Terengganu legible, and create a modern grid which could simplify (and extinguish) 
complex understandings o f land and tree ownership. They also sought to prevent 
mobile shifting cultivators from claiming non-contiguous land parcels containing their 
swidden sites and fruit trees, which were located within Terengganu’s forests— now 
government forest. For this reason, simplified land tenure recorded under the Torrens 
System was far more desirable, stabilising the rakyat's location and fixing households 
to specific, permanent plots o f land.
However, as the rakyat and Islamists emerged with their grievances and 
claims, the contest for the forest was no longer a two-way one, played out at the elite 
level. It was now a three-way contest between the British, the royal family and the 
movement o f rakyat and Islamists. The rakyat were threatened by two competing claims 
over their forests. Competition for control over the hulu was now being played out in 
terms o f swiddens, plots, forests, fruit and rubber trees; and colonial government policy 
was directed at wresting control over these from both the royal family and the aggrieved
335 G.A.C. de Moubray to Commissioner for Lands and Mines, 28 Zulkaedah 1346 [8 May 1928], SUK T 
1376/1346.
336 W.M. Millington, Dato’ Seri Andika Diraja, Dato’ Seri Amar Diraja, ‘Exhibit D \ Thomson Report, p. 
128, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
337 James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1998), Introduction.
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rakyat alike. The rakyaf s responses to this competition amounted to an attempt to 
appeal to each side against the other, using these appeals as ‘weapons of the weak’ in
T O O
between their moments of rebellion. The colonial takeover of Terengganu, and the 
struggle to establish a colonial state empowered to manage natural resources, was an 
acre-by-acre struggle for its physical, territorial space. The control and use of 
Terengganu’s land and forests had emerged as the key issue at stake in the 1928 
uprising.
338 James C Scott, Weapons o f the Weak: Everyday Forms o f Peasant Resistance (New Haven, London: 
Yale University Press, 1985).
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and Connections
/ think that the Siamese should he told that Her Majesty ’s Government will not 
sanction their interference...and that any attempt to strengthen their 
position... will not he recognised. They should he made to understand that the 
British Government intends to he the paramount power in the Malay Peninsula,
subject to Treaty obligations hitherto existing.
Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, Governor and High Commissioner, Straits Settlements, 
proposing the extension of British power over Terengganu in response to observations
of increased Siamese control in Kelantan in 1888.ii9
The contest for power to subject the hulu to government resulted in a complex struggle 
over forests. Its outcome was the appropriation of forests from the rakyat hulu by 
British officials and the royal family, achieved through the deliberate disruption of 
shifting cultivation. This displacement fuelled political organising in the hulu, creating a 
movement of thousands of people prepared to challenge government regulations, and 
more surreptitiously, royal land claims. The most striking feature of this challenge was 
its basis on an alternative Islamic environmentality, in which the politics of the rakyat's 
claim were premised on Islamic teachings believed to authorise their practices. The 
movement’s turn to Islam for its political language, however, did not emerge suddenly, 
or solely from the immediate need by rebels to fashion an environmental politics. Nor 
was it an outcome of the hulu's isolation, lack of exposure, or encapsulation in tradition. 
Rather, it reflected Terengganu’s embeddedness in circuits of intellectual exchange, and 
the ways in which Islamic scholars in these circuits responded to changing political 
circumstances.
These circumstances arose gradually, from a struggle tor territory on a larger 
scale, of which the smaller forest struggle was an outcome, and which played out 
around Terengganu before its formal colonisation. This larger struggle was between 
Britain and Siam for colonial control of the Malay Peninsula as a whole, which created 
a larger logic of territorial ordering relating to Siam’s Malay tributaries. The longer-
339 C. Clementi Smith to Colonial Office, 3 December 1888, C0717/156: 25873, ‘British Protectorate in 
Tringgano’.
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term Islamisation of Terengganu politics, in which Islam came to occupy an 
increasingly central place in Terengganu’s courtly and social life, was partly driven by 
this territorial ordering, in which they peninsula was gradually apportioned between 
Britain and Siam. The apportionment of territory reorganised power relationships in the 
northern Malay states which formed Siam’s southern tributaries. To begin with, these 
states—the largest of which were Patani, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu—constituted 
a Siamese-influenced Malay zone, united by the need for Siamese protection, whether 
from other regional powers or even each other. Yet these states also feared Siam, and 
when they found its protection too overbearing, or militarily threatening, they assisted 
each other in resistance. As such, these states’ relationships with Siam were messy and 
variable. They were tributaries to Siam, yet as Anglo-Siamese competition emerged, 
such tributary relationships were gradually dismantled and they were organised into 
delineated and territorially contiguous spheres of control. Eventually, Britain gained 
Terengganu, Kelantan and Kedah for Malaya, and Siam cemented its control over 
Patani.
This same re-ordering also necessitated the formal bounding and delineation of 
the Siamese tributary Malay states themselves, making them available for wholesale 
territorial integration by either power. Just as borders came to separate Siam from 
British Malaya, they were also drawn between the individual states. Thus Terengganu 
was reconstituted as a discrete piece of territory, and it also became a zone for resource 
exploitation, a unit of revenue collection and taxation.340 As borders were gradually 
defined with the aim of dividing the zone, its resources and population, people’s 
behaviour began to change in response. Rather than completely reconstructing their 
behaviour, however, the states of the Siamese Malay zone assisted each other in 
rebellion against both Siam and Britain until they were eventually all colonised. Rebels 
moved across the zone from colonised territories to those which momentarily remained 
unaffected. For example, Terengganu hosted rebels fleeing colonial intervention in 
Pahang in the 1890s.
340 James C. Scott, The Art o f Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History o f  Upland Southeast Asia, Yale 
Agrarian Studies Series (Yale University Press, 2009), Chp. 2.
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Other connections were also slow to be broken. The states had been integrated 
in a common culture o f Islamic scholarship, in which young people were sent to study 
Islam with prominent shaykhs, and upon graduating, would move to seek further 
knowledge in Mecca. Once in the Middle East these scholars moved in the same circles, 
and interacted with others from Muslim Southeast Asia before returning to the Siamese 
Malay zone to establish schools o f their own. Known as pondok, these were schools 
organised as a series o f small huts, in which students lived and studied alongside their 
shaykhs. Mecca-returned shaykhs channelled their prestige into building these 
institutions, often with royal funding. With the establishment of the Siam-Malaya 
border, these pondok continued to link scholars from the former Siamese tributaries. 
One key difference, however, was that to escape Siamese rule, Patani scholars fled in 
large numbers to the states to their south. The majority settled in Kelantan, and many 
also settled in Terengganu, shifting the centre o f the pondok scholarly culture southward 
from Patani. Once in Terengganu, refugees and rebels often found courtly and popular 
support.
Those who settled along the Terengganu River system arrived in the crucible o f 
Terengganu’s own political Islamisation, occurring as states all around it were taken 
over. Terengganu, lately construed as an Islamic holdout against the kafir colonisers, 
was in the throes o f a debate over how a Muslim kerajaan should respond to the 
colonial threat. This debate raged in Kuala Terengganu, and was expressed in a series o f 
precedents which bound the Sultan to resisting Britain. Shaykhs, disciples and pondok 
along the Terengganu and its tributaries linked the capital to the hulu, drawing forest 
cultivators into networks o f study, prayer and politics.
It was these networks that provided assistance to the Pahang rebels who fled 
into Terengganu in 1895, and which were built by the arrival o f the Patani refugee 
scholars. The entire river system was drawn into the Islamic ferment, in which the 
scripturalism and claims to orthodoxy made by Islamic scholars were gradually drawn 
into anti-colonial action to create a burgeoning Islamist politics. With the colonial 
advent, however, Terengganu’s Islamic scholarly community lost access to the royal 
court as the source of its authority. Some accepted co-option into the colonial religious
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affairs department. Others, like Haji Drahman, rejected the government’s approaches, 
turning instead to the rakyat hulu and the forest struggle to refashion his religious 
authority. These developments, played out over more than a century, underlay how the 
uprising’s organisers imagined their purpose, and generalised their political claims into 
a Holy War.
Terengganu’s Maussian Gifts
Of the tributary Malay states in the Siamese Malay zone, Terengganu was the 
southernmost, occupying an ambivalent position in relation to Siam’s growing 
peninsular dominance. The origins of Siam’s peninsular power lay in its competition 
with other regional trading centres. For Bangkok to compete as a port, it needed a 
constant supply of goods for trade, requiring greater control over its hinterlands, from 
which those goods were sourced. These hinterlands included the Malay states to Siam’s 
south.341 Southern domination was not smoothly achieved, and Siam’s power over the 
south varied through time. Terengganu, for example, shifted its tribute as power 
relationships in the region also shifted, alternating between Siam and first Melaka, then 
Melaka’s post-fifteenth century avatar, Johor. The situation changed dramatically when 
in 1699, Sultan Mahmud of Johor, the only remaining descendent of the illustrious 
Melaka lineage, was murdered, severing the Melaka line and leaving a ‘void of power’ 
in the northern Malay Peninsula.342 Johor’s new royalty, installed from the line of the 
bendahara (prime minister), sought to protect themselves in this dangerous situation. 
They did this by seeking an alliance with Patani and establishing an independent 
sultanate in Terengganu, an offshoot of their own. By 1726, one of the bendahara'’s 
descendents, Sultan Zainal Abidin I, was in place in Kuala Berang.
Yet the very circumstances in which the Terengganu sultanate was born were 
also those which required Siam as its protector. By 1781, despite its links to Johor, the 
Terengganu royal line had begun to seek Siamese protection from other powers seeking
v;l Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-Regional Relations from the 
Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), 10-16.
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to expand their influence on the peninsula. In 1786, one such power, the British East 
India Company (EIC), formally arrived in Penang. With the British presence in Penang 
established, the advancement of Siamese influence any further southward was perceived 
as a potential threat to Britain’s commercial interests. Commercial and territorial 
concerns came together for British officials within the context of an even larger contest, 
between imperial European states which aimed to gain control of strategically-important 
areas of Southeast Asia. Britain’s resulting moves to secure peninsular territory were 
therefore influenced by a race with France and China for control of mainland Southeast 
Asian territory, requiring a neutral Siam as an intervening buffer zone.343 Against 
calculations of Siam’s potential territorial bargains with other European powers, British 
authorities feared France, or possibly even Germany, gaining territory on the 
peninsula.144 Britain needed to seal its strategic advantage against these powers by 
ensuring access to the route between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea via the 
Melaka Strait.
The Terengganu royal family was a player in the resulting competition, just as 
it later remained an active agent in the struggle with Britain for its own hinterland. 
Siamese-British competition was immediately and aggressively pursued by Terengganu 
Sultans with their own interests in mind. In soliciting relationships with both competing 
powers, the Terengganu rulers were building alliances on the galactic polity or mandala 
model, in which stronger states in one locality attempted to consolidate their leadership 
over the smaller polities around them. Smaller polities in turn formed relationships of 
tribute with more than one stronger state as a strategy for gaining protection from each 
against the other, using gifts as symbols of their bond. 345 Small states such as 
Terengganu frequently pursued such relationships with two, or even more, large
343 Chandran Jeshurun, The Contest fo r  Siam 1889-1902: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry (Kuala Lumpur: 
Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1977), Chp. 1.
344 Ibid., 118.
345 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, "The Galactic Polity in Southeast Asia," in Culture, Thought and Social 
Action: An Anthropological Perspective (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 
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competing powers. 346 However, the message conveyed in the gift was always 
ambiguous, with both giver and receiver able to derive different meanings from the 
exchange.347
Malay states such as Terengganu invested their hopes for protection from other 
powers in the act of exchange. Yet they simultaneously intended for that protection to 
remain a largely symbolic commitment to assistance against other powers which could 
diminish their independence. The exchange was never meant to imply a voluntary 
cession of power to the receiver, and any pressure from the larger polity on the tributary 
would be resisted; indeed, this was seen as part of the bargain. Siam, on the other hand, 
read the exchange as obligatory, especially given the tendency of Siamese rulers after 
1767 to systematise tributary relations into a permanent relationship of power and 
submission.348 Thongchai’s characterisation of the exchange as an essentially Maussian 
exchange—a seemingly voluntary relationship which was essentially obligatory—is 
therefore apt for Terengganu’s situation.344
In the 1780s the Terengganu royal family made gestures of tribute to both Siam 
and Britain, in an attempt to maintain Terengganu’s independence in the interstices of 
peninsular power. By doing so, it became caught up in threatening relationships with 
both. In 1781, for example, Sultan Mansur Syah I (r. 1733-1793) participated in a
350Siamese attack on a state near Patani, possibly Ligor (Nakhon), according to Buyong. 
This may have occurred because of the 1767 declaration by Nakhon that it was no
• 3 5 1longer a Siamese tributary, which resulted in Nakhon’s violent suppression by Siam. 
Sultan Mansur sailed to Patani with tens of armed boats (perahu) of various sizes, 
where he was met by Siamese warboats, ready to approach Nakhon together. On
346 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 87-88.
347 Ibid.
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Nakhon’s defeat, Siam gifted to the Sultan two perahu full of valuable goods pillaged 
by Siamese troops. When the Sultan returned, he called a meeting with Terengganu’s 
notables with the purpose of 'reciprocating Siam’s good will’. “ This meeting decided 
to send Siam a gift of small trees made of gold filigree (bunga mas). From this time, 
Terengganu began to send bunga mas to Siam every three years, although as no gold 
mines existed in Terengganu, the gold had to be purchased from Kelantan or Pahang.354 
Terengganu also sent gifts produced by three of its important industries: floor mats and 
cloth from its looms,355 pearl shells collected from its seas, and sago and two types of 
rattan collected from its forests.3^ 6
Sultan Mansur Syah I’s contribution to the attack on Nakhon was designed to 
win Siam’s protection, from other powers and from Siam itself. As Hugh Clifford, the 
British Resident in Pahang from 1896 to 1893, wrote in 1927, ‘Sultan Mansur of 
Trengganu, who first sent the bunga amas to Siam in 1776, did so, not in compliance 
with any demand made by the Siamese Government, but because he deemed it wise to 
be on friendly terms with the only race in his vicinity which was capable, in his opinion, 
of doing him a hurt’.357 Immediately, however, he began to find this protection stifling, 
as Siam went about integrating its ‘voluntary’ tributaries. In 1785, Siam decisively 
demonstrated that integration would be forceful if necessary, when it invaded Patani,
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and ‘enslaved or displaced a large portion of the sultanate’s population’, killing its 
sultan, Muhammad.359 These events made it clear to Terengganu that it needed an 
additional protector other than Siam to avoid the same fate. Britain’s arrival in Penang
,s2 Haji Buyong Adil, Sejarah Trengganu, 41.
353 Ibid., 42.
354 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 79.
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as a permanent peninsular power took place at precisely this time. Large numbers of 
Patani refugees were fleeing southward, in response to a Siamese tactic of removing 
Patani men and women as slaves, and also killing large numbers of women and 
children.360
Reports from Captain Francis Light in Penang to the EIC in Calcutta indicated 
that large numbers of refugees fled Patani, followed by warnings by Siamese officials to
v  i
states like Kedah not to accept them. After Patani’s invasion by Siam, a series of 
rebellions took place, joined by the other states in the Siamese Malay zone. These 
rebellions, always defeated, caused waves of refugees to leave after each resulting 
Siamese crackdown. Precisely how many refugees arrived in Terengganu over 
subsequent decades is not clear, but large numbers of Patani Malays settled in 
Terengganu either permanently or temporarily. Zalfullah has pointed out that many of 
these refugees settled in the Kuala Terengganu neighbourhoods of Pulau Duyung, 
Chabang Tiga, Losong, Bukit Bayas and Kampung Patani—the last of which was 
apparently originally established by the eighty Patani families who accompanied Tun 
Zainal Abidin to his coronation as Sultan Zainal Abidin I of Terengganu.
After Patani’s invasion, Sultan Mansur of Terengganu immediately began to 
approach EIC officials in Penang and India, making stronger and stronger requests. To 
begin with, the Sultan approached Warren Hastings, the EIC Governor General in India, 
asking for a British Resident in Kuala Terengganu to protect it from Siamese 
aggression. He also wrote to Captain Francis Light, an EIC official in Penang, this time 
asking directly that Captain James Glass, also of the EIC, be sent as the British Resident 
in question. This second letter came after the Siamese court requested that Sultan 
Mansur present himself in Bangkok to acknowledge his vassalage to Siam, a request the 
Sultan refused. In 1787 he wrote to Light again, asking for two warships to protect
,<>() See R Bonney, Kedah 1771-1821: The Search for Security and Independence (Oxford University 
Press, 1971), 79. See also Bradley, "Moral Order," 291.
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Terengganu from a rumoured Siamese attack. None of these requests were met by the 
British.363
Pressing on, Sultan Mansur wrote another letter in 1787, to John Macpherson, 
the Acting Governor General of the EIC in India, this time stating that the Dutch too 
were a threat to his independence. This was followed by another letter asking the 
Company to fly the British flag in Terengganu, and asking again for a resident British 
official in Kuala Terengganu.364 Light eventually agreed to install a small trading post 
(loji) in Terengganu under Glass’s supervision, and argued that the presence of 
Company ships in the Kuala Terengganu port from time to time should be sufficiently 
threatening to Siam.365 In 1787 Sultan Mansur Syah also sent two representatives, 
Orang Kaya Seri Wangsa and a trader, Nasool Ally Deen, to Penang to meet with Light. 
Their message was intended to open a relationship, so they presented a gift with strings 
attached—the Sultan would send 6,000 pikul of pepper to Penang annually, with the 
request that it be repaid with 240 chests of opium. These men also travelled to Bengal 
the following year, in Glass’s ship, to request an alliance with the new EIC Governor 
General, Lord Cornwallis. Cornwallis, however, agreed only to private trade, not 
company trade, between British traders and Terengganu.366
Throughout all these representations, Siamese control in Patani continued to 
strengthen, resulting in repeated and more intense rebellions. The Malay states further 
south in the Siamese Malay zone understood the threat Siamese control of Patani posed 
to their futures. In response, Terengganu and the other states assisted Patani rebels in 
every case.367 Rebellions took place in Patani in 1790 and 1808, and both were defeated. 
In 1808 Terengganu, along with Siak and Mindanao, joined Patani in attacking 
Songkhla, 368 a major southern centre which Siam charged with administering both
364
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Patani and Terengganu after the 1790 rebellion.369 In response, Siam divided Patani into 
seven smaller provinces, further tightening its control over it by appointing Siamese- 
sanctioned officials to each new province and denying Patani a united centre. As Vella 
has pointed out, and as Terengganu feared, Siam’s consolidation of its control over 
Patani was designed to both lock in Patani itself as part of Siam’s own territory, and to 
enable its campaign to stabilise its control over its tributaries further south.370 Kedah, in 
particular, was concerned about victorious Siamese troops in a territory directly adjacent 
to it.371 Terengganu, previously safe from Siamese integration due to its southerly 
position,372 also experienced Siamese intervention at this time when Siam removed 
Kelantan from Terengganu’s suzerainty. In response, Terengganu continued its 
attempts to undermine Siam’s position.374
Territorialisation
In 1800, the EIC in Penang leased a strip of land on the Kedah mainland. The EIC was 
momentarily the only European power on the peninsula, having gained control of 
Melaka from the Dutch in 1795. This was a temporary arrangement, after Britain agreed 
to manage possessions held by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) when France 
attacked the Netherlands in Europe. In 1816, Melaka was handed back to the Dutch 
government, which had taken over the bankrupt VOC in the meantime. ' The 
Netherlands was, however, never in a position to compete with Britain on the peninsula, 
and the EIC’s only real challenge instead came from Siam. The EIC felt Siam’s 
administrative influence over its tributaries growing increasingly firm, although the 
further south a tributary was located, the less it felt Siam’s administrative incorporation.
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In 1824, two events coincided, creating a consensus among British officials that Siam 
should be contained. One of these was the final withdrawal from the peninsula of the 
Netherlands, with the Anglo-Dutch treaty which stipulated that the peninsula would fall 
within the British sphere of influence. The second was the inauguration of Nangklao as 
King Rama III of Siam. Nangklao’s installation coincided with Selangor’s raid on Perak, 
which appealed to Siam for help. Perak had at one stage been controlled by Kedah, and 
was therefore subject to Siamese influence. It had broken away from Kedah with 
Selangor’s help. Rama Ill’s policy was to reclaim Perak, moving Siam’s influence 
further south.376
Already, Siam’s Malay tributaries were more firmly administered by Bangkok, 
and larger numbers of Siamese were also found living in them. Malay rulers in the 
Siamese Malay zone were required to be confirmed by Bangkok, and foreign relations 
were also handled centrally. ~ Bangkok also designated Nakhon, in addition to 
Songkhla, as a second administrative centre in charge of managing the southern 
tributaries’ affairs, signalling that it was increasing its efforts in consolidating the 
south. Penang officials had made a decision that they were willing to tolerate Siamese 
suzerainty only as far south as Kedah, ' and were now convinced they needed to limit 
Siam’s expansion lby any means’.380 Tributary relations were inconvenient, and some 
British officials wanted to force Siam’s agreement that the tributary states of the 
Siamese Malay zone were in fact independent. Penang officials began to work to 
limit Siam’s southward advance, sometimes exceeding their brief from the EIC in India,
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For the EIC and British officials in Malaya, the need to delimit Siam’s southern 
limits drove a logic of delineation, which began to emerge in the British government’s 
actions relating to the Siamese Malay zone over the nineteenth century. For this reason, 
Penang EIC officials intervened as mediators in Siam’s dispute with Perak in 1824,
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convincing Siam not to take military action there. For the same reason in 1825 the 
Governor General of India appointed Henry Burney, a former Penang official, as 
ambassador to Siam, and charged him with clarifying Siam’s ambiguous relationship 
with its Malay tributaries. Burney’s attempt to do this culminated with the first 
delineation of separate British and Siamese spheres of influence, in the Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty of 1826/ Negotiated between Burney and Governor of Bengal Lord Amherst 
for Britain, and the Siamese King Rama III and his Wang Na (heir apparent) for Siam, 
the treaty’s primary stress was on establishing the idea of a territorial and jurisdictional 
boundary between Siam and Britain.
Yet specific boundaries were not defined—establishing the idea that individual 
powers belonged in separate territories appears to have sufficed. The Burney treaty 
formally established a logic of bounding, and read like a didactic attempt to educate 
Southeast Asians in the idea of jurisdictional separation. Article I stated the following:
The Siamese must not go and molest, attack, disturb, or take any place, territory, 
or boundary belonging to the English, in any country subject to the English. The 
English must not go and molest, attack, disturb, or take any place, territory or 
boundary belonging to the Siamese, in any country subject to the Siamese.385
The idea of discrete territories and separate jurisdictions having been established in this 
way, methods for managing cross-border relations were spelt out in Article II, including 
the instruction:
Should any place or country subject to the English do anything that may offend 
the Siamese, the Siamese shall not go and injure such place or country, but first 
report the matter to the English, who shall examine into it with truth and sincerity;
383 Vella, Siam under Rama III, 1824-1851, 64.
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and if the fault lie with the English, the English shall punish according to the 
fault.386
The reverse applied if the Siamese offended the English.
Having established the idea of separate and exclusive claims over particular 
territories, the Burney treaty also established the principle of mutual cross-border 
clarification of boundaries:
In places and countries belonging to the Siamese and English, lying near their 
mutual borders, whether to the east, west, north or south, if the English entertain a 
doubt as to any boundary that has not been ascertained, the Chief on the side of 
the English must send a letter, with some men and people from his frontier posts, 
to go and enquire from the nearest Siamese Chief, who shall depute some of his 
officers and people from his frontier posts to go with the men belonging to the 
English Chief, and point out and settle the mutual boundaries, so that they may be
• T ö  7ascertained on both sides in a friendly manner.
The establishment of these broad principles, however, was all the Burney treaty was 
able to do. Siamese or British relationships with Terengganu were not specified. Rather, 
the treaty left Terengganu and Kelantan as independent states, with which Siam and 
Britain were equally free to negotiate relationships. The treaty also prevented Siam from 
taking over the management of their trade relationships.
In legal terms, Terengganu and Kelantan remained ‘independent’ tributaries of 
Siam at this stage, but Burney’s treaty set off a chain of attempts to define and contain 
Siam’s power over these states. Many more treaties were negotiated; indeed, the treaty 
was established as the main instrument through which these attempts would be carried 
out, and subsequent treaties built on the Burney framework. They furthered the logic of 
containing Siam by gradually becoming more and more specific about exactly where 
Siam’s control came to an end. For example, in an 1869 treaty, the limits of Siam’s and 
Britain’s power over Kedah were defined, in terms that were much more specific than 
those enabled by the Burney treaty. Kedah appeared to be serving as a first and 
experimental case, an education in territorial negotiation with Siam on the issue of its
386 ‘Treaty between Great Britain and Siam’, 20 June 1826, Ibid.
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southern limits. This treaty was signed by Thomas George Knox, the British Consul- 
General in Siam, and the Siamese Prime Minister, Chao Phya Sri Surawongsa Phra 
Kalahome, who was named in the treaty as the ‘Rajah of Quedah’ instead of Kedah’s 
Sultan Ahmad Tajudin III.
In this way the treaty demonstrated Siam and Britain reaching over the top of a 
tributary Malay state to divide its territory between them, further compromising the 
‘independent’ status of Siam’s tributaries. A section of Kedah was bounded, and then 
exchanged between Siam and Britain, without Kedah being involved. The treaty did this 
in the following terms:
the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty on the mainland, opposite the island of 
Penang, shall comprise the territories bounded as follows: that is to say, on the 
West by the Sea, on the North by the right bank of the River Mudah, on the South 
by the right bank of the River Kurreen (Kreean) [Sungai Kerian], and on the East 
by a line running South from a spot on the right bank of the River Mudah, 
opposite the existing Frontier pillar at Sematool, in a straight line to a point on the 
extreme eastern end of the Maratajam [Mertajam] range of Hills. Thence along the 
top ridge of the Punchore Hill [Bukit Panchor] to the existing Frontier pillar on 
the right bank of the River Kurreean, about 400 English yards above and east of 
Bukit Tungal [Tunggal].388
Stone pillars would mark the Eastern boundary line of this newly British-controlled 
territory, and a police station would be built on it. British authority over this territory 
would also be marked by a prohibition on Siamese authorities from entering it to 
capture escaped fugitives. All fugitives would be delivered from this territory— 
Province Wellesley, later called Seberang Prai in Penang state—would be delivered by
T O Q
the Kedah authorities to British officials.
This treaty marked the first specific delineation of territory and jurisdictional 
authority between the competing powers in the Siamese Malay zone. It was also the first 
agreement between these powers in which the subject was territory controlled by 
tributary states which considered themselves independent. With this treaty, bounding 
was established as a logic for separating Siam and Britain’s spheres of influence, but
388 ‘j reaty between Great Britain and Siam’, 6 May 1869, Ibid., 82-85.
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also as a vehicle for Britain to gain control of territory. These peninsular negotiations 
were also taking place in parallel with broader negotiations between Britain and France 
to delineate their territorial possessions in Southeast Asia. At the same time, British 
officials in Malaya were debating whether Terengganu and Kelantan should be viewed 
as sites for colonial intervention. They aimed to prevent Siam from asserting its control 
over these two states, and also feared that Siam would use their position to install other 
European powers on the peninsula.
A discussion to this end ensued between officials in the late 1880s. For 
example, in 1888, one unnamed official had written of being unable to rely on the 1826 
treaty to prevent Siam from allowing other powers access to Kelantan. This official also 
felt that British entry to Terengganu would be more easily achieved than into Kelantan, 
as he feared that Kelantan may have already been lost to Siam. In response, another 
official, R.M., wrote that ‘any starting connection between Siam and a Malay state 
should be weathered rather than strengthened...The Siamese are now taking action and 
if the state of affairs in Kelantan is still as reported, their officers are established in 
Kelantan and their flag flying.’ Action of some kind was therefore considered all the 
more urgent in Terengganu. On the basis of these concerns, Sir Cecil Clementi Smith 
wrote the following to the Colonial Office in December 1888:
There is no sort of doubt that by Treaty the two states of Kelantan and 
Tringganu are independent of Siam... I see no reason why Tringganu should 
not, if its Ruler wishes, be placed under British protection.. .The 
encroachment of Siam should be resisted in every way... If nothing is done 
on our part Tringganu will be absorbed and it is to save as much as possible 
of the Malay Peninsula from Siamese influence that I shall advise the 
extension of British influence over Tringganu... The Siamese will doubtless 
protest, but they could do nothing further.
Intervention in Terengganu first was conceived by Clementi Smith as both a 
means to gain control of Terengganu, and also to pressure Siam in Kelantan, ultimately 
forcing it out:
Siam could be called upon, under the Treaty, to withdraw from Kelantan, 
where I understand they have a Commissioner and other officials who take 
part in the active government of the State. This however could not 
advantageously be done unless it were first made clear that the Raja of 
Kelantan and his people desired to be relieved of Siamese interference. In
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course of time it may be practicable to weaken the existing influence of 
Siam in Kelantan, but this will be best brought about by the development of 
the adjoining states—first Pahang, second Tringganu...In short, then, my 
view is that unless something is done now, the independence of Tringganu 
will practically be lost.. ,390
Covetous Inquiry
Throughout the 1880s and 90s then, Terengganu, although still independent, was being 
discussed as a possible target for British intervention. The strategy that Clementi Smith 
outlined, however, indicated that Britain would gain control of territories in order from 
south to north. Such a strategy would ensure contiguity of territory, and pressure Siam 
incrementally. To this end, in 1891, Britain began its intervention in Pahang. In 
response to Britain’s reorganisation of power in the hinterland, the Pahang ‘rebellion’ 
broke out in 1895.391 The rebellion was led by district heads in the hulu—Dato’ 
Bahaman, Tok Gajah and Mat Kilau. Upon their defeat by British forces, these rebels 
and their supporters fled north into Kelantan, and then into Terengganu. From here, they 
recruited new supporters, along with material, political and spiritual assistance, and 
resumed their raids in Pahang territory.
That same year, Hugh Clifford, British Resident in Pahang, pursued the rebels 
deep into the Terengganu hinterland with a force of troops and guides. Clifford’s 
expedition, however, was more than a pursuit. It was an exercise in gaining as much 
territorial knowledge of Terengganu (and Kelantan) and its resources as possible, so 
these states could be ‘interpreted by imperial concerns’. ~ This was the first European 
exploration of Terengganu, which, as recently as 1891, had appeared as a completely 
blank space on a map produced by the Royal Asiatic Society.393 As Clifford put it, his 
expedition:
390 Sir C. Smith, to Lord Knutsford, Colonial Office, 3 December 1888, in C0273/156: 25873.
391 This conflict is also frequently referred to as the Pahang War.
392 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian 
Frontier, 1865-1915 (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2005), 28.
393 Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Straits Branch., "Map of the Malay Peninsula," 
(London: Edward Stanford, under the auspices of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1891).
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traversed a large tract o f country never before visited by a European: and 
which forms the greater part o f that belt o f country on the East Coast of the 
Malay Peninsula, which as Mr. Henry Norman recently wrote, is “still as 
unfamiliar as the remotest parts o f Africa to the foreign explorer” .394
• T Q C
Clifford began mapping the Terengganu hinterland, ' creating a time and 
compass survey as he proceeded. 396 Clifford’s mode of inquiry was covetous from the 
beginning, and his report a hybrid o f colonial modalities— historiography, travel 
narrative and survey all rolled together—-to further the region’s categorisation into 
revenue-recording units. 197 His report also offered insights into a large variety o f 
considerations relevant to expanding British rule. He described Terengganu’s forest and 
mineral resources, and even flagged routes for their transport by river. He described the 
twelve distinct river valleys thought o f as ‘Terengganu’, the flat coastal plain and the 
sudden rise into hilly country at the Paling falls on the Trengan river, small ‘Sakai’ 
(Orang Asli) populations, the upland tracks used by collectors of jungle produce, even 
the prices that rubber-growing smallholders earned for their crops: all were subjects of 
his attention. Clifford also reported on population distributions, and participation in
398fishing, agricultural cultivation and manufacturing.
394 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 48.
m  Ibid., 101.
397 Bernard S Cohn, "Introduction," in Colonialism and Its Forms o f Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a 
Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915, 28.
39X Refer to Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan .
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Figure 6: A cropped map extract showing Terengganu as a blank space.
w  Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Straits Branch., "Map of the Malay Peninsula".
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Most importantly in the context of plans to intervene in Terengganu, Clifford 
also provided important justifications for British control, including his description of 
local tax and justice systems which he argued were oppressive. He considered the 
political situation, including likely sources of resistance to British intervention. He also 
reported some details regarding the Sultan, his representatives in the hinterland, and his 
Shaykhul Islam Tokku Paloh, all of whom were helping the Pahang rebels. He 
confirmed what dementi Smith already thought about the extent of Siamese influence 
and control in Terengganu, namely that Siam’s real administrative influence was much 
weaker in Terengganu than in Kelantan. To illustrate his point, Clifford told of how he 
was accompanied through both states by two Siamese officers, Luang Visudh Parihar 
and Luang Sevasti Borirom. Their presence reflected the claims of both peninsular 
powers over Terengganu, while recognising that Britain was not entitled to unilaterally 
intervene in the state.
In Terengganu, Clifford found that courtly and popular relationships with Siam 
were extremely complicated. In 1890, Sultan Zainal Abidin III had agreed to fly the 
Siamese flag in Kuala Terengganu for state visits. There was a Post Office which issued 
Siamese stamps. Clifford had also heard that many Malays believed that Britain was 
frightened of Siam, and that Siam was willing to protect them from the British 
government.400 At the same time, it seemed to Clifford that the Siamese officials 
travelling with him were attempting to win favour with the Terengganu court by 
sending the rebels money instead of helping British troops to capture them. Yet he was 
not certain that the Siamese agents were acting on Bangkok’s orders. He felt instead that 
they had gone rogue, overstepping their orders in their work to advance Siam’s interests 
in the south. Nor could they win popular support with their gesture. In Kuala Berang, 
Luang Visudh had organised rafts, ostensibly to pursue the rebels, but could not find 
enough men willing to cooperate with him by poling them upriver.401
For British officials at this stage, however, gaining Terengganu remained a 
future objective. British officials began to negotiate more and more specific boundary-
400 Clifford, Trengganu andKelantan, 110-18.
401 Ibid., 20-21.
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delineation treaties, first with France, then with Siam. Negotiations with France were 
formalised in the 1896 French-British agreement, which formed a larger, overarching 
structure within which Britain was careful to leave its options open for gaining 
peninsular territory. Britain had entered into this agreement based on a contradictory 
policy, which asserted that Britain did not ‘wish’ to interfere with Siam’s southern 
Malay tributaries, as it supposedly respected Siam’s claim over these states. At the same 
time, however, Britain held that preventing other European powers’ incursions on the 
peninsula was of greater importance than this wish.402 The 1896 Agreement reflected 
this policy, also affirming the principle of Siam’s territorial integrity, but neglecting to 
delineate its tributaries as integral parts of Siam. In this way, the agreement functioned 
to enable Britain’s entry into Siam’s Malay tributaries. It did this by leaving those 
tributaries outside of Siam’s acknowledged territory, therefore allowing the possibility 
for Siam to cede them to France—a possibility Britain would need to act to avoid, 
precisely by gaining control over them.
At the same time, the growth of the FMS was setting limits to Siam’s aim to 
consolidate its control further south than Patani. Yet Siam’s status as a ‘semi- 
colonial’403 but independent state allowed it sufficient autonomy to continue to compete 
with Britain for the peninsula. As Loos has argued, Siam possessed colonial ambitions 
in its own right over its Malay tributaries, which drove its attempts to set limits to 
Britain’s northward advance. During the 1890s, Siam fashioned its own ‘pre-emptive 
colonisation policy in [its] South’,404 anticipating British intervention in the other 
northern Malay states. Southern colonisation would be carried out by using ‘modern 
centralisation techniques’, which would integrate the territories beyond the central 
Menam Valley into Siam’s state structures.405 These techniques would effectively
4(L Jeshurun, The Contest for Siam 1889-1902: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry, 118-57.
403 Peter Jackson, "Autonomy and Subordination in Thai History: The Case for Semicolonial Analysis," 
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 8, no. 3 (2007).
404 Tamara Loos, Subject Siam (Cornell University Press, 2006), 80.
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convert mandala tributaries into territorially and administratively incorporated 
provinces within Siam’s geo-body.406
Siam’s move to ensure integration would both protect its interests and allow it 
to ‘prove to imperial Britain that Siam was a colonial power equally capable of 
colonising a foreign population’.407 Siamese efforts at integration remained mostly 
focused on Patani, where it effectively realised its aims, although Kedah and Kelantan 
also hosted Siamese officials and advisers. Terengganu remained the southernmost, and 
least-affected, tributary, experiencing little real Siamese influence. Britain responded by 
limiting Siam’s options with another treaty, the secret Anglo-Siamese Convention, 
signed in 1897, which prevented Siam from surrendering its tributaries to any foreign 
power other than Britain. These moves both left the Siamese Malay zone ambiguously 
defined and controlled, and established Britain and Siam as the only two contenders for 
it.
At this stage, however, it was with Pahang and its neighbour Perak in mind that 
boundary negotiations continued. An 1899 Anglo-Siamese treaty locked these two 
states within British territory, limiting the southern reach of the Siamese Malay zone. 
The text announced considered it:
desirable to settle all frontier disputes in the Malay Peninsula, and to define 
the boundaries between the above-mentioned states of Perak and Pahang on 
the one side, and the Siamese province of Reman and the Siamese 
dependencies of Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu on the other...408
Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu were now recognised as Siamese dependencies. The 
British border was defined as such:
4. The boundary between Pahang and Trengganu is:- 
(i) The main watershed.
406 Ibid., 80-82. For further discussion of the term ‘geo-body’, refer to Thongchai Winichakul, Siam 
Mapped.
407 Loos, Subject Siam, 80.
408 ‘Anglo-Siamese Boundary Agreement, 1899, in Chandran Jeshurun, "Three Agreements Relating to 
the Northern Malay States Concluded in 1896, 1897 and 1899," Peninjau Sejarah (1968), 61.
128
Chapter Three—Territory and Mobility: Borders and Connections in the Siamese Malay Zone
(ii) Then the southern drainage of the Nemaman [Kemaman] River until it 
meets the watershed of the Chendar River.
(iii) Then the northern drainage of the Chendar River to Tanjong Glugor on 
the sea coast.409
For the British, this move sealed their control over Pahang. Terengganu, however, was 
also partially bounded as a result, and increasingly caught up in the logic of border 
creation. This is because Pahang’s newly-delineated border set Terengganu’s specific 
southern and southeastern limits for the first time.
This is not to say that Terengganu had never possessed any boundaries 
whatsoever before the British created this one. One pre-existing boundary was the ‘post 
driven into the sand’ to show that Kelantan territory began on the Kelantan side of the 
Besut river mouth. 410 Even this boundary post, however, may have been a result of 
Kelantan’s separation from Terengganu, relatively recently engineered by Siam. It was, 
however, accepted that Terengganu was limited by the watersheds of the Besut, Hulu 
Terengganu and Kerbat rivers.411 These rivers were natural boundaries, however, and 
precise and complete border definition was new. In the context of British colonial 
intervention the need for such precision was absolute. This was because, as Tagliacozzo 
has recognised, establishing precise borders was essential to both gaining control of 
territory and of governing territories as units of production, trade, regulation, resource 
management and revenue.412
In his Terengganu expedition report, Clifford offered some comments on a 
boundary dispute between the Sultans of Pahang and Terengganu with exactly this need 
in mind:
The boundary on the coast between Pahang and Trengganu has long been a matter 
of dispute, and has formed the subject of correspondence, during the last two 
years, between myself and the Sultan of the latter State. It is contended by His
4l|l) ‘Anglo-Siamese Boundary Agreement, 1899, in Ibid.
410 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 50-51.
411 Ibid., 50.
412 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 
1865-1915, 28-52.
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Highness the Sultan of Pahang, and by all such natives of this State as are 
qualified by their age and local knowledge to give an opinion on the question, that 
the boundary is, and always has been, at Tanjong Gelugor; while the Sultan of 
Trengganu maintains that his territory extends along the coast as far as Tanjong 
Tengah.413
These details were not merely added for local colour. Clifford also recognised the issue 
at stake for Britain, aside from moving its limits closer to Siam. This was the 
‘considerable quantity of valuable timber’ which was exported annually from the 
disputed area to China. Clifford had recommended that a Commission be appointed to 
decide the precise location of the full boundary. In his report, Clifford showed he was 
hopeful that negotiations with Terengganu’s Sultan could achieve more than the 
cooperation in tracking the rebels that he was seeking. Rather, he recognised that in 
these same negotiations, he could also gain agreement for the boundary to be set to 
Pahang’s advantage.414 As the 1899 treaty demonstrated, the boundary more favourable 
to Pahang was ultimately gained.
The 1899 treaty had settled the Pahang-Terengganu boundary, and the range of 
Terengganu’s resources had also been understood. An estimate of Terengganu’s larger 
strategic importance and amenability to British intervention had also been made. In 
addition, the logic of strict and separated jurisdictions, whose limits were separated by 
precise and immovable boundaries, was now well-established. The stage was thus set 
for further delimitation, which occurred with the 1902 ‘declaration and draft 
agreement’. This document specifically concerned Terengganu and Kelantan and was 
signed by the British Foreign Minister, Lord Lansdowne, and the Siamese Special 
Envoy, Phya Sri Sahadeb. The agreement established Kelantan and Terengganu as a 
bounded parcel of territory, which could be traded between the two powers. In this 
document, Siamese nominal suzerainty over Terengganu and Kelantan was formalised, 
and the rulers of either state were ‘forbidden from engaging in political relations or 
political dealings with any foreign Power or Chiefs of States, except through the 
medium of the Government of His Majesty the King of Siam’.
413 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 50-51.
414 Ibid., 51.
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In other words, Kelantan and Terengganu were no longer independent polities 
in anyone’s eyes but their own, and to both large peninsular powers they were subject to 
Siam and would be treated as such. Siam had now won the entitlement to appoint 
Advisers and Assistant Advisers in both states, and to collect one-tenth of gross 
revenues in excess of $100,000 from them. Concessions were not to be granted by the 
Malay rulers to ‘any individual or Company other than a native or natives of the State of 
Kelantan/Trengganu’.41:> Kelantan immediately accepted the installation of Siamese 
advisers, although, foreshadowing Kelantan’s future, the Siamese adviser W.A. Graham 
was a British national.416 At this time, the beginnings of a Terengganu pattern of refusal 
to negotiate began to emerge, and Terengganu refused to accept a Siamese adviser.417
Nevertheless, Kelantan and Terengganu were now recognised as belonging to 
Siam, and negotiations began to specify Siam’s final boundary. In 1909, in a treaty 
between British Envoy Ralph Paget and Siamese Minister for Foreign Affairs Prince 
Devawongse Varoprakar, Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis and a number of islands 
were transferred back to Britain. Already bounded territories in legal-political terms, 
these states’ collective boundaries were delimited in a ‘Boundary Protocol’ attached to 
the treaty so that the exact dimensions of the territorial handover were clear. The 
boundary, delimited by the protocol, started in Perlis on the ‘most seaward point of the 
northern bank of the estuary of the Perlis River’, and traversed the peninsula upriver and 
uphill until it reached the watersheds of the Patani, Telubin and Perak rivers. It 
eventually reached the watershed of the Golok River (Sungai Golok), and then followed 
the Golok to the sea at Kuala Tabar. The arrangement left ‘the valleys of the Sungei 
Patani, Sungei Telubin, and Sungei Tanjung Mas and the valley on the left of the west 
bank of the Golok to Siam and the whole valley on the right or east bank of the Golok to 
Great Britain’. 41s The boundary was surveyed in 1910-11 following this protocol.414
415 ‘Declaration and Draft Agreement, Kelantan and Terengganu, 1902’ Maxwell and Gibson, eds., 
Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, 85-88.
416 Misbaha, Terengganu Dari Bentuk Sejarah Hingga Tahun 1918, 238.
417 Ibid.
418 ‘Boundary Protocol Annexed to the Treaty dated 10 March 1909’, Maxwell and Gibson, eds., Treaties 
and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, 217-19.
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Negotiating Boundaries
As Vandergeest and Peluso have observed, territorialisation as the exercise of 
governmental power can take place at more than one scale—at the larger national or 
proto-national scale of the geo-body, as proposed by Thongchai, and at the smaller local 
or internal’ scale, in the political forest. Thongchai has described the work of 
territorialisation as involving ‘classification by area, ‘communication by boundary’ and 
‘an attempt at enforcing’. 420 The effect of these efforts, the definition of a discrete geo­
body, or ‘a certain portion of the earth’s surface which is objectively identifiable’,421 
was central to imagining and realising Siam as a nation-state. As such, Siam had 
sovereign powers and jurisdiction over its own territory from its centre to its designated 
extremities, and no further. With the Siamese geo-body’s southern delineation at Patani, 
Britain’s permanent and uncompromised control over Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu 
was simultaneously made possible.
Terengganu was caught up within the large-scale work of creating Siamese and 
Malayan geo-bodies on the peninsula. This is how Terengganu’s existence at the 
shifting periphery of Siam’s power mandala was finally and permanently ended. In the 
process, the Siamese Malay zone was formally split. Patani, already incorporated into 
Siam through military action, was now formal Siamese territory, and Kelantan and 
Terengganu were decisively brought into the British sphere of influence, even without 
colonial control being acknowledged by the Sultan of either state, or the British 
themselves. The new legal framework represented by the treaty and the border it 
stipulated enabled both Siamese and British administrators to consolidate their control 
over the territory now on their side, and to formally incorporate these areas into their 
states.
Resistance to the new situation in Patani continued, and rebels immediately 
began to subvert the border by crossing it to evade arrest. Patani’s royal family had 
already had its power broken much earlier, but continued to sponsor rebellion against
419 Ibid., 219. Refer to Maps on p. i, above.
420 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 16.
421 Ibid., 17.
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Siam from Kelantan, where its members expected to be safe. In Terengganu, despite its 
earlier interest in Britain, the royal family was increasingly likely to refuse to cooperate 
with British officials. In return, Britain’s approach to Terengganu also changed between 
1902 and 1909. In 1902, British officials had informed Sultan Zainal Abidin III of the 
conditions in the treaty, and Frank Swettenham, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of 
the Straits Settlements, had even visited Kuala Terengganu to ask for his signature. The 
Sultan informed Swettenham that Siam may not have been a ‘straightforward’ friend, 
but he did not wish to build closer relationships with any other outside powers all the
_  422same.
This marked a serious shift from the attitude of previous Terengganu Sultans, 
who had looked to Britain as well as Siam for protection. Now, as the Terengganu court 
observed its encirclement by these powers, the Terengganu Sultan did not wish to 
cooperate with Britain at all. For Terengganu, therefore, in 1909, the principle 
established in Province Wellesley in 1869 was now applied to it: the border treaty 
established Siam and Britain as the agents of territorial negotiation, rather than the 
hereditary rulers of the Malay states which formed the subject of negotiations. Despite 
having not ceded his state’s independence to Britain, Terengganu’s Sultan Zainal 
Abidin III now saw his freedom of action as an independent sovereign significantly 
limited. Britain had assumed control over Terengganu’s territory simply by asserting an 
entitlement to that control. Britain and Siam had effectively licensed each other to 
consolidate their power over ‘their’ territories, permanently diminishing Terengganu’s 
independence, which it nevertheless clung to.
On the Patani side, Siamese administrators were free to consolidate their 
control as they saw fit. Siamese methods did not please British officials. W.A.R. Wood, 
the British Consul in Songkhla, had commented in 1909 that he thought Patani was 
‘grossly misgoverned’. British officials were aware that many Patani Malays were 
deeply opposed to Siamese rule, and that their location on the Siam side was the source 
of considerable grievance. ~ Other than stipulating the boundary however, the new
422 Misbaha, Terengganu Dari Bentuk Sejarah Hingga Tahun 1918, 236.
424 Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Sejarah Perjuangan Melayu Patani 1785-1954, 45.
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treaty also worked to govern populations by limiting their mobility to within the borders 
of the geo-body, in this case, using classification by citizenship. The treaty required 
rakyat to make their choices as to which side o f the Siam-Malay border they would 
choose to live on. Given that rebellions had taken place in Patani against Siam around 
eleven times, large numbers o f refugees who had fled the state now lived outside 
Siamese territory, on the peninsula as well as in many other places in the archipelago.424 
Malays who wished to retain their Siamese nationality were given six months to move 
back across the boundary, after which their citizenship would be fixed.427
British officials identified the practice o f kerah, or corvee, in particular, as one 
major factor pushing Malays south from Patani. British officials argued that Siamese 
officials demanded kerah to satisfy their personal desires, as opposed to building public 
works. Dissatisfaction quickly resulted. Wood wrote to Paget, the British Charge 
d’Affaires in Bangkok, that the 'natives o f Patani who begged me to register them as 
British subjects were very numerous’, and that he ‘should have considerably more 
respect for the natives o f Patani than [he] now [had] were they to rise up and massacre 
every Siamese in the state’ .426 Wood’s position probably also reflected the awkwardness 
o f the final split in the Siamese Malay zone. British negotiators had attempted to gain 
the territories o f Patani, Legeh, Reman and Setul for Britain, basing their argument on 
the proportion o f ethnic Malays in these states’ respective populations. Yet the Siamese 
government’s American Chief Adviser, Edward Strobel, was willing to give up 
Kelantan and Terengganu and the other territories it handed over, but not Patani, Legeh, 
Reman and Setul.427
Loos has also pointed to a series of Siamese measures aimed at culturally 
transforming the Patani minority, justified in terms of modernising a Malay Muslim 
population which was ‘foreign and backward compared to Bangkok, which are key
424 Mohammad Zaffullah Haji Arifin, "Peranan Dan Perkembangan Masyarakat Melayu-Patani Di Kuala 
Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman", 35.
425 ‘Treaty between Great Britain and Siam’, 10 March 1909, Maxwell and Gibson, eds., Treaties and 
Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, 88-95.
426 W.A.R. Wood to Colonial Office, 11 June 1909, FO 371/735, cited in Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, 
Sejarah Perjuangan Melayu Patani 1785-1954, 45.
427 Ibid., 45-46.
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characteristics of a colonial state’s rationale for rule’. " As Loos has described, Siamese 
administrators like Prince Damrong first believed that Malay Muslims would begin to 
identify as Thai ‘through education, economic security and government 
employment’.429 Resistance continued, and immediately after the border treaty of 1910- 
11, an uprising led by religious teachers based in pondok schools took place.430 Such 
uprisings, centred on the Islamic education system which was strongly identified with 
Malay-ness as well as Islam, occurred regularly, and generally involved cross-border 
organisation, participation and flight to evade Siamese authorities.
If Siamese integration policies had been licensed by the 1909 border, British 
administrators were similarly licensed to bring Terengganu under a unified system of 
administration. Terengganu became an Unfederated Malay State, operating under many 
of the policies and regulations already established in the FMS, but without joining the 
federation. One feature of British rule in the Malay states was the system of residents or 
advisers, who possessed similar powers. Despite earlier British plans to gain control of 
Terengganu first and Kelantan later, it was Kelantan that immediately accepted a British 
Adviser in 1909. This acceptance was easily won, as Kelantan already had Siamese 
advisers in place, who were themselves British bureaucrats appointed by Siam to work 
in its interests in 1903. The post ‘Siamese Adviser’ was directly changed over to 
‘British Adviser’ in a straightforward transfer of title and personnel, and no time lag 
was experienced.431
It was therefore in Kelantan that the work of mapping and mastering territory 
and resources in the peninsula was able to advance. In addition, it was through bounding 
Kelantan as a discrete state that Terengganu also experienced the final delimiting of its 
northeastern and northern limits. As always, this did not happen entirely smoothly: 
bo und ary-marking was not a straightforward process and needed to be negotiated with
428 Loos, Subject Siam, 81.
429 Ibid.
430 Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Sejarah Perjuangan Melayu Patani 1785-1954, 45.
431 Shaharil Talib, History of Kelantan 1890-1940, 235 vols. (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the 
Royal Asiatic Society, 1995). See chapters 4-5.
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British and courtly officials on both sides. For example, the Kelantan government was 
forced to wait for the Sultan of Terengganu to return from the Haj before both parties 
could decisively delimit the border in early 1914.432 Delimitation was ultimately 
successful; in June 1915, the British Adviser in Kelantan, W.E. Pepys, wrote of 
inspecting the Kelantan—Terengganu boundary.4”
Terengganu remained the only space on the Malay Peninsula not formally 
under the control of Britain or Siam. Fully surrounded by British territory, the 
Terengganu court’s position was weak and lonely. Terengganu was immediately 
articulated by the British as a political space outside its control, but simultaneously 
requiring it. Terengganu courtly officials were well aware of the impossible position 
they occupied, and continued to refuse to negotiate. After avoiding a Siamese Adviser 
in 1902, Sultan Zainal Abidin III began to adopt a posture of stalling whenever 
confronted by British officials for a decision, claiming he had not made up his mind.4’4 
Continuing to refuse became impossible, however, and in 1910, Sultan Zainal Abidin III 
signed his own treaty with Britain, agreeing to accept a British Agent. This was not a 
British Adviser of the kind that Kelantan had accepted the previous year, but an official 
of considerably less power, who could not compel the Sultan to accept his advice. The 
Sultan, however, was required to furnish the Agent with a piece of land for his residence 
free of charge, and Britain was now allowed free access to Terengganu’s sea and land 
territory. It was this treaty which also prevented Terengganu from corresponding with 
any foreign government, and which prohibited granting any mining concession larger 
than 500 acres, or any other land greater than 3000 acres, to anyone other than a 
Terengganu subject.435
Signing the 1910 treaty appears to have been a grave mistake for Sultan Zainal 
Abidin III. He was already subject to great political pressure from within his own court
432 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, December 1913, 4 January 1914, p. 5, 
CO273/409:7545.
433 W.E. Pepys, 2 June 1915. In British Adviser, Kelantan 622/1915: ‘W.E. Pepys: Recommends Early 
Erection of a Police Station on the Besut Border’.
434 Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920, 150.
435 ‘Agreement between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Trengganu’, 22 April 1910, 
Maxwell and Gibson, eds., Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, 112-13.
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to resist cooperating with Britain. This pressure erupted publicly in 1911, in a 
remarkable political development in the shape of a new founding document for 
Terengganu. This document, titled Itqanul Muluk Bi Takdilis Suluk, or Convincing 
Kings of the Blessings o f the Path,436 is also now referred to as the 1911 Terengganu 
Constitution. It recognised explicitly that Terengganu’s colonisation was imminent, and 
rebuked the Sultan in the strongest terms. In response to the British presence and the 
Sultan’s previous actions, the document limited the Sultan’s powers in ways which were 
completely unprecedented in any Malay state, including Johor, the only other state to 
have adopted a constitution by this time.4’7 In Article 14, entitled ‘Prohibitions upon the 
Raja’, it stated that:
It is not permissible or valid whatsoever for a raja to make an agreement or 
arrangement for releasing or surrendering the state and its government, or 
any part of the government’s power or rights [hakulkak] to any government 
or power of Europe or elsewhere.
If a raja should attempt to bypass this prohibition it will be deemed that he 
has broken the trust placed in him and that his actions are not valid. 43X
This statement bound the Sultan to resist colonialism, and increased the 
pressure on Sultan Zainal Abidin III to never sign a treaty like that of 1910 again. 
Breaking fully with ‘traditional’ notions of the divine right to kingship, the document 
marked a new and explicit statement that the Sultan’s right to rule came from those who 
granted him their trust, and not from any other source of authority. The document 
continued, even more remarkably, by spelling out the consequences should the Sultan 
cede any power to the British:
436 I thank Michael Laffan for this translation. Elsewhere, the Arabic title is generally translated as the 
Constitution in the Way of Illustrious Sovereignty. A later Constitution (Undang- Undang Tubuh), adopted 
in 1959, was appended to the 1911 document, and both documents remain in force.
437 Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920, 150.
438 "Itqanul Muluk Bi Takdilis Suluk," in Bengkel Kajian Naskhah Kesultanan Melayu IV, ed.
Muhammad Yusof bin Abdullah (Kuala Terengganu: Malaysian National Archive, Terengganu/Pahang 
Branch, 1911), 8.
Maka tiada lulus dan tiada sah sekali-kali raja membuat perjanjian atau ikhtiar melepas atau 
menyerahkan negeri dan kerajaannya atau suatu bahagian daripada kuasa kerajaan atau hakulkaqnya 
itu kepada sebarang mana-mana kerajaan atau kepada kuasa-kuasa bangsa Eropah atau lainnya.
Maka jikalau Raja cuba lalui larangan dan tegahan ini nescaya disifatkanlah akan dia memecahkan 
amanah yang diletakkan atasnya serta tiada sah perbuatannya yang demikian itu.
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At such a time it will no longer be a requirement of members of the 
government and all the rakyat that they remain loyal to him, and he should 
be removed from his throne and a replacement appointed in his place.4 ' 4
The document did not specify whose trust would be broken, and who would 
replace the Sultan, although the implication is that this would be Terengganu’s Islamic 
authorities. This is supported by statements in the document itself, which pointed out 
that it was founded on syariah principles, by which Terengganu should be governed as a 
‘kerajaan Islamiyah Melayuwiyalr—a Malay Islamic state44" Under these principles, 
unlslamic rulers, implied here to be those who cooperated with foreign powers, forfeited 
their right to rule. Now Sultan Zainal Abidin III was experiencing the bounding of his 
power from two directions—British appropriation of his sovereignty, and a sudden and 
radical reformulation of his very entitlement to rule, inspired by syariah-oriented 
Islamic principles.
The document is believed by Gullick to have been the work of the Sultan 
himself, advised by Wan Abu Bakar, a schoolteacher who had some experience in 
drafting the Johor Constitution.441 Wan Abu Bakar was a teacher o f ‘young reformers’ 
in the only Malay school in Kuala Terengganu, who Gullick argues formed the source 
of the political pressure on the Sultan. Misbaha, however, has stated the Constitution 
was the work of a large number of courtly officials, including the Yang Dipertuan Muda 
(Crown Prince) Muhammad bin Zainal Abidin, later Sultan Muhammad Syah II, and the 
supplementary heir (waris ganti), Tengku Muda Sulaiman bin Zainal Abidin, later 
Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah. The drafters also included a long list of others with 
the royal title Tengku, and two prominent Arabs of Hadhrami extraction, Tokku Paloh 
and Tuan Dalam, a title then held by Tokku Paloh’s brother.442
439 Ibid., 9.
Maka tatkala itu tiadalah diwajibkan di atas ahli-ahli kerajaan dan segala rakyat bersetia lagi dengan 
dia haruslah diturunkan dia daripada takhta kerajaannya dan diangkatkan gantinya pula.
440 Ibid., 26.
441 Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920, 150.
442 Misbaha, Terengganu Dari Bentuk Sejarah Hingga Tahun 1918, 258-59.
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Misbaha’s claim is credible, as Tokku Paloh was the chief religious adviser to 
the Sultan himself. He had intimate daily contact with the Sultan, and mentored Zainal 
Abidin III from a young age, even referring to himself as the Sultan’s father. More 
importantly, Tokku Paloh was known for his strident opposition to the treaties with 
Britain, and repeatedly wrote to the Sultan in very grave tones, asking the Sultan to 
oppose British colonialism with all his energy.44’
In these letters, he warned of the threat to the status of syariah in Terengganu, 
and the moral authority of the kerajaan itself, warnings whose echoes were found in the 
Itqanul Muluk. For Tokku Paloh, the very aim of the British government was to 
denigrate the authority of Islam and remove it from its position of primacy in the state. 
In one letter, apparently referring to the 1910 treaty, Tokku Paloh forcefully wrote:
This matter of the treaty desired by the English with the permission of Siam 
is a grave matter in [my, your father’s] understanding, and it will very much 
burden Your Excellency [my son]’s heart. May God aid [you] in resisting it, 
as it is absolutely plain that Siam and the English have come to an 
agreement. God willing, God has never empowered the kafir over Muslims, 
except to restrict them their rights under syariah. They are not at all genuine 
in holding firm to the syariah which we proclaim, and introduce into Islam 
matters which are despised by the Prophet (Peace be Upon Him). It is 
obligatory at this time for Your Excellency [my son] to hold firm and realise 
religion and renounce all religious abrogations. By no means can you be 
silent or not heed [my message].444
443 Excerpts from these letters are appended in Misbaha’s history of Terengganu. The language in Tokku 
Paloh’s letters was heavily influenced by Arabic, and fortunately Misbaha has annotated the Arabic 
phrases interspersing the text with Malay translations. See Ibid., 242. I also thank Michael Laffan for his 
assistance.
Perkara ehwal teriti yang dikehendaki oleh Inggeris dengan kebenaran Siam itu sangat besarlah pada 
faham paduka ayahanda waqi ’ah [yang terjadi] dan sangat sukarlah pada fluid [had] Seri Paduka 
anakanda aa ’anahullahu ‘ala da ’afini [moga-moga Allah memberi pertolongan untuk menolaknya] 
kerana sudah bersuatu kira antara Siam & Inggeris tepat nyata Insya Allah tiada sekali-kali Allah SWT 
tasalitkan [memberi kekuasaan] Kuffar [kafir] atas Muslim melainkan sebab tadyik [menghilangkan] [sic. 
‘restrict’] mereka akan huquk syariat [hak-hak hukum Islam] dan tiada bersungguh-sungguh mereka itu 
dengan berpegang atas syara ’ yang mu ’tabarah [diakui] dan mempermasukkan ke dalam agama Islam 
akan barang yang dibenci oleh Rasulullah SAW maka wajiblah pada sekarang ini seri Paduka anakanda 
berkuat pada menzahirkan agama dan membatalkan segala munkarat [perkara-perkara yang diteguh 
oleh agama] jangan sekali-kali diam atau tidak dihiraukan.
139
Tokku Paloh, however, did not oppose tribute to Siam, or Siam’s protection 
over Terengganu. His letter indicated that Terengganu had been in correspondence with 
Siam over the treaty with Britain, and named an official called Prat Kucai. One letter 
appears to indicate that Siam’s approval was sought before the treaty with Britain was 
agreed to, and another seems to imply incredulity that this permission was received, 
given that Terengganu had affirmed Siam’s suzerainty over it.44> By the time of the 
Itqanul Muluk, which commented explicitly on the 1910 treaty, a sense of bitterness at 
being abandoned by Siam and left at Britain’s mercy emerges in the text. The Itqanul 
Muluk obliged Terengganu to fulfil the 1910 treaty diligently, but also obliquely 
characterised it as ‘cruel and abusive’. It did this in a backhanded statement which 
implied the treaty’s conditions should be fulfilled, if only in order to show how 
disagreeable the treaty was:
It is intended that the Raja and government of Terengganu hold firmly and 
constantly, and without deviation, in following and fulfilling the conditions 
of the government’s agreement—treaty—which was made on 12 
Rabiulakhir 1328, or 22 April 1910.
If other agreements are made with any government at all, this is as well, so 
long as there is no doubt, and the cruelty and abuse of the other party’s 
deeds are clear for so long as they remain in effect. 446
In any case, in 1909 W.L. Conlay had been appointed as British Agent in 
Terengganu. Efforts to obstruct his work began immediately. Even for his successor, 
E.A. Dickson, it took four years to be granted a seat on the State Council, but even then 
only ‘as a temporary arrangement during the absence of the Sultan on a visit to Mecca’.
445 Ibid.
Ada pun pacla jawaban kepada Perat Kucai itu maka iaitu dengan bahaxva diperiksakan surat treaty yang 
hendak diperbuat ini dengan permintakan siapa. Maka jika dijawab dengan pemerintahan kita serta 
dengan kebenaran Siam maka sebaik-baiklah dikabulkan danjika dengan permintaan Siam serta kita 
punya tertanggung pada ugama dan istiadat negeri kita. Maka itu pun boleh dikabulkan kerana kita di 
dalam beberapa tapis sudah di bawah peliharaan Siam tiada suatu perkara yang ada kita menyalahi.
446 "Itqanul Muluk Bi Takdilis Suluk," Article 48.
Hendaklah raja dan kerajaan Terengganu berpegang teguh dan tetap serta betul lurus mengikut dan 
menyempurnakan syarat-syarat perjanjian— tread—kerajaan yang diperbuat pada 12 haribulan 
Rabiulakhir tahun 1328 itu berkebetulan pada 22 haribulan April tahun 1910.
A tan jikalau diperbuat pula lain-lain perjanjian dengan mana-mana kerajaan pun baik selagi tidak ada 
yang syak dan terang zalim and aniava perbuatan daripada pihak mereka itu dan selama tidak 
dibatalkan.
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He was invited to only two meetings, ‘at both of which only formal business was 
transacted, and as several meetings were held without any notification to him, the real 
gain [was] but little’.447 Tokku Paloh, too, took opportunities to obstruct Dickson’s 
business, especially when it related to claiming or demarcating land. In August 1914, 
Dickson identified and applied to reserve an ‘ideal site’ for his quarters, along a road 
passing the Bukit Losong hills between Kuala Terengganu and Paloh,44'5 the village that 
Tokku Paloh was colloquially named after, as it formed his main place of residence.
Having not received a reply for two months, in October Dickson wrote to the 
Sultan about his application for the Bukit Losong land, and pointed out the boundaries 
he desired. Within a few days, the Sultan replied that he had ordered the site’s 
demarcation.444 In January 1915, having still not received the land, Dickson wrote to the 
Sultan again. The Sultan replied that Tokku Paloh had claimed half the hill himself, and 
he could not grant Dickson the whole hill. Tokku Paloh moved fast to act on his claim, 
ordering for it to be fenced off so that he could plant a tapioca plot on it.450 In March the 
matter was still not resolved. Dickson visited the site again, accompanied by a 
demarcator. He noticed that all the survey pickets on the land Tokku Paloh claimed had 
been pulled out, and the surveyor reported he had received ‘considerable opposition 
while making his survey of the site’.451 Others also joined in disrupting the grant of land 
to the British Agent. In May 1916, the land between the British Agency and the sea, 
which the Agent used to entertain his official guests, was fenced off for coconut 
plantations by unknown people.452
447 Arthur Young, High Commissioner, Malay States, to Lewis Harcourt, MP, Colonial Office. 8 October 
1914, C0273:412/43418: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
44s E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, August 1914, 8 September 1914, pp. 1-2, 
C0273/412: 41387: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
444 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, October 1914, n.d., pp. 1-2,
CO273/412:50446: ‘Trengganu Affairs’.
450 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, January 1915, 9 March 1915, p. 1, C0273/425: 
16985: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
451 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, February 1915, 9 March 1915, p. 1, CO 
273/425: 19310.
472 J L Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, May 1916, 31 May 1916, p. 7, C0273/445: 
32544.
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Political Precedents
Tokku Paloh personified a strong domestic pressure on Sultan Zainal Abidin III to 
refuse to cooperate with Britain. The letters he wrote to the sultan, the Terengganu 
Constitution and the sabotage of the British Agent’s plans were evidence of that 
pressure. Once the British Agent was present, any advance Britain made in extending its 
control over Terengganu was to be resisted, using weapons of the weak, such as 
avoidance, sabotage and snub, wherever necessary.43’ The 1909 treaty, and Dickson’s 
subsequent appointment, however, were serious blows to Terengganu’s ability to resist 
Britain. The Itqanul Muluk was a last demand, a final major eruption of political 
pressure within Terengganu’s independent royal court. This pressure was expressed in 
terms of a growing focus on Islam, overwhelming Terengganu’s political climate, and 
gradually building in intensity. While remarkable, therefore, the Itqanul Muluk did not 
appear from nowhere. The Constitution and the pressure it represented on the Sultan had 
in reality built up over the entire long period of territorialisation in the Siamese Malay 
zone, roughly correlating with Tokku Paloh’s lifetime. The strong Islamic climate in 
Terengganu political life did not stem from a single group of ‘reformers’ or any 
particular event. It was much more gradual, growing out of the interaction of several 
diffuse, but linked, long-term phenomena, some linked and others not.
The first of these was the early migration to Terengganu of Arabs from the 
Hadhramaut, and the activities of their descendents in teaching, preaching and travelling 
around Terengganu. The second was the development of a culture of pondok education, 
which connected Terengganu scholars to those from elsewhere in the Siamese Malay 
zone and Muslim Southeast Asia, first in pondok throughout the zone and then in further 
education in Mecca’s Masjid al-Haram. The Terengganu Hadhrami Arabs were 
themselves key protagonists in building this pondok culture, apparent in Terengganu by 
the beginning of the eighteenth century.454 The third was the shifting Siam-Malaya 
boundary, which at moments left Terengganu outside effective Siamese or British
453 Scott, Weapons o f the Weak: Everyday Forms o f Peasant Resistance .
4’* 4 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu" (paper presented at the Seminar Islam di 
Terengganu, Kuala Terengganu, 1991), 14.
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control, establishing it as a haven for rebels and refugees from north and south of it, 
who crossed into its territory to seek shelter from their pursuers.
These rebels, from Pahang and Patani, and refugees, including prominent 
Islamic scholars from Patani, settled or took temporary refuge around the Terengganu 
River system. Patani settlers reinforced the pondok culture in the area and joined 
established Hadhrami Arabs in the royal court—influencing its political life. They also 
worked as mobile preachers through the villages. Pahang rebels were hidden by 
villagers, the royal family and Islamic scholars, up and down the same river system, on 
the basis that the Pahang rebellion was a Holy War. These various phenomena, then, 
travelled along the river system through the villages, forests and rice and rubber 
swiddens which it connected, Islamising Terengganu’s political life at every level, from 
the raja to the rakvat. This river was later key to the 1928 uprising. Metaphorically, it 
also enmeshed Kuala Terengganu with Kuala Berang, and the villages beyond it in the 
hulu, in webs of Islamic scholarship and activism which connected Terengganu to the 
Middle East.
Azyumardi has described some of the connections between Southeast Asia and 
the Middle East, forged through Indian Ocean trade and religious pilgrimage, and well 
established by the sixteenth century. Communities of Arabs had formed in Southeast 
Asian trading centres, and Southeast Asian communities were found in scholarly centres 
in the Middle East, primarily Me c c a . Ar a bs  living in Southeast Asia influenced 
Islamic practices in their adopted surroundings, and they and their descendents occupied 
important positions in trade and religious affairs, including in rulers’ courts. Further, as 
Laffan has pointed out, Mecca-returned scholars themselves campaigned vigorously for 
reform based on scripturalist readings of Islam, urging personal piety and the 
abandonment of customary practices which clashed with these readings.
These reformers’ stress on syariah was often taken up by Southeast Asian 
rulers who sought associations with these scholars to augment their authority. A 
‘symbiotic relationship’ between rulers and these ulama was created, oriented around
4:0 Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Ulama: Timur Tengah Dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad Xvii Dan Xviii. 
Melacak Akar-Akar Pern banian Pemikiran Islam Di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1994).
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adopting syariah principles in Malay statecraft.456As Shafie Abu Bakar’s work shows, 
Terengganu was a part of these developments, which were first centred in the hulu, then 
the centre of power in Terengganu. It was from Kuala Berang that South China Sea 
trade with Patani, Songkhla, Champa, Brunei, Sambas and Aceh, conducted in large 
Terengganu perahu, was first directed. Terengganu trade, although concentrated around 
the archipelago and South China Sea, also extended to the Middle East, and it was also 
at this time that Arab traders began to arrive and settle in Terengganu.
In the second half o f the sixteenth century, a man called Sharif Muhammad bin 
Abdullah al-Baghdadi is said to have come from Mecca to Terengganu. He is now 
widely held to be Terengganu’s first known Arab trader. Like many other traders from 
the Middle East, he is also believed to have been an active scholar and preacher. Al- 
Baghdadi, who settled in the hulu, married locally and eventually died in the hulu 
Kampung Batu Belah, where he was entombed. Not much more is known of his 
activities, although his son Abdul Qahhar, and grandchildren, Abdullah and Ismail, are 
entombed in Kampung Pauh.4^7 Despite his obscurity, however, al-Baghdadi and those 
after him who came from the Hadhramaut are known to have settled in Terengganu and 
led lives of scholarship, preaching and teaching, and often also of trade. 458 Those 
claiming descent from these men also displayed similar life stories, studying in pondok, 
spending some years in Mecca in further study, then returning to Terengganu to teach in 
their own names. No matter how local they were, or how many generations removed 
from their original Middle Eastern ancestor, these descendants of Arabs were esteemed 
for being learned in Islam. Many claimed to possess the status o f say id, or descendents 
o f the Prophet.459
456 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds, 398-400.
457 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 8-9.
4~s Engseng Ho, The Graves o f Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley; Los 
Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2006).
454 Huub de Jonge and Nico Kaptein, "The Arab Presence in Southeast Asia: Some Introductory 
Remarks," in Transcending Borders: Arabs, Politics, Trade and Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. Huub de 
Jonge and Nico Kaptein, Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
2002), Ulrike Lreitag, Indian Ocean Migrants and State Fonnation in Hadhramaut: Reforming the 
Homeland (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003), Ho, Graves o f Tarim, Sumit K Mandat, "Pinding Their Place: A 
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Embodying this chain of descent and the transmission of prestige, al- 
Baghdadi’s most well-known descendant was Shaykh Abdul Malik bin Abdullah (1650- 
1736), who was bom in the hulu. Abdul Malik’s life story also represents the beginning 
of a pattem of scholarship in which individuals from Terengganu travelled to other 
renowned Southeast Asian centres of scholarship before graduating to Mecca. Abdul 
Malik was first educated locally in the hulu by his parents, and preached and traded 
between Terengganu and places around the peninsula and archipelago, using large 
perahu to travel to Siam, Champa, Brunei, Java and Johor. Aged in his twenties, he 
travelled to Java and then to Aceh, where he studied under the renowned Shaykh Abdul 
Rauf Singkel, and subsequently continued his education in Mecca for a decade under 
one Maula Ibrahim and a Shaykh Ibrahim al-Kurani, who had also taught Abdul Rauf 
Singkel.460
While in Mecca, Abdul Malik joined a Sufi order, or tarekat, the Shadhiliyah, 
named after the thirteenth-century Morrocan mystic, al-Shadhili. Al-Shadhili’s thought 
was compiled in an influential text, called the Hikam, by an Egyptian scholar, Tadj al- 
Din Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah al-Iskandari (d. 13 09).461 The Shadhiliyah emphasised a mystical 
practice that was in keeping with fulfilling one’s obligations under syariah, discouraging 
the mystical intoxication, asceticism and interest in thaumaturgy that characterised 
much Sufi practice before it.462 He also wrote a text of lasting influence, described by 
Shatie as the greatest book of Sunni mysticism written in Malay, the Hikam Melayu. 
This book was a compilation of the thought of the eleventh century Persian mystic, al- 
Ghazali, and assembled as a reader designed for teaching students when he returned to
History of Arabs in Java under Dutch Rule, 1800-1924" (PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1994), 
Mohammad Redzuan Othman, "The Middle Eastern Influence on the Development of Religious and
Political Thought in Malay Society, 1880-1940" (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1994),--------- ,
"The Role of Makka-Educated Malays in the Development of Early Islamic Scholarship and Education in 
Malaya," Journal o f Islamic Studies 9, no. 2 (1998), Mohammad Sidik Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad 
Redzuan Othman, The Malays in the Middle East.
46(1 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 9-12.
4<l1 N Han if, Biographical Encyclopaedia o f Sufis: Africa and Europe, vol. 1, Biographical Encyclopaedia 
o f Sufis (Sarup & Sons, 2002), 154.
4(’“ P. Lory, "Shadhiliyya," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Second Edition, ed. P Bearman, et al. (Brill Online, 
2010) .
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Terengganu.463 The assertion of the al-Ghazali tradition as Islamic orthodoxy in Muslim 
Southeast Asia was a central priority of many Mecca returnees of Abdul Malik’s 
generation, and Abdul Malik was one of the earliest to take it up 464 Abdul Malik also 
began the pattern of returning from Mecca to actively teach and preach in his place of 
origin, in this case, the Terengganu River system.
After also teaching in Mecca while studying, Abdul Malik returned to 
Kampung Pauh, his village in the hulu in the early 1690s. After his return, Terengganu 
became an independent sultanate. Abdul Malik is said to have been present at the state’s 
inception, at the coronation of Sultan Zainal Abidin I as its first ruler in 1725.465 Abdul 
Malik later came to advise the sultan as a court scholar, and his incorporation into the 
court began a close association between the Terengganu sultanate and Islamic scholars 
with Middle Eastern credentials. From its very inception, the Terengganu sultanate’s 
project of enacting its authority in Terengganu relied on it prominently associating itself 
with displays of Islamic piety and authority. As Kobkua has pointed out, after the 
extinction of the Melaka line of sultans, many Malay states could no longer rely on their 
ruler’s personal command of divine authority to legitimise their position.466 For this 
reason, states like Terengganu needed Siam to protect them, and state weakness also 
caused religion to ‘command a prominent place’ as ‘society was threatened with danger 
and disintegration’.467
Terengganu, a sultanate which began after Melaka’s end, also appears to have 
needed Islam to authorise the social order the new state sought to establish. The 
connection between Terengganu sultans and prominent Arab-descended ulama was 
therefore established, and when the Sultan moved his capital to Kuala Terengganu from 
Kuala Berang, the shaykh also moved. Abdul Malik even married the Sultan’s sister, in
464 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 13.
464 Muhammad Shafie bin Abu Bakar, "Perkembangan Keilmuan Dan Kesedaran Keislaman Di 
Terengganu," Pesaka V (1989), 24.
465 Ibid., 11.
4<’6 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-Regional Relations from the 
Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries, 8, 19.
467 Ibid., 50-56.
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468a practice Ho has described as presenting the ‘precious gift of genealogy’. Southeast 
Asian Royal families seeking Islamic prestige frequently desired ‘installing a resident 
Muslim jurist to refashion a grimy pirates’ haven as a new sphere of civilian concourse’, 
and marrying their women to say id men was one method tor doing so.46) Abdul Malik 
settled in Kampung Pulau Manis, near Kuala Terengganu, becoming known as Tok 
Pulau Manis. Here he established a pondok, where he taught and wrote on a wide range 
of Islamic disciplines, attracting notables and pupils from Johor and Pahang to his 
gatherings, until his death in 1736.
Tok Pulau Manis’s travel to Mecca represented a pattern which became a 
hallmark of the Southeast Asian ulama community—creating a field of activity which 
traversed the Indian Ocean and created the Middle East as an aspirational destination in 
Muslim Southeast Asia. After him, generations of Terengganu scholars continued this 
pattern, performing what Subrahmanyam has described as the ‘contamination of...neat 
categories’ between regions—in this case Muslim Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East.47'1 Mecca became a site for rehearsing Southeast Asian political debates, and 
Terengganu’s Islamic scholars came to operate within a transnational community of 
Islamic thinkers and transmitters of Islamic thought.471 On their return to Terengganu, 
this transmission to younger scholars was based around the pondok that these translocal 
scholars, like Tok Pulau Manis, established. In these schools, students from Terengganu 
and elsewhere lived in small huts, established around a central study area, a balai or 
balaisah. Teaching was conducted in study circles known as halaqah, in which students 
would read together from texts and teachers would provide commentaries on them.472
468 Ho, Graves of Tarim, 168.
469 Ibid., 169.
470 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes Towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern 
Eurasia," Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (1997), 759.
471 For more discussion of this translocal community, refer to Ulrike Freitag, Indian Ocean Migrants and 
State Formation in Hadhramaut: Reforming the Homeland (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003).
472 Hasan Madmarn, The Pondok and Madrasah in Patani (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 1999), 12.
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This tradition was continued with a sense of succession—sons and sons-in-law 
were schooled in ponclok and in the Middle East, then encouraged to establishpondok of 
their own. One of Tok Pulau Manis’ grandchildren went on to establish a pondok in 
Kampung Sungai Rengas, just outside Kuala Terengganu. As the pondok gained in 
fame, it grew into hundreds of individual huts to house its large numbers of students. By 
the time Baginda Omar came to power in 1837, the Sungai Rengas descendants of al- 
Baghdadi were also prominent enough to achieve courtly patronage, and one scion of 
this line, Haji Muhammad bin Abdul Malik, became a courtly alim, serving at 
ceremonies and receiving frequent audiences with the Sultan. He also taught religion at 
the palace, earning the title Tok Kadi, and Sultan Zainal Abidin III, as a young boy, 
apparently borrowed books from Muhammad, whose son also later became a courtly 
official.473 Tok Pulau Manis’s descendants continued establishing and teaching in 
pondok in Kampung Sungai Rengas and Kampung Beladau, also near Kuala 
Terengganu, for a very long time. This family line influenced Islamic thinking in the 
Terengganu River area through their pondok at least until Malayan independence in 
195 7.474
Other than the line descended from al-Baghdadi, another prominent family of 
Arabs also settled in Kuala Terengganu, ensconced itself in the royal court, and built up 
a significant following in the Terengganu River area. This was the al-Idrus line, which 
originated from the Hadhramaut. The family used the title sayid, claiming descent from 
the Prophet Muhammad himself, which they traced using a sdsilah, or genealogical 
record, which remained in the family’s possession when Alias conducted his research in 
1992.475 The first al-Idrus in Terengganu is thought to have arrived in the eighteenth 
century, based on an old grave in Kampung Cabang Tiga in Kuala Terengganu, 
belonging to Sayid Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Idrus, or Tokku Makam Lama.476 Tokku
477 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 48.
474 Ibid, Muhammad Shafie bin Abu Bakar, "Perkembangan Keilmuan Dan Kesedaran Keislaman Di 
Terengganu," 53-62.
475 Alias bin Mat, "Peranan Tok Ku Paloh Dalam Perkembangan Islam Di Terengganu", 64.
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Makam Lama’s daughter was believed to have married a grain merchant from Java, also 
a Sayid of Hadhrami origin, who settled in Terengganu.477
The sons of this family achieved significant political prominence, and became 
well-placed insiders in the court of Baginda Omar (r. 1839-1876). Indeed, the story of 
the al-Idrus family’s rise to fame is woven into that of the Terengganu royal family’s 
strategic deployment of Islam and Islamic scholars, especially under Omar’s rule. Omar 
cultivated relationships with large numbers of scholars, and these scholars, conversely, 
competed for courtly access. Omar’s motivation in surrounding himself with ulama may 
have been to legitimise his rule, using scholars as political antidotes against his status as 
a Siamese appointee who had displaced his predecessor, Muhammad Syah I (r. 1837- 
1839). Omar’s decision to provide patronage to the al-Idrus line may have been 
designed to augment his prestige and authority, as the family was respected for its 
special Islamic knowledge.
There was evidently some competition among Islamic scholars for Baginda 
Omar’s favour, and some may have felt humiliated by it. Alias has recounted the story 
of another Hadhrami family, the al-Yahyas, who arrived some time during the reign of 
Sultan Zainal Abidin I. Believed to have been skilled administrators, they were not 
known for being especially learned in Islam. The al-Yahyas, unable to match the 
success of the al-Idrus line, gradually relocated to Pahang and Kelantan. Omar’s 
interest in the al-Idrus family culminated when he appointed Tok Makam Lama’s son, 
Sayid Muhammad bin Zainal Abidin al-Idrus (1794-1878), also known as Tokku Tuan 
Besar, as Shaykhul Islam in his court. Tuan Besar had already made a name for himself 
as a Mecca-returned scholar, and author of Islamic texts which were widely used for 
teaching in the ponclok. Tuan Besar, however, did not adopt the pondok style of 
teaching, preferring to deliver lectures. He also composed the ‘Syahadah Tokku’, a short 
verse emphasising the principle of tauhid, or the indivisible unity of God.474 This verse
477 Mohammad Abu Bakar, Ulama Terengganu: Suatu Sorotan (Jawatankuasa Koleksi Terengganu, 
Perbadanan Perpustakaan Awam, and Utusan Publications, 1991).
47X Alias bin Mat, "Peranan Tok Ku Paloh Dalam Perkembangan Islam Di Terengganu", 64.
474 A scanned page from an unnamed book, printed in Jawi with the Roman text ‘Printed by Mansor 
Press’ at the bottom of the page, is available online at http://devali.multiply.com/photos/hi-
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was repeatedly called by a leader of a study circle and then chanted by the others in 
attendance.480 Tuan Besar had initially studied under Shaykh Abdul Kadir, a Patani alim 
who had moved to Terengganu earlier, and taught from Kampung Bukit Bayas in Kuala 
Terengganu.481
Tuan Besar also learned Sufi practice during his studies, but instead of joining 
the Shadhiliyah like Tok Pulau Manis, joined the Naksyabandiyah tarekat instead, the 
favoured tarekat of the Ottoman authorities which controlled Mecca during this time. 
The outlook encouraged by the Naksyabandiyah differed from that of the Shadhiliyah, 
encouraging its members to seek to influence ruling regimes to incorporate the syariah 
and practices it regarded as orthodox. In India, the Naksyabandiyah asserted a strong 
influence over Emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707), and the influential alim, Shah Wali 
Allah (1703-1762), greatly increasing its prestige in the process, and earning a 
reputation as ‘the most illustrious and pure and the least heretical’ tarekat. By the 
nineteenth century, the Naksyabandiyah had come to epitomise the spirit of scripturalist
res/upload/RivZdAoKCsYAAC3XdH81. The site’s author, ’devali’, claims it is the Syahadah Tokku. The 
text includes:
...aku ketahui dan aku iktiqad dengan hatiku dan aka nyatakan bagi yang lain daripadaku akan bahawa 
sesungguhnva tiada Tuhanyang disembah dengan sebenarnya melainkan Allah...
Maka wajiblah atas tiap-tiap makhluk itu benar akan dia dan mengikut akan dia dan haram atas mereka 
itu mendusta akan dia atau menyalahi akan dia maka barang siapa yang mendusta ia akan dia maka 
orang itu zalim ia lagi kafir ia, dan barang siapa yang menyalahai ia akan dia maka orang itu derhaka ia 
lagi binasa ia.
...I know, and I believe in my heart, and I attest truthfully to those other than myself that there is no God 
submitted to faithfully other than Allah...
It falls upon each created being to be true to God and follow God and it is forbidden to lie to him or 
wrong him . Whoever lies to God is cruel, and kafir too, and whoever wrongs God has committed 
derhaka and [will be] destroyed.
Terengganu writer Awang Goneng has referred to the Mansor Press as the former Saudara Store, a 
Terengganu bookshop near the Abidin Mosque. Refer to Awang Goneng, Growing up in Trengganu 
(Monsoon Books, 2007), 122, 218.
4X0 Mohammad Abu Bakar, Ulama Terengganu: Suatu Sorotan .
4X1 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 33.
4X2 K..A. Nizami, "Nakshbandiyya," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, ed. P. Bearman, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1995).
4X4 Shah Wali Allah, cited in Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and 
Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World, ed. Ian Netton, Curzon Sufi Series (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon 
Press, 1999), 7.
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reform in Islam in the colonised Muslim world, breaking with older strains of mysticism 
and emphasising piety and compliance with syariah in every sphere of public and 
personal life.484 Tuan Besar’s influence on the Terengganu court, in keeping with this 
Naksyabandi thinking, left an important legacy, and Tuan Besar’s sons grew to become 
political insiders just as he did—one was made a minister in Baginda Omar’s court, 
bearing the title Engku Sayid Seri P erdana^  and another, Sayid Abdul Rahman bin 
Muhammad al-Idrus (1817-1917) or Tokku Paloh, was made Shaykhul Islam by Omar’s 
eventual successor, Sultan Zainal Abidin III (r. 1881-1918).
Tokku Paloh’s presence in the sultan’s court sealed the al-Idrus family’s 
position in Terengganu, and marked the high point of ulama-raja symbiosis. Tokku 
Paloh’s lifetime was also a boom period in Terengganu Islamic literature, which he and 
his father both contributed to. This literature, especially that produced by Tokku 
Paloh himself, placed the syariah at the centre of the Muslim experience, also urging a 
rigorous personal piety and a scripturalist interpretation of Islam which was extremely 
hostile to bidah, or local ‘cultural accretions’—often any customary practice authorised 
by any social force but Islam. The ideas which Tokku Paloh brought to Sultan Zainal 
Abidin Ill’s court were influenced by his experience of studying in a cohort of 
Southeast Asian students who travelled to Mecca for further Islamic education. The 
nineteenth-century milieu in which these students worked has been shown by Laffan to 
have been an incubator for Southeast Asian anti-colonial Islamic thought. The 
experience inculcated an orientation to scripturalism in these scholars, and a syariah- 
orientation that infused their religious belief. They also stressed syariah compliance in
4X4 Nizami, "Nakshbandiyya”.
485 Mohammad Redzuan Othman, "Hadhramis in the Politics and Administration of the Malay States in 
the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in Hadrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the 
Indian Ocean, 1950s-l960s, ed. Ulrike Freitag and W G Clarence-Smith (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
4X6 Hamdan Hassan, "Trengganu Sebagai Pusat Kegiatan Sastera Islam Abad 19," Dewan Sastera 8, no. 
35 (1978).
4X7 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds .
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their mystical practice, which the new generation o f scholars, perceiving a previous 
clash with syariah tenets, sought to better align with thinking on jurisprudence.
These scholars’ shared experiences within a mobile cohort, which placed 
movement between Southeast Asia and the Middle East at the centre of its political 
awakening and leadership on its return. Tokku Paloh himself lived this mobility, both as 
a student, and later as a preacher and religious official. Bom in 1817 in Kampung 
Cabang Tiga, Tokku Paloh was the second of Tokku Tuan Besar’s five children. One o f 
his brothers became Chief Minister under Baginda Omar, and a second brother also 
served on the ruler’s executive council.484 Another brother, called Tokku Melaka, wrote 
a number of Islamic tracts.490 In his teens, Tokku Paloh studied under his father at the 
mosque in Chabang Tiga. Quick to grasp new lessons, he showed more talent than his 
siblings. Subject to high expectations, he once ran away to Patani after experiencing his 
father’s anger when he did not study hard enough. He also studied under Tok Shaykh 
Duyong, a Patani alim who had settled in Terengganu. On graduating, Tokku Paloh 
went to Mecca, where he studied under Sayid Ahmad Zayni Dahlan and Sayid Abdullah 
al-Zawawi, a professor at Masjid al Haram and later Mufti o f Mecca.4'*1 On his return, 
he taught at the Surau Tokku in Chabang Tiga, then moved to Kampung Paloh, after 
which he earned his colloquial title. In Terengganu, he grew cloves, nutmeg and fruit, 
and was visited on his grounds by a large number o f disciples, who brought him gifts, 
and even built him a house.492 He was also granted control over the Nerus River district 
on behalf o f the Terengganu court.493
488 Michael Francis Laffan, Sufis and Salqf is: A Century o f Conflict and Compromise in Indonesia with 
Special Reference to East Java (Leiden University, 2003 [accessed 2003]); available from 
http://www.iias.nl/iias/research/dissemination/annex2.htm , Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufls.
484 Mohammad bin Yusuf, "Sayid Abdul Rahman Bin Sayid Muhammad (Tok Ku Paloh)," Malaysia dari 
Segi Sejarah 13 (1984), 52-55.
490 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 53.
491 For a more detailed discussion of the role these ulama played in educating the Southeast Asian 
scholars, refer to C. V. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part o f the Nineteenth Century: Daily Life, 
Customs and Learning, the Muslims o f the East-Indian-Arch ip e l ago, Brill Classics Islam (BRILL, 2006), 
Chps. 2-3.
492 Mohammad bin Yusuf, "Tok Ku Paloh," 52-55.
494 Clifford, Trengganu and Ke l an tan, 198.
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Tokku Paloh did not establish a pondok, preferring to deliver lectures to the 
public at his prayer room (surau). His audience came not only from Terengganu, but 
Kelantan, Patani and Pahang as well. He delivered lectures on the Qur’an and 
performed early morning prayer services before audiences composed not only of men, 
but also of women. British Agent Humphreys noted this mixed audience in 1917, 
writing that ‘[a] number of ladies, who are not usually allowed out of doors, have 
attended the services in their best clothes’.494 Tokku Paloh viewed himself as an 
orthodox Sunni, syariah-oriented mystic, and joined the Sufi tarekat whose claims most 
matched his, the Naksyabandiyah.495 He was said to possess the gifts of foresight and 
transubstantiation. His reputation for being keramat (thaumaturgic), led to stories of his 
mystical power circulating about him. One told of his ability to make a fish appear at 
the heart of a coconut.496 His role in transmitting the ideas he learned through his 
immersion in the Southeast Asian Mecca milieu is most apparent in the main tract he 
wrote, M a’arij al-Lahfan, or Milestones for the Desirous. In this tract, a compilation of 
his lectures, Tokku Paloh set out his commitment to syariah, and his desire for Muslims 
to embody high standards of piety and model correct Islamic behaviour.497 In it, he 
argued that:
Just as ulama of the syariah exercise their reasoning [herijtihad], so too do 
ulama of the tarekat. They flow openly through all their spiritual states 
[ahwal] following the Qur’an and Hadith, and their laws are not at odds 
with the Book [Qur’an] and the Sunnah [beliefs and practices of the 
Prophet].498
The most outstanding feature of the text, however, was his polarising polemic 
against those practices which he viewed as standing outside Sunni orthodoxy. For
4,4 J.L. Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, June 1917, 30 June 1917, p. 3, CO273/460: 
41033: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
41,5 Mohamad bin Abu Bakar, "Sayid Abdul Rahman Bin Muhammad Al-Idris (Tokku Paluh)," in Islam 
Di Malaysia, ed. Khoo Kay Kim (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 1979), 39-48.
496 Ibid.
447 What remains of the full text is reproduced in Azhar bin Chik, "Ma'arij U1 Lahfan Sayyid Abdul 
Rahman Bin Muhammad A1 Idrus: Ulasan Dan Edit" (Honours Thesis, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
1977).
4 JS Sayid Abdul Rahman al-Idrus, Ma ’arij al-Lahfan, original pagination unavailable, Ibid., 110.
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example, he praised the Naksyabandiyah as ‘the closest and easiest [way] for disciples 
to achieve oneness with God [tauhid]' .4"  Other tarekat, on the other hand, could lead 
disciples to gnosis, but ‘generally first foliow[ed] the path [suluk] o f passion 
[jazbah]’ . m  There were yet others, self-styled Sufi shaykhs whom he accused o f lying 
about themselves (mendakwa dirinya dengan dusta) and misrepresenting themselves 
(memperolok-olokkan dirinya) as Wali Allah, or saintly mystics, sufficiently 
accomplished to be friends o f God. They were, to his mind only ‘dogs, dragging along 
the most wretched carcasses [hangkai yang sangat hina] in the name of religion1. These 
shaykhs, however, did not notice the stench, as they had become accustomed to it.501 He 
also specifically condemned certain tarekat as not only misguided but kafir and fasiq— 
having committed one or more o f Islam’s ‘great sins’ . 502
Tokku Paloh also denounced bidah, or ‘innovation’—the incorporation into 
Islam of ‘cultural accretions’, beliefs and practices authorised by traditions other than 
Islam. In an assault on Malay adat practices, he specifically targeted two practices 
associated with Malay spirit-healing, and which Terengganu Muslims continued to 
practice. These were membnang acak, or making offerings of food or slaughtered 
animals to spirits to gain their protection, or to lure them away from someone they are 
tonnenting; and bermain peteri, a practice in which a healer enters a trance to 
percussive accompaniment for up to three nights, in order for spirits to leave their 
victim’s body and enter the healer’s. These spirits are then interrogated, and the purpose 
in tonnenting their victim determined. For Tokku Paloh, there was no middle ground— 
those who practiced bidah should repent, and those who refused to repent should be 
killed.' This opposition to bidah informed Tokku Paloh’s opposition to the treaties 
with Britain, and his involvement in drafting the Itqanul Muluk, which referred to the 
abuse and denigration of Islam, and the sure incorporation o f unlslamic practices and
499 Sayid Abdul Rahman al-Idrus, Ma ’arij cil-Lahfan, Ibid., 114.
500 Sayid Abdul Rahman al-Idrus, Ma 'arij al-Lahfan, Ibid.
501 Sayid Abdul Rahman al-Idrus, Ma 'arij al-Lahfan, Ibid., 110.
502 Ibid., 11 . These tarekat were the Hubbiyah, Auliyaiyah, Umar, Ibahiyah, Haliyah, Huriyah, Waqiliyah, 
Mutajahiliyah, Mutakasiliyah, Ilhamiyah, Hululiyah, Wujudiyah, and the Mujassimah.
154
Chapter Three—Territory and Mobility: Borders and Connections in the Siamese Malay Zone
beliefs into the Terengganu state. Tokku Paloh’s stance of encouraging takfir, or the 
labelling of certain Muslims as kafir, was in itself an important political precedent for 
T erengganu.
Rebels and Refugees
The remarkable rise of Terengganu’s Arab sayids was only one aspect of Terengganu’s 
political Islamisation. Their base and backdrop to their mobility, the Siamese Malay 
zone in which they lived, was becoming increasingly stifling for syariah-oriented 
courtly insiders, characterised by the creeping colonisation which surrounded them. For 
example, Tokku Paloh’s lifetime corresponded closely with the period of bounding set 
off by the Burney Treaty of 1826, which was signed when he was nine years old. 
Thousands of Patani refugees had dispersed around the Peninsula during this time, and 
the families of several prominent Islamic scholars arrived in Terengganu. On their 
arrival in Terengganu, the experiences and practices of these Patani scholars came to be 
intertwined with those of the Terengganu Arabs. In a very short time, they also came to 
enjoy courtly patronage and prestige as reputed pondok teachers, and they also 
participated in the translocal networks which connected Terengganu with the Middle 
East. In short, they brought another layer of political Islamisation to Terengganu during 
the period of British-Siamese territorialisation.
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Figure 7: A diagram showing the relationships between ulama who claimed Hadhrami or Patani 
descent with scholars in Mecca and the Terengganu sultans. Rebels are named in the bottom right- 
hand corner.
One such family, that o f Tok Shaykh Qadi, or Wan Muhammad Amin bin Mat 
Yaacub, fled early. Tok Shaykh Qadi was a product o f the Johor-Patani alliance— a 
descendent o f Johor nobility on one side and Patani nobility on the other. In 1808, an 
armed conflict broke out between Datuk Pengkalan Raja Patani, a relative o f Tok 
Shaykh Qadi, and a Siamese noble, Panglima Dajang. Panglima Dajang was assisted by 
Siamese troops from Ligor, and Datuk Pengkalan Raja was killed. Tok Shaykh Qadi
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and his family, including his six-year old son, Wan Abdullah, fled to Kelantan, where 
they were granted protection by the court. Kelantan, however, was not sufficiently safe 
from Siam, which began to apply pressure on Kelantan to surrender its Patani refugees. 
At this point, Tok Shaykh Qadi moved his family again, this time to Terengganu, where 
Sultan Ahmad Syah I (r. 1808-1830) offered them protection and sent them to live in 
Kampung Paya Bunga in Kuala Terengganu.
Here Tok Shaykh Qadi also became close to the Sultan, and was effectively 
granted entry into Terengganu’s nobility. He also began to build up a reputation 
teaching religion from his house. He became acquainted with Tokku Tuan Besar, Tokku 
Paloh’s father, and they travelled back and forth together between Kampung Paya 
Bunga and Kampung Bukit Bayas, where Tokku Tuan Besar’s teacher and Tok Shaykh 
Qadi’s relative, Shaykh Abdul Kadir bin Wan Abdul Rahim (d. 1864), taught. Shaykh 
Abdul Kadir, himself an 1830s arrival from Patani, had become Mufti, or Shaykhul 
Ulama—the chief religious scholar—in Baginda Omar’s court.504 His pondok in Bukit 
Bayas was very influential, specialising in the now-orthodox al-Ghazali-influenced 
mysticism, and included Baginda Omar himself as one of its students. Abdul Kadir had 
been a member of the Shattariyah, a tarekat which had been influential in India, and 
which according to Shafie, had been favoured by the renowned Patani scholar, Shaykh 
Daud al-Fatani (d. 1843).505 Tok Shaykh Qadi also studied mysticism under Shaykh 
Daud.506 Shaykh Daud himself had lived in Pulau Duyong in Terengganu for some time 
before moving on to Mecca/07
Tok Shaykh Qadi’s son, Wan Abdullah, continued the family tradition of 
Islamic scholarship and travel. Wan Abdullah’s life very closely paralleled that of 
Tokku Paloh, and he first studied under Shaykh Daud, and then in Mecca under Sayid 
Ahmad Zayni Dahlan (1826-86), also Tokku Paloh’s teacher. Ahmad Zayni Dahlan, at
504 Mohammad Abu Bakar, Ulama Terengganu: Suatu Sorotan, 145-53.
505 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 54-58.
506
507
Ibid., 5. 
Ibid., 34.
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least one of whose books was used in Patani pondok in the 1800s,508 was the rector of 
the Masjid al-Haram, where study in Mecca was concentrated. Wan Abdullah brought 
back a large number of books from Mecca, which he taught from at his home in Pulau 
Duyung, Kuala Terengganu, after which he was named Tok Shaykh Duyung (1802- 
1889). Tok Shaykh Duyung rose to significant prominence, attracting students from 
Kelantan, Pahang, Sumatra, Brunei, Patani and Borneo, who established pondok around 
his, living and studying near him. One of his students was Tokku Paloh himself, who 
studied with him before leaving for Mecca.5119 Baginda Omar bought a large number of 
books that Tok Shaykh Duyung brought back from Mecca, and gifted them to the 
pondok. 510 Tok Shaykh Duyung was also elevated to prominence by Baginda Omar. He 
was first made Kadi, or chief religious teacher, and then he became Shaykhul Ulama 
after Shaykh Abdul Kadir, and worked closely in the Terengganu court with Tokku 
Paloh, the Shaykhul Islam. After Tok Shaykh Duyung, Haji Muhammad, an al- 
Baghdadi descendant, served as Kadi, bringing all three prominent Terengganu River 
ulama families into very close contact with the ruling house. Tok Shaykh Duyung was 
often sent to other Malay states as an envoy of the Terengganu court, for example to 
Pahang during the civil war of 1857, and to Kelantan in 1874 to convince the Sultan not 
to support a rebellion in Besut against the Sultan of Terengganu. On Tok Shaykh 
Duyung’s death in 1889, Tokku Paloh was reported to have been greatly saddened.511
After Tok Shaykh Qadi’s flight from Patani with his family, Islamic scholars 
began to leave Patani in larger numbers. Terengganu and Kelantan were contributing 
troops to rebellions in Patani on a regular basis. In 1831 and 1832, Kedah and Patani 
staged an uprising against Siam with Terengganu support. In both cases, Siam’s 
response was overwhelming. In 1832, 6,000 men were captured and taken to Bangkok 
as prisoners. Another 4,000 people fled, including to Terengganu. Kelantan, closer than 
Terengganu to Patani, was too close to Siam to be relied on consistently as a refuge. For
508 ffasan Madmam, The Pondok and Madrasah in Patani, 21.
5tw Mohammad Abu Bakar, Ulama Terengganu: Suatu Sorotan, 154-67.
r' ll) Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 54.
511 Mohammad Abu Bakar, Ulama Terengganu: Suatu Sorotan, 154-67.
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instance, after the defeated Patani chief and his family fled to Kelantan in 1832, Siam 
threatened to invade Kelantan, forcing it to surrender the fugitive and pay 50,000 silver 
pieces. On this occasion, Terengganu was not safe either, especially for generals 
directing the rebellion, who had fled there. Sultan Mansur Syah II (r. 1831-1837) was 
pressured into surrendering them by a Siamese warship off the Terengganu coast.512 In 
calculating its response to Terengganu, however, Siam revealed that Terengganu existed 
beyond its capacity to invade or pressure militarily, for the simple reason that it was 
next to British territory in Pahang. As Kobkua has noted, Siamese authorities decided 
that ‘to wage war on Terengganu would only cause the Malay leaders and much of the 
population to flee to British territory. The Siamese desired the prestige and tribute of a
C 1 T
vassal state, not a vacated and useless territory’.
Terengganu was therefore safe from military action from Siam. What Siam was 
willing to do, however, was depose Sultan Muhammad Syah (r. 1837-1839) from the 
Terengganu throne and replace him with his cousin, Baginda Omar (r. 1839-1876).514 
Perhaps in an act of defiance, it was Baginda Omar who brought ulama from Patani into 
the centre of his courtly circle. Indeed, Baginda Omar’s reign marked the wholesale 
institutionalisation of the ulama in the royal court. Omar built pondok, including in 
Pulau Duyung and Bukit Bayas. Pondok education continued to grow at this time, with 
more and more students returning from Mecca to open their own, where students would 
seek them and build huts to live with them and study.55 Students came from all over the 
Siamese Malay zone, and also from Pahang and Johor, before beginning their own 
journeys to Mecca and back to their places of origin. Their movements forged repeated 
connections, through movement, between locations in the Siamese Malay zone, and
12 Mohammad Zafrullah Haji Arifm, "Peranan Dan Perkembangan Masyarakat Melayu-Patani Di Kuala 
Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman", 37.
513 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-Regional Relations from the 
Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries, 69.
514 Ibid.
515 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 45-52.
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continued to incorporate the Middle East as a location for Southeast Asian political 
development.
At this point, therefore, Terengganu offered a more peaceful existence than 
Kelantan, and so scholarly activity from Patani began to shift to Terengganu. The Patani 
ulama were also focused on Mecca before their arrival, as Patani had undergone a 
strong political Islamisation of its own after the Siamese invasion of 1785. After this 
time the raja ceased to function as the centre of social life, and Mecca emerged as a new 
source of moral authority. In Bradley’s formulation, ‘Patani experienced a social 
revolution in the early nineteenth century that elevated Islam from one of a number of 
social forces to the primary dynamic for cohesion in the community, thus completely 
reshaping Patani’s social fabric’.516 This social revolution in Patani moral politics also 
washed over Terengganu, adding its influence to Terengganu’s own very strong 
Islamisation. Some Terengganu Islamic scholars were also swept along with Patani 
scholars’ flight to Mecca. This was enabled by Shaykh Daud al-Fatani, who found that 
many of his Terengganu students could seek him out for further study in Mecca because 
of advances in sea travel. 517
One student of Shaykh Daud was a Tok Pulau Manis descendant and legatee, 
Abdul Malik bin Isa. Abdul Malik also joined a Sufi tarekat under Shaykh Daud’s 
influence, before returning to Terengganu to marry and teach at the pondok in Kampung 
Sungai Rengas. On his return from Mecca, he turned the pondok into a significant 
repository of Islamic texts, bringing back 307 books in Arabic and 78 in Malay.516 The 
pattern of mobility established by Terengganu and Patani ulama was not, however, only 
focused on Mecca, the pondok and the Sultan’s palace. These Islamic scholars also 
wrote prolifically, producing large numbers of tracts influenced by various other 
sources, which they synthesised in their lessons to their students. The literature they 
produced dealt with questions of personal ethics, and was filled with stories related to
516 Bradley, "Moral Order," 291-92.
517 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 34.
518 Ibid., 37.
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the Qur’an, Hadith, and stories about the Prophet, his Companions, and other historical 
figures. This literature was used as a source for further teaching, and was used in their 
pondok. Before the nineteenth century, then, Terengganu had already become a centre 
for Islamic manuscript production.
Further, with their pondok and community activities in the hidu areas, and their 
other activities in Kuala Terengganu, they also connected all the tributaries that made up 
the Terengganu River system. Ulama established followings among villagers, to whom 
they would deliver lectures at public gatherings and offer their religious services. 
According to Shafie, Muhammad bin Abdul Malik from Kampung Sungai Rengas, for 
example, travelled up and down the Terengganu River teaching and officiating. He kept 
with him a seal and a book listing the grievances of the nikyat he met. “ Tok Shaykh 
Duyung also travelled from village to village performing prayers for the dead, 
apparently without ever collecting a fee from the grieving family. Ulama acted as 
sounding boards and mediators between villages, the rakyat, and the royal court. In 
terms of his support and admiration among the rakyat hidu, again, Tokku Paloh stood 
out among the Terengganu ulama. This was most evident in the cooperation he garnered 
when he took a decision to harbour a different set of refugees in Terengganu—the 
Pahang rebels. It was also at this time that the population of Terengganu’s hinterland 
first began to display a clear supportive attitude toward anti-colonial Holy War, 
encouraged by Tokku Paloh.
When the Pahang rebels fled into Terengganu, the population around the 
Terengganu River system—which links the Terengganu, the Nerus, the Telemong, the 
Berang and the Tersat—became contributors to what they understood was a Holy War 
against Britain. The rebels’ movements took them through the Terengganu River system 
numerous times, as they were in frequent contact with Tokku Paloh, who was protecting 
them. Tokku Paloh was going to some considerable effort to both confuse Clifford’s
521 Hasan Madmam, The Pondok and Madrasah in Patani, 22-39.
’22 Muhammad Shafie Abu Bakar, "Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengaruh Pemikiran Ulama-Ulama Silam 
Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Terengganu Dan Alam Melayu", 45-52.
522 Mohammad Abu Bakar, Ulama Terengganu: Suatu Sorotan, 154-67.
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search for the rebels, and to tutor the rebels themselves in ideas o f Holy War (perang 
sabil). He encouraged them to see their resistance to British rule as such a war, 
providing them with amulets and swords inscribed with verses from the Qur’an.524 
Sultan Zainal Abidin III was also cooperating with Tokku Paloh in this effort, and had 
personally encouraged Malays in upriver areas to refuse to cooperate with Clifford’s 
expedition. Stockades that were built in these areas, ostensibly to slow the rebels, turned 
out to have been built to prevent the expedition’s progress up the Terengganu and Nerus 
rivers/“' The Sultan also organised a search through Kampung Paloh, in which 400 men 
asked every householder if they had seen the rebels, accepting the denials o f the 
forewarned villagers. He also apparently instructed villagers in the Setiu and Besut 
districts to rescue the Pahang rebels by force o f arms if the British should capture 
them . 52' Clifford was convinced that the Sultan’s and rakyaf s actions had been 
personally organised by Tokku Paloh.' He also knew that he was being lied to, and 
made this observation o f the say id:
On 12th April I had an official interview with Ungku Saiyid [Tokku Paloh], 
who is a man o f a remarkable personality, and who wields an extraordinary 
influence over the superstitious and somewhat fanatical Muhammadans o f 
Trengganu. I had a second and more private interview with the Saiyid 
during my stay at Kuala Trengganu, and on both o f these occasions he lied 
to me concerning his connection with the rebels with a directness and a 
stolidity o f countenance which accorded ill with his saintly reputation.529
Not only did the say id refuse to cooperate with Clifford, but rumours also circulated 
after these meetings that Clifford and his men experienced Tokku Paloh’s thaumaturgic 
power while in his house. Clifford and his men were said to have conducted the 
meetings on chairs, to which their bodies stuck fast, and they trembled until they could 
barely speak.530 Tokku Paloh’s sabotage was quite aside from the Siamese sabotage that
524 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 45.
525 Ibid., 46.
526 Ibid., 38-41.
527 Ibid., 46.
528 Ibid., 47-48.
529 Ibid., 19.
530 Mohamad bin Abu Bakar, "Sayid Abdul Rahman Bin Muhammad Al-Idris (Tokku Paluh)," 48.
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Clifford also suspected was at play, and his other serious disadvantage: the sheer size of 
his expedition. It consisted of three Europeans, 190 Malays, 39 Dayaks, eight Sikhs, 
two ‘Sakai’ and ten Siamese. A full 147 of the Malays were ‘bearers and personal 
attendants of the European officers, and ten people were simply carrying ghee and milk 
for the Sikh troops to consume.531
Clifford, and the rebels he was pursuing, also travelled through Kuala 
Telemong and up the Berang River. He found that wherever he went, villagers in the 
area, influenced by Tokku Paloh’s considerable personal and religious prestige, were 
also helping to shield the rebels from detection. When Clifford attempted to gain their 
cooperation, they refused to provide it. Between the villagers and Tokku Paloh, 
Clifford’s mobility around the river system and efforts to detect the rebels were severely 
hampered. For example on the Nerus River, which meets the Terengganu close to 
Kampung Paloh, Clifford asked some men on rafts if other boats had passed them. He 
had heard of Pahang men heading for Paloh to ‘place themselves under the protection’ 
of the sayid. The rafting men denied that they had seen anyone. On Clifford’s arrival 
at Tokku Paloh’s house, however, he found the rebels’ boat tied up at his jetty, and the 
tracks leading up to his gate still wet.53 ’ The rebels had such firm support in the area 
that after gaining Tokku Paloh’s authorisation to wage a Holy War, they ‘proceeded up 
the Trengganu River, openly declaring their intention of waging a Holy War in Pahang, 
and being feasted by the people of Trengganu’.534
The attitude displayed by Tokku Paloh and the rakyat hulii toward the Pahang 
rebels was one of support for their goal of subverting British rule, which was 
understood as a Holy War and therefore worthy of support. This kind of behaviour 
demonstrated how two aspects of territorialisation—building an inventory of resources 
and population, and creating identities which correspond with new political units—are
531 Clifford, Trengganu andKelantan, 11.
532 Ibid., 37.
533 Ibid., 38.
534 Ibid., 45.
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not necessarily achieved together.535 Ulama who moved across the Siamese Malay zone 
and between Terengganu and the Middle East, and rebels who moved across borders to 
seek refuge, had not assumed new identities as Siamese or British subjects 
simultaneously with border- and geo-body creation. Territorialisation did not produce a 
‘feeling of belonging to a bounded territory’, and people in the newly-bordered 
Siamese Malay zone did not begin to live bounded lives. Instead, the experience of 
these rebels and refugees demonstrates Radcliffe and Westwood’s claim that ‘the 
correspondence o f nation [or in this case, proto-nation] and people is constantly overlain 
by other subjectivities’. 537 In the case of the Terengganu ulama, the refugee Patani 
ulama to whom they became close, and the Pahang rebels, this other subjectivity was 
Islam, evident in the continued focus on Mecca and the transformation in Terengganu o f 
the Pahang rebellion into a Holy War.
The ulama and rakyaf s ability to support rebels and refugees was enabled by 
Terengganu’s independent status. In 1895, for example, Clifford discovered on his
^38
expedition that 3,000 Pahang Malays had simply moved to Kelantan’s Lebir Valley. 
After 1909, however, Terengganu remained the most effective haven for refugees and 
rebels, who strategically used the border to avoid being captured. In 1915, for example, 
the Kelantan-Terengganu border became important from a ‘law and order’ perspective 
for the British. In that year, an uprising took place in the hulu district o f Pasir Putih, led 
by Haji and orang besar, Tok Janggut (not the same man who participated in the 
Terengganu uprising). This protest bore all the hallmarks o f a protest against the new 
territorial regime, demonstrated by the rebels’ actions in burning Land Office records in 
the Pasir Putih government offices, which they occupied for days.53l) In this uprising, the 
border was essential to preventing Kelantan rebels from finding ‘safe harbourage’ in
535 Matthew G Hannah, Governmentality and the Mastery o f Territory in Nineteenth-Centwy America, ed. 
Alan R H Baker, Richard Dennis, and Deryck Holdsworth, Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Radcliffe and Westwood, Remaking the Nation: Place, 
Identity and Politics in Latin America.
536 Hannah, Governmentality and the Mastery o f Territory in Nineteenth-Century America, 16.
537 Radcliffe and Westwood, Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America, 14.
538 Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920, 143.
539 Cheah Boon Kheng, To' Janggut: Legends, Histories, and Perceptions o f the 1915 Rebellion in 
Kelantan (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2006), 11.
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Terengganu.>4u All available police were sent to guard the border during the immediate 
period of action,Ml but ten Terengganu Malays were still caught harbouring rebels who 
had managed to cross it.2'42
Breaking with the State
Terengganu’s historical moment as a haven for refugees and rebels was made possible 
not only because it was the last peninsular Malay state to be colonised, but also because 
its main political players—the royal court, prominent ulama around it, and rakyat in its 
central coast-hinterland axis around the Terengganu river system—were working 
together to subvert British aims. This included cooperating with the Pahang Holy War. 
The period of Sultan Zainal Abidin Ill’s rule was particularly amenable to such 
cooperation, and its channeling into anti-colonial, Islamist subversion. The Sultan 
himself was appointed at the age of sixteen, when he was already a very devout Muslim, 
and he surrounded himself with shaykhs from the beginning of his reign. These included 
Tok Shaykh Duyong, Tokku Paloh, and the sons of Tok Shaykh Duyong and Shaykh 
Abdul Kadir Bukit Bayas. The new Sultan’s reign also represented a moment in 
Terengganu’s political history when anti-colonial Islamism came to utterly dominate 
courtly life. This can be seen in the way he himself, and not only his courtly ulama like 
Tokku Paloh, characterised the colonial threat as a kafir threat to Islam. The Sultan sent 
messages to a number of ulama during treaty negotiations in 1909, asking them to 
perform prayers to ‘ask God to weaken and annul the violence and evil of the devious 
kuffar enemy which desires to assert its rule in our state’.543
r"4() E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, June 1915, 28 July 1915, p. 3, 
C0273/427:39688: ‘Affairs of Trengganu.
541 E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, May 1915, 1 July 1915, p. 1, 
C0273/427:39688.
:'42 E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, July, August and September 1915, 16 
December 1915, p. 1, CO273/428:2049: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
544 Letter from Sultan Zainal Abidin III to an alim from Losong, Haji Abdullah bin Abdul Latif, quoted in 
Misbaha, Terengganu Dari Bentuk Sejarah Hingga Tahun 1918 . Misbaha writes that similar letters were 
sent to every alim capable of performing these prayers.
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This climate o f remarkable anti-colonial cooperation, with a very strong 
Islamist flavour, could not last indefinitely. Indeed, Terengganu’s moment as the last 
state holding out against the British abruptly came to an end in 1918. This end was 
foreshadowed by the Bucknill Commission in July o f that year, which raised the control 
of territory and mineral resources as particular problems for Terengganu, and 
recommended the appointment of a British Adviser who would have the power to 
enforce his ‘suggestions’ to the Terengganu government.544 Also in 1918, first Tokku 
Paloh, and then Sultan Zainal Abidin III both died. For British officials, both main 
sources of resistance to their colonial takeover o f Terengganu had propitiously 
collapsed. In 1919, after the subsequent appointment o f Sultan Muhammad Syah II (r. 
1918-1920), negotiations to install a British Adviser began between the Sultan and Sir 
Arthur Young, Governor o f the Straits Settlements. Humphreys, in his file notes on the 
Commission, recognised that the Sultan might be ‘obstinate’, a result o f his exposure to 
‘very strong domestic pressure’.545
This pressure was obvious when Sultan Muhammad arrived in Singapore for 
negotiations. He brought with him tour advisers who had repeatedly urged Sultan Zainal 
Abidin III before him to refuse to accept a British Adviser. These advisers were Haji 
Ngah, the Menteri Besar, Tengku Ngah, his brother-in-law, Tengku Chik Ahmad, the 
Commissioner for Lands and Mines, and Tuan Embong, one of Tokku Paloh’s sons. 
Humphreys had hoped Sultan Muhammad would himself ‘see the wisdom of asking for
...minta dilemahkan dan dibatalkan Allah Subhanahu wa Taa ’la akan kekerasan dan kejahatan seteru 
yang kuffar dan tipu daya mereka itu yang mencita-cita mereka itu hendak masuk memerintahkan di 
dal am negeri kit a...
This letter also expressed disappointment in Siam not playing its role as protector of Terengganu’s 
Islamic government.
...minta dimudahkan oleh Allah Subhanahu wa Taa ’la akan kerajaan Siam menerima dan menurutkan 
seperti bagaimana maksud dan kehendak kita demikian lagi hendaklah minta dikekalkan oleh Allah 
Subhanahu wa Taa ’la akan kerajaan kita dan yang kemudian daripada kita kerajaan yang Islam jua yang 
memerintahkan di Negeri Terengganu ini dengan keadilannya menjalankan segala hukum syariat 
Sayyidina MuhammadSallalahu Alayhe Wasallam...
’44 High Commissioner, Malay States to Colonial Office, 23 December 1918, C0273/474:6947: 
‘Trengganu Commission’.
545 Humphreys, file notes, 13 March 1919, C0273/474:6947, ‘Trengganu Commission’.
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the appointment of a British Adviser’,546 but in the negotiations Young found the Sultan 
unwilling to do so, and ‘some pressure was brought to bear on him’ as a result.647 Sultan 
Muhammad had tried to stall the process several times, first by claiming illness, then by 
avoiding discussions of official matters, and after that by asking for more time to 
consider the text of the 1919 treaty which was now put to the Sultan and his advisers.
The Sultan also tried to renegotiate the text of the treaty, allowing himself to 
reject the Adviser’s instructions unless he felt they served the ‘benefit of the state’. 
Nevertheless, Sultan Muhammad eventually agreed to the new 1919 treaty appointing 
an Adviser.64s Zahadi has described Sultan Muhammad’s actions in stalling the final 
British takeover as demonstrating his attempt at jihad.549 Whatever the Sultan thought 
of his actions, by 1920, the situation had become unbearable, and he abdicated. His 
younger brother, who British officials considered ‘not a strong character’, was installed 
on the same afternoon.550 Arifin Ngah, in his stylised representation of this event in his 
novel, Tangisan Bangsaku, has described the Sultan as:
voluntarily descending from the royal throne as he did not wish to befriend 
the kafir English.. .Baginda was of the opinion that Muslims cannot unite 
with kafir within a single administration.551
Regardless of Sultan Muhammad’s motives, an Adviser’s post was established 
and filled by Humphreys, formerly the British Agent. Terengganu was no longer a non­
colonial space, and its incorporation into the empire quickly allowed for British officials 
to begin aligning Terengganu’s policies and administration with the other British Malay 
states. This allowed the standardisation of regulations across all contiguous peninsular 
territory south of the Siamese boundary, and enabled the colonial consolidation of 
Terengganu into an emerging ‘British Malaya’. It was now possible for all of
546 Humphreys, file notes, 13 March 1919, C0273/474:6947, ‘Trengganu Commission’.
547 Arthur Young to Colonial Office, 4 June 1919, CO273/487:39802.
548 Arthur Young to Colonial Office, 4 June 1919, CO273/487:39802.
544 Zahadi bin Haji Mohammad, "Perjuangan Jihad Umat Islam Terengganu Menentang British: 1881- 
1928" (BA, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1996), 173.
550 Guillemard to Colonial Office, 31 May 1920, C 0 7 17/2:26903.
551 Arifin Ngah, Tangisan Bangsaku, 4.
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Terengganu’s relationships with the outside world to be mediated through its 
membership of a completed Malaya-shaped political territory. In a legal-political sense, 
the division of the Siamese Malay zone between two separate state-shaped spaces had 
effectively taken place. Negotiations, trade, movement, political developments, and 
indeed all kinds of social relations on either side of the boundary could now be 
funnelled through or shaped by the administrative structures created by Siam and British 
Malaya. They would not be allowed to take place or develop independently, and serious 
attempts to create and enforce new social identities on either side could now begin. One 
aspect of unifying the administration of the Malay states was precisely the policy of 
punishing shifting cultivation to force Malays to settle into stable agriculture, a policy 
which was replicated in all the states of the peninsula. “
The end of Terengganu’s special position as an uncolonised space also marked 
the end of the special cooperation between Sultan, ulama and rakyat. The formal advent 
of colonial rule caused a split among Tokku Paloh’s disciples, as it must also have 
caused disarray among the rest of Terengganu’s Islamic scholars. Terengganu’s Islamic 
scholars were now faced with a choice to join the new colonial system as co-opted 
religious leaders, or to refuse, turning away from the state. Tokku Paloh had opted for 
the latter strategy before his death, and the constitution he drafted in 1911 had 
announced a radical break with the state, outlining to the Sultan the criteria by which his 
fitness to rule would now be judged. Tokku Paloh, whom the Sultan had kept close to 
him to augment his Islamic authority, had withdrawn his legitimating power from the 
state. British officials pursued this division purposefully, and immediately set about 
grooming individual ulama to join the colonial Department of Religious Affairs, in 
keeping with a feature of British colonial rule which Ansari has observed in India. 
British administrators would actively select and groom potential local collaborators, 
who could act as intermediaries between colonial officials and ‘native’ populations.
yS2 Kathirithamby-Wells, Nature and Nation: Forests and Development in Peninsular Malaysia .
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Such collaborators often included local religious leaders, through whom
• c  r
‘systems of local cooperation’ were established. In 1922, Humphreys confirmed in a 
reference to the department that this was precisely his strategy in Terengganu. He wrote, 
‘There will always be a sprinkling of fanatics in Terengganu, and the Mufti [Shaykhul 
Islam] and his colleagues should be used as ex-poaching game-keepers’.5^ 4 By 1919, 
Terengganu’s Islamic scholars needed to adapt to such colonial strategies, which, while 
seeking alliances with them, cast them from the centre of government into a narrow, 
limited realm of issues touching the Muhammadan religion. This new relationship 
between government and ultima was embodied in the Religious Department, which had 
existed since 1913 to ‘superintend’ marriage, divorce, mosques, festivals and Islamic 
courts. From 1919, this was now the only space left for Terengganu’s courtly ulama. 
Tokku Paloh’s son, Tuan Embong, elected to head this bureaucracy as the new 
Shaykhul Islam in 1919, although five years later Humphreys characterised him as 
friendly, loyal but ‘so lazy that I have at times grudged the establishment’.555
An altogether contrasting stance was taken by Tokku Paloh’s most outstanding 
disciple, Haji Drahman, who refused to collaborate with the colonial government 
altogether. Although cut off from the support of the royal court with the colonial 
takeover, Haji Drahman was possessed of significant material and moral resources. He 
also embodied the mobility and prestige that Islamic scholars before him could 
demonstrate. The Haji was also a thoroughly commercial personality, and was no small­
time player in Terengganu trade. Haji Drahman’s business dealings and family relations 
were intertwined, as shown by his land-holdings in Sarawak, where his parents-in-law 
lived. His trade connections also allowed for his religious influence to grow. In 1928, he 
was revealed to have been involved in South China Sea trade between Sulawesi, 
Sarawak, Sumatra, Siam and Terengganu. He conducted this trade in motorised perahu, 
worth up to $3000, and long perahu made of cengal, a type of hardwood, powered by 
sail. His orchards, estates, pacli fields, mineral and forest holdings, worth $4430 (not
553 Sarah F. D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs o f Sind, 1843-1947, vol. 50, Cambridge 
South Asian Studies (Cambridge: 1992), 2.
354 J.L. Humphreys to Colonial Office, 22 April 1929, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
555 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 6, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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including land in his wife’s name), made him a sizeable landowner, and his lands 
produced coconuts, rubber, rice, minerals, and bananas.
Apart from the land in Sarawak, these landholdings were in Terengganu, 
around Kemaman and Beladau Kolam, Losong and Pulau Tinggol. He also had at least 
one durian orchard, and land on which cotton was planted in Terengganu. He was also 
an employer.556 Not dependent on anyone else’s largesse, Haji Drahman turned to 
alternative strategies to replenish and reconstitute his Islamic authority. Haji Drahman 
focused his attention on the hulu area, where he commanded a great deal o f loyalty, 
drawing on his reputation for thaumaturgy, religious knowledge and association with 
Tokku Paloh. The Haji began to lead non-cooperation with government in the hulu, 
echoing Tokku Paloh’s interest in sabotage, and mobilising his following in anticolonial 
action. He began with an anti-vaccination campaign in the Telemong River valley, and 
also refused to register marriages he performed with government agencies. At this time, 
it also emerged that he was discouraging the rakyat from taking out permits to fell trees 
or gather forest products, new conditions of forest management which the colonial 
government had established.557 In doing so, he was drawing on a long chain o f events 
which culminated in his actions being authorised in the name of Islam, and this was 
exactly how he and his followers began to justify them.
Another o f Tokku Paloh’s disciples also turned to the hulu and issues o f land 
and forests as his main political focus. This man, Haji Musa bin Abdul Ghani 
Minangkabau, attracted the kind of surveillance attention from the colonial government 
which now offers the best insight into how Terengganu’s mobile preachers operated. In 
one report from 27 April 1924, Haji Musa, who lived on Duyong Island, where Tok 
Shaykh Duyong had once lived, was reported to have travelled through the hulu region 
to ‘incite’ the rakyat there to non-cooperation. He persuaded many rakyat that they were 
forbidden from following the government’s land and forest regulations. He had also 
delivered this argument in Tanjung Baru two months previously at a Ramadan feast.
556 Refer to SUK T 1442/1346: ‘Pesanan Haji Abdul Rahman Limbong berkenaan dengan harta dan 
hutangnya’.
557 See SUK T 1269/1342: ’Orang-orang Telemong tidak mengikut peraturan kerajaan dengan ajaran Haji 
Abdul Rahman Limbong’.
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Haji Musa was apparently confident enough to even visit the reporting official at home 
on 2 April; to explain to him the Qur’anic ay at [verses] and their accompanying 
exegesis which made it clear that government revenues should not be paid.
The official’s response was to advise him firmly that he should not speak in 
this way and that he was not to interfere in the matter, which Haji Musa verbally 
accepted. It was too late, however, and many rakyat in the area were receptive to his 
message. The official had also conducted some investigations, and concluded that Haji 
Musa was one of a group which wished to resist the government in the Telemong River 
valley. The official appealed to the government to take strong action, as he was worried 
about the Haji’s activities.558 It was also at this time that reports began to filter in to the 
government in Kuala Terengganu of extensive movement and organisation in the hulu 
areas.
558 Pejabat Pesuruhjaya Kuala Berang (PPKB), to Setiausaha Kerajaan Terengganu (SUK T), 7 Zulkaedah 
1342 [27 April 1928], SUK T 1268/1342: ’Haji Musa bin Abdul Ghani menegah dan menghasut rakyat 
daripada menurut peraturan dan membayar hasil kerajaan’.
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Turkish Lodestar
His Highness [Sultan Zainal Abidin III] showed me a large map o f the world 
which he had just purchased. He asked me to point out the British possessions 
which I did. His visit to Mecca and to Egypt last year have considerably 
widened his knowledge o f the world and he no longer thinks, as he obviously did 
before, that Trengganu is one o f the principal kingdoms o f the earth.
J.L. Humphreys, British Adviser, Terengganu, 9 September 1914.559
The far-reaching patterns of travel and teaching built up by Terengganu’s shaykhs drew 
its forest cultivators into far-reaching and anti-colonial Islamic networks. These 
networks embodied and articulated a political identity that did not correspond with the 
bounded Malay states or proto-national geo-bodies that now existed in the Siamese 
Malay zone. They also occupied a variable position in relation to the pre-colonial 
Terengganu state. At first, they formed a mediating connection between the hinterland’s 
population and the state’s coastal centre in Kuala Terengganu. During Tokku Paloh’s 
lifetime, however, this pattern was broken, as he engendered a new politics which 
authorised a clean break with the state. This new politics encouraged the practice of 
takfir against colonial collaborators, and withdrawing support from Sultans who 
collaborated with foreign powers. It also encouraged rakyat to participate in, and 
mobilise for, Holy War.
Shaykhs like Tokku Paloh, and his disciples Haji Drahman and Haji Musa, 
frequently visited hulu villages to teach and preach the new religiosity and Islamist 
politics. Through their connections to these Hajis, hulu villages became crucibles for a 
universalising, anti-colonial Islamism, established as the political mode for responding 
to the colonial threat during Terengganu’s territorialisation. At the onset of colonial 
rule, Terengganu’s shaykhs connected to the al-Idrus line appear to have split, with 
some electing to continue working with the new colonial government, and others 
refusing to do so. Cut off from the royal court as a source of patronage and authority, 
Haji Drahman and Haji Musa sought new sources of authority, this time by turning to
v’l) J.L. Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, September 1914, n.d., p. 1, C0273/412: 
49570: ‘Trengganu Affairs’.
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the rakyat hulu in the Terengganu River system, and urging them to refuse to cooperate 
with the British. These men and their disciples became political brokers, bringing Islam 
to the rakyat again, this time as a discourse in which to express their resource claims 
and environmental grievances.
As sporadic refusals to cooperate with the 1920s forest reforms began to 
intensify into an uprising, the leaders who were speaking for it were overwhelmingly 
Islamist, and generalising its purpose beyond forest rebellion. The Islamists were Haji 
Drahman’s disciples, and the Haji himself had used the 1922 trial of rebels to assert his 
authority in the movement. He did this by translating rebels’ actions in defence of 
shitting cultivation into an Islamic challenge to state authority. As the movement gained 
in momentum over the following six years, Haji Drahman’s disciples also narrated all 
the grievances the movement brought together as a story of resistance in the name of the 
Muslim umat against the kafir European colonisers. The politics of the movement 
reflected its location in the Islamist networks established by the shaykhs, whose 
movement between the Siamese Malay zone and the Middle East brought to 
Terengganu a sense of the global breadth of the umat.
The movement’s spokespeople self-consciously styled their defence of forest 
cultivation as a defence of the entire umat, and sought to position themselves as 
furthering a global struggle between it and its kafir oppressors. Rebels did this in May 
1928 by displaying the symbols of what many Muslims regarded as the political centre 
of the global umat hitherto—the Ottoman Caliphate in Istanbul. The recent abolition of 
the Caliphate and Turkey’s transformation from empire into republic, however, had 
marked the end of Islam’s geopolitical power. This end was caused by the growth of 
western empires, Turkey’s defeat in the First World War and its new leadership’s 
position that only the nation-state could serve as a sovereign territorial form. The 
Ottoman Caliphate had become detached from its former earthly presence, and had 
become Terengganu’s Turkish lodestar, which they invested in symbolically as they 
witnessed Terengganu’s forests become kafir territory. The Terengganu rebels’ politics 
expressed a longing for a sovereign centre of an Islam that was now deterritorialised.
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Through the 1920s, the colonial government had pursued its land and forestry reforms 
hand in hand, allowing each set of regulations to reinforce the other to clear the forests 
o f the rakyat and their livelihoods. The work of implementing the Torrens System 
progressed through the hulu district, and surveying and registration proceeded through 
the valleys o f the Terengganu River system. Settlement land in the Telemong valley 
began to be measured and surveyed in 1924, and by April and May 1928, Kuala Berang 
surveyors had moved into the Tersat valley. Land and forestry regulations were both 
enforced by a complex o f government agencies, housed in offices in Kuala Berang. The 
rakyat hulu was now visible to the colonial government.
The government’s capacity for collecting standardised revenues on land and 
forest products was improved, as was its capacity for keeping cultivation activity out of 
the forests, for which Forest Guards and police officers were despatched into the hulu. 
With land-holdings matched to owners, and illegal forest activity more visible to the 
government, the practice of shitting cultivation could now be shut down. The legal 
instruments by which this curtailment would be achieved were the punishing pass 
system, along with fines for collecting forest products or felling trees more than seven 
years old. For colonial officials, the new regime would enable more consistent resource 
management, focusing on conserving forests, managing and increasing rice production 
in stable sawah holdings, and preventing forest rubber smallholders from competing 
with the plantation sector.560
These measures had created a contest between the colonial government and the 
rakyat in Terengganu’s forested hinterland. From 1922, hulu cultivators had avoided 
cooperating with land surveyors and forest guards, who were creating the ‘[n]ets of finer 
and finer official weave’.561 This weave would help the government identify, register 
and fix the rakyat to specific territorial lots distinct from the forest, now government
560 Kahn. Other Malays, 48.
561 James C Scott, The Moral Economy o f the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), 94.
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space.562 A leadership of Islamists had also crystallised around the forest conflict, who 
sought new sources of authority by leading the conflict and narrating the rakyaCs 
struggle as one of Islam against the kafir. In April and May 1928, there was a 
resurgence in mass non-cooperation with the regulations, and an intensification in the 
movement’s militancy. A series of violent episodes broke out between the rakyat and 
Islamists on one side, and an array of government men from the Kuala Berang offices 
on the other. These government men—embodiments of state territorialisation and 
surveillance in the halii areas—were now being met not only with tactics of non­
cooperation, but ambushes and threats of violence. An armed struggle was in the 
making, and it was strongly marked by efforts by the Islamists to define the enemy, and 
consolidate their own side in the process.
Violent intent was declared before Mahmud bin Piah and Abdullah bin Ali, 
both Forest Guards from Kuala Berang, and Hamzah bin Taib, the Assistant Penghulu, 
who had been surveying Settlement Land along the Tersat River in April 1928. In the 
process, they had stopped to investigate the felling of government forest near Kampung 
Pasir Nyior, in the Tersat Valley. They had set out from Kuala Berang at 7:30 in the 
morning of 19 April and arrived at one in the afternoon at the house of Penghulu Salleh 
in Kampung Pasir Nyior. There, they observed an assembly of around 500 men led by 
one Abdullah Jurukaka—armed with spears, guns and golok—gathered on Penghulu 
Salleh’s land, and looking as though they would attack the forest guards at any moment.
The three immediately entered Penghulu Salleh’s house, where Mahmud 
demanded to know which area of forest had been cleared nearby. Salleh did not answer 
the question. Instead, he declared that the 500 armed men outside were all from Pasir 
Nyior, and that they had all been involved in clearing the forest. He himself was the 
kepala (head) of the group felling illegally. Pressing on with his questioning, Mahmud 
asked, ‘Why didn’t you get passes?’ Penghulu Salleh replied, ‘People who get passes 
have joined the kafirV Again, Mahmud asked to be shown the cleared forest location. 
This time, Penghulu Salleh replied, ‘If you want to fight, I’ll show you the place!’ The
562 Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.
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three government men glanced from Penghulu Salleh to the large assembled crowd, 
concluding they would surely be attacked if they did not leave immediately. They spent 
the next three hours searching for the cleared location on foot, but could not find it. 
They gave up and returned to Kuala Berang, and reported the incident the following 
day.563
This remarkable episode was the first of the physical confrontations between 
the rakyat, Islamists and government men. Throughout the 1920s, different actors in the 
movement had stressed different concerns, which were threaded together as the 
movement grew in strength. Some had voiced their frustration that their livelihood 
practices were being punished; others feared their customary land tenures would be 
extinguished. Islamists like Haji Drahman had used his legal intervention in the 1922 
court hearing to Islamise the uprising’s message. Now, in 1928, actions like this ambush 
were serving the same purpose—they brought together the rakyat huhks varied 
concerns in a narrative of confrontation between Islam and its enemy. The movement’s 
purpose was explained by a layer of leading Islamists as militant resistance against the 
kafir colonial government.
Further, for the Islamists, the stigma of kuffar did not apply only to British 
officials, but Muslims who worked for them, whom they were targeting with increased 
militancy. Indeed, Islamists were mobilising crowds of rakyat to seek out, accuse and 
violently harass Malay officials, presenting them as having crossed a line—from 
Muslim to kafir—by joining a kafir government. These new confrontations were 
marked by the politics of defining the enemy, in the same way that Tokku Paloh had 
done when he broke with the state. In Islamic tenns this was the practice of takfir, or 
classifying certain people from within the Muslim community as unbelievers because of 
their particular beliefs or actions. The Islamists were using the powerful tactic of 
defining the enemy by stripping away the very Muslim-ness of colonial collaborators.
The very next day, on 20 April, Police Officer Number 81, Abdullah bin Haji 
Sulaiman, received orders from Sergeant Othman in Kuala Berang to deliver
563 Mahmud bin Piah and Abdullah bin Ali to District Officer, Kuala Berang, 29 Syawal 1346 [20 April 
1928], SUKT 1295/1346.
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summonses in Kampung Penjing along the Tersat, and also in Kampung Penih, on the 
Penih R iver/64 He went with a Kuala Berang Forest Guard, and on the way they were 
joined by a man called Su bin Sulaiman, who was headed for Kampung Kuala Meh, in 
the same direction. They arrived in Kampung Penjing at noon, having left at seven, and 
noticed that all the houses had their doors closed, and the village appeared abandoned. 
Eventually, they came across a bangsal (storage shed), where they suddenly 
encountered one Abdullah bin Abu Bakar and Lebai Hasan bin Mahmud, a religious 
teacher. The men they encountered asked threateningly: ‘Where are Sergeant Man 
[Othman], the Magistrate and the Police? You three are not enough!’ It was an ambush. 
Crying out ‘SabilV they drew a knife and a her is, and lunged towards the government 
men and their hapless companion, stabbing as they went. Finding they were suddenly 
faced with 200 men, all yelling ‘Shoot and kill those who have joined the kafirV the 
three retreated.565
Officer Abdullah reported the incident, and the next day, on 21 April, Sergeant 
Othman asked the Kuala Berang magistrate for a warrant for his attackers’ arrest on the 
charge o f detaining police officers with violence.566 The warrant was issued the next 
day, 22 April. 567 This incident made it clear that the conflict was being conceived o f as a 
perang sabil, or Holy War between real Muslims, those who would not cooperate with 
the government, and kafir, who did. Islamists were beginning to argue to the rakyat that 
taking out passes was tantamount to crossing the same line that government men had 
crossed— it would make them kafir. This incident also showed that not only was front­
line government staff like forest guards and police officers targets o f the movement; 
rather, it had senior Kuala Berang officials like the Sergeant and Magistrate in its sights 
as well.
M>4 Kampung Penih is on the Penih River, and its watershed is very close to the upriver Tersat, almost 
forming a loop connecting the Tersat, Belawan, Brang and Penih rivers at their sources as well as at the 
confluence at Kuala Brang. Refer to Maps on p. x above.
565 Statement by Abdullah bin Haji Sulaiman, 29 Syawal 1346 [20 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
5<><> Statement by Sargeant Othman, 1 Zulkaedah 1346 [21 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
567 Statement by Abdullah bin Haji Sulaiman, 29 Syawal 1346, SUK T 1295/1346.
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Two days later, on 22 April, Terengganu authorities discovered that these mass 
ambushes were somehow connected to the recent movements o f travelling preachers up 
and down the Terengganu River system. This time, the preacher in question was Haji 
Musa. According to the District Officer in Kuala Berang, he had recently travelled 
through the Tersat valley teaching villagers that ‘in the book [Qur’an], anyone who pays 
for passes to fell trees and plant padi becomes a kafir’.568 Haji Musa had also been in 
Tersat on 31 January, in Kampung Bukit Gemuroh with Haji Abdullah from Kampung 
Dusun, Imam Tahir o f Kampung Pasir Nering, and one unknown man. He had spoken 
before a mosque congregation o f men and women, asking them, kDo you want to follow 
syariah law or kafir law?’
When no-one answered, Haji Musa read the ‘hadis perang\ or ‘war Hadith’, 
one o f the narratives o f the Prophet’s beliefs otherwise known as the Trsyadul Ibad’.569 
Haji Musa announced that those who did not choose syariah would not be considered a 
part of the Prophet’s umat. Later, two men from Kampung Kuala Menjing, Itam and 
Jusuh, collected Haji Musa and accompanied him to Menjing and Kampung Durian 
Bador, where people from other Tersat villages congregated to hear him read H adith/70 
Haji Musa pleaded complete innocence when questioned subsequently by the Religious 
Department. He argued that he had read the Hadith because he had travelled to the 
Tersat to seek his rezeki, alms, and had not travelled there before the month of Rejab 
that year (December 1927— January 1928). On his arrival as a virtual newcomer, people 
there had asked him to read Hadith for them. He had also recently been reading about 
the sifat dua puluh, or the Twenty Attributes o f God,571 and so people had sought his
568 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 2 Zulkaedah 1346 [22 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
569 The had is perang referred to here is the Irsyadul Ibad Ila Sabil Rawsyad, translated into Malay as the 
Petunjuk Manusia Kepada Jalan Yang Baik, or Directions to the Righteous Path. Sabil, the righteous path, 
can be defended by violent jihad  or perang sabil.
57(1 Tuan Long bin [Illegible] to District Officer, Kuala Berang, 25 Zulkaedah 1346 [15 May 1928], SUK 
T 1295/1346.
571 These are the Twenty Divine Attributes, which believing Muslims are obliged to accept and 
understand, as they demonstrate God’s perfection. Examples include ‘existing’ and ‘eternal’. They are 
opposed in Islamic teachings to the Impossible Attributes, which cannot be held by God as they are the 
opposite of the Divine Attributes, such as ‘not existing’ or ‘temporary’. However, Muslims are instructed 
not to be lulled into believing that God possesses only twenty divine attributes, as no human can truly 
understand God’s full complement of attributes, which are surely limitless.
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advice on whether ‘controlling the wealth of others’ was halal (permissible) or haram 
(forbidden). Haji Musa had answered that appropriating wealth made people kafir—an
S79oblique reference to the government’s claim over Terengganu’s land and forests.
Such reports indicated the situation was grave. The movement was using 
Islamic sources which justified Holy War, and the government began stepping up its 
discursive attacks against the people involved. The Malay authorities dubbed them 
penderhaka (traitors), a term with considerable force in the context of the Malay 
kerajaan and its projection of an entitlement to unlimited loyalty from its subjects.573 
That same day, on 22 April, the District Officer in Kuala Berang provided a list of 
known organisers behind the confrontations. These were Abu Bakar Ceting, Mat Zin, 
Penghulu Salleh, Mamat Tok Pitas, Encik (not Haji) Drahman, Haji Tahir and Bilal 
Sulaiman. Their villages had all been visited by Haji Musa. The identities of another 
three leaders, Lebai Hasan, Abdullah Jurukaka and Penghulu Salleh, were also 
transmitted through secret channels.574
Two senior courtly officials, Tengku Nara and Dato’ Lela, arrived in Kuala 
Berang to arrest these three on 25 April, having first organised contact with them by 
letter through an intermediary.57> Yet when the officials arrived, they were met not by 
the three men, but a crowd of 500 to 700 armed men. The three leaders, who had 
promised to travel back to Kuala Terengganu with Nara and Lela, had given them the 
slip instead/76 sending a message through one Mat bin Isa that they could be found at
Literalist and scripturalist Islamic movements such as the Wahhabis denounce the doctrine of God’s 
Twenty Divine Attributes as duping believers into thinking that God is limited. Certain schools of thought 
argue that there are only thirteen obligatory Divine Attributes, as seven others are characteristics derived 
from the first thirteen. The twenty attributes are not to be confused with the 99 names of God.
’72 Pejabat Ugama Kerajaan Trengganu, ‘Periksa akan Haji Musa bin Abdul Ghani’, 6 Zulkaedah 1346 
[26 April 1928], SUK T 1307/1346: ’Haji Musa Orang Minangkabau Mengajuk di Kampung-kampung 
Hulu Tersat Barang Sesiapa Membayar Pas Menebang Hutan dan Hasil-hasil Tanah Menjadi Kafir’.
573 Anthony Crowthers Milner, Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve o f Colonial Rule (Tucson, 
Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1982).
574 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 2 Zulkaedah 1346 [22 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
575 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 4 Zulkaedah 1346 [24 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
576 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 5 Zulkaedah 1346 [25 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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Haji Drahman’s housed77 Nara and Lela then took a perahu downriver to Beladau, one 
o f Haji Drahman’s residences. People there told them that the three were not there. They 
went on to the houses o f Sayid Sagaf and Haji Musa as well as the prayer hall where 
Haji Drahman was known to teach his disciples. The three Islamist leaders were not to 
be found.578
The connection between these events and Haji Drahman was not clear. In the 
background, Haji Drahman was arguing to the rakyat hulu that they should not take out 
the government’s passes. Nevertheless, at this time he preferred to make his arguments 
by letter rather than by appearing before the rakyat or the government in person, as he 
had done in his 1922 court speeches, and his 1923 campaign against vaccination. His 
letters were carried by mosque functionaries and read out before congregations, 
including in the mosque in Kampung Kuala Tajing. Discussions in villages were 
becoming more heated as a result. The Kuala Tajing villagepenghulu, Ismail bin Haji 
Yusuf, went to the Kuala Berang government complex to report a heated discussion in 
late April. Ismail had spoken up at the end of Friday prayers, saying to the congregation, 
‘We had all better get passes for planting [huma] because the deadline passed at the end 
o f last month.’
After he spoke, however, Hasan bin Sulaiman, the Tok Kerah or village corvee 
leader, countered his comments. He said to the congregation ‘Don’t take out passes or 
pay the government— their lockup isn’t big enough!’ The mosque bilal, Mamat bin 
Diman, supported Hasan, saying ‘There’s no point taking out passes, we just lose 
money for no reason. They can’t prosecute us, they are few and we are many.’ Penghulu 
Ismail had been forced to shut up. He found out later that a letter had come from Haji 
Drahman, carried to the village by the son of the bilal, Hasan of Kampung Pauh, and 
that it had been about the government passes. Penghulu Ismail also heard that Bilal 
Hasan had told others not to listen to the penghulu or they would become kafir. Bilal 
Hasan assured his audience that he had heard this from Haji Drahman. Penghulu Ismail
577 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 5 Zulkaedah 1346 [25 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
’7S Statement by Dato’ Lela and Tengku Naral 1 Zulkaedah 1346 [1 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346. 
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had even confronted Hasan, asking him if he wished to commit derhaka. Hasan had
C 7 Q
replied, ‘I do not follow the government’s laws’.
By this time, meetings were occurring every day in the village, presumably 
featuring discussions of this kind. They were also occurring elsewhere, and frequently 
took place as letters arrived in the village. Later, after their arrest for participating in the 
uprising, three men from Kuala Pueh described a letter from Mat Zin arriving in their 
village, where it was read out to the gathered villagers. One man, Mat Diah, described
COA
returning to his house to hear from his children that the letter had arrived. Another, 
Ismail bin Daud, said he was approached by people he did not recognise to attend the 
reading. According to the third man, Imam Abbas, three people arrived with the letter 
and read it out together, and it specifically summoned the Imam, Mat Diah, Abdullah 
bin Mat Ali, Yusuf bin Muhammad and Umat bin Bakar to Telemong. They were asked 
to bring one gantang of uncooked rice and a golok (sickle) each. ~ They were to attend 
the following Monday.583
Because of meetings like these, the pattern of non-cooperation in the hulu was 
developing into an organised Islamist campaign. It set itself against the colonial 
government’s environmental regime, and against the government itself. With the terms 
perang sabil and kafir emerging regularly in reports of rebel speech, and challenges 
being voiced against the government’s capacity to lock the rebels up, it was apparent 
that rebel leaders were preparing for a violent struggle against the kafir. Their targets 
were not only the kafir laws of the government, but also the Malay Muslim men from 
the Terengganu civil service who were implementing them. The structure of the 
movement’s organisation was still unclear, and Haji Musa’s involvement remains 
mysterious as he dropped out of government records. Nevertheless, reports of rebels
579 Statement by Penghulu Ismail, 11 Zulkaedah 1346 [1 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
580 Statement by Mat Diah, 12 Zulhijjah 1346 [1 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
581 Statement by Ismail bin Daud, 12 Zulhijjah 1346 [1 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
582 Statement by Imam Abbas bin Abdullah, 12 Zulhijjah 1346 [1 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
583 Statement by Mat Diah, 12 Zulhijjah 1346 [1 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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organising meetings were filtering in to Kuala Terengganu, and it seemed that Sayid 
Sagaf was also involved.
On 29 April, Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, a Forestry Department official, 
and his associate Sayid Ali bin Amir, brought a letter from Sayid Sagaf to the District 
Officer in Kuala Berang. The letter had been read to worshippers after Friday prayers 
the day before, calling on all Tersat villagers to travel to Kuala Terengganu for a 
discussion. ‘The head o f this group has spoken’, noted the District Officer, ‘and he has 
called for a meeting’.584 Another secret report came in on 3 May, brought in by Encik 
(not Penghulu) Salleh from Kampung Buloh, who had infiltrated the rebel group. He 
informed Tengku Nara that Penghulu Salleh, Haji Tahir, Abu Bakar Ceting, Mamat Tok 
Pitas, Encik Drahman bin Haji Daud, Abdullah Jurukaka and Ismail Kuala Pueh had 
travelled to Kuala Terengganu for a meeting with Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf. Later 
it transpired that the rebel leaders had apparently met with the scholars to discuss their 
complaints about prohibitions on forest cultivation. The scholars appear to have 
authorised the movement’s actions, saying to the rebel leaders, ‘Fell. Do not take out 
passes. We will help you. If you do not take out passes you are all our brothers in this 
world and the next. But do not lean on us [do not use our names as support for your 
cause]’.585
By May 1928, therefore, the construction o f the enemy as kafir was firming up, 
resistance to the passes had been authorised by leading Islamic scholars, and the 
movement was prepared to engage in violence against the government and its officials. 
The rebels, led by the group o f Islamists around Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf, were 
mobilising as many rakyat as they could convince to join them. Any government 
official in Kuala Berang and the hulu was a target, and these government men were 
beginning to grasp that not only did they make the rakyat visible to the state; they also 
made the state visible— and vulnerable—to the rakyat. On 19 May 1928, the 
government in Kuala Terengganu received an urgent request for police reinforcements 
at the Kuala Berang government complex, where the Land Office, District Office,
584 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 9 Zulkaedah 1346 [29 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
585 Statement by Encik Salleh bin Drahman, 13 Zulkaedah 1346 [3 May 1928], SUK T 2195/1346. 
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Forest Guard and Police Station were clustered together. There were reports of an armed 
assembly gathering at the house of Ismail Kuala Pueh, and rumours were circulating of 
an attack on the government buildings. The Holy War had broken out. On 20 May 1928, 
the Kuala Berang District Officer, and the entire Kuala Berang police force, composed 
of one sergeant and four constables, fled for Kuala Terengganu, ‘having evacuated [the] 
Station on account of [the] large armed crowd on [the] opposite bank having started to 
come across the river’. The government immediately despatched a relief force of police 
from Kuala Terengganu to ‘retake Kuala Brang’.586
The relief force consisted of Dato’ Lela, Dato’ Panglima Dalam, a police 
inspector and 27 police, who set out in three motor boats up the Terengganu River on 21 
May. They had passed Kuala Telemong and were near Pasir Pulau Babi in the afternoon 
when they encountered Penghulu Ali, who reported that he had seen 300 rebels 
occupying the Kuala Berang government offices. A further 40 rebels were stationed on 
the road from Kuala Berang to Bukit Payung, and 30 rebels with guns were gathered at 
Kampung Kuala Akab, a short distance downstream, waiting for government men to 
arrive from the coast. Penghulu Ali was sure that the rebels in the Kuala Berang 
government buildings were about to descend on Kuala Terengganu. He also reported 
that they had raised a red flag over the occupied buildings. ' Dato’ Lela’s 
reinforcements were unable to proceed any further, having found their motorboat caught 
in low water between Kuala Telemong and Kuala Berang. They spent the night in 
Kampung Sungai Ular instead.
The next morning, they sent a man upriver to scout on the rebels, who returned 
to report that the occupation force had grown to 700 armed men. The red flag was still 
flying.' The government force decided to retreat to Kuala Telemong—where 200 
armed hulu men were already present and ready to attack the police station there—as 
they had heard the Kuala Berang rebels were also heading there. Dato’ Lela, concerned
586 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 2, CO 717/61:52432.
>S7 Dato’ Lela and Dato’ Panglima Dalam to SUK T, 1 Zulhijjah 1346 [21 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346. 
5X8 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 2, CO 717/61:52432.
589 Dato’ Lela and Abdul Rahman to SUK T, 2 Zulhijjah 1346 [22 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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that the crowd would continue from Kuala Telemong to the Bukit Payung, Manir and 
Kuala Terengganu police stations, issued orders that all Terengganu stations be well- 
guarded.^0 By around eleven on 22 May 1928, the official party had heard that the 
Kuala Berang group was on its way, and they could even hear their voices, ‘noisy and 
boisterous, intense and proud’ (riuh rendah dengan kehebatan dan kemegahan).591 
When the crowd appeared in plain sight, suddenly it became clear that they were 
chanting (berzikir) the Muslim affirmation of faith—La ilaha il Allah.
The reports that were filtering in to Kuala Terengganu, when read against the 
grain, reveal that several aspects of the uprising were very loosely grasped by the 
colonial government. The government could perceive cooperation of some kind 
between the movement’s Islamist rubber smallholder leaders grouped around Mat Zin, 
and high-profile religious teachers like Haji Musa, Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf. Yet 
it was not clear exactly how these connections worked. The rebels’ organisational 
method was also reported in fragmented snippets, suggesting the possibility of a dual 
strategy. Under this strategy, Haji Drahman issued letters which were circulated and 
read before congregations in mosques and other gatherings, while Haji Musa travelled 
the rivers speaking in person. Government reports could also be read to suggest a rivalry 
between Haji Drahman and Haji Musa, who may have been competing against each 
other to claim leadership of the movement.
There were also many hints that all these Islamists coordinated their 
movements up and down the Terengganu system’s rivers. Further, as Dato’ Lela 
discovered on his journey to quash the uprising, the rebels were making symbolic use of 
a red flag, which none of the officials who reported it ever explained. Penghulu Ali 
witnessed and reported it, as did the man Dato’ Lela sent upstream from Kampung 
Sungai Ular, but neither of these witnesses shed light on its meaning, referring to it only 
as a bendera merah (red flag). Information about the red flag arrived very late. Indeed, 
the first time the government received this information about a rebel flag was on the day
590 Dato’ Lela to SUK T, 2 Zulhijjah 1346 [22 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
591 Dato’ Lela Diraja, Dato Seri Nara Wangsa, and Dato’ Panglima Dalam to SUK T, 3 Zulhijjah 1346 
[23 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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of the occupation in Kuala Berang, 21 May. All these fragments together did not 
produce a clear picture of the movement’s structure and politics, even after it had 
apparently been forced to retreat by the police firing on the crowd at Kuala Telemong.
It was some days later before more information about any of these issues 
reached the government, this time from the Dungun River valley. The Dungun River 
connected the southern Terengganu coast to the inner hulu area. When travelling upriver 
toward the headwaters of the Dungun’s northern tributaries, rakyat hulu could cross on 
foot to meet the headwaters of several southern tributaries of the Berang, which in turn 
joined the Terengganu. As Clifford has pointed out, even very shallow rivers unsuitable 
for boat travel were regularly used by east coast populations as wading tracks, or routes 
to walk beside until a launching point was reached. Perhaps by travelling in precisely 
this way, the Terengganu rebels had attempted to draw the Dungun rakyat into the 
uprising. In April Wan Mahmud, the District Officer in Kuala Berang, had heard from 
the bi/al in Kampung Lubuk Periok, on the Penih, a Terengganu tributary close to the 
Kelmin, that people from Kampung Mukmin had joined the rebellion. They had 
travelled to Kampung Pasir Nyior on the Tersat, also a Terengganu tributary, to hear the 
rebels’ plans and appoint a kepala in their own locality.' “ Rebels had also tried to 
recruit people in Marang, and certain Marang rakyat had also been observed travelling 
towards the Tersat.593
After the police shootings, Dungun became a focus for rebels seeking to revive 
the uprising, and on 29 May a report arrived in Kuala Terengganu which again 
mentioned the red flag, suggesting that it was connected in some way to the rebels’ new 
attempt to mobilise rakyat. In this new report, the Dungun District Officer wrote to the 
Terengganu Chief Minister, Dato’ Amar Diraja, that:
Encik Wan Ahmad from mukim Jengol, and Encik Yusof from mukim 
Kumpal, report that today three people from Berang arrived to gather people 
by corvee in hulu Dungun, and urge them to come to Berang on 15 Zulhijjah 
1346 [4 June 1928] to raise the flag and install the Raja [pasang hendera
592 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 5 Zulkaedah 1346 [25 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
593 SUK T to District Officer, Marang, 4 Zulkaedah 1346 [24 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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dan gelar Raja]. I ask for special orders here so Dungun people can fight the 
enemy. I ask for assistance from Terengganu to travel to Berangf44
This letter was the final report of rebel activity delivered to Kuala Terengganu as the 
uprising was actually taking place. Again, the significance o f the flag was not explained, 
although the report strongly suggested that raising the flag was a symbolic gesture 
associated with appointing a new ruler in Terengganu.
Flag, Wazir and Faqir
The uprising was not a straightforward forest conflict. Not only focused on the 
livelihoods of shifting cultivators or the unimpeded ability to raise forest rubber, the 
rebels were flying a flag whose symbolism was connected to their desire to install a new 
ruler. Such an installation would involve ridding Terengganu o f Sultan Sulaiman Badrul 
Alam Syah, who had come to power in 1920 after his brother Muhammad abdicated. 
This was not the first time, however, that the idea o f replacing Sultan Sulaiman had 
been raised in connection with the uprising. Indeed, the idea o f replacing him with 
former Sultan Muhammad had been raised in 1925, when Sulaiman and Muhammad’s 
sister, Tengku Nik Haji, had land she claimed cleared illegally by rakyat called together 
by Mat Zin bin Mat Min. The Police Commissioner, M.L. Wynne, had taken a 
statement at that time which stated explicitly that the rebels around Mat Zin wished to 
restore the former Sultan.
Three years later, in June 1928, it was apparent that the movement still held 
this aim, even after its defeat by police in Kuala Telemong. This was confirmed on 4 
June, in a report from thepenghulu in Kampung Padang Buloh, which made it clear that 
the rebels still intended to replace Sultan Sulaiman and his general advisers (wazir- 
wazir am) with Sultan Muhammad and advisers o f their choosing. The penghulu argued 
forcefully that ‘the seeds o f derhaka had been planted in fertile soil’ and the plants 
(itumhuh-tumhuhan) that resulted were the rakyat hulu and their emerging agreement
594 District Officer, Dungun, to Dato’ Arnar, 9 Zulhijjah 1346 [29 May 1346], SUK T 1295/1346. 
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that the Sultan should be replaced. In the penghuliTs opinion, such a matter, which 
originated from the seeds of derhaka, was contrary to the syariah.595
Now it was evident that the idea of raising the flag was linked to the rebels’ 
desire to replace Sultan Sulaiman with his abdicated brother, Sultan Muhammad. More 
details of this motivation were delivered to the government in June, in a report which 
recounted a conversation on 18 May 1928, three days before the Kuala Berang 
occupation, between Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, who worked in the Forestry 
Department, and Abu Bakar Ceting, one of the rebel leaders. Tuan Dalam and Wan 
Mahmud, the Kuala Berang District Officer, had been returning from Kampung Pasir 
Nyior in the Tersat valley. Wan Mahmud had been issuing passes there to some hiilu 
cultivators who had been cooperating with the forestry regulations—presumably risking 
their reputations as Muslim by doing so.
The two officials stopped off momentarily at Wan Mahmud’s house, where 
Sergeant Abdul Rahman arrived suddenly with the news that Tersat people were 
planning to assemble for action. Tuan Dalam was ordered to travel to the scene, and 
arrived at Kampung Kuala Menjing at 5:30 that evening, where he saw thirty people 
assembled, including Abu Bakar Ceting and Haji Husin, also from Kampung Ceting. 
Haji Husin informed Mamat, Tuan Dalam’s assistant, that they planned to gather 
outside the house of Ismail Kuala Pueh in Kampung Pasir Nering. Tuan Dalam and 
Mamat returned to Kuala Berang to report this. Tuan Dalam had prepared to return to 
Tersat the next day, to investigate further in Kampung Pasir Nering, but Wan Mahmud 
had advised him against it, stating, "No need to go lah. Just people messing with us.’596
The following day, on 20 May, Tuan Dalam saw Abu Bakar Ceting again in 
Kuala Berang, where he had ostensibly arrived to discuss his land matters and write a
595 Penghulu, Padang Buloh, SUK T, 15 Zulhijjah 1346 [4 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
y,<’ The Malay term which I have translated as ‘messing with us’ is ‘main hantu’, and the report of the 
same conversation later uses the term ‘kusik hantu'. It is also possible to translate this sentence as ‘Just 
people invoking spirits’. Bermain hantu, or berhantu, is an alternative term for bermain peteri, the 
practice of spirit invocation condemned by Tokku Paloh in his manuscript, Maarij ul-Lahfan. Refer to 
Mervyn Llewelyn Wynne, Triad and Tabut: A Survey o f the Origin and Diffusion of Chinese and 
Mohamedan Secret Societies in the Malay Peninsula A.D. 1800-1935 (Singapore: WT Cherry, 
Government Printing Office, 1941), 320-21.
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letter to the Sultan. Oddly, however, Abu Bakar had come in the evening, not during the 
day. Wan Mahmud explained later that he himself had called him in, as rakyat in 
Kampung Pasir Nyior had cleared land without paying for passes. Wan Mahmud was 
going to ask the Commissioner for Lands, H.P. Bryson, to allow the rakyat to postpone 
their payments.597 Regardless, Tuan Dalam began to question Abu Bakar directly about 
his motives. He asked ‘Why are you organising [the rakyat]? The Raja has pardoned 
you, and it’s not as though Wan Mahmud or the white people themselves asked you to 
fell all those trees. You haven’t paid, and I’m afraid you’ll be prevented from felling. 
And you’ve been let off paying for the rattan, screwpine [mengkuang] and woven leaves 
[kajang]. Why do you want to cause further trouble?’ Abu Bakar answered, ‘I’m not 
finished with this matter yet. I’ve just come to wait for Wan Mahmud. Tuan Dalam 
asked, ‘Why wait for him?’ Abu Bakar replied, ‘I’m waiting for Encik Weh [Ismail] 
from Kuala Pueh and his friends to arrive, so we can meet with Wan Mahmud and 
Sergeant Abdul Rahman.’ ‘Why?’ ‘We just want to wait for him, no reason. We just 
want to invite him to meet with us.’ ‘For what?’ ‘Just because. Anyway, it was 1 who 
warned the Tuan Hakim [Magistrate, also Wan Mahmud]: Watch out Tuan, people are 
planning to kidnap you.’ Abu Bakar elaborated, ‘The Hakim will say, what do you want 
to kidnap me for, when I can help you?’
Tuan Dalam asked again, ‘What’s your purpose in organising like this? If you 
just tell me what you’re up to, maybe I can come with you.’ Abu Bakar replied, ‘Those 
who want to kidnap Wan Mahmud want to sit him down with them because on the 
twelfth Sayid Sagaf and Encik Lah bin Haji Abdul Rahman [Drahman] are coming to 
take them downriver.’ Tuan Dalam asked, ‘Who’s the kepala o f this group?’ Abu Bakar 
replied, T am, with Tahir from Kampung Pandan in Tersat, we’re the amanat 
[representatives] o f Haji Abdul Rahman Limbong [Haji Drahman], and Mr Weh and 
Lebai Hasan from Kuala Menjing are the amanat o f Sayid Sagaf. I have travelled 
downriver four times to see Sayid Sagaf.’ The conversation veered off, then returned— 
Tuan Dalam asked Abu Bakar, ‘Where do you plan to take Wan Mahmud?’ He 
answered, ‘We just want to replace him with someone else.’
507 Statement by Wan Mahmud bin Wan Mohamed, 26 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 56, 
C0717/6L52432.
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Tuan Dalam asked, ‘Who do you want to replace him with?’ Abu Bakar 
replied, ‘We want to come downriver en masse, abduct Dato’ Amar [the Chief Minister] 
and Tengku Setia [the State Secretary], kick them aside [sepak ke tepi], and take Sultan 
Sulaiman and put him in Kuala Berang. Tuan Haji Drahman wants to put in Sultan 
Muhammad (the former Sultan) as Raja in Kuala Terengganu.’ Tuan Dalam replied, 
‘You can’t! You’ll be met by lines and lines of people [troops], shot and who knows 
what.’ Abu Bakar answered, ‘Even if they want to shoot us they can’t.’ Abu Bakar 
elaborated—thanks to Sayid Sagaf s power (daulat) bullets travelling downwards would 
fall down and bullets travelling upwards would pass above them. He concluded, ‘after 
all this, we’ll have it made [gak senanglah kita\, and we can do as before without 
paying anything. Like the adat of before. ’599
In this conversation, a self-declared kepala of the movement was openly 
discussing his plans to remove the Sultan and his two most senior advisers. The 
movement’s politics of takfir were not directed only at small players like individual 
forest guards. It was already clear that senior officials in Kuala Berang were also 
targets. In addition, it was apparent from Abu Bakar’s words that the takflri imagination 
in the Terengganu River system was wide enough in scope to target the Sultan and his 
wazir-wazir am themselves. The Islamists were so confident of their own strength, 
bolstered by the invulnerability bestowed upon them, that they aimed to demote the 
Sultan to some kind of district head. Some of Abu Bakar’s words also revealed 
something of a contradictory vision for what would happen after Sultan Sulaiman’s 
removal. On the one hand, Abu Bakar expressed a desire to return to the adat of before, 
under which shifting cultivators in the hulu were not required to pay for passes to clear 
swiddens or access forest products. On the other hand, to achieve this 'adat of before’, 
he was part of a movement which aimed to remake Terengganu’s system of rule anew. 
In the movement’s vision, restoring a particular set of ‘old’ practices was linked to
Wan Mahmud had also heard Abu Bakar claim that Sayid Sagaf had taught him to cause bullets to 
pass above or beneath him. Statement by Wan Mahmud bin Wan Mohamed, 26 June 1928, Thomson 
Report, p. 56, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
599 Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 18 Zulhijjah 1346 [7 June 1928], SUK T 1432/1326: 
‘Berkenaan dengan hal derhaka—kenyataan Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad’.
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establishing a new authority in the Terengganu River system. Two numinous leaders 
located outside the hybrid colonial kerajaan structures, Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf, 
would be able to choose the Sultan, his advisers, and the official in Kuala Berang.
The basis on which Abu Bakar could put forward a political vision like this 
continued to emerge in June 1928, when a commission o f inquiry into the uprising 
began, led by H.W. Thomson, the British Resident in Perak. Thomson conducted a 
number o f interviews with Terengganu officials and rebels, a couple o f whom shed 
some light on how the new political system was being conceived. The rebels’ planned 
ouster of Sultan Sulaiman and the Islamist claim to power in Kuala Terengganu were 
not the only aspects o f the movement which in reality, expressed a great departure from 
the adat o f before. One such departure was the basis on which the movement 
generalised its attack on Malay officials working with the British. The rebels were not 
satisfied with targeting front-line colonial staff like Forest Guards and Police Officers, 
but were also making targets o f Wan Mahmud, the Kuala Berang District Officer and 
Magistrate. From Kuala Berang officials like Wan Mahmud, the rebels were willing to 
generalise their attack even to the Sultan, albeit more carefully.
Thomson conducted one key interview with Muhammad bin Yusuf, or Dato’ 
Amar Diraja, the Terengganu Chief Minister, who revealed his view o f the movement’s 
aim in styling itself as a perang sabil:
The real meaning o f “sabil” is to fight for one’s own religion against another 
religion. I think the leaders o f this recent row used it, meaning that His 
Highness was following the advice o f European officials and abandoning 
his own religion, and that therefore they should attack him.600
The rebels were measuring Sultan Sulaiman’s actions not against the claims to power, 
authority and loyalty usually made by Malay sultanates, but by an external yardstick, 
namely their understanding o f the syariah. It was the same yardstick established in 
Terengganu with Tokku Paloh’s Itqanul Mnluk. In the climate o f political ferment 
evident in Terengganu in the 1920s, in which Malays working with the British were
600 Statements by Muhammad bin Yusuf and Dato’ Amar Diraja, Thomson Report, pp. 35-36, and pp. 35- 
36, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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denounced as kafir, even the Sultan could be accused of standing outside the Muslim 
community, and could become a target of Holy Warriors.
Another key interview which revealed this generalisation from government 
officer to Sultan, was that with Omar bin Mahmud, or Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, a State 
Commissioner and member of Terengganu’s Executive Council. Dato’ Jaya Perkasa 
recounted a story about a former corporal from Dungun, Abdul Rahman bin Abdul 
Ghani. The corporal had gone to Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf after his dismissal for 
bribe-taking. Haji Drahman had told him, in Dato’ Jaya Perkasa’s words, ‘not to worry 
about rejoining Government sendee; that his body was now lucky and valuable, just like 
a man who has got out of hell. Government servants are “orang Neraka” [people from 
hell]’. This was not all that that Haji Drahman told him. Reportedly,
Haji Drahman said that Sultan Mohamed would eventually be Sultan of 
Trengganu, and that the control was now threefold—Raja, Syed [sayid] and 
Fakir. Syed [Sayid] Sagaf would be Wazir, and he (Haji Drahman) would be 
Fakir. When the time came, he would attack everybody, and the country 
would never be ruled by kafirs. They left all Muhammadan religion aside. 601
In this explanation, Abu Bakar Ceting’s statement which put Haji Drahman and Sayid 
Sagaf in control of Terengganu’s political system was elaborated, to show that Sultan 
Muhammad would not be the sole ruler, not at all like the adat of before the colonial 
period. The new raja would rule in a tripartite system, accompanied by a wazir and faqir 
who would choose all his officials. Under the slogan the rebels were using in Dungun— 
raise the flag and install the Raja—was subsumed a vision of this new system, and at its 
creation, the red flag the rebels were flying would be raised.
But where did this idea of tripartite rule come from? Every Sultan in 
Terengganu since Sultan Zainal Abidin I had appointed a Shaykhul Islam as close 
personal confidant and chief religious adviser in matters of state as well as religion. 
Baginda Omar and subsequent rulers provided royal patronage to a very large number 
of religious scholars who conferred their Islamic authority on the Sultanate, and who 
gained significant political power in return, which was ultimately realised in Tokku
601 Statement by Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, Thomson Report, 28 June 1928, pp. 103-104, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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Paloh’s exceptional position in Sultan Zainal Abidin Ill’s court. During the crisis o f 
royal legitimacy caused by the treaties between Siam and Britain, and then Terengganu 
and Britain, Tokku Paloh had attempted to use the Terengganu Constitution to place the 
power to appoint or recall Terengganu’s rulers under the courtly ulama.
But even the Constitution did not elaborate a vision of Islamic scholars ruling 
together with the Sultan. There was no theory o f government in the Terengganu 
Constitution, and further, no Malay sultanate had ever been organised in such terms. 
Nor is there any evidence o f any Islamic theory o f government anywhere in the world 
which advocates tripartite rule by Raja, wazir and faqir. The proposal was entirely new, 
created in the conflict over Terengganu’s forests, and by Islamists leading the 
movement who were also positioning themselves as arbiters of who was sufficiently 
guided by Islam to possess a right to rule Terengganu. Yet the proposal was based on a 
political precedent created by Tokku Paloh. Subsequently his legatees, the forest 
Islamists, were not willing to tolerate a Sultan who sided with the kafir in their kerajaan 
Islamiyah Melayuwiyah. The Sultan could not possibly hold sufficient authority to rule, 
and would be disqualified from holding the title he bore.
Despite the novelty o f this vision o f government, however, the sources from 
which it was drawn together were o f a sufficiently Islamic provenance to be used in this 
way. The terms wazir and faqir were themselves drawn directly from the Q ur’an, and 
from a long and rich tradition o f Islamic exegesis, jurisprudence and mysticism. In the 
sura (chapter) al-Furqan (Redemption)602, it is stated that Harun (Aaron), the brother of 
Musa (Moses), acted as his wazir or helper60’ in confronting the might o f the Firaun 
(Pharoah) in defence o f Egypt’s enslaved Jews. 604 The idea of the wazir, often translated 
into English as vizier, later developed in Islamic political theory into an official post
602 R Paret, "Furkan," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Second Edition, ed. P Bearman, et al. (Brill Online, 
2009).
603 The Koran, trans. N.J. Dawood, Fifth ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), 25-35, Muhammad Qasim Zaman 
et al., "Wazir," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, et al. (Brill Online, 2009).
6114 B. Hellerand D.B. MacDonald, "Musa," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, 
et al. (Brill Online, 2009).
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signifying ‘representative’ or ‘deputy’ to the khalifa (Caliph)605—the political, and 
notionally, spiritual ruler of the earthly Islamic community. As a ‘royal counsellor’, the 
institution of the wazir was also theoretically developed by jurists of the Shafi’i and 
Hanbali mazhah (schools) of Islamic jurisprudence, who described the wazir as ‘the 
holder of extensive civil and military power delegated.. .to him by the caliph’.606 
Gradually the institution came to imply a set of interpretive and problem-solving skills 
based on ‘referring to the authoritative sources in Arabic and Persian’.607
Fakir, by contrast, does not signify political office, but refers in the Qur’an to 
those who are ‘poor or destitute’.608 Most important to the fakir concept is the rejection 
of property and ‘resignation to the will of God’.600 This attitude, however, should not be 
the basis for a world-rejecting asceticism but participation in human society, through 
which gnosis is better pursued.610 Haji Drahman not being a man who had rejected 
social participation (or property ownership—another matter), the fakir idea may have 
poetically described his vision of his own role in Terengganu’s future. For Sayid Sagaf, 
a claimed descendant of the Prophet himself, entertaining the office of wazir, with its 
more glorious provenance, may have been more apt. Nevertheless, there is no available 
Islamic theory of politics in which a religious mendicant permanently participates in 
government alongside a Sultan and his vizier.
A new political system had been imagined for Terengganu in an unprecedented 
leap of creativity, not to mention an unprecedented power-sharing gesture by all 
interested parties imaginatively building and authorising the movement. But why use a 
red flag to symbolise the struggle for this new system? Why articulate a connection 
between raising the flag and installing the raja? The June 1928 Thomson interviews 
were most unrevealing on this question. For example, Dato’ Panglima Dalam gave a
605 Zaman et al., "Wazir,"
606 Ibid.
607 Ibid.
608 K.A Nizami, "Fakir," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P Bearman, et al. (Brill Online, 
2009) .
609 Ibid.
610 Ibid.
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second-hand account o f Penghulu Ali’s observation that the rebels had raised a red flag 
over the government buildings in Kuala Berang. His only interpretation of the flag was 
‘[t]he Malay meaning o f a red flag is a fight’ . 611 The Chief Minister, Dato’ Amar 
Diraja, could only say that in Terengganu, the red flag meant war. “ Dato’ Panglima 
Dalam did, however, add, in a more fear-inducing snippet, that when the crowd reached 
Kuala Telemong, Mahmud, Mat Zin’s assistant was waving the red flag, and called out 
to the others in the crowd, ‘That is Sergeant Draman of Kuala Brang. Quick: let us kill 
him . ’ 613 This was confirmed by Dato’ Lela, who added that Mahmud had been decked 
out in a white turban and robe, 614 and a Police Inspector, Tungku Abdullah, who added 
that Mahmud had called Sergeant Drahman a ‘heretic’ (probably kafir) . 615
Regardless o f how many people recalled the flag, explanations for its 
appearance were scanty. In total, all these government men could tell Thomson was that 
the flag was connected to an effort to violently kill kafir in a Holy War, by a man 
dressed in Islamic regalia. Arrested rebels were even more guarded when discussing the 
flag. Ismail Kuala Pueh made sure to deny responsibility: T did not raise a red flag at 
[he gam bang [government houseboat] at Kuala Brang. ’616 Another rebel, Imam Taib bin 
Ahmad, admitted he had met Ismail Kuala Pueh, and asked him why he wanted him to 
appear in Kuala Berang. Ismail Kuala Pueh had replied, ‘Ah, you are very dull’. Dull as 
he was, Imam Taib had still appeared keen to avoid being overheard when he mentioned 
that a red flag was flying over [he gam bang. But he still maintained, T don’t know who 
ran up the flag. ’ 617
The interviews, however, did not constitute the only evidence brought before 
the Thomson Inquiry. Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, who had told the story that revealed the
611 Statement by Dato’ Panglima Dalam, 25 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 39, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
612 Statement by Dato’ Amar, 24 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 37, CO 717/61:52432.
612 Statement by Dato’ Panglima Dalam, 25 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 39, C0717/6T52432.
614 Statement by Dato’ Lela Diraja, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 70, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
615 Statement by Tungku Abdullah bin Tungku Abdul Rahman, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 77, 
C 0 7 17/61:52432.
(,l<’ H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 88, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
617 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 98, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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theory of Sultan, wazir and faqir, had also brought with him a number of ‘exhibits’, 
probably in the style of his experience as a Special Court Judge in Kemaman, another of 
his official positions. One of the exhibits Dato’ Jaya Perkasa tabled in his meeting with 
Thomson was ‘Exhibit R’, a letter, and its interesting genealogy. The Dato’ had 
acquired the letter from Che Wan Ahmat, penghulu of the Jengai mukim in Dungun. 
Che Wan Ahmat had probably received the letter indirectly, as it was ‘traced back’ by 
the Dato’ to one Mat Adam from Kampung Buruh Hangus, in the Kelmin river valley. 
Mat Adam, ‘the local head of the rebel party in the Ulu Dungun’, claimed to have 
received it from Abdullah bin Suleiman, who told him he got it directly from Sayid 
Sagaf when he met him at Haji Drahman’s balai (meeting hall) in Kuala Terengganu on 
21 April. He, presumably with other rakyat from Hulu Dungun, had travelled there to 
‘discuss their grievances’.618
The letter revealed the ambitions of Sayid Sagaf and Haji Drahman, and, in 
doing so, also rather incriminated them. The letter was translated for Thomson, other 
British officials in Malaya, and ultimately, the Colonial Office in London. Yet Dato’ 
Jaya Perkasa, in his spoken description of the letter, appears to have been referring to 
the original Malay. The Dato’ described the letter in the following terms:
This exhibit has at the head in red ink “Syed Sagaf ibni Syed Abdul Rahman 
is Khalifah”. “Haji Draman Limbong from this world till the next”. It comes 
from “Kita Syed dan Tuan” [us, Sayid and Tuan] to all Muhammadans who 
are in the “Sharikat”—asks them all to come to Kuala quickly on 2.12.46 
[22 May 1928]. Syeds and Hajis to collect at Pulau Manis, Trengganu. We 
hope all Muhammadans will attend. Two paragraphs follow (1) “We hope to 
raise the “Bendera Stambul,” (2) If there is a devil in the high-road, do not 
follow it. It is that spoils our religion.” [sic]. The letter is dated 3.12.46 [23 
May 1928]. It seems to urge them to tight anyone who tried to resist 
them.619
The red flag had again appeared. In direct translation from Malay to English, the letter 
was changed slightly, and the translator also pointed out that it must have been dated 
wrongly by mistake.
<lis Statement by Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 101, C0717/6L52432. 
619 Statement by Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, 28 June 1829, Thomson Report, p. 101, C0717/6L52432.
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Yet the red flag was here, and the translation revealed: ‘[t]he plan is to raise the 
standards o f war (lit: the flag o f Stamboul)’. The translation had elided the meaning 
revealed by Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, but the translator’s note in parentheses again revealed 
it. ‘Stamboul’ was possibly included as a curiosity, or possibly because the translator 
was aware that he or she was repeating an understanding only established by the 
inquiry’s own logic, which held that the flag meant ‘war’. In any case, the letter urged 
Muslims to attend because the flag was going to be raised, and a new Sultan installed, 
on 27 May in Kuala Berang. The assembly, and the flag-raising, eventually took place 
on 23 May, leaving open the possibilities that the rebels planned to have toppled the 
government in four days, that events moved faster than planned, or that the dates had 
been translated in error.
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Exhibit "R".
Hajl Abdulrahman 
Limbong.
This w r it in g  i s  tr u e .
Syed S a g a ff  bin Syed Abdulrahraan 
who 5.3 th e  Khali* (Hod13 Regent) In Trengganu.
In t h i s  ,To r ld  and in  E te r n i ty .
On th e  3rd day o f  2nd moon th e  
year 1346. $
Prom U 3  Syed and f a s t e r -
Bq i t  known unto a l l  o f  you who are ray b ro th ers  
( l i t :  r e l a t i v e s )  in  Islam  and have en tered  th e  S o c ie ty ,  th a t  
you are i n v i t e d  to Kuala 3rang w ith  a l l  speed on th e  7th 
(? 6 th )  day o f  S u lh ij jk h  ( z  27 or 2 6 -5 -1 9 2 8 )  to  the  p laoe  
o f  ®syx*lt«x£5x«dx Assembly and m eeting  at Kuala Brang,
th e  3yed and th e  Hajl 
We hope th a t  a l l
w ithout f a i l ,  and to th e  p la c e  o f  
at Manir I s la n d  in  th e  Trengganu riv™  .
our brothren in  Islam  w i l l  assem ble t h e r e ,  and we send our
- : > •  ■
g r e e t in g s .
1, The plan i s  to  r a i s e  th e  stand ard s  o f  war ( l i t :  th e
C l a 8 oC 3tarab0Ul)' t h 9 r ö C o r 8 00,08 w l th o , , t  e ? u *
are encountered  on th e  way t o  not fo l lo w
ho d estroy  our r e g i o n  or
s t e d ,  r e s i s t  in  your turn to the  utmost,
___________
Figure 8: A letter from Sayid Sagaf and Haji Drahman referring to the red flag, or Bendera 
Stambul.620
620 Exhibit R, Thomson Report, p. 139, C 0 7 17/61:52432. Courtesy of the Arkib Negara Malaysia.
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Imagining Stambul
The Bendera Stambul was the Ottoman flag, and ‘Stambul’ was a Malay domestication 
of the name of the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. But what did the Stambul flag have to do 
with an occupation of the government offices and houseboat in Kuala Berang, a tiny 
administrative centre in faraway Terengganu? Why would Islamic scholars with no 
courtly support, with forest rubber smallholders and shifting cultivators, seek to declare 
a new Terengganu Sultan, and why under this emblem? The answer is that Stambul lay 
in the imagination of the rebels, who had located both their politics of takfir and ouster, 
and their customary forest tenures, in a larger imaginative map of a global, sovereign, 
Muslim space. On the map of the earth, Stambul is Istanbul, which lies in Turkey. Until 
the end of the First World War it had been the capital of the Ottoman Empire, whose 
war defeat by Allied forces caused its dismemberment into a variety of new nation­
states, one of which was the Republic of Turkey, founded in 1922. Under the new 
Turkish government, led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), only Turkish integration into a 
nation-state was deemed suitable for modernising society and participating in the world 
system on an equal footing with Western states.621
For Ataturk, this logic called for the abolition of two institutions key to the 
Ottoman Empire’s image among Muslims around the world—the Ottoman Sultanate, 
and the Caliphate, embodied in the Turkish Sultan. The idea of the Turkish Sultan as the 
global ‘sovereign of Islam’ had gained currency internationally since the treaty ending 
the Russo-Turkish war in 1774, which referred to the Ottoman sultan as ‘the sovereign 
caliph of the Mohammedan religion’. The treaty was also explicit that Islam was a 
political community in an earthly, geopolitical form, by referring to an ‘Islamic 
nation’. “ This idea of a global Islamic community with a territorial political centre had 
also been backed by Muslim intellectuals close to the Ottomans, in the face of Western 
imperial control of much of the Muslim world. Yet in 1923, Ataturk abolished the 
Sultanate and declared Turkey a republic. He also abolished the office of Shaykhul 
Islam.
(’21 Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear, 57-63.
62~ Reinhard Schulze, A Modern History o f the Islamic World (I.B. Tauris, 2002), 16.
198
Chapter Four—Sovereignty and the Caliphate: Terengganu ’s Turkish Lodestar
In 1924, he abolished the Caliphate altogether, and with it, the possibility for 
Muslims around the world to organise anti-colonial resistance in terms of political 
communities other than the nation-state. The idea of a non-national community of Islam 
was effectively ended, despite a vigorous movement by Muslims, in India in particular, 
to restore it. Partly out of the failure of this movement, the demand for a Pakistan, a 
nation-state of Islam, was bom.623 Cut free from its earthly moorings, Islam as an anti­
colonial polities could no longer look to Istanbul and the Caliph to symbolise its 
territorial unity as a political community,624 and new forms of imagined communities 
were required.
Figure 9: The Ottoman Flag in use in the 1920s, adopted in 1844.62?
In colonial Terengganu too, Stambul represented a longing for a centre of 
sovereign Islam, even as it could no longer function as one on earth. The Terengganu
623 Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850 
(London, New York: Routledge, 2000), Chp. 5.
624 Schulze, A Modern History of the Islamic World, 16.
625 Wikimedia Commons: http://en.wikipedia.0rg/wiki/File:Ottoman_Flag.svg.
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rebels made no reference at any time to the nationalist demands beginning to occur in 
Malaya and across the Muslim world. Nor did they raise their claims in terms of Malay 
adat, even though adat notions of land management in the Malay states were already 
significantly Islamised. Rather, they located their earthly, territorial claim to 
Terengganu’s forests within a different sort of longing—for a now deterritorialised 
sacred geography of sovereign Islam. For the Terengganu rebels, Stambul had become a 
lodestar, calling from a distance, no longer the political seat of the Muslim umat. By 
refusing to take out permits and harassing government men, the rebels had staked their 
competing territorial claim on the hulu’s forest that was now bounded, off-limits and 
alienated to kafir.
The shifting cultivators’ claim, and their resistance to the bounding of their 
space, had for years been translated—back to them and also to the government—into a 
revivalist Islamic idiom by Hajis and Islamic scholars. This is how the diverse claims 
and concerns of Terengganu’s cultivators came to be expressed in terms of Islamic 
textual sanction, and how Terengganu’s forests—dense, green and alive—came to be 
understood as mawat, dead land. Haji Drahman and his disciples translated shifting 
cultivation without paying for passes into the sanctioned practice of the Muslim umat. 
In this translation, rebels located their claim, and themselves and their forests, within a 
much larger imagined political landscape. Terengganu’s forests were mapped by the 
rebels in a radically different way to that of the colonial government, within an 
imagined space of Islam, in which the movement self-consciously positioned itself 
against the incursions of globally counterposed, and unwelcome, kafir colonisers.
The colonial government and its staff could not explain the importance of the 
Stambul flag. The use of Ottoman symbolism in Terengganu, however, did not 
represent a sudden or inexplicable development. The Stambul flag in Terengganu may 
have demonstrated the forest Islamists’ audacious political leap. Yet this was far from 
the first time that such symbolism, and the relationship between territory and identity 
that it represented, had been used in Malaya. Rather, Stambul had already undergone a 
long career as an anti-colonial symbol both in Malaya and elsewhere in Muslim 
Southeast Asia. Ottoman power had been invoked countless times during the Malay
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world’s encounter with western colonial powers. Indeed Stambul’s mystique in Muslim 
Southeast Asia emerged as European power was increasing across the Indian Ocean, 
and Ottoman power significantly fading. There was therefore no need in the hulu for 
Stambul to represent a geopolitical reality of sovereign Muslim space. The symbolic 
construction of Stambul as a lodestar of Muslim sovereignty in Southeast Asia was 
therefore already severed from its earthly referent before the final abolition of the 
Caliphate, and overdetermined in Terengganu in 1928. In Terengganu, as elsewhere in 
Muslim Southeast Asia, appeals to Stambul indicated a longing for an imagined 
community other than that being constructed around them by colonial powers.
The Umat United
The influences which created this longing in Terengganu had roots which stretched back 
to the Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean, the first known time when Southeast 
Asian Muslim unity under the Ottoman Caliphate had been attempted against an outside 
power. The Ottoman Empire had risen to dominance over Turkey and Arabia, Northern 
Africa and Eastern Europe after it annexed Constantinople in 1453, and Turkish traders 
and Ottoman navies established a presence for themselves in the Indian Ocean from the 
1500s. ~ Also during this period of expansion, successive Ottoman Sultans worked to 
develop their claim to the title of Caliph (khalifa), whose institution, the Caliphate 
(khilafa) had existed in Islamic political theory since the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad in 632 and the succession of power to his Companion, Abu Bakr.628
The title of Caliph came to signify the political leader of the Muslim umat, and 
was later claimed by the Abbasid dynasty in Iraq and Egypt (750-1517), the Umayyad 
dynasty in Spain (928-1 132) and the Fatimid dynasty in northeastern Africa (909-
626 In his work, Salman Sayyid argues that this is how the Islamist politics of the Caliphate continue to 
work today—as a longing by a deterritorialised community of believers for a geopolitical representation 
for Islam on earth. See Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear .
627 Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age o f Exploration: (Oxford University Press, 2010).
(,2X P.M. Holt, "Khalifa," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, ed. E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, and C.H. Pellat (Leiden: 
Brill, 1978).
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1171 ).62 > During his reign from 1512 to 1520, Ottoman Sultan Selim I used the title, 
along with Khadim al Haramayn (‘servant of the Holy Places’, Mecca and Medina, also 
then under Ottoman control). Selim also pacified Haj routes to these holy places, a boon 
to Muslims worldwide. 630 It was under the Ottomans that Mecca was able to expand its 
prominence as a key centre for Islamic scholarship as well as pilgrimage.
During the same period, Portugal began to assert itself in the Indian Ocean, 
whose trading routes it entered in 1498.631 Southeast Asian Muslim interest in the 
Ottoman Empire increased greatly after Melaka’s fall in 1511. In 1519, Antonio 
Pigafetta, a Portuguese navigator, noted rumours that an Ottoman armada would soon 
arrive to free Melaka from Portugal. On hearing the news, Portuguese authorities sent 
ships to the Red Sea to meet the Ottoman threat.632 This reaction was not misplaced, as 
Ottoman expansion from 1516 ‘introduced to the Indian Ocean a first-class military 
power with an interest in defending the Muslim spice-trading routes’. This expansion 
continued into the 1530s.63’ In 1537-1538, Turkey attacked Portuguese ships in the 
Indian Ocean, and in 1539, it sent hundreds o f troops to Aceh, with which it had 
developed a stable pepper-trading relationship which it intended to protect.634
More than any other Southeast Asian polity, Aceh maintained a strong 
connection with Turkey during this period, claiming to be a tributary o f the Ottoman 
Empire, sending repeated delegations to Stambul, and receiving repeated shipments of 
troops, artillerymen, gunsmiths and engineers.633 Turkish troops and guns were used in
629 Ibid.
630 Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Ulama: Timur Tengah Dan Kepulauan Nusantara AbadXvii Dan Xviii. 
Melacak Akar-Akar Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam Di Indonesia, 49.
63 Anthony Reid, "The Ottomans in Southeast Asia," (ARI Working Paper: Asia Research Institute, 
National University of Singapore, 2005), 3.
632 Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Ulama: Timur Tengah Dan Kepulauan Nusantara AbadXvii Dan Xviii. 
Melacak Akar-Akar Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam Di Indonesia, 51.
633 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age o f Commerce, 1450-1680, 2 vols., vol. 2: Expansion and 
Crisis (Yale University, 1993), 146.
635 Casale, a scholar of Ottoman history, has offered an alternative interpretation of Aceh’s actions, 
characterising Aceh as ready to assert itself as an imperial power in Southeast Asia in its own right. This 
view extends some of Reid’s comments on Aceh’s military success in Sumatra during this period. See 
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repeated attacks by Aceh on Portuguese Melaka between the 1540s and 1570s, 
constituting what Reid has called a ‘pan-Islamic counter-crusade against the Portuguese 
in Southeast Asia’. 636 This counter-crusade took place under the leadership of the 
Ottoman ‘Khalifa of Islam’, as Aceh was addressing the Ottoman ruler. The Ottoman 
Sultan Selim II (r. 1566-1574) even ordered that an armada be sent to Aceh to assist 
with what must have been a planned major offensive to re-take the Indian Ocean, for 
which he even ordered that a canal be dug between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea 
at Suez. A revolt in Yemen caused the ships to be diverted, however, and they never 
arrived. Nevertheless, during the reign in Aceh of Sultan Ala al-Din Riayat Syah (r. 
1588-1604), Stambul allowed Acehnese ships to fly the Ottoman flag.639 This period in 
the 1500s marked the first iteration in Muslim Southeast Asia o f ‘the ideal of the unity 
of the ummat under a sole Caliphate’.640 This ideal, and the discourse of Holy War 
which accompanied it, however, lasted only for a brief moment, coming during the 
decline of Ottoman naval power. By 1589, Stambul had no presence in the Indian Ocean 
at all.641
Alexander’s Travels
Aceh’s attempts to act in the umafs name under the Stambul Caliphate paralleled 
Stambul’s actual decline as a power in the Indian Ocean arena. Even in its first known 
self-conscious deployment in Southeast Asia, the Caliphate did not geopolitically 
represent Southeast Asian Islam; its power instead located in Southeast Asian Muslim 
desire. Indeed, Stambul was most important to Southeast Asian polities precisely when 
it could do least to assist them in resisting European colonial incursions. Melaka, for
Casale, The Ottoman Age o f Exploration, Chp. 7 and Anthony Reid, An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese 
and Other Histories of Sumatra (Singapore University Press, 2005), 84-87.
636 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, 147.
637 Reid, An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of Sumatra, 79.
638 Ibid., 79-80.
639 Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Ulama: Timur Tengah Dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad Xvii DanXviii. 
Melacak Akar-Akar Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam Di Indonesia, 51-53.
640 Reid, An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories o f Sumatra, 86-87.
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example, had already fallen to Portugal, and the moment of resistance having passed, 
there was nothing its royal house could do from its position of retreat in Johor other than 
recount its lost glory. In 1612, Bendahara Tun Seri Lanang completed the Sejarah 
Melayu, a courtly narrative of Melaka’s history. Effectively also an origin narrative for 
Malay identity, the Sejarah Melayu located Melaka on a map of global Islam, and 
reinforced Stambul’s mythic status.
The Sejarah Melayu, like Aceh’s appeals to the Ottomans, represented a 
longstanding practice by Southeast Asian Muslims of spiritually and politically locating 
their societies in an imagined map of global Islam. This practice had existed since the 
early acceptance of Islam by important trading polities on the Malay Peninsula and the 
Indonesian archipelago. This practice of ‘self-Islamisation’, through mapping Southeast 
Asian lands on imagined geographies of Islam, would therefore parallel Wolters’ 
description of ‘self-Hinduisation’, in which local ‘mountains, rivers, sacred bathing 
pools, caves, stones, chiefs [and] overlords’ were given Sanskrit names.642 One Islamic 
example is the Javanese town of Kudus, named after al-Quds (Jerusalem), half a world 
away.642 While Wolters’ point was about the linguistic adoption inherent in this process, 
it also demonstrates the imaginative location of Southeast Asian landscapes on maps of 
prestige, power and self-projection by larger exemplary centres on the manclala model. 
Islamisation changed the flavour of this self-conscious positioning, but Islam’s global 
scale continued to enable it.
The maps of the imagination produced by this self-Islamisation linked 
Southeast Asian locations to Middle Eastern centres of Islamic prestige. Yet prestige 
was never territorially-referenced, referring to mythic tales with their roots in the 
Qur’an, listing kingdoms and genealogies which did not exist on earth. At the beginning 
of European power in Southeast Asia, however, the politics of location involved in 
Islamisation displayed a more tragic quality. Threatened or defeated Muslim polities, 
like Melaka, now projected their claims to glory backwards into a hazy past. They 
imagined maps of Muslim power that were now even less closely matched by
642 Wolters, Histoty, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, 110.
643 I thank Robert Cribb for this point.
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geopolitical reality— namely that Muslim lands were now under serious colonial 
pressure.
On the Malay Peninsula, Melaka was the most important and powerful o f these 
tragic polities. It located itself on the global map of Islam described in the Sejarah 
Melayu only after its defeat by the seven gun-loaded ships brought from Goa by the 
Portuguese admiral Alfonso d’Alberquerque in 151 1 .644 The narrative begins by 
recounting Melaka’s establishment (c. 1377-1402), and locates its origins in Stambul, 
also known at various times as Byzantium, Constantinople and Rum. In the text, 
Stambul is referred to as Rum, after Rome, an association created when the Eastern 
Roman Empire moved its capital to Byzantium, which it renamed Constantinople after 
its Emperor Constantine. Melaka’s claimed glorious association with Rum was self- 
conscious, and projected the Melaka Sultan’s entitlement to rule by connecting his 
genealogy to that o f the most important and prestigious exemplary centre in Islam.
The narrative begins by outlining the origins o f Raja Iskandar Dzulkarnain, 
who travelled eastward to Hindi (India), whose Raja, Kida, he defeated in battle and 
converted to Islam. 645 Iskandar later married Raja Kida’s daughter, Syahrul-Bariyah.646 
Their descendant, Raja Tersi Berderas, married the daughter o f Raja Sulan from Amdan 
Negara in southern India, and she gave birth to three sons— Raja Hiran who ruled India, 
Raja Fandin who ruled Turkestan, and Raja Suran, who became ruler o f Amdan 
Negara.647 Suran led Amdan Negara to such glory that all the rajas, ‘from east to west’, 
paid him tribute.648 The one recalcitrant was China, but Raja Suran decided China was 
too far away to conquer and that he knew enough of the earth and wished to discover 
the seas.649
044 A. Samad Ahmad, ed., Sulalatus Salatin (Sejarah Melayu), XIV: 1, 267.
645 Ibid., 1:2, 4.
646 Ibid., I: 2-3, 4-8.
647 Ibid., I: 4-5,9-10.
648 Ibid., I: 5, 10.
649 Ibid., I: 5-6, 10-14.
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On his arrival at the bottom of the sea in a glass box, Raja Suran met Raja 
Aktabu’l-Ard o f Dika, an undersea kingdom, and married his daughter, Mahtabu’l- 
Bahri, who gave birth to three sons. After three years, Raja Suran decided to return to 
land, which he did on a winged horse, having instructed Aktabu’l-Ard to send his sons 
to land when they were adults, leaving behind for them clothing, regalia, and symbols to 
show their descent from Iskandar Dzulkarnain. 650 These three princes, Nila Pahlawan, 
Krisyna Pandita and Nila Utama, were sent back to land by their grandfather on a cow 
so white, it looked like burnished silver. They arrived at Bukit Siguntang near the 
Melayu River in Palembang, Sumatra.
From Palembang, Nila Pahlawan was installed raja o f Minangkabau, Krisyna 
Pandita became raja in Tanjung Pura, and Nila Utama was granted the title Seri Teri 
Buana by Palembang’s own ruler, Demang Lebar Daun. 651 Seri Teri Buana married 
Demang Lebar Daun’s daughter, Radin Ratna Cendera Puri, 6 ^2 and founded Singapura 
on Temasek Island. ' During the reign o f their descendant, Raja Iskandar Syah, 
Singapura was attacked by Majapahit, and the defeated Iskandar Syah travelled through 
Johor searching for a site to found a new kerajaan. He came to a place forested by 
melaka trees, where he witnessed a tiny mousedeer defeat his own hunting dogs. Taking 
this event as an auspicious omen, Iskandar Syah founded Melaka in that place. 654 
Melaka went on to rise to predominance in the Melaka Strait, and in the Sejarah 
Melayu, its fall is presented as nothing less than an absolute tragedy.
The practice o f linking place and genealogy through origin narratives is 
common across Southeast Asia. Groups which demonstrate a political or ‘ethnic’ unity 
have tended to map their origins to their inhabited landscapes, usually within larger 
maps dominated by more powerful centres. Narratives link identities to these more
650 Ibid., I: 7, 15-18.
651 Ibid., II: 1-2, 19-25.
652 Ibid., II: 3, 26-27.
653 Ibid., IIL 5-7, 30-41. Reid discusses an alternative, Johor account of the three undersea brothers, as 
well as Gayo and Kedah narratives describing the Raja Rum as their ancestor. See Reid, An Indonesian 
Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories o f Sumatra, 69-70.
654 A. Samad Ahmad, ed., Sulalatus Salatin (Sejarah Melayu), IV 2-4, 69-73.
206
Chapter Four—Sovereignty and the Caliphate: Terengganu ’s Turkish Lodestar
powerful centres through the genealogies of ancestral founders, who may have travelled 
to the area from a stronger polity, or, in an interesting twist, may have been born locally 
and travelled away to found the dominant centre itself. Territories and landscapes, 
therefore, while not bounded states, have frequently been seen as essential to many 
Southeast Asian groups’ ethnogenesis, and central to their sense of belonging in these 
landscapes.
Groups’ territorial and imagined location within these venerated ethnoscapes 
has underpinned entitlements to land and forest resources, understandings of territory 
and identity, and the entitlement to rule as a kerajaan. Most anthropological discussion 
of these practices has focused on claims of origin and alliance at small scales, for 
example on individual localities or islands of the Indonesian archipelago. 655 As the 
Sejarah Melayu demonstrates, however, the self-conscious mapping of Malay origins 
and entitlements has not been carried out on such a small scale. Melaka, acting with a 
sense of its own prestige, boldly projected its entitlement to rule as a kerajaan by 
mapping its genealogy onto a political and sacred geography which reached over an 
entire hemisphere. Glorious and distant Rum served as the ‘galactic polity’ or 
‘exemplary centre’ to Melaka’s Islamised mandala—‘at once a microcosm of the 
supernatural order...and the material embodiment of political order’656—a Southeast 
Asian understanding of power which could easily accommodate the idea of the 
Caliphate.
The enormous scale of the imagined Islamised mandala, and Melaka’s claim to 
awesome ancestors, was enabled by geographical and personal references in the Qur’an. 
Raja Iskandar Dzulkarnain, the two-horned one and the original ancestor of the Malays, 
is referred to in the Qur’an, and is believed to be Alexander the Great. The Sejarah 
Melayu is in no doubt that it is Alexander, referring to his home state as Makaduniah
655 For example, see James J. Fox, ed., Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian 
Ethnography (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006).
656 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton University Press, 
1980), 13.
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(Macedonia).657 The claim to descent from Alexander is an origin narrative restyled and 
rescaled by Islamic conversion, locating Malay lands in a large sacred geography which 
was not territorially or chronologically referenced, creating an audacious claim to 
legitimacy and entitlement by the Melaka ruling house.
Anticolonial Ensign
After a long submergence, Stambul is known to have emerged again in the Southeast 
Asian imagination in the nineteenth century. This time, however, Stambul was 
reconstituted. In the fluid situation of early colonial encroachment in Muslim Southeast 
Asia, asserting tributary status to Stambul could assist in seeking alliances in the hope 
of defeating Portugal. In the 1800s, however, the Netherlands and Britain exercised 
direct control over increasingly large swathes of territory, and Stambul, the seat of the 
Caliphate, was no longer a real ocean presence nearby. Stambul symbolism now began 
a slightly different kind of career—appeals to Stambul were no longer only made by 
royal courts seeking assistance.
Rather, while Stambul itself was unable to send real assistance or lead 
Southeast Asian resistance, Stambul symbolism was now deployed by those leading 
direct local revolts against colonial encroachment in their own names. The Stambul flag, 
in particular, became a commonly-used anti-colonial symbol in the Netherlands Indies 
and Malaya, flown by local rakyat and their leaders in many of the large number of 
uprisings which met colonial expansion in the region. Stambul’s diffusion in this way 
may have made it possible for the flag to simply mean ‘war’ at a first reading, as it did 
to Terengganu Malay officials.
A series of uprisings took place in response to Dutch encroachment in the 
Indonesian archipelago. Given Aceh’s historical link with Turkey it was not surprising 
that resistance there, especially from the 1860s, featured an appeal to Turkey by
658insurgent chiefs, and widespread rumours that it would intervene with eight warships.
657 A. Samad Ahmad, ed., Sulalatus Salatin (Sejarah Melayu), I: 2, 4.
658 Anthony Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain, 1858-1898 (Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 65-66, 149.
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Turkey loomed large in rumours around other uprisings also, such as the 1888 Banten 
uprising in Java.659 In 1913, in the Surakarta region, it was rumoured that the Sultan of 
Turkey had begun a movement for the defence of Islam.660 In 1916 an anti-landlord 
uprising in the Batavia locality of Meester Comelis featured a red flag with a white 
crescent, and its protagonists cried ‘Sabilillah’ as they converged.661
The rise of the Syarikat Islam in the Indies was also at times associated with 
Turkish imagery, and some who attended rallies did so in ‘Turkish’ dress. “ Royal 
appeals for assistance from Stambul also persisted. Most prominently, Aceh resumed its 
contact with the Ottomans, nominating a pepper trader, Muhammad Ghauth, and a 
Hadhrami say id, Habib Abdurrahman az-Zahir as envoys in the 1850s and 1870s. 
Turkey confirmed Aceh as a tributary but could not intervene. In 1855, the Sultan of 
Jambi had appealed to Turkey to declare Jambi its tributary.664 In 1904, the princes of 
Riau also sent an envoy to the Raja Rum, requesting assistance against Dutch pressure 
to have the Governor-General appoint the Riau heir.665 That same year the royal family 
in Bone, Sulawesi, employed four Turkish ‘military instructors’ in its court.666
On the Malay Peninsula too, Stambul loomed large as an anti-colonial symbol 
by those resisting Britain on their own behalf, while positioning themselves within a 
larger struggle for Islam. In 1875, fighting broke out between rival chiefs over control
654 Sartono Kartodirdjo, Pemberontakan Petani Banten 1888: Kondisi, Jalan Peristiwa Dan 
Kelanjutannya: Sehuah Studi Kasus Mengenai Gerakan Sosial Di Indonesia, trans. Hasan Basari and Bur 
Rasuanto, Pustaka Sarjana (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1984).
660 Sartono Kartodirjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth 
and Early Twentieth Centuries (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), 180.
661 Ibid., 41-44.
662 Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), 65.
663 See Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain, 1858-1898 .
<><>4 Barbara Watson Andaya, "From Rum to Tokyo: The Search for Anticolonial Allies by the Rulers of 
Riau, 1899-1914," Indonesia 24 (1977), 129.
665 Ibid., 130-31.
C van Dijk, "Colonial Fears, 1890-1918: Pan-Islamism and the Germano-Indian Plot," in 
Transcending Borders: Arabs, Politics, Trade and Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. H. de Jonge and N 
Kaptein (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 60.
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of trade and taxation on the Linggi River in Sungai Ujong.667 One o f these chiefs, Dato’ 
Kelana, was backed by British troops against his rivals. Dato’ Kelana’s side flew the 
Union Jack, and the other side flew the Turkish flag.668 In 1892 the appeal to Istanbul 
was even more explicit. That year, a group of Arab sayids toured some Malay States 
asking for signatures on a petition to the Turkish Sultan, to whom they would deliver 
the document via a Turkish admiral visiting Singapore at the time. One Negeri Sembilan 
chief signed, and the tour also extended at least to Pahang on the East Coast.669
The Pahang uprising of 1890 to 1895 also saw rumours o f intervention from 
Stambul surface there. The Pahang Chief Minister informed Cecil Clementi Smith, High 
Commissioner for the Malay States, that he felt the sayids’ tour had precipitated the 
uprising.6711 The British Resident o f the time, Hugh Clifford, later noted rumours 
circulating through Pahang, along the lines that:
[i]t is said that the Sultan of Istanbul, King o f Siam, Emperor o f China, and 
every other potentate known to Malay trad it ion... are in league with the 
outlaws to drive the white men screaming from the land to make universal 
the faith of the prophet throughout the world.671
Clifford was sure that Sultan Zainal Abidin III himself was in support o f the Holy War 
being waged in Pahang, writing later that the Sultan had sent a letter with his insignia 
out to the Setiu and Besut districts, warning the rakyat not to cooperate with the British 
expedition to track rebels who had fled to Terengganu.672 The Ottomans also featured in 
Kelantan on the eve o f its takeover— in the negotiations between British and Siamese
667 Later one of the Negeri Sembilan.
(,<>x Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y Andaya, A Histoiy o f Malaysia (London: Macmillan, 1982), 
163.
669 Mohammad Redzuan Othman, "Hadhramis in the Politics and Administration of the Malay States in 
the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," 92.
(’711 Sir Cecil Clementi Smith to Colonial Office, 6 July 1892, C0273/181; cited in Roff, Malay 
Nationalism, 71, fn.
971 Hugh Clifford, Bushwhacking (London: Harper & Bros, 1927), 72.
672 Clifford, Trengganu and Kelantan, 46.
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officials for control of Kelantan in 1909, Kelantan’s Sultan also sought the help of the 
Ottoman Sultan.673
War for Islam
In Terengganu in 1928, it was therefore logical that a Holy War against the British 
should be waged under the flag of the Turkish Caliphate, even if the proposed new 
system of Sultan, wazir and faqir was new. This was because of Turkey’s long history 
in Southeast Asian Muslim imaginations, influencing how they saw their struggles 
against colonial powers and how they located these struggles on larger maps of Islam 
under attack. During the First World War, anti-colonial Islamist organising reached a 
new pitch, reinforcing Southeast Asians Muslims’ sense of fighting for Islam against 
Britain in the name of the Caliphate. Britain, to which hundreds of millions of Muslims 
worldwide were subject, and which ruled more Muslim territories than any other power 
globally, 674 was now at war with Turkey, the seat of the Caliphate and the greatest 
independent Muslim power on earth.
British officials tended to characterise Turkey’s involvement in the war as 
instigated by Germany, with whom Turkey was working against Britain and its allies. 
The German Kaiser, Wilhelm, had actively sought this alliance with Turkey to foment 
uprisings in Britain’s Muslim possessions. Weakening Britain’s position in India was 
central to this strategy, as India was then the country with the largest population of 
Muslims in the world, and was also viewed as Britain’s most important imperial asset. 
At this time German authorities began to refer to the Ottoman Sultan as the Caliph of 
Islam, and German intelligence agencies began to sponsor shiploads of arms and 
revolutionary literature—both secular and Islamic—headed for India. Many Indian 
Muslims themselves took the cause seriously, and defence of the Caliphate became the
673 Farish A Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development o f the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party Pas 
(1951-2003), vol. I (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2004), 11.
674 Peter Flopkirk, Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire (New York, Tokyo, 
London: Kodansha International, 1994), 4.
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central organising principle of the Khilafat Movement.67x In Malaya too, many Indian 
Muslims were watched by the authorities in case they should join the agitation.
Again in this period, Turkey itself had supported a sense of global Muslim 
political identification with the Caliphate. For some decades before the war, Stambul 
had been emphasising Islam and the Caliphate more prominently in its international 
image. Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1842-1918) had sponsored prominent Muslim 
intellectuals like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), who advocated a theory of the 
umat which colonial powers like Britain and the Netherlands referred to as ‘pan-Islam’. 
The main innovation in al-Afghani’s thought was the exhortation to the global umat to 
unite politically as a single community, and that all the world’s Muslim leaders should 
work under the authority of the Ottoman Caliphate. At the same time, however, al- 
Afghani authorised support for nationalist movements in Islamic countries, viewing 
Muslim national liberation as a tactical step toward creating a global political 
community for the umat. 67(1 In this spirit, the war between the Ottomans and Russia in 
1877 had been declared a Holy War.677
Abdul Hamid also vigorously promoted this thinking overseas, and also 
sponsored Sufi orders in Turkey and elsewhere, especially the Naksyabandiyah.67* In 
this spirit, the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Mohammed V (r. 1909-1918), joined the 
First World War in 1914, and the Ottoman Shaykhul Islam in Istanbul quickly declared 
the war against Britain a Holy War. Leaflets announcing the fact were smuggled into 
Britain’s Muslim possessions, including one found by British authorities in the 
Bosphorus, which read: ‘Know ye that the blood of infidels in the Islamic lands may be 
shed with impunity—except those to whom the Muslim power has promised security 
and are allied with it.’ Another such leaflet read:
Take them and kill them whenever you find them, he who kills even one
unbeliever among those who rule over us, whether he does it secretly or
675 See Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, Chp. 5.
676 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces o f Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World 
(University of Michigan Press, 2007), 133-34.
677 van Dijk, "Colonial Fears, 1890-1918: Pan-Islamism and the Germano-Indian Plot," 53-54.
67s Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds, 41.
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openly, shall be rewarded by God. And let every Muslim, in whatever part 
of the world he may be, swear a solemn oath to kill a least three or four of 
the infidels who rule over him, for they are the enemies of God and the 
Faith. A Muslim who does this shall be saved from the terrors of the Day of 
Judgement.679
Figure 10: The declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire, and armed /7/mr/ on behalf of Muslims 
worldwide, against Allied powers by the Ottoman Shaykhul Islam in Constantinople, 1 November 
1914.680
In this climate, two pro-Turkish rebellions took place in Malaya in 1915. The 
most dramatic was the mutiny in Singapore of the Fifth Light Infantry. Composed of 
Indian Muslim Punjabis and Pathans, the unit’s sepoys had heard rumours that they 
would be sent to Turkey to fight against fellow Muslims there. They sought the 
guidance of a Singapore Indian Muslim shaykh (pir), Nur Alam Shah, and released
674 Hopkirk, Like Hidden Fire, 59.
6S(I Photographer unknown, Wikimedia Commons:
http://commons.wikimedia.0rg/wiki/File:Ottoman_Empire_declaration_of_war_during_WWI.png.
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German prisoners and commandeered all the weapons in the depot. One arrested 
mutineer, Jellal Khan, told a British interpreter that this was unlike other wars he had
/: o 1
served in, as this was against the ‘head o f religion the Sultan at Stambul’. The second 
1915 uprising was in Pasir Putih, Kelantan, led by a different Tok Janggut. During this 
uprising too, there were reports of rumours that Turkey would win the war any day, and 
even the Sultan apparently mentioned that the end o f the British Empire was at hand.6*2
In response to the growing power o f anti-colonial Islamism, Britain began 
projecting itself as the Empire of Islam, a claim it argued Turkey had no right to make. 
In Malaya, to counter Turkish and German leaflets and the potential exemplary effect of 
the uprisings, statements o f loyalty were signed and collected in 1915. In Selangor for 
example, two courtly officials even toured the state, showing people a declaration o f 
loyalty to Britain against Turkey signed by the Sultan, and ‘exhorting the inhabitants to 
be loyal to the British throne’.6*3 The perception by authorities that such a tour was 
necessary demonstrates their concern— a public response was required to change the 
population’s ambivalence and lack o f loyalty toward the British Empire. This was 
further proven in Singapore, where three thousand Muslims attended a meeting to 
declare that they had ‘from first to last been constant in [their] allegiance and in [their] 
loyalty to the throne’.684 At this same meeting, however, a secret agent reported that he 
had ‘heard disloyal sentiments expressed in the crowd’. The problem was papered over 
by noting the ‘sincerity o f the leading Moslems of Singapore’, even if they could not 
convince others to feel the same way.68:1
In the FMS, a proclamation was issued jointly in the names o f all the rulers and 
circulated. It warned inhabitants not to associate themselves with Turkey, not to respond
6X1 Governor, Straits Settlements to Colonial Office, 20 February 1915, CO 273/420:8462: ‘Situation at 
Singapore’.
6X2 Ban Kah Choon, Absent History: The Untold Story o f Special Branch Operations in Singapore 1915- 
1942 (Singapore: SNP Media Asia, 2001), 53.
(’x4 Refer to HCO 1196/15: ‘Mohamedan Inhabitants of Selangor send Expressions of Loyalty to His 
Majesty the King’.
6X4 Governor, Straits Settlements, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10 March 1915, CO273/420: 
11562.
6X5 Governor, Straits Settlements, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10 March 1915, CO273/420: 
11567.
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to Turkey’s call for aid, and, most emphatically, not to incite in Turkey’s favour. A 
Perak official even suggested that a Malay army be recruited on the British side. The 
Sultan of Perlis circulated two sets of proclamations, published in Singapore: one was a 
description of how Turkey provoked hostilities against itself, and the other was a 
message from the Aga Khan, the leader of India’s Ismaili Muslims, to all Malayan 
Muslims. The message suggested that the war had no religious importance, and that no 
Muslim interests were threatened by it. The Aga Khan added that, by joining Germany, 
Turkey had forfeited its status as trustee of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
Circulating these messages assisted Britain in discrediting the Caliphate. Its 
information campaign was important to its war effort as it was also simultaneously 
supporting the Arab Revolt against Ottoman control in Mecca.6*6 After finding himself 
under suspicion, the Sultan of Kelantan also joined in, by ordaining a public prayer for 
Britain’s success, cabling a loyalty message to the King of England, George V (r. 1865- 
1936). The Sultan even subscribed to a relief fund and issued a pronouncement that 
Britain’s hostility to Turkey was not a religious problem for Muslims. Malaya’s Sultans 
even contributed to the cost of a new battleship, Malaya, for the British Navy. The 
Sultan of Pahang likewise contributed to the relief fund and ordered special prayers for 
Britain in all mosques in the state.6*7 Authorities in Malaya banned news of the Turkish 
war, and Reuters adopted ‘voluntary’ censorship, ‘lest Muslim feeling should be 
inflamed’.6** Flyers originally written in Urdu and Hindi for circulation in India were 
translated into Malay for local use, all arguing that Turkey’s defeat was inevitable.6*9
Terengganu, the Haj and the War
The global cacophony of war and political conflict reverberated through Terengganu as 
it did elsewhere in the Muslim world. Terengganu possessed established links with the
686 Hopkirk, Like Hidden Fire, 112-13.
687 Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: Policies and Implementation 1874- 
1941 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979), 113-14.
6X8 Prime Minister’s Office to Colonial Office, 15 March 1915, C0273/421: 11927: ’Press Notices re 
Future of Constantinople’.
(,8l) See HCO 1406/15: ‘Publication of official news in the Urdu language’.
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Middle East, forged by generations o f scholars and Hajis, and was therefore located on 
routes of discussion relating to the war and Islamist ferment. On the eve o f the First 
World War, Sultan Zainal Abidin III himself travelled to Mecca as a Haj pilgrim. 
Although cut short by illness, his pilgrimage and tour o f the Middle East reveal 
something of how Mecca and Turkey were viewed in Terengganu in this period. The 
Sultan travelled to Mecca with a Terengganu stamp, to help him prove his identity to 
other Terengganu ‘natives’— other pilgrims and the community o f scholars who were 
long-term residents there. The Sultan further demonstrated both his piety and goodwill 
towards Terengganu pilgrims by investing in a resthouse for those travelling to Mecca 
in future.690
The Sultan was stricken by an undisclosed illness in Suez, inflating the Haj bill 
to $70,000 in cash, $25,000 of which was lent to him by a Terengganu Chinese man 
named Soon Hoe. Costs had blown out because the Sultan was forced to spend a period 
o f convalescence in Cairo, another period in quarantine in a Russian ship from Jeddah 
back to Suez, and was also required to pay for a doctor to accompany him from Port 
Said back to Singapore, at 80 pounds per month and the cost of passage both ways.691 
On 2 February 1915, the Sultan returned from the Haj and was welcomed by a 
‘congratulatory address and thanksgiving’.692 Stamps were created o f the Sultan in ‘Haji 
costume’.693 On his return, the Sultan expressed his surprise that Muslims in Egypt were 
wearing neck ties with collars, a style he believed was prohibited by Islam.694
690 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, January 1914, 16 February 1914, p. 5, C0273: 
409/9399.
691 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, January 1914, 16 February 1914, p. 5, C0273: 
409/9399.
692 E.A. Dickson, Journal of British Agent, Trengganu, February 1914, 4 March 1914, p. 1, CO 273/410: 
13347.
693 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, January 1914, 16 February 1914, p. 5, C0273: 
409/9399.
694 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, January 1914, 16 February 1914, p. 5, C0273: 
409/9399.
216
Chapter Four—Sovereignty and the Caliphate: Terengganu ’s Turkish Lodestar
The Sultan’s illness meant that he never reached several of his planned 
destinations, namely Medina, Europe and Stambul.695 This did not, however, prevent his 
trip from fuelling rumours of Turkish support for Terengganu, which fed on the 
mystique the Turkish flag already held for the rakyat hulu in 1914. E.A. Dickson 
reported during the Sultan’s trip that:
[r]umour has it that the outstation [rural, hulu] Malays believe that...the 
Sultan’s aim was not Macca really but was Stambol (Constantinople), where 
he was going to get a flag from the Sultan of Turkey.696
The first indication that the Turkish flag held some attraction for the Terengganu rakyat 
hulu, therefore, was recorded before the First World War, and before the abolition of the 
Caliphate. On 6 August 1915, Dickson, the British Agent, reported that he had 
‘[received news of the declaration of war between England and Germany’.697
Even after this date, during the war, the Turkish flag continued to appear in 
Terengganu. This caused a heated exchange in 1915, between a local Arab shopkeeper 
and an Australian merchant, Mr. Gild, the Manager of the Bukit Tawang Gold Mining 
Syndicate,69s who had donated rice to the rakyat hulu during floods in 1913.699 Gild had 
reported to the British Adviser holding two Turkish flags which he had found flying 
outside the Arab’s shop in Kuala Terengganu. He had asked the shopkeeper to take 
them down, and when he refused, had pulled them down himself. When the British 
Adviser pursued the matter with the Sultan, he replied coyly that during the festival of 
Mandi Safar, when Malay Muslims bathed in the sea to cleanse themselves of their sins, 
it was usual to fly whatever flags came to hand to celebrate the occasion. Despite his
695 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, January 1914, 16 February 1914, p. 5, C0273: 
409/9399.
696 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, March 1914, April 1914, p. 5, CO273/409: 
17991, ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
697 E.A. Dickson, ‘Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, August 1914, 8 September 1914, p. 2, 
C0273/412: 41389.
(,9S E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Trengganu, January 1914, 16 February 1914, p. 3, 
CO273/409:9399.
699 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, December 1913, 4 February 1914, p. 4, 
CO273/409: 7545.
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claim that the flag might not have been flown with a political motive in mind, Sultan 
Zainal Abidin III agreed to issue a statement prohibiting the use of the Turkish flag in 
Terengganu for the duration of the war.700
Since 1914, the Sultan had in any case been doing his best to ‘prove’ to the 
British Agent that he was a loyal British subject. In August 1914, he offered the use of 
any part of Terengganu’s territory for Britain’s war effort.701 In September he held a 
public prayer service ‘for the victory of British arms’, ‘attended by all the principal 
ministers, Imams, Khatibs, etc’. “ In November, when Turkey joined the war, the 
Sultan ‘took a very sensible view of the situation and remarked that the best thing
703Turkey could do would be to ask pardon of the Allies quickly and pay an indemnity’.
The British Agent translated the Aga Khan’s message, which had been 
published in the Straits Times, into Malay for use in Terengganu. He reported that ‘His 
Highness was extremely pleased with the wording of the message and said he would 
have copies of the Government proclamation and the Aga Khan’s message printed 
locally for circulation.’ Two thousand copies were ‘widely circulated’ directly. The 
Sultan seemed prepared to make larger and larger gestures. Atter a conversation with 
the British Adviser, who suggested collecting subscriptions from ‘foreigners and British 
subjects’ to help with war funds, the Sultan went further, suggesting that ‘natives of 
Trengganu’ also be asked to donate. Soon thereafter, the ‘Opium and Spirits [Tax] 
Farmer called and handed [Dickson] $1000 as a first donation towards the War 
Fund’.704
The Sultan’s gestures to mollify the British were necessary because of the 
significant interest in Turkey in Terengganu. This interest was expressed not only by the 
rakyat hulu but by the local Arab community too, as the altercation between Mr. Gild
700 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, January 1915, 14 February 1915, CO 
273/425:16985: ‘Affairs of Trengganu’.
701 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, August 1914, 8 September 1914, p. 4, 
C0273/412: 41389.
702 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, September 1914’, 22 October 1914, p. 1, 
C0273/412: 45970: ‘Trengganu Affairs’.
703 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, November 1914, n.d, p. 3, C0273/413: 3825.
704 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, November 1914, n.d, C0273/413: p. 5, 3825. 
218
Chapter Four—Sovereignty and the Caliphate: Terengganu ’s Turkish Lodestar
and the Arab shopkeeper demonstrated. The Sultan was already under pressure because 
of the strength and position of these local Arabs. A few years before 1914, so many 
people of Arab descent were reported to be living in Terengganu that a full thousand of 
them could be mobilised, bearing arms, in a dispute with the royal family. The Arabs 
were powerful enough to win the dispute, causing the court to back down over the 
unspecified offensive behaviour of a young raja, who was fined $400 as a result/05 This 
Arab community was believed by Dickson to be sympathetic to Turkey, and he wrote in 
November 1918 that ‘[tjhere is, of course, a considerable pro-Turkish party in this state, 
chiefly among the Arabs’.706 That some of these local Arabs, like Tokku Paloh, were so 
prominently ensconced in the Terengganu court, added to the Sultan’s difficulty in 
managing the competing interests and pressures which surrounded him.707
Caliphate Deterritorialised
On 5 November 1918, Humphreys, the British Agent, received news of Turkey’s 
surrender in the war. Despite all the gestures of loyalty, Humphreys seemed aware of 
his solitary position on the pro-British side, writing, ‘[bjeing the sole European in 
[Kuala] Trengganu, my opportunities for rejoicing are limited’.708 In any case 1918 was 
a significant year in Terengganu for reasons other than the end of the war. On 25 
November, Dickson reported:
I received a telephone message from the Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) at 
2am to say that the Sultan had died suddenly. I went to the Istana (palace) in 
the morning; preparations for the funeral were going on in great disorder; 
the Raja Muda (crown prince) was asleep after being up all night...
I went down in the evening for the funeral. A Trengganu Sultan cannot be 
buried until his successor is installed. When the coffin was brought to the 
big Istana the Raja Muda was solemnly installed, according to Malay 
custom, in front of it; a declaration of loyalty signed by the Chiefs and
7lb E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, January 1914, 16 February 1914, p. 5, C0273: 
409/9399.
706 E.A. Dickson, Journal of the British Adviser, Trengganu, October 1918, n.d., p. 1, C0273/474: 6941, 
‘Journal of British Adviser Trengganu’.
707 Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920, 152.
708 E.A. Dickson, Report of the British Agent, Terengganu, November 1914, n.d, p. 2, C0273/413: 3825.
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Members of Council was read out; they then performed the act of homage; 
drums and trumpets were sounded, and guns were fired. The Raja Muda was 
much affected, and most of the people were in tears.704
The Sultan’s death came a few months after that of Tokku Paloh, the Shaykhul Islam. 
The year of Turkey’s defeat also quickly became the year of Terengganu’s defeat as an 
independent polity, and the following year, the newly-installed Sultan Muhammad 
accepted a British Adviser in Terengganu.
In 1922, the institution of the Caliphate was separated from the Ottoman 
Sultanate, and in 1924 Turkey became a republic. In Terengganu and in the wider 
world, geopolitical sovereign representation for the Muslim umat as a unified political 
community was finished. In Terengganu, as in the rest of the Muslim world, the lands of 
Islam were colonised. The hope that Stambul represented as the centre of an empire of 
Islam was now permanently detached from territorial reality, a situation which called 
for a new politics of national, not ummatic, liberation. In this process, the imaginative 
relationship between Terengganu Muslims and the Caliphate was also reconstituted, as 
it was for other Muslims across the world.
The possibility of a sovereign umat under the Caliphate was now refashioned 
as a deterritorialised political ideal—an invocation, which in Terengganu was used in 
local Islamist mobilisation. The Caliphate was now refashioned as a fantastical 
representation of a sovereign Muslim political space, a platform on which the 
Terengganu Islamists staged their defence of the Terengganu rakyat' s local territory. 
The political and sacred geography over which Stambul, deterritorialised, now floated, 
was the Terengganu forest, and the umat in whose name Terengganu Islamists were 
fighting consisted of the Terengganu rakyat, excluding government collaborators.
Stambul’s deterritorialisation allowed it to maintain a political salience in 
Terengganu in 1928, its exemplary power remaining sufficient to assist in mobilising 
the rakyat. Its use by the Islamist disciples of Terengganu’s marginalised ulama is 
contrary to Roff s argument that pro-Ottoman ‘pan-Islamism’ was not an ‘independent
709 L.J. Humphreys, Journal of the British Agent, Terengganu, November 1918, n.d., p. 3, CO 
273/474:6941.
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focus for political discontent at rule by infidels’ because of the Malay states’ lack of an 
organised ulama class.710 Rather, the Terengganu rebels’ actions were more in keeping 
with Sayyid’s argument that ‘[t]he place of the Caliphate can be (and has been) re­
articulated at different moments according to different (re-) construct ions of the present 
and projects for the future’. 711 Importantly,
the Caliphate also represents the idea of an Islamicate great power. A power 
that can lead, as well as guarantee, an independent and sovereign Islamicate 
presence in the world...The politics of the Islamicate world continue to be 
conditioned by the absence of the Caliphate. The Caliphate represents not 
only political legitimacy for the Ummah, but also the possibility of its global 
political presence.712
The Terengganu uprising was a resource claim, but also a symbolic act linking 
Terengganu’s forests and its shifting cultivators to this longing for a sovereign seat for 
the umat. The Stambul flag was emblematic of the Terengganu Islamists’ argument that 
the rakyaf s right to territory and resources were consistent with the umaf s claim to 
Muslim territory, within an imagined global—Muslim—political space. The fact that 
the Caliphate had ceased to exist in the world was immaterial, as Stambul’s lack of 
maritime power was beside the point for Aceh in the 1600s. The act of raising the flag, 
asserting a connection to an exemplary centre of Islam, invoked sacred, not territorial, 
political geographies.
The Terengganu rebels’ act of raising the Ottoman flag over the Kuala Berang 
government offices ‘borrowed’ the Caliphate’s prestige for their own claims to land, 
forests and sovereignty, negating the bounding and zoning of the spaces in which 
Terengganu’s shifting cultivators now lived. In doing so, and in asserting a new system 
of rule under the reinstalled former Sultan, Terengganu Islamists created an ‘alternative
. 7  1 Timaginary’, for a ‘new and different social order’ out of the destruction of the old. 
The relationship between territory and identity which they forged did not fit into the
7111 Roff, Malay Nationalism, 71.
711 Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear, xvii.
7,2 Ibid.
717 Craig Calhoun, "Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public 
Sphere," Public Culture 14, no. 1 (2002), 170.
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Malaya-shaped map finally created with Terengganu’s colonial takeover in 1919, and 
the zones o f peasantisation in which the rakyat was expected to settle.
The rebels were confronted by a globally-constituted regime o f power—the 
British Empire— which thought of itself as universal in its reach, but which sought to 
localise the rakyat as peasants. British officials sought to ‘dismantle and reorganise the 
identification o f subjects’714 on new, racialised and peasantised, terms. In response, 
Terengganu Islamists translated their forest and land claims into a global Islamist idiom 
under the Ottoman flag. Local territorial claims were being made in new, global terms 
within an Islamised political mandala. In Terengganu in 1928, even after the 
Caliphate’s abolition, Stambul’s exemplary power remained sufficient to mobilise the 
rakyat against kafir government men.
714 Radcliffe and Westwood, Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America, 14. 
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My own feeling is that local leaders should now be tried and that any o f them 
who are not natives o f Trengganu should be banished, while the natives o f the
State should receive terms o f imprisonment...
H.W. Thomson, British Adviser, Perak, after conducting an inquiry into the causes of
the uprising in June 1928.715
I f  we can avoid it, we had better not publish anything.
‘G.G.’, Colonial Office official, in his file notes of 31 August 1928.716
The rebels’ use of the Bendera Stambul demonstrated the most radical aspect of the 
Terengganu uprising. Islamists, enclosed within a colonised and bounded Malay state, 
poured their local land and forest claims into an audacious political vision. The 
universalist aspect of the uprising, however, was not its only face. After the shootings 
that dispersed the rebellion, the rebels were brought from their universal political 
heights back to Terengganu soil. Rebels had to deal once more with the colonial 
government, the police, and their own diverse fears and interests. In the aftermath of the 
uprising, the unity the rebels had created among their own ranks by converging on 
Kuala Berang dissipated into thin air. Many rebels were gradually swept up in police 
raids and arrests, and were brought to face the authorities at the palace, the Istana 
Maziah, in Kuala Terengganu. The rebels—Terengganu shaykhs, Islamist leadership 
figures and the rakyat—remained bound up in local and temporal entanglements. 
Terengganu Islamists may have been emplotting their struggle within a narrative of 
global Islam confronting kafir colonialism, but they remained embroiled in local 
confusions, differences, rivalries, and struggles. Even as the uprising was unfolding on 
21 May, differences were apparent in the claims putative rebels were making for 
themselves.
Their statements and actions during this time revealed scholars and Islamists 
moving to distance themselves from each other, and rakyat moving to disown the
715 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 7, C0717/6E52432.
7I6G.G„ file note, 31 August 1928, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
uprising. Many rank and file rakyat, in particular, revealed a strategy of ambivalence 
toward the uprising and its Islamist grammar. The rebels had created their own narrative 
of struggle, but no amount of narrative agency could elevate them completely from their 
local contexts. The collapse of the movement caused the rebels’ narrative to utterly 
disintegrate. The fractured nature of the movement was revealed in the fragmented 
information filtering back to the colonial government in Kuala Terengganu. In the days 
and weeks after the uprising, the government took further steps to collect, digest and 
understand the information it both received and produced. The ways in which British 
and Malay officials understood the movement’s aims and organisation reflected the 
conditions of partial and uneven knowledge in which they worked. Officials fleeing the 
rebels in the hulu brought competing versions of events to the capital. Kuala 
Terengganu’s formal and informal information networks also fed information of varying 
reliability to the capital. These fragments of information were all understood in specific, 
political ways by British officials, and threaded into new explanations, new narratives 
within which to frame the Terengganu uprising.
Reports Flood In
Throughout the period of conflict in the hulu, a stream of reports had been flooding in to 
Kuala Terengganu, creating a mass of information on the rebels and their motives. 
These reports filtered through various official conduits, brought together by W.M. 
Millington, the Acting British Adviser, into an effective information network. The 
network’s circuits were formed by the same river valleys that the rebels used to 
mobilise. Like the rebels’ secret letters, official reports were transported along riverine 
routes on rafts, mail perahu, motorboats, and on foot or bicycle along river banks. 
Sometimes they were transmitted instantly, by telephone. The network’s nodes were 
formed by hulu officials—District Officers and penghulu. 717 District Officers had 
existed in Kuala Berang since 1921, when the government offices were established, and 
were also installed elsewhere the hulu in the 1920s. Holders of colonial posts, they were
717 For a more detailed treatment of colonial information networks, refer to C.A. Bayly, Empire and 
Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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responsible directly to the colonial government. Penghulu, on the other hand, holders of 
pre-colonial privileges whom the colonial government was attempting to co-opt as civil 
servants, had operated as free agents until they were brought under greater control by 
Millington.
Millington recognised the need for greater control over information networks at 
the beginning of his term in 1927, and he bolstered and clarified the responsibilities of 
penghulu. Before this time, it is not clear how many penghulu—residents of the same 
villages as Islamists and rakyat—were cooperating with the early rebel movement. 
Some cooperation was evident. In 1925, for example, when Mat Zin and the other 
Islamists gathered rakyat by corvee to Tengku Nik Haji’s land, they did so using letters 
addressed to penghulu like Mahmud of Kampung Sungai Ular. Apparently signed by 
Haji Drahman, the letters asked penghulu to summon the men who would breach the 
government’s regulations. Millington grasped that without improving reporting between 
the capital and the hulu, officials would continue to experience difficulty in establishing 
the colonial government in the hinterlands. So he targeted penghulu, and the ketua 
kampung (village heads) who reported to them, to make them report to the capital. 
Speaking after the uprising, Millington noted that:
[a]t the outset, [he] realised that the proper channels of communication from 
the Collector to Penghulus, and from Penghulus to Ketuas—and vice 
versa—simply did not exist in the Trengganu river. To get information, it
718was necessary in almost every case to send out and fetch it.
Given the unrest in the hulu, Millington sought to remedy this situation. ‘[A]t 
some date before’ 21 May 1928, he directed the Chief Minister Dato’ Seri Amar Diraja, 
the Commissioner of Lands G.A.C. de Moubray, and the Chief Collector of Land 
Revenue H.P. Bryson, to arrange for daily reports from every ketua kampung and the 
penghulu of every mukim. This was apparently no easy task, as some members of the 
State Council had not understood that Millington was reconstituting the role of these 
hulu officials to suit colonial needs. No longer possessed of their pre-colonial semi­
autonomy, penghulu and their underlings were now nodes connected to a central hub of
718 Statement by W.M. Millington, 22 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 11, C0717/6L52432.
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government in Kuala Terengganu. To create a penghulu reporting chain, Millington 
ordered them to be responsible to Collectors of Land Revenue.7 19 In areas in which 
compliance with land and forest regulations was the government’s main surveillance 
need, this structure merged the government’s information-gathering apparatus with its 
capacity for revenue-collection. After Millington’s directive, more information from 
more outlying areas began arriving directly in the capital, including the many reports 
that revealed how the rebels organised.
The new role of penghulu in surveillance had been clearly perceived by the 
rakyat and the Islamists. The rakyat who brought their grievances before the Sultan in 
Kuala Berang on 4 May had specifically criticised Penghulu Mat Arifin in the Penih 
River valley for his punitive surveillance of their forest gathering. On the day of the 
uprising too, Che Leh bin Haji Drahman had declined to greet the penghulu in Hulu 
Nerus, stating instead that he ‘could not shake a dirty hand’. After the uprising the 
reporting role of penghulu was strengthened again. On 23 May a list of penghulu was 
prepared by the Chief Minister, and a directive issued to them that they should send 
information daily to the Commissioner of Police in Kuala Terengganu. “ The penghulu 
in Manir followed this directive so closely that he sent daily reports for many days, all 
informing the authorities that nothing was happening in his mukim.
Others do not appear to have been so diligent. Yet they submitted information 
that came to hand. In the days after the Kuala Berang occupation, officials in the capital 
learned through the penghulu network that the group of Islamists was also aiming to 
involve rakyat from hulu Dungun. The penghulu in Jengol had learned this when he 
visited Kampung Durian Belanja, where he noticed two men from the Penih River 
valley suddenly arrive. One was called Ahmad and the other Jembol bin Pak Anjung. 
They told him that Tok Janggut, Haji Karia and Haji Tahir had instructed them to call 
people in the Dungun and Kelmin valleys to fight (hergacluh) in Kuala Berang. The 
Dungun recruits were to arrive there on 20 May. The penghulu told them to leave the
7|l) Statement by W.M. Millington, Thomson Report, p. 11 C 0 7 17/61:52432.
7211 Saya tak boleh jab at sal am tangan kotor. Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 
16, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
721 SUK T to Penghulu, n.d. [after 23 May], SUK T 1295/1346.
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area, and proceeded to the surau, where he asked for the religious teacher, Lebai 
Awang. Together, they gathered a group of villagers and advised them not to become 
involved. Thepenghulu reported all this to Kuala Terengganu soon afterwards.
On 20 May, it also emerged that the rebels were attempting to recruit followers 
in Marang. Information to this effect arrived in Kuala Terengganu from Mat Ali bin 
Haji Abdullah, the penghulu in Ajil, whose report echoed an earlier, courtly style 
(‘before Tengku, a thousand apologies’). Mat Ali’s investigations had proven that the 
rakyat in Marang was occupied in its villages, working to its capacity. Yet Abdullah 
Jurukaka had been there that day, meeting with Lembi Awang Sulaiman and Zakaria 
Ibrahim. Abdullah had told (suruh) them to mobilise rakyat and bring them to Kuala 
Berang. Zakaria, however, had informed the penghulu, but by the time the penghulu had 
gone to look for him, Abdullah had got away.
The following day, the Marang District Officer telephoned Kuala Terengganu 
with a report from Mat Ali stating that fifty raky>at from Kampung Ajil, Kampung 
Jerong, Kampong Kubu and Kampung Barat had gone to Kuala Berang. “ The 
penghulu in Kuala Berang was also making reports, and his son Kasim, travelled 
downriver on the morning o f the occupation to inform the authorities.724 Penghulu Ali 
from Kuala Telemong was also passing on information, informing Dato’ Lela Diraja 
immediately about the Kuala Berang occupation and the red flag flying over it.72^  Ali 
bin Salleh, a penghulif s assistant in Kampung Serada, saw and spoke to the rebels 
during the occupation. He noticed they were wearing police rifles and were continuing 
to corvee people to join them, and saw people he did not recognise travelling to join
Even before the uprising, penghulu in the area had taken their surveillance role 
seriously. A penghulu in the Tersat River had his assistant, Hamzah bin Taib, help
722 Penghulu Jengol to SUK T, n.d. [after 19 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
723 Penghulu Mat Ali to SUK T, 1 Zulhijjah 1346 [21 May], SUK T 1295/1346.
724 Statement by Penghulu Muda Kasim, 1 Zulhijjah 1346 [21 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
725 Dato’ Lela and Dato’ Panglima Dalam to SUK T, 1 Zulhijjah 1346 [21 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
726 Statement by Ali bin Salleh, 5 Zulhijjah 1346 [25 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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Forest Guards to survey settlement land.727 Penghulu Awang in Dungun had also helped 
enforce the land and forest regulations in his mnkim. “ The Tersat penghulu's son had 
also assisted the government, by helping Wan Mahmud, the Kuala Berang District 
Officer, to investigate suspected rebels.724 Likewise Penghulu Ismail from Kampung 
Kuala Tajing, who had delivered information to the authorities o f the debate he had 
heard over acquiring passes in his village mosque.730
After the uprising, Penghulu Muhammad Amin, from the Bukit Payung mukim, 
and the two penghulu from Jerong and Manir, also passed on news, in their cases 
reporting no threatening incidents. The Jerong penghulu also noted the rakyat of 
Marang were too busy occupied with making a living to become rebels, and for good 
measure he had told them about the rebels already killed in Kuala Telemong, and the 
resulting ruin o f their wives and children (anak hini). “ On 26 May, however, he noted 
he had seen three men, Ismail bin Wok, Mamat bin Abdullah and Sulaiman, and he was 
sure they were going to commit derhaka as they were carrying weapons. Not to be 
outdone in his loyalty, the penghulu o f Padang Buluh added that the rebels were ‘stupid’ 
(kurang akal) in the report he submitted.734
These penghulu had begun working reliably on the government side. Yet not 
all penghulu in Terengganu were loyal to the government. Others were more 
compromised, and possessed ambivalent loyalties. Many were related to rebels or linked 
to them in other ways, and a number of rebels even used the title of penghulu 
themselves. It is not clear if they had been penghulu before the British arrived, or used
727 Mahmud bin Piah and Abdullah bin Ali to District Officer, Kuala Berang, 29 Syawal 1346 [20 April 
1928], SUKT 1295/1346.
728 Statement by Wan Ahmad, 17 Zulhijjah 1346 [6 June 1928], SUK T 129/1346.
729 Wan Mahmud to SUK T, n.d. [late April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
730 Statement by Penghulu Ismail, 11 Zulkaedah 1346 [1 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
731 Penghulu Muhammad Amin to SUK T, 17 Safar 1347 [5 August 1928], SUK T 1295/1346; Penghulu 
Mukim Jerong to SUK T, 3 Zulhijjah 1346 [23 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346; Penghulu Manir to SUK T, 
17 Zulhijjah 1346 [6 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
732 Penghulu Jerong to SUK T, 30 Zulhijjah 1346 [19 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
733 Penghulu Jerong to SUK T, 6 Zulhijjah 1346 [26 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
734 Penghulu Padang Buluh to SUK T, 15 Zulhijjah 1346 [4 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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the title for other reasons. One of the Islamist leaders himself, Penghulu Salleh, also 
used the title, yet does not appear to have been employed by the colonial government at 
any time. After the uprising, it also became clear that a Penghulu Omar had been 
identified as a rebel.735 Another Mat Zin, the son o f one Penghulu Hasan from Kampung 
Kuala Mil had also been named by an informer as a rebel, as had Penghulu Ali Bakar 
from Kampung Sekayu.716 A Penghulu Abu Aham from Hulu Dungun was also named 
after the uprising.737
To further confuse matters, some government loyalists who used the title were 
not in fact employed by the government. For example, Penghulu Abdullah, who 
provided information on Mat Zin and his associates to Police Commissioner M.L. 
Wynne in 1925, was not a 'government’ penghulu. In addition, even government 
penghulu were sometimes closely connected to rebels, such as Penghulu Ismail from 
Kampung Kuala Tajing, one o f whose in-laws, Muhammad Jambol, was found to have 
been a rebel.739 Another penghulu from Marang might have been working on both sides. 
He was described as having met with the Islamists and might have also submitted 
information to the government.740
Yet penghulu did not form the only component o f the information network 
reporting to Kuala Terengganu. District Officers were o f less variable loyalty, and 
appeared to report directly to the Terengganu Secretariat, under Dato’ Amar. They were 
therefore available for deployment by the capital in a different way to penghulu. They 
were, for example, much more likely to be directed to conduct siasat, or investigations, 
into matters or people considered urgent by the Dato’ Amar. So in April 1928, when 
Islamists were found to be recruiting rakyat from Marang, Dato’ Amar sent a secret
735 Peringatan Kerajaan Terengganu, ‘Perkara Penderhakaan Rakyat-Rakyat itu Telah Dibicarakan’, n.d., 
SUKT 1295/1346.
736 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 2 Zulkaedah 1346 [22 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
737 State Commissioner, Kemaman to Dato’ Amar Diraja, 1 Muharram 1347 [20 June 1928], SUK T 
1295/1346.
73x Statement by Penghulu Abdullah, 6 May 1925, appended to M.L. Wynne, ‘Unlawful Assembly at 
Kuala Telemong’, 6 May 1925, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
739 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 15 Zulkaedah 1346 [25 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
740 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, n.d., SUK T 1295/1346.
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despatch to the District Officer. The letter asked him to investigate whether any rakyat 
from Marang had travelled to the Tersat or any other o f the Terengganu’s tributaries, 
and to determine what they were doing now. At the bottom of this note was the message 
that ‘This matter should be carried out with considerable secrecy, and your statement 
should only be carried in the hands o f one who can be entrusted to carry it.’ The 
instruction itself had come in the hands o f such a trusted person, who had taken it by 
bicycle, with the $1 with which to pay him enclosed with the letter.741
Much o f the information gathered from these exercises was useful, if partial— 
‘actionable intelligence’ in today’s terms. Some also reflected less useful leads and 
rumours which circulated through government circles. The 24 April instruction to the 
Marang District Officer, for example, also asked for reports on the movements of a man 
called Jusoh bin Hitam from Kampung Rusila.742 The District Officer assigned an 
official to follow Jusuh immediately.74’ On 23 May he phoned Dato’ Amar’s office to 
advise that Jusoh was in Kampung Teratak Batu, leading a group of a hundred armed 
men to continue the uprising. Jusoh was thought to have responded to a request from the 
Kuala Berang Islamists to advance on Kuala Marang, Bukit Payung and Kuala 
Terengganu. Marang was relatively lightly guarded, by men with only small
744weapons.
Later that day, Jusoh was found. He was later questioned at the Istana Maziah. 
The suspicions which surrounded his movements appeared to have been unfounded. 
Jusoh stated that he had never gathered a group o f rebels, and had not even received 
news o f the Kuala Berang occupation. He noted that he had once heard of plans for 
some kind of confrontation, at a kenduri (communal feast) which he attended in 
Kampung Kawah. There, at the house o f Penghulu Mat Haz he had eaten sticky rice. 
Since then he had been sick with fever, although he had attended prayers at the Masjid 
Haji Awang in Kampung Marang. He had already been questioned after these prayers
741 SUK T to District Officer, Marang, 4 Zulkaedah 1346 [24 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
742 SUK T to District Officer, Marang, 4 Zulkaedah 1346 [24 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
743 District Officer, Marang, SUK T, 7 Zulkaedah 1346 [27 April 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
744 Peringatan Jawatan, 3 Zulhijjah 1346 [24 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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by one Tengku Sulung at his house, where his attendant had given him water to drink. 745 
The following day, Haji Mamat bin Haji Musa from Jusoh’s village came forward to 
vouch that Jusoh had not been involved. 746 Jusoh seems to have been released at this 
point, and so ended his unique food- and drink-focused account of the uprising.
Jusoh’s arrest had yielded nothing for the government. Regardless, much o f the 
other information from District Officers was more useful. Wan Mahmud in Kuala 
Berang submitted a large number o f reports to Kuala Terengganu which were filled with 
specifics— names, incidents and conversations taking place around him. Wan Mahmud 
was ordered to conduct a large number o f siasat, and much o f the information 
surrounding the uprising either originated with him, was channelled through him, or was 
confirmed by him through these siasat. For example, he reported that Abu Bakar Ceting 
had told him that the rebels recruited from Marang and Dungun were to meet in two 
locations: Kuala Berang and Kuala Terengganu, where they would be joined by other 
groups from the Terengganu’s tributaries. 747 Wan Mahmud was also sent to other 
districts by Dato’ Amar to inform other District Officers o f events in Kuala Berang.
The Dungun District Officer, on the other hand, had some doubt cast over his 
reliability. A letter from Kemaman, probably from the area’s State Commissioner who 
had recently been asked to visit Dungun, informed Dato’ Amar that the District Officer 
‘was no longer doing anything’. Worse still, he had news which he kept ‘in the small o f 
his heart’, but he did not attempt to convey it to the State Commissioner, or directly to 
Dato’ Amar.744 Perhaps the District Officer did not take the rumours seriously. After the 
uprising, however, he appeared to swing into action, and submitted several reports to the 
government, including one informing the Chief Minister that he had travelled to the 
Jengol mukim the previous day to investigate the ‘treasonous group’ (kaum
745 Statement by Jusoh bin Hitam, 3 Zulhijjah 1346 [23 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
746 Statement by Haji Mamat bin Haji Musa, 4 Zulhijjah 1346 [24 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
747 District Officer, Kuala Berang, 30 Zulhijjah 1346 [19 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
748 Peringatan Jawatan, 1 Zulhijjah 1346 [21 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
74,) State Commissioner, Kemaman to Dato’ Amar Diraja, 2 Zulkaedah 1346 [22 April 1928], SUK T 
1295/1346.
231
menderhaka). He also passed on reports he had heard o f rebel recruitment in the 
Kelmin. In Tapuh and Jerangau, where an ongoing land census may have provoked the 
rakyat there, there was no news o f attempts to recruit followers.750
O f all the state’s districts, the information network was strongest along the 
Terengganu and its tributaries. Information from this area was generally more reliable 
than from further afield. This area was also being monitored closely by three officials 
from the capital, most notably Dato’ Seri Lela Diraja, who had been sent on 
information-gathering and negotiation missions into the hulu. Lela had first been sent up 
the Terengganu with Tengku Nara Wangsa on 22 April, and then again later, in May, as 
the uprising appeared to be swinging into momentum. The first time, after Officer 
Abdullah o f Kuala Berang reported he had been attacked by rebels in Kampung Penjing, 
the two officials had been entrusted with making contact with the rebels. Much of the 
information they provided to Dato’ Amar resulted from this direct contact.
Dato’ Lela and Tengku Nara travelled extensively up and down the 
Terengganu River system, conducting a large number o f enquiries into the movement, 
its leaders, and its organisation. They acted as mobile information collectors, feeding 
information back to Kuala Terengganu constantly. Together, Lela and Nara’s central 
role was most evident when they met Penghulu Salleh, Abdullah Jurukaka and Lebai 
Hasan and asked them to accompany them to Kuala Terengganu to face the Sultan in 
person. After gaining the Islamists’ initial agreement Lela and Nara arrived at their 
meeting place to find a large armed crowd instead, and were informed that the Islamists 
had gone to Haji Drahman’s house. The two officials also managed to meet Haji 
Drahman and Sayid Sagaf, and even take them on 3 May to Penghulu Salleh’s house, 
where they encountered another crowd o f 1,000 armed men. The men had been poised 
to attack, but did not because the two Islamic scholars were present. Penghulu Salleh 
named himself the leader o f the rakyat before them.751 An extract from Dato’ Lela’s
750 District Officer, Dungun, 3 Zulhijjah 1346 [23 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
7?l Dato' Seri Lela Diraja, "The Ulu Terengganu Disturbance, May 1928: Extracts from the Diary of Dato 
Seri Lela Diraja," Malaysia in History 12, no. 1 (1968).
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diary, published in Malaysia in History in 1968, also records how the two officials
7received information that Haji Musa Minangkabau was also implicated.
Dato’ Lela also despatched a large number of reports by himself. In the days 
leading up to the Kuala Berang occupation, he sent reports to the capital two or three 
times daily, informing them of the armed assemblies he had heard about or personally 
witnessed. On the day of the uprising, he was the source of numerous reports on rebels’ 
movements and intentions. That day, Dato’ Lela stopped at Kampung Pasir Pulau Babi, 
where he met Kasim, who had travelled down from Kuala Berang for his father, the 
penghulu. Kasim was the source of the news that the rebels intended to advance on 
Kuala Terengganu that very day. He was also an eyewitness—the previous night, he had 
seen people from Kuala Pueh gathering en masse at Lubuk Rengas, a field in Kampung 
Buluh at Kuala Berang on the Tersat River bank. They intended to cross to the opposite 
bank, where the government offices were located. This was the beginning of the 
occupation. Kasim had friends in the group, and had told them not cross. He had also 
asked who was leading them, but received no answer. On hearing Kasim’s news, and 
finding that he could not reach Kuala Berang in his motorboat because the river was too 
low, Dato’ Lela made the decision to spend the night in Kampung Sungai Ular. He met 
the rebels at Kuala Telemong the following morning. He, and the other officials with 
him, were responsible for the shots fired into the crowd which stopped the rebels’ 
downriver advance.
Confusion and Flight
With this many reports flooding in to Kuala Terengganu, some of them were bound to 
be contradictory. Some accounts demonstrated how poorly-positioned certain officials 
were to follow the action, even when they were eyewitnesses to important events and 
participants in conversations with rebels. The statements given by various officials who 
had fled the action in Kuala Berang reflected this confusion. The rebels themselves 
seem to have created uncertainty on purpose. Before the occupation, Abu Bakar Ceting
752 Ibid.
753 Dato’ Lela Diraja to SUK T, 1 Zulhijjah 1346 [21 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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in particular seemed to be feeding contradictory accounts o f the movement’s intentions 
to separate officials. Kasim had described seeing a group of rebels headed for Lubuk 
Rengas in the morning as he headed for his office. He also reported that Tuan Dalam o f 
the Forestry Office had fled that morning, leaving his attendant Awang Kar behind, 
guarding the office with a gun all by himself. Notably, Kasim had heard the rebels 
discuss gathering at Kuala Telemong the following day, and travelling from there 
straight to Kuala Terengganu. Kasim also overheard them discussing their aim, which 
he asserted was ‘to face, not fight, the Raja’, an important distinction for rebels already 
accused of committing derhaka. ^ 4
Tuan Dalam, however, gave a statement on 10 June that contradicted Kasim’s 
in one important respect. Four days before the occupation, Tuan Dalam had spoken to 
Abu Bakar Ceting, who told him that he intended to kick the Sultan aside and replace 
him with the former Sultan, Muhammad. He also stated that he wanted to meet with 
District Officer Wan Mahmud. Tuan Dalam pointed out that Abu Bakar had asked him, 
in that same conversation, if he could visit the police station. Tuan Dalam was 
suspicious of Abu Bakar’s intentions, and had replied, ‘Not without business there. You 
just want to check out the police rifles’. Abu Bakar had suggested, ‘I could just look in 
from outside?’ and Tuan Dalam had refused again. After this incident, Tuan Dalam 
approached Wan Mahmud to convey one more message from Abu Bakar: ‘Wan 
Mahmud, Abu Bakar told me that he and a crowd o f people want to meet with you and 
Sergeant Abdul Rahman. Watch out, because if it’s not this afternoon, it’ll be tonight’. 
Tuan Dalam suspected a trap. Abu Bakar also wanted to meet with Sergeant Abdul 
Rahman.
Perhaps Abu Bakar hoped for an audience with the Sultan before deposing 
him. Perhaps he trusted Tuan Dalam enough to reveal the uprising’s ‘real’ motive. 
Alternatively, perhaps he was using the government’s information network to confuse 
the authorities, or perhaps his statements revealed contradictory currents within the 
movement itself. In any case, Tuan Dalam immediately prepared to warn Wan Mahmud 
that the rebels were also making him a target. Yet events were unfolding in a way which
7:14 Statement by Penghulu Muda Kasim, 1 Zulhijjah 1346 [21 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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Tuan Dalam did not understand himself. He went to tell the Sergeant, Abdul Rahman, 
the news, and found him at a Chinese coffee shop where he also saw Abu Bakar Ceting 
at a table with Kasim. He told them to leave, and eat their meal at Encik Zainal’s 
mother’s house, so he could speak with the Sergeant in private. He told the Sergeant, 
‘Abu Bakar’s talking crazy. He wants to ambush you with a large crowd’.
Later that afternoon, Tuan Dalam saw that Abu Bakar had also reached Wan 
Mahmud before him. He was sitting and talking with Wan Mahmud at his house with 
another man called Encik Pilus from Kampung Buluh. They were armed. When Tuan 
Dalam asked them what their business was, they replied, ‘We’ve come to meet the 
magistrate’, Wan Mahmud. At this point, Tuan Dalam, growing more suspicious, 
instructed the shirtless Wan Mahmud to go to his room, and escorted Abu Bakar back 
across the Telemong River to Kampung Buluh. On their arrival, he saw a crowd at the 
Kampung Buluh mosque, 150 strong and apparently led by Haji Awang bin Haji Ali, 
the Imam. These were rebels, making their preparations to occupy the government 
buildings on the other side. The uprising was beginning. Already, however, it was 
becoming apparent that not all the rebels were prepared to use the soaring Islamist 
rhetoric that Mat Zin and his associates were using. When Tuan Dalam asked the Imam, 
‘[yfou’re so old, Father Haji, what are you doing mixed up with all this?’ the Haji 
answered, T don’t know. I’m just following along’.755
With the uprising now effectively taking place around them, Tuan Dalam could 
not understand the contusing events. He found later that Wan Mahmud had come to 
Kampung Buluh against his advice, when he saw him in a shed near the mosque with 
Abu Bakar Ceting. Wan Mahmud had been invited there to help draft a letter the group 
claimed to be writing to the Sultan. Tuan Dalam asked Wan Mahmud, ‘Father Mud, 
what have you come for?’ Wan Mahmud answered that he and Awang, a kerani, had 
come to meet the crowd ‘to help them consider’ their letter. ‘What’s to consider?’ Tuan 
Dalam asked, to be met by Wan Mahmud’s answer, T don’t know any more’. Awang 
was also asked what the crowd’s considerations were, but he only said, T don’t know,
755 Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 21 Zulhijjah 1346 [10 June 1928], SUK T 1432/1346.
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Tuan, I was just asked along.’ Tuan Dalam appeared to have become angry at this point, 
replying ‘Tuan, why don’t you ask around among people in Lubuk Rengas, and if 
there’s anyone there with any brains, ask them to consider [matters] here in the 
mosque’. On arriving at the mosque ready to help, Wan Mahmud had been told the 
letter would only be drafted at Lubuk Rengas.
Wan Mahmud was willing to follow the rebels to Lubuk Rengas, replying, 
‘Doesn’t matter lah. I’ll go.’ It appeared as though he was not aware of the potential 
danger o f abduction or murder by the rebels. Just at that moment, Abdullah Tok Mis, a 
Forest Guard, arrived, with the instruction, ‘Don’t let Wan Mahmud go alone to meet 
the crowd at Lubuk Rengas! They want to abduct him.’ Tuan Dalam offered, ‘If they 
want to kill you, they’d better come and do it here in the open. Don’t go, Wan Mahmud. 
They don’t want to consider anything, they want to trick you.’ Wan Mahmud, however, 
was still willing to walk to Lubuk Rengas with Abu Bakar, leaving Tuan Dalam 
scrambling to find a suitable weapon with which to defend him. At this time, there were 
still people in the mosque and also at Lubuk Rengas, and the crowd appeared to be 
increasing in size.756
Tuan Dalam finally convinced Wan Mahmud to return to his house to write a 
report o f these events to send to Kuala Terengganu. Sergeant Abdul Rahman, two other 
officers Harun and Zainal, and Abdullah, a kerani, sat there together with them, writing. 
Tuan Dalam suggested, ‘If we want to get [the report] there quickly, we could go by 
motorboat.’ Suddenly, at around eight at night, two men from Kampung Buluh arrived, 
one o f whom was Awang Kar, Tuan Dalam’s assistant. They reported that the crowd 
was on its way to Kuala Berang. Awang Kar had a parang, and Wan Mahmud grabbed 
his brother-in-law’s gun and bullets. Later that night, when the others had gone home 
and ‘even all the Chinese were asleep’, Tuan Dalam and Wan Mahmud stood in front of 
Wan Mahmud’s house, which they had designated as a meeting point.
At around 12:30 on the morning of 21 May, one Tuan Tengah bin Sayid Kadir 
arrived, calling out ‘Father Wan, Father Wan, they’ve crashed their way through (orang 
langgar dah)V The rebels had launched their occupation. The letter draft that Abu
756 Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 21 Zulhijjah 1346 [10 June 1928], SUK T 1432/1346. 
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Bakar wanted to consider had either been abandoned, or had been a ruse all along after 
all. Tuan Dalam described rushing to inform the Sergeant, then searching for Abu Bakar 
Ceting, whom he did not find, then returning to Wan Mahmud’s house, where several 
policemen and a few others had assembled. At around 2:30, they sent a man called Wan 
Muda across the river where some o f the crowd was still gathered. Another man, Sayid 
Rus, arrived in the meantime, saying 200 men had already crossed the river and were on 
their way.
At this point, a loud ‘prak’ sound was heard; it was a branch snapping. The 
Kuala Berang government men were growing more afraid. The Sergeant asked, ‘Will I 
have to shoot them?’ Tuan Dalam replied, ‘Yes lah.’ Tuan Dalam saw the 200 men. The 
sergeant requested permission to shoot, to which Tuan Dalam replied, ‘Yes lah, shoot.’ 
The sergeant replied, ‘But if I shoot, I might end up in jail. We don’t know yet if they 
are traitors [penderhaka] or not. It’s late at night.’ Wan Mahmud chimed in, ‘Ya, that’s 
true’. Tuan Dalam continued in his statement that they could hear a dog barking, but 
could not see anyone. They continued to wait in the dark, growing more anxious. When 
Tuan Dalam turned around, he saw the Sergeant and Wan Mahmud climbing into the 
motorboat, saying, ‘Two or three o f us can’t stop them.’ Tuan Dalam replied, ‘Why do 
you think they didn’t tell us they were coming here? They want to kill us!’
All the police and officials boarded the motorboat and set off downstream. 
They continued to flee to the sound of gunshots from Kampung Buluh, just as they saw 
the rebels’ lamps as they crossed the river.757 Abu Bakar’s coded statement to Tuan 
Dalam that there would be a ‘meeting’ that night had come to pass. But what about the 
letter, and what were the rebels’ real intentions? Wan Mahmud’s statement after the 
Kuala Berang officials’ flight downstream both corroborated Tuan Dalam’s, and 
reinforced the feeling o f sheer confusion, created on purpose by Abu Bakar. Wan 
Mahmud had actually been in contact with the rebels for days, and had heard another 
version o f their plans, again from Abu Bakar. The day before the Kuala Berang 
occupation, Abu Bakar had come to Wan Mahmud’s house several times. First he told
757 Statement by Tuan Dalam bin Sayid Ahmad, 21 Zulhijjah 1346 [10 June 1928], SUK T 1432/1346.
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Wan Mahmud there would be a gathering of rakyat the next day to write a letter to the 
Sultan. Then he informed him that the rebels would go to Kuala Terengganu, armed and 
en masse, to deliver the letter themselves.
Abu Bakar had said he wanted an audience with the Sultan to ask him to 
explain their rights. The purpose of the letter was to ask the Sultan to restore their land 
and forest access, which the Sultan had already done to some extent, at least in relation 
to the British regulations. Wan Mahmud described how suddenly, at around three that 
afternoon, Abu Bakar again arrived at Wan Mahmud’s house, this time with Encik 
Pilus. They asked him to come to Kampung Buluh to write the letter with them. When 
they arrived at the Kampung Buluh mosque, another man called Awang told him the 
kepala o f the group had instructed them all to go to Lubuk Rengas to write the letter 
there. Wan Mahmud also described how he was about to follow them, but was 
prevented from doing so by Tuan Dalam. Back in Kuala Berang at five that afternoon, 
Wan Muda from Kampung Buluh arrived and told him the group at Kampung Buluh 
intended to ‘smash up’ (rengkah) Kuala Berang. Apparently, the leader of the group
7^8which wished to damage the police station was one Haji Yusuf from Dungun.
Did Wan Mahmud’s information show that the rebels were split between a 
group which wished to write a letter and a group which wished to occupy the 
government offices? Or did the entire group in fact wish to occupy, using the letter as a 
trap, with some rebels urging that the premises be destroyed and others urging that they 
be occupied without damage? At seven Awang Kar and Mamat arrived, requesting 
weapons. Wan Mahmud gave Awang Kar a rifle and Mamat was presented with a 
golok. Wan Mahmud recounted how he stood on watch with several police officers, and 
went up to his house at around midnight to perform the prayers he had missed. At 
12:30, Tuan Tengah bin Sayid Qadir arrived with his report that the occupation had 
begun, apparently also mentioning that Haji Yusuf was the kepala o f the group. Wan 
Mahmud was also told that Awang Kar and Mamat had run to check on the rifle room.
Wan Mahmud’s account also referred to the dog barking at around one in the 
morning, its presence seemingly having added to the fear and stress the officials were
758 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 15 Zulhijjah 1346 [4 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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experiencing. The snapping branch was also mentioned, a result of the rebels having 
arrived on the bank the officials were on. Wan Mahmud also mentioned informing the 
police, who were afraid they would be arrested, that they could fire on the rebels. He 
also told of his decision to flee, with the addition that if they had not done so, the news 
would not have reached Kuala Terengganu. When Wan Mahmud arrived at the Chief 
Minister’s office, he was taken straight to the Commissioner of Police, British Adviser, 
and Sultan to account for himself.759
These statements by fleeing officials were rich with details about the uprising 
as it unfolded. They are the primary repository of eyewitness information about the 
morning of 21 May, and offer an insight into how even such an audacious uprising 
could appear confused and conflicted on the ground. They also show that the 
Terengganu authorities received contradictory information about the uprising’s purpose, 
especially on the matter of whether the rebels wished to ‘face’ or ‘fight’ the Sultan. On 
top of these contradictions, Wan Mahmud himself, writing on 20 May, also reported to 
the authorities that Abu Bakar Ceting had mentioned doing both:
The intention of the rakyat is to gain an audience with the Dato’ [Amar], 
and to ask to be released from all the payments in the way of earlier Rajas.
If the [meeting with the] Dato’ yields no result, their intention is then to gain 
an audience with the Raja. If that yields no result, then we intend to put up a 
fight [beri gaduh].
Wan Mahmud’s report also indicated that he advised them to write a letter. He also 
added, T think the passes alone cannot be the root cause’.760
These conflicting reports make clear not only that the moment of the Kuala 
Berang occupation was complicated, but also that the uprising may have carried 
contradictory intent. It may have been produced by groups of rebels with separate, 
competing political aims and varying levels of militancy. The differences between these 
groups may have resulted in a compromise, to first attempt dialogue with, and then only 
fight, the Sultan. Alternatively, the confusion may have reflected a fractious movement,
759 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 15 Zulhijjah 1346 [4 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
760 District Officer, Kuala Berang to SUK T, 30 Zulkaedah 1346 [20 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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in which individuals and interests jostled for a hearing, and in which differences could 
not be resolved. In this environment Abu Bakar Ceting, just one player out of many, 
may have revised his position several times, or he might have purposefully fed the 
authorities contradictory and misleading information. Further, in addition to these 
reports from Kuala Berang, the uprising’s archive also records Haji Drahman and Sayid 
Sagaf s reported intention to rule Terengganu with the former Sultan Muhammad, after 
Sulaiman’s overthrow. The uprising’s eyewitnesses could not reconcile the uprising’s 
conflicting messages.
Arrests and Evidence
For the government in Kuala Terengganu, the lack of clarity was evidently a serious 
problem, and all the more so from 21 May. Officials made contingency plans based on 
the worst-case scenario— that the rebels might arrive in Kuala Terengganu any day. 
Nerves were evidently frayed, and Mills, the Acting Commissioner o f Police, reported 
that Dato’ Amar was ‘very anxious’ about the rebels arriving in town. 761 Kuala 
Telemong was a post o f only three police officers, and no other officials were stationed 
there. All British families in Kuala Terengganu were moved to the homes o f officials, 
with the men recruited to patrol their surrounds.762 Malay volunteers were also recruited 
and sent upriver to guard the Manir Police Station, but they disregarded Mills’ orders 
and were stripped of their authority.76’ At seven in the evening Dato’ Lela and the 
others who had been present in Kuala Telemong that morning arrived, ‘tired out but 
pleased with themselves’ for having stopped the rebels. At this stage, however, no-one 
in the capital could predict without doubt the disintegration o f the movement, and so 
Mills sent officers to Bukit Payung and Chabang Tiga to defend their police stations.764
The next day, 22 May, police reinforcements from the FMS arrived, totalling 
two officers and fifty ‘rank and file’, under the leadership of Mr. O’Connell. Sultan
761 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 26, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
762 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 26, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
763 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 27, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
764 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 28, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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Sulaiman also quickly granted Mills a tauliah, a letter of authorisation, allowing him to 
take whatever steps he considered necessary to end the uprising. Notices were also 
issued offering rewards for the capture of twelve leaders, whose names were suggested 
by Dato’ Amar.765 Penghulu were now asked to spread information outward from the 
capital, including a special notice the Sultan issued urging anyone who had joined the 
rebels, either willingly or by compulsion, to surrender themselves peacefully to the 
authorities. Those who were pressured would be forgiven.766
A second notice was issued by the Sultan prohibiting rakyat from carrying 
weapons between the capital and the hulu. The penalty for rakyat caught with a weapon 
was arrest, or if they offered resistance, they would be shot by police.767 Only those 
issued with a ticket were permitted to carry arms, and lists were drawn up of people 
who owned guns. 768 Such lists represented the authorities attempting to quantify 
numbers on the government side, and they contained a large number of titled aristocrats. 
Wan Mahmud was also issued with thirty tickets, and penghulu were granted them in 
various numbers. 766 Later, another list, this time o fpendekar (warriors) was drawn, and 
pendekar were called up to guard the Sultan’s palace. With names like Mat Min Hitam 
(Mat Min the Black) and Salleh Gagah (Salleh the Heroic), they were sure to be 
frightening. 770 Some rakyat hulu were recruited to guard the palace, and a lorry was 
borrowed from the Kuala Terengganu town council to transport them between shifts.771 
Some FMS police were sent to guard the Customs Office and to patrol Kuala 
Terengganu, while O’Connell and the Assistant Commissioner of Police Tungku 
Muhammad were sent to arrest Che Leh, Haji Drahman’s son, in Kampung Beladau
765 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 29, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
766 ‘Pemberitahu klias dengan titah Duli Yang Maha Mulia al Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah 
Kerajaan Terengganu’, [n.d] Zulhijjah 1346 [May-June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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768 ‘List nama orang yang ada senapang di dalam bandar’, n.d., SUK T 1295/1346.
769 ‘List nama orang yang ada senapang di dalam bandar’, n.d., SUK T 1295/1346.
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1295/1346.
241
772Kolam. They did not find him, but confiscated some weapons from his house. “ On the 
following day, 23 May, police made a raid on Kampung Pasir Pulau Babi to find Abu 
Bakar Ceting and Mat Pitas, but they were not found either. On 24 May, O’Connell and
77Ttwenty police travelled up the Nerus River to meet withpenghulu and reassure them.
The next day, having heard a rumour that 2,000 rebels had again occupied 
Kuala Berang, Mills himself travelled into the hulu. Mills noted that ‘information was 
so thoroughly unreliable and unsatisfactory that I felt I had better go m yself.774 This 
trip became the key information-gathering and arrest mission of the Terengganu and 
FMS police. A mission consisted o f a large number of men, namely
Mr. Trump, E.E., and Mr. Dorrity, an Assistant Engineer (who has 
remarkable knowledge o f the Malays and of the river), a Dresser...and a 
total o f 30 men (inclusive) Terengganu Police, and o f 23 Federated Malay 
States Police.775
This force travelled upriver in six large motorboats, including one belonging to Haji 
Drahman, which Mills commandeered ‘[f]or moral effect’.776
By the time they returned to Kuala Terengganu on 4 June, the police sweep had 
arrested Haji Karia, Ismail Kuala Pueh, Haji Tahir, Penghulu Salleh, Che Isa, Mamat 
Tok Pitas, Abdullah Jurukaka, Abu Bakar Ceting and Lebai Hasan. Some of these 
Islamists surrendered, others were ‘enticed to come in’, and others pointed out by 
informers, to whom $310 was paid in rewards.777 Guns and other weapons were also 
confiscated. Mills reported that on the journey upriver, the banks were deserted, and 
villages contained ‘practically only women’. On the return journey, riverbanks ‘had 
recovered their normal aspect, and the people on the banks did not run away from [the 
police]’. It also appeared that the group of rebels advocating ‘smashing’ the government 
buildings had lost the debate, and they remained undamaged after the occupation. Men
772 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 29, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
777 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 30, C0717/6L52432.
774 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 30, C0717/61:52432.
775 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 30, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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were also recruited by corvee to ‘clean up Kuala Brang’, which was deserted when the 
police arrived.
Figure 11: Arrested rebels are displayed in a town council lorry in Kuala Terengganu before a 
crowd of onlookers, FMS police and Mr. O’Connell (extreme left). Courtesy of the Arkib Negara 
Malaysia.
Mills and the other police also found several important pieces o f evidence in 
various houses they raided. For example, O’Connell found an ‘invulnerable war-coat of 
white cloth with Arabic and some Jawi characters on it’, at the house o f one Haji Muda 
bin Haji Him.7™ At Mat Zin’s house, Tungku Muhammad found a book with the names 
o f 800 rakyat from up and down the Terengganu River system, dated 1343 (1924-1925). 
This list o f names could have been the very same list that Wok bin Mamat had compiled 
o f rakyat who assisted in clearing Tengku Nik Haji’s land. That same day, at a river 
landing site outside Mat Zin’s house, Mills also found fourteen rafts, fifty feet long and 
fit to carry 25 people each.774 By 9 June, however, Mat Zin and Che Leh, the men Mills
77S Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 32, C 0 7 17/61:52432. 
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considered ‘the most powerful o f the leaders’ after Haji Drahman,780 had still not been 
found.781 Nevertheless, between 15 and 22 June, the FMS police left Terengganu.782
Figure 12: An ‘invulnerability’ vest, embroidered with Qur’anic text. Courtesy of the Kelantan 
Museum of Islam.
7X0 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 34, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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The Official Narrative
On Mills’ return, the evidence gathered in the police sweeps through the hulu was fed 
into the most important and systematic attempt by British and Malay officials to 
understand the uprising, its mobilisation and its meaning. This attempt was the 
Thomson Inquiry, led by H.W. Thomson, the British Resident in Perak, in June 1928. 
Thomson, selected to ensure an outsider’s impartiality, was instructed on 14 June by the 
Chief Secretary of Government in Singapore to perform a ‘full and searching enquiry’ 
into the ‘disturbance’, 7lSl and travelled immediately from Perak to Terengganu, via 
Singapore. In Terengganu, the information Thomson relied on was heavily shaped by 
Mills, reinforced by Millington’s account of events.
Thomson proceeded with some diligence, spending around a fortnight 
interviewing some thirty people with an interest in the action, including a retinue of 
British and Malay officials at all levels, including Dato’ Amar, State Commissioner 
Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, and Dato’ Lela. Senior police, such as former Assistant 
Commissioner Dato’ Pahlawan and Tungku Muhammad were also questioned, as was 
Tungku Abdullah, an Inspector. Senior land and revenue officials also gave statements, 
including Commissioner of Lands G.A.C. de Moubray and Collector of Land Revenue 
H.P. Bryson. Kuala Berang and Kuala Telemong officials were also interviewed, 
including Wan Mahmud, Sergeant Drahman, Tuan Dalam and a Kuala Telemong 
penghulu, Che Yusofbin Abdul Rahman.
Most importantly for the inquiry’s sense of balance and breadth, a number of 
rebel leaders were also questioned. Key interviewees included some of the arrested 
Islamists themselves, including Penghulu Salleh, Haji Tahir, Abdullah Jurukaka, Ismail 
Kuala Pueh, Haji Karia and Mamat Tok Pitas. Haji Musa Minangkabau was also 
questioned, as were new personalities from among the rakyat who became known only 
after their arrest, including Latif bin Hamat, Mahmat bin Musa, Abu Bakar bin 
Drahman, Isa bin Haji Mamat, Ungku Mat bin Ungku Wok, Tayit bin Jusoh and Imam 
Taib. The scholars Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf were also questioned, as was Che
7X3 H W Thomson, ‘Memorandum’, 30 June 1928, p. 1, C 0 7 17/61:52432 ‘Disturbances in Trengganu’.
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Leh, who had by now been arrested. Mat Zin, still at large, did not appear before the 
inquiry, and his continued evasion o f the police drew comment on 13 July from Sir H. 
Marriott, the High Commissioner for the Malay States, who noted that all the other rebel 
leaders had been ‘captured without any attempt being made to offer active
• 784resistance’.
Despite Mat Zin’s absence, Thomson released his report on 30 June. It was 
only eight pages long, but was backed by extensive appendices, including the interview 
transcripts and a few exhibits, such as the letter which mentioned the Bend era Stambul. 
With this extra material, the report amounted to 126 pages, and represented the input of 
a large and diverse cast of characters. Regardless, the Thomson Report was not a 
decisive explanation o f the uprising’s politics, nor did it answer how it could have been 
organised. Thomson admitted as much, writing, ‘I am unable to give definitively the 
“cause and origin” of the outbreak’. Nevertheless, he had ‘formed [his] own 
conclusion’, and decided that no additional time spent questioning people could 
possibly have yielded any more solid explanations. ' On 13 July, Marriott forwarded 
Thomson’s report to the Colonial Office, noting again that the report was ‘unable 
definitely to determine the cause and origin of the recent occurrences’.786
Shortcomings aside, Thomson’s was the only official colonial inquiry which 
attempted to explain the uprising at all, and his report formed the authorities’ key 
explanatory framework within which to situate the uprising. For 1920s officials, and 
historians o f Terengganu since, it has formed an important foundation stone upon which 
contemporary historical knowledge o f the Terengganu uprising has been built. Yet in 
this document, new material about the movement came to light which had not been 
reported before, and the language around the uprising changed radically as British 
officials sought to interpret that material. Most importantly, the Thomson Report 
displayed a strong tendency for British officials to search for, and believe more readily, 
reasons other than the rakyat's land and forest grievances for the uprising’s possibility.
784 Sir H. Marriott to Colonial Office, 13 July 1928, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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The Hidden Hand
Despite the flood of reports and the new evidence uncovered by police, there was no 
decisive proof of what form of organisation the rebels created for themselves. These 
were conditions of uncertainty for British officials, caused by the fragmentary nature of 
their knowledge of the movement. Given they could not decisively determine the nature 
of the threat to themselves that they had just quelled; the movement appeared to them to 
be secret. British officials began to focus on secrecy as a characteristic of the 
movement, and Millington, in particular, concluded most strongly that the Terengganu 
uprising must have been organised by a ‘Muhammadan secret society’. Millington 
made this connection most explicitly in his 22 June statement to Thomson. In this 
statement, Millington also referred to a ‘Central Rebel Organisation’ composed of Mat 
Zin, Tok Janggut, Ismail Kuala Pueh, Yusuf Hitam, Tungku Jafar, and ‘others’. Their 
aims were to ‘overthrow the present Government, Sultan, and all Europeans, to hoist the 
Red Flag of the Secret Society or the “Bendera Stamboul’” .788 In one sense, the idea of 
a secret society being involved was not a mistake. The Terengganu rebels were, after 
all, mobilising rakyat in ways which, in general, they did not purposefully reveal to 
British or Malay government officials.
The connection between a secret society and the uprising was made by 
following an apparent thread formed by disparate pieces of evidence, all demonstrating 
the presence of some kind of organisation in Terengganu. The book of names that Mills 
found at Mat Zin’s house was taken as proof of its existence, as was a series of letters 
presented to Thomson by Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, including that referring to the Bendera 
Stambul. This letter, apparently written by Sayid Sagaf and Haji Drahman, was 
translated as addressing ‘brothers in Islam’ who had ‘entered the Society’.784 Another
7S7 For an understanding of how many diverse organisations were described as ‘Malay secret societies’ in 
the northern Malay states, refer to Mahani Musa, Kongsi Gelap Melayu Di Negeri-Negeri Utara Pantai 
Barat Semenanjung Tanah Melayu, 1821 Hingga 1940-An, MBRAS Monographs (Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2003). Outside British colonial explanatory frameworks, 
the varied social influences of such organisations, formal and informal, remain unclear.
7SS Statement by W.M. Millington, 22 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 3, C0717/6L52432.
7S9 ‘Exhibit R \ Thomson Report, p. 139, C0717/6L52432. Refer to Figure 8 in Chapter 4, above.
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two letters, labelled ‘Exhibit Q’ and ‘Exhibit S’ by Dato’ Jaya Perkasa, were also signed 
by the two scholars and were translated as addressing people ‘who belong to the 
Association’.740 These letters were also signed by Tok Janggut, Haji Karia, and two 
unknown men called Othman and Jabal. The letters were intended to be secret, as 
another, ‘Exhibit P’, demonstrated. A section o f this unsigned letter was translated to 
read:
After acquainting yourself with the contents o f this letter do not leave it 
about but tear it up or bum it or throw it away— and do not send it 
downstream, but spread this information only. Do not let the Police know.741
On 4 June, Haji Musa Minangkabau was also discovered to keep ‘many secret letters’ at 
his house.742
With this evidence the Terengganu authorities had established the presence o f a 
society, its secrecy, and the involvement within it o f the uprising’s Islamist leadership. 
Mills combined this information to identity the organisation involved— the Syarikat 
Islam. Mills also revealed that the police had known of the Syarikat for some time, and 
he had a list o f Syarikat members in Hulu Marang which his predecessor, M.L. Wynne, 
had given him. Mills had given the list to O’Connell to take on his mission to the hulu, 
indicating that he suspected the Syarikat’s involvement before the new membership list 
or letters were found. He also already connected Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf with 
the Syarikat. Wynne had written on the list, for Mills’ reference: ‘These are all under 
the banner of Syed Sagaff They form a wing (Marang) of the army o f Haji Draman.’ 
Mills had also heard that Jusuh bin Hitam, who later insisted he had only been eating 
sticky rice, was the leader o f the Marang wing.793
Perhaps Jusuh’s mistaken arrest was justified. After all, the Syarikat Islam was 
indeed secret from the authorities, who had acted on whatever information came to 
hand. For the Syarikat this secrecy was necessary because it had apparently been denied
790 ‘Exhibit Q’ and ‘Exhibit S’, Thomson Report, pp. 138, 140, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
791 ‘Exhibit P \  Thomson Report, p. 137, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
792 SUK T to Commissioner of Police, 15 Zulhijjah 1346 [4 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
793 Statement by E.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 32, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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government permission to establish itself legally in Terengganu in 1923. This denial of 
permission was carried out on the basis of a 1918 government decision, which it 
announced by circular. It stated that groups or organisations formed ‘with the intention 
or agreement to fight against others or cooperate in matters or deeds which are 
forbidden by the syariah or the government’ would not be permitted to exist legally in 
Terengganu.794 Yet the Syarikat’s continued existence, and the apparent confirmation 
that Haji Drahman and Sayid Sagaf were involved in it, appears to have also filled an 
important credibility gap for British officials in Terengganu.
Millington and Mills, in particular, demonstrated a strong tendency to believe 
that some mysterious agency must have been involved in organising the rebels. This 
tendency reflected their more general, a priori assumption that the rakyat were not 
agents in their own right, and that their grievances were too trivial to have motivated 
them to rebellion. Thomson, for example, noted that hundreds, and sometimes 
thousands, of people were organised to assemble at specific times. To him, it was 
‘difficult to believe that such gatherings could be due to nothing more than the relatively 
trivial grievances as to passes for planting padi; the taking of timber and other materials 
for their own use; and the tying up of buffaloes. I am inclined to think that these were 
only superficial troubles’.79^ Thomson also suspected that the rakyat were probably 
more aggrieved by the Sultan’s cap system, and so they must have been manipulated by 
religious leaders.796 The cap system was in reality also a factor in the uprising’s Islamist 
politics, and Thomson’s sensitivity to this was not misguided. Yet Thomson held that 
the Sultan’s meeting with the rakyat in Kuala Berang in April, and the subsequent relief 
they were offered from several of the land and forest regulations, should have 
substantially alleviated the rakyat's original grievances. Therefore, for Thomson, ‘from
794 ‘Pemberitahu Kerajaan Terengganu’, 7 Rabiulakhir 1336 [20 January 1918], SUK T 1033/1342: 
‘Pakatan Syarikat Islam’. The circular is the only document in the file other than its cover, indicating only 
that it was probably used to support a discussion between officials regarding the Syarikat Islam. This 
discussion may have taken place in response to an application for registration.
795 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, pp. 2-3, C 0717/61:52432.
796 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 3, C 0717/61:52432.
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this time onwards, it [was] obvious that the armed gatherings [were] due to some other
, 797cause .
Having discounted the rakyat's own grievances as motivations for them to join 
the Islamist leaders in rebellion, Thomson concluded that the uprising’s Islamist 
character was further proof that the rakyat could not have organised themselves. He 
noted that:
[e]ven before the first assembly had collected in the Tersat, the word “Sabil”
[was] introduced, and after that the attitude [was] adopted that the ways of 
the Government are the ways of the infidel, “kafir”, and that to obey the 
regulations of Government is to incur infamy in the sight of all true 
Muhammadans. 798
To Thomson, the rakyat could not have arrived at this political position without 
instigation ‘from some more educated leader or leaders.’ Yet he also doubted that the 
movement’s Islamist leadership could have possessed the ‘necessary knowledge’ to lead 
such a campaign, ‘with the possible exception of Che Smail [Ismail Kuala Pueh], Haji 
Zakariah, Haji Musa, Che Leh and one or two others. ’799 This would still have left five 
or six people capable of leading the movement, but nevertheless, Thomson felt their 
influence was too local, too limited to the hulu area. 800
Ultimately, there must have been some other agency involved. Now, the 
association between the Islamists and the Syarikat Islam began to fill the explanatory 
gap. Yet more evidence was also pointing to the likelihood that the Syarikat may itself 
have been an instrument, this time of Haji Drahman. In making the connection between 
the Syarikat and the Haji, the Haji’s frequent travel to Pahang emerged as particularly 
important. For the month before the uprising, the Haji had been in Kemaman, where he 
had been under observation. There he had been overheard telling people he had been 
falsely accused of involvement in the uprising, when he had in fact been occupied with
797 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 3, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
798 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 3, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
799 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 3, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
800 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 4, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
801 Statement by W.M. Millington, 22 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 7, C 0 7 17/61:52432. 
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selling his kebitn in Beserah, on the Pahang coast, because he was about to leave for 
Mecca.802 His presence in Beserah had been confirmed to Dato’ Amar, who heard from 
the Kemaman State Commissioner that the Haji had travelled between Kemaman and 
Beserah twice before eventually returning to Kuala Terengganu. Later, Haji Drahman 
denied leading or participating in the movement, citing his presence in Beserah as proof 
of his innocence.804
These denials, however, only implicated Haji Drahman all the more. As Mills 
later noted to Thomson of the Haji’s trip to Beserah, ‘[t]his I believe to be true, but it
on r
must be remembered that Beserah was a “cell” of the Sharikat-ul-IslamY This was 
also true. The Syarikat Islam was known to operate legally in Beserah, having registered 
with the Registrar of Societies in Pahang in 1924.806 Further implicating himself, Haji 
Drahman had posted a letter from Temerloh, also in Pahang, to Haji Tahir. The letter 
was intercepted and sent to the Terengganu authorities by Lim Paik Hong in the 
Terengganu General Post Office.807 Further, on his way back from Pahang and 
Kemaman, Haji Drahman had stopped for a time in Dungun, another centre in which the 
Syarikat was believed to be operating.M'8 To make matters worse for the Haji, Dato’ 
Amar told Thomson, l[a]s to the Sharikat-ul-Islam, I remember a Syed Mohamed 
coming from Johore, and trying to enlist people here. I opposed him, and he went to the 
house of Haji Draman’.800
802 State Commissioner, Kemaman to Dato’ Amar Diraja, 2 Zulkaedah 1346 [22 April 1928], SUK T 
1295/1346.
803 State Commissioner, Kemaman to Dato’ Amar Diraja, 2 Zulkaedah 1346 [22 April 1928], SUK T 
1295/1346.
804 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 31, C0717/61:52432.
805 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 31, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
8(Ul District Officer, Kuantan to British Resident, Pahang, 29 July 1924, BRP [British Resident Pahang] 
1381/1923: ‘Sharikat at Islam at Beserah’.
807 General Post Office, Terengganu to SUK T, 21 Zulhijjah 1346 [9 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
8118 State Commissioner, Kemaman to Dato’ Amar Diraja, 2 Zulkaedah 1346 [22 April 1928], SUK T 
1295/1346.
804 Statement by Dato’ Seri Amar Diraja, 24 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 35, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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A chain o f evidentiary connections had been formed linking Haji Drahman,
through the Syarikat Islam, to the Islamists and 800 rakyat. This now explained the
movement’s ability to mobilise mass action despite the Islamists lack of capacity for
political leadership. This information was sufficient for Thomson, even after
acknowledging the lack o f conclusions in his report, to declare that ‘the whole
movement was organised by Haji Draman Lim bong\810 Haji Drahman, after all, already
possessed a large following among the rakyat, whom British officials believed to be
credulous and fanatical, in his thrall. Further, through an organisation like the Syarikat,
even uneducated local leaders like Mat Zin could become powerful and persuasive.
Mills was also so convinced o f the Haji’s ultimate responsibility that on 4 June, during
the police operation he was leading in the hulu, he returned to Kuala Terengganu to see
Millington. Mills wished to ‘urge the absolute necessity...of Haji Draman’s leaving the 
811country at once’.
Other than official assertions that the Syarikat was a secret society, there are no 
Terengganu records which describe the group. The only available indication comes 
from Temerloh, where the penghulu, Tuan Tengah bin Tuan Wok, applied to register a 
Syarikat Islam with the Pahang authorities in 1923. Tuan Tengah sent a list o f the 
Syarikat’s office-bearers and rules to the District Officer in Kuantan on 25 May. The 
rules immediately caused concern in official circles, as they referred to the principles o f 
mutual Muslim assistance that British officials had come to associate with secret 
societies. These included the following sections under Rule Seven:
2. Any members o f this Sharikat is known to have been unfairly treated and 
unlegally fined will be given a help o f $5/- for each case.
3. Any members of this Sharikat having any troubles with the outsiders in 
connection with this Sharikat and religious affairs, if any fines inflicted the 
Sharikat shall give a help of $10/- the limit, for each case.
810 H.W. Thomson, Thomson Report, p. 4.
811 Statement by L.L. Mills, 23 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 31, C 0 7 17/61:52432. 
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4. Any members of this Sharikat having any troubles with the outsiders, if 
the matter are unlawful and if they ask for assistance, this Sharikat will give
O 1 'J
all the necessary assistance they can [sic].
The District Officer immediately ‘took exception’ to the Syarikaf s seventh 
rule, and, having forwarded the rules to the Pahang Deputy Kadi, obtained his 
agreement that these sections should be ‘expunged or modified’.813 These rules, after 
all, explicitly referred to Syarikat members assisting each other to pay fines levied by 
the government (‘the outsiders’), whenever members breached laws the Syarikat felt to 
be unfair. Further, the Syarikat was also prepared to defend itself, and its views on 
religious affairs, outside the bureaucratic framework for managing religion established 
by the colonial government. This framework was represented by the Deputy Kadi. In 
addition to these sections of Rule Seven, the District Officer also objected to Rule 
Three, which stated that:
Religious studies will be given in this Sharikat on the following nights, 
Saturdays, Mondays and Wednesdays from 8:00 pm till 11:00 pm the least.
814
To the District Officer, this represented a desire to establish:
a Muhammadan Society not controlled by persons invested with religious 
authority by His Highness the Sultan, with the possible if not probable result 
of a religious cleavage among the Muhammadans of the place.815
This carried ‘considerable possibilities of breaches of the peace’.816
Nevertheless, Rule Three was permitted to stand, and Tuan Tengah was 
directed to remove the offending sections of Rule Seven. Tuan Tengah responded by 
writing that they were ‘not at all proscribed by the syariah or the laws of the government
812 ‘Rules of the Beserah Sharikat al Islam’, appended to Tuan Tengah bin Tuan Wok to District Officer , 
Kuantan, 25 May 1923, BRP 1381/1923.
813 District Officer, Kuantan to BRP, 26 July 1923, BRP 1381/1923.
814 ‘Rules of the Beserah Sharikat al Islam’, appended to Tuan Tengah bin Tuan Wok to District Officer , 
Kuantan, 25 May 1923, BRP 1381/1923.
815 District Officer, Kuantan to British Resident, Pahang, 26 July 1923, BRP 1382/1923.
81(1 District Officer, Kuantan to British Resident, Pahang, 26 July 1923, BRP 1382/1923.
253
and would be maintained by the Syarikat’.817 His ‘flat refusal’818 to amend the rules, 
however, was not accepted, and the Syarikat was registered without those sections in its 
rules under the 1913 Societies Enactment on 19 January 1925.819 Between 1923 and 
1924 the Kuantan District Officer had changed his mind about the need to accept the 
Syarikat’s existence, writing in 1924 that ‘[t]he Society has been a fait accompli for a 
long time. Mere non-recognition will not efface it. Only active repression will do 
that’.820
By 1925 the Syarikat Islam was no longer a secret in Pahang. It was a legally- 
registered organisation with the following aims:
1. To promote the religious course among its members.
2. To recognise and act in all the festival days during each month and 
year.
3. To give necessary assistance to the funerals o f its members, their 
wives, children and parents.
4. To attend and assist its members in connection with marriage and 
circumcision.
5. To assist members by settling disputes amongst them whenever 
possible.821
Yet it seemed that in Terengganu, Haji Drahman had been behaving in ways more in 
keeping with the expunged sections o f Rule Seven. In February or March 1928, one 
Tuan Long gave a statement to the Kuala Berang Magistrate which informed authorities 
that Haji Drahman had discussed raising $500 with Penghulu Salleh. The money was 
required to assist one Habib Mustafa, who had been fined for an unspecified offence. “  
Another statement by the penghulu in Padang Buloh indicated that whatever 
organisation the Terengganu Islamists had formed, its influence might also have spread 
to Kelantan. The penghulu informed Dato’ Amar that rakyat from the Kelantan 
hinterland had also arrived in Kampung Pasir Nering, to participate in the occupation o f
817 Tuan Tengah bin Tuan Wok to District Officer, Kuantan, 2 July 1923, BRP 1381/1923.
818 District Officer, Kuantan to BRP, 26 July 1923, BRP 1381/1923.
819 BRP, 19 January 1925, BRP 1381/1923.
820 District Officer, Kuantan to BRP, 29 July 1924, BRP 1381/1923.
821 ‘Rules of the Beserah Sharikat al Islam’, appended to Tuan Tengah bin Tuan Wok to District Officer , 
Kuantan, 25 May 1923, BRP 1381/1923.
822 Tuan Long to Magistrate, Kuala Berang, 25 Zulkaedah 1346 [15 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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the Kuala Berang offices. “ Could this have been the proof of the Islamists’ 1925 claim 
that they could gather the whole state, ‘from Kelantan to Kemaman’?
Whatever its reach, the Syarikat Islam appears to have been modelled on the 
organisation of the same name active in the Netherlands Indies, and which had helped to 
lead mass agitation against Dutch rule in Sumatra and Java in the 1910s and 1920s.824 
As in Terengganu, political life in the Indies at this time was also marked by a rich 
tradition of ‘pan-Islamic’, pro-Turkish radicalism, apparent in the politics of the mass 
organisations which formed there during this period. In the east coast Malay states of 
the peninsula, too, the presence of a pro-Turkish organisation was feared in the same 
year the Syarikat Islam applied to register itself. The presence of Turkish jewel traders 
from Java in Patani during an uprising against Siam in 1923 raised rumours to this 
effect. After their deportation by Siamese authorities, J.F. Johns from the British 
Consulate in Singgora heard that ‘a society had been formed on the Malay Peninsula for 
the support of Islam and that branches were to be established in Pattani’. ~ To what 
extent the various societies, real and suspected, of the peninsular east coast were 
connected with the Syarikat Islam in Java and Sumatra remains a mystery.
The Red Flag’s Double Life
Such mysteries notwithstanding, the involvement of the Terengganu Syarikat Islam, 
characterised officially as a secret society, was now confirmed in the uprising. But why 
would it wish to raise a red flag? Was the red flag the ‘Red Flag of the Secret Society’ 
as Millington had stated to Thomson? For British officials, there was every reason to 
believe this. Indeed, the red flag was suggestive of one known example of a Malay 
Muslim ‘secret society’—itself named Red Flag—which had been active in Penang and 
Kedah since around the 1830s.826 British officials discovered the Red Flag and its
s2' Penghulu, Padang Buloh to Dato’ Amar Diraja, 1 Zulhijjah 1346 [21 May 1928], SUK T 1295/1346. 
824 Refer to Shiraishi, Age in Motion.
s2:> J.F. Johns, ‘Report on the disturbances in Pattani during January, February and March 1923’, 9 March 
1923, p. 5, C 0 7 17/31: 22418: ‘Disaffection among Malay population in Pattani district’.
s2<> Mahani Musa, Kongsi Gelap Melayu, clip. 3.
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nemesis, the White Flag, in Penang after a riot there in 1867, which they found to have 
been orchestrated by alliances o f Chinese and Malay secret societies. The Red Flag was 
believed to have formed ten to twelve years before the riot, and to have allied itself with 
the Toh Peh Kong, a Chinese society, while the White Flag allied itself with the Ghee 
Hin.827
Understood in the context of this nineteenth-century experience, the Bendera 
Stambul in Terengganu began a radically different symbolic career in the years after 
1928. It was emplotted within an alternative historical narrative, in which its red colour, 
and potential association with the Red Flag, was more important than its Turkish-ness, 
and its apparent association with the Caliphate. Removed from its regional historical 
context, where it was a symbol o f resistance to European encroachment, the red flag 
entered a British imperial imaginary based on fear and threat, produced by official 
interpretations o f partial and fragmented knowledge. The flag came to symbolise the 
mysterious gap at the heart of colonial knowledge in Terengganu and elsewhere— how 
did challenges to British rule, Islamist or otherwise, materialise?
The seeds o f an alternative emplotment were already present in the Thomson 
Report. G.A.C. de Moubray was the first to make the connection between the red flag 
and the Red Flag. In his statement to Thomson, de Moubray noted:
I received information fairly early from a Penghulu who went up through 
the “rebel assemblies” that Haji Abdul Rahman [Haji Drahman] o f Pulau 
Babi and Bladau had issued the orders for these assemblies to collect; and 
that the Red Flag Society was concerned. This society is always known as 
the “Bendera Merah” [Red Flag] here, and was started in 1341 [1922-23], 
about five and a half years ago, by some gang-robbers, who were eventually
o 9  o
rounded up at Paka.
Now a chain o f connections between Haji Drahman, the Islamists, the uprising and the 
Red Flag Secret Society had been made.
827 Mahani Musa, "Malays and the Red and White Flag Societies in Penang, 1830s-1920s," Journal o f the 
Malaysian Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society 72, no. 2 (1999), 152-53.
828 Statement by G.A.C. de Moubray, 26 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 61, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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Later, this association was developed by Wynne, for whom the red flag in 
Terengganu demonstrated the development of an anti-British ‘Muhammadan 
fanaticism’ and criminality. Wynne had served in Terengganu during the 1920s, and 
during this time had struggled to understand the roots of the hulu discontent. He had 
provided Mills with the list of Syarikat Islam members which he used in 1928. 
Previously, in 1925, Wynne had responded to the crowd on Tengku Nik Haji’s land. It 
was Wynne who discovered that the letters summoning the rakyat to attend had 
displayed Haji Drahman’s name, although Mat Zin had stated that he had used it in the 
Haji’s place. Wynne nevertheless suspected the Haji’s involvement, but could not 
confirm it. He later admitted to the serving British Adviser, J.L. Humphreys, that ‘[i]t 
[was] practically impossible for a European to see and speak to him’. Wynne had ‘lived 
near him for two years’, but did even ‘know him by sight. A glimpse of an infidel [was]
829said to send this fanatic [Haji Drahman] into a state of mind bordering on frenzy’.
In 1941, however, after more than a decade to reflect on what he learned in 
Terengganu, Wynne produced his narrative. It was a comprehensive study of secret 
societies in Malaya, titled Triad and Tabut. Subtitled A Survey o f the Origin and 
Diffusion o f Chinese and Mohamedan Secret Societies in the Malay Peninsula AD 
1800-1935, the book argued that the Red Flag society had spread to Trengganu through 
Pahang. In Wynne’s work the Pahang secret society connection, however, predated the 
Syarikat’s establishment and Haji Drahman’s travels to Beserah. It even predated 
another, older connection which Dato’ Amar mentioned in 1928, stating that a Sayid 
Abdul Rahman from Balok, in Pahang, had once come to Terengganu with news of the
o -> r\
Syarikat. There had apparently been an unregistered Syarikat in Balok for a time 
before the registered Syarikat in Beserah, which was viewed by the authorities as a 
‘centre for disaffection and defiance’. For Wynne, the connection was even older, 
established during Tokku Paloh’s time, before his break with the state and Haji
820 J.W. Simmons, ‘Report’, 10 July 1925, p. 2, C0717/61:52432.
830 Sartono, in his study of agrarian discontent in Java, has asked whether the Turkish flag, often flown by 
rebels, was adopted by the Syarikat Islam as its own flag. See Sartono Kartodirjo, Protest Movements in 
Rural Java: A Study o f Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 44.
831 District Officer, Kuantan to BRP, 29 July 1924, BRP 1381/1923.
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Drahman’s rise to prominence. Wynne argued that the Pahang rebels who stayed with 
Tokku Paloh ‘may well have been Red Flag Malays, who had caught the [secret society] 
infection from the Chinese miners there’ . 832
For Wynne, because Tokku Paloh ‘fostered’ the Pahang uprising, he must have 
himself been ‘infected’ by the urge to form secret societies. Tokku Paloh then passed 
the infection to his legatees, Haji Drahman and the other Islamists. As Wynne stated:
We shall show in a subsequent Chapter XXVII the influence which this 
Trengganu Sayid (Ungku Sayid of Chabang Tiga) [Tokku Paloh] and his 
followers wielded in connection with a minor rising in Trengganu in 
1928.833
Unfortunately the promised Chapter XXVII, in which Wynne would have elaborated 
this connection, was in a section o f the manuscript claimed to have been destroyed 
during the Japanese occupation in the Second World War. Wynne did, however, go 
on to state that the Siamese agents who ‘half-heartedly’ assisted Clifford in tracking the 
Pahang rebels through Terengganu ‘belonged to the other camp’. This other camp was 
the White Flag. 835
832 Wynne, Triad and Tabut, 420.
Ibid., 421.
834 Ibid., v.
835 Ibid., 421. 
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Figure 13: Mervyn Llewellyn Wynne, Terengganu Police Commissioner, in 1923. Courtesy of the 
Arkib Negara Malaysia.
The Hidden Other Hand
Wynne had worked hard, ‘during such spare time as was available to a very busy Police 
Officer’ , 836 to fit the Terengganu uprising into his history of occultist fanaticism and 
criminality. Yet his narrative did not close off an alternative understanding of how the 
rebels mobilised the rakyat. Under this explanation, the rebels were members of the 
Naksyabandiyah tarekat. This explanation is also plausible, especially for historians 
skeptical that an uprising of rakyat defending their livelihoods could have its roots in 
Muslim criminality. Further, it is known that Tokku Paloh was a Naksyabandi, and that
836 W.L. Blythe, "Foreword," in Triad and Tabut: A Survey of the Origin and Diffusion of Chinese and 
Mohamedan Secret Societies in the Malay Peninsula, A.D. 1800-1935 (Singapore: WT Cherry, 
Government Printing Office, 1957), iii.
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the authority to lead tarekat is generally passed from mentor to disciple. By this logic, 
why would Haji Drahman and his disciples, bearers o f Tokku Paloh’s spiritual and 
political legacy, not be Sufis?
In 1977, Azhar bin Chik, who studied Tokku Paloh’s M a ’arij al Lahfan, made
o'? 7
a call for researchers after him to investigate the Naksyabandiyah in Terengganu. 
Timah Hamzah, who published her monograph on Haji Drahman in 1981, appears to 
have attempted this, conducting interviews with descendents of certain protagonists in 
the uprising. Respondents provided Timah with information about Sufis o f the time, but 
did not inform her directly that Haji Drahman was a Naksyabandi. Yet Timah has 
described him as such, on the basis that Haji Drahman was Tokku Paloh’s favoured 
disciple.838 On this basis, she has rejected the secret society narrative, arguing that it is 
‘impossible that a religious figure who had attained the level o f Sufi would want to 
become a robber’. Later, in 1998, Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah published the claim 
again, citing a 1988 article by Imam al-Soouti in the Malaysian periodical, Mingguan 
Islam (Muslim Weekly).840
The rebels behaved in certain ways which were consistent with Sufi practice. 
For example, they performed ratib in groups and met for religious discussions, 
potentially supporting Timah’s interpretation. Further, ‘Exhibit S’, the secret letter 
referring to the Bendera Stambul, was signed by Sayid Sagaf, who claimed he was the 
khalifah in Terengganu. The title khalifah, or Caliph, does not only apply to the leader
841of the global Islamic community, but is often claimed by the leaders o f Sufi tarekatI 
Haji Drahman himself was also known to practice silat, a martial art associated with the
837 Azhar bin Chik, "Ma’arij U1 Lahfan Sayyid Abdul Rahman Bin Muhammad Al Idrus: Ulasan Dan 
Edit”, 2.
838 Timah Hamzah, Pemberontakan Tani, 3 1.
839 Ibid., 111.
840 Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah, Pemikiran Islam Di Malaysia: Sejarah Dan Aliran, Siri Pendidikan 
JarakJauh (Kuala Lumpur & Pulau Pinang: Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka & Pusat Pendidikan Jarak Jauh, 
Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1998), 52-53. This particular copy of Mingguan Islam, 8 January 1988, is 
missing from the Malaysian National Library’s collection. It is not held anywhere in Australia and Abdul 
Rahman was not able to provide me with a copy.
841 D. Sourdel et al., "Khalifa," in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, et al. (Brill 
Online, 2009).
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842Malay aristocracy and Muslim mystical practices' “ In 1922, the serving Police
0 4 - ?
Commissioner, Mr. Cheers, observed the Haji in action on the night of Maulid.
These fragments may provide a glimpse of a subterranean politics in 
Terengganu. Yet because 1920s British officials did not become aware of Sufis in 
Terengganu, they did not record their presence. Nor did Malay officials inform them of 
their presence, and there is at present no available record which confirms Naksyabandi 
involvement. Further, the window of time for interviewing rebels has passed. In any 
case, subsequent Malaysian scholarship, more concerned with portraying the rebels as 
Malay nationalists, has not been concerned with discovering Terengganu’s 
Naksyabandis. The assertion that the Terengganu rebels were Sufis is however, 
occasionally still made, especially online. The best example is from the internet forum 
BicaraMuslim.com (Muslim Chat), which features a 2003 thread in which participants 
debate the place of Sufism in Islam and the necessity or otherwise of Muslims 
defending their maruah bangsa sendiri (own national/racial honour). Here the claim that 
Haji Drahman was a Naksyabandi and a rebel is made to demonstrate that Sufis should 
act politically to defend their people.844
Disbelief
British officials in Terengganu, who directed their efforts into identifying the secret 
society responsible, discounted another plausible explanation for the uprising. This was 
the explanation that the rakyaf s land and forest grievances had become bound up in an 
Islamist critique of British rule, sufficient to mobilise, by corvee or by conviction, 
numbers of rakyat who may have seen their interests served by it. This possibility was 
not entertained because British officials in Terengganu consistently saw their new land 
and forest regulations as benevolent reforms. Further, although no debate occurred 
within the Terengganu government over the type of land reform required, Terengganu
842 Refer to D.S. Farrer, Shadows o f the Prophet: Martial Arts and Sufi Mysticism (Springer, 2009). 
844 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 1, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
844 g3p_ajib, 19 October 2003, ‘Bicara Aqidah’ threads, 1 October 2003, www.bicaramuslim.com.
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officials were informed by similar reforms across the Malay States under British rule. 
They were also informed by previous debates elsewhere on the peninsula.
A fierce debate about land tenure had raged in Perak in the 1890s, hinging on 
questions of how Malay land systems were conceived. This debate, between F.E. 
Swettenham, then the British Resident in Perak, and W.E. Maxwell, Colonial Secretary 
in the States Settlements, concerned how much Malay adat surrounding land rents and 
crop revenues was influenced by Islam. Swettenham had taken a position aligned with 
that of several Malay sultans, including that o f Perak, that the state owned all land, and 
the rakyat simply had a right o f usufruct over the parts o f it that they claimed.845 
Maxwell, on the other hand, had argued that they held land ‘on a tenure founded on 
ideas which are common to all, or most, Mohammedan countries’, and furnished 
evidence from Turkey to prove it.846 Maxwell went on to argue that sultans’ notions of 
adat were projections of their own claims to own all land, whereas in more common 
understandings, ‘Malay land tenure [was] generally founded upon Mohammedan 
law’.847
Based on this understanding, Maxwell argued, the Malay rakyat ‘owned’ their 
land, inherited it, and were not simply tolerated in usufruct by benevolent rulers. They 
paid a land tax, fixed at ten per cent o f their produce, and their trees, houses and other 
fixtures were their own property. Further, they could claim any land that was not being 
used by another person, as it was deemed ‘dead land’ and was theirs to enliven. For 
Maxwell, this was ‘Mohammedan law pure and simple’, and he quoted exactly the same 
Hadith that Haji Drahman later quoted to the Land Office in Terengganu. ' Maxwell 
was therefore sufficiently aware of ‘ada f tenurial practices to see that they could be 
defended on their Islamic merits if anyone wished to do so. Swettenham, unimpressed,
84:1 F.A. Swettenham, ‘Minute by the British Resident, Perak’, appended to Perak Land Regulations, p. 7. 
This document is available from the ANU Library’s Bliss Microform Collection, at TCKti M465.
846 Maxwell, "Memorandum on the Introduction of a Land Code in the Native States in the Malay 
Peninsula," 2.
848 Ibid., xviii.
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accused Maxwell of using the Thousand and One Nights as his authority on land tenure 
in Islam.849
Although no such fierce debate raged in Terengganu, officials who were too 
knowledgeable about anger in the hulu were viewed as being too close to the rakyat. 
Diverse observations were tunnelled into a limited range of explanations on this basis, 
strengthening the notion that a secret society must have whipped up emotions. Along 
these lines, the opinions of de Moubray, in particular, were undermined by other 
officials. De Moubray had noticed Haji Drahman’s role in defending the rakyafs land 
use rights, and also the rakyaf s anger about royal land claims. In his statement to 
Thomson, he also mentioned defending certain ra/cyat against their fines, telling Bryson 
that ‘the fines of $10 a piece were ridiculous in view of the poverty of the 
population’.850 He also described having tried to gain more information about Haji 
Drahman, describing him as ‘an extremely good man of the Ghundi [Gandhi] type’. He 
continued:
There seems to be no question of exaction of any sort on [the Haji’s] part.
My opinion is that he genuinely is protecting the rayat against the exactions 
of the Astana [royal] party, and that up till the present he has been the only 
one to do anything for them. Whether or not he had purely religious grounds 
for including us in his hatred...We have so far hardly done anything that we
O C 1
can show in the way of countering the exactions of the Astana party.
De Moubray’s characterisation of Haji Drahman did not make a significant 
impact on other officials’ views. In December 1928, High Commissioner Marriott wrote 
T am not disposed to attach too much importance to the evidence of Mr. de 
Moubray’. 852 Yet one aspect of his argument was taken up by Millington, who 
attempted to portray the rakyaf s anger as being directed more towards the royal family 
than toward the British, an argument that Thomson also made. This argument was also 
noted by officials in the Colonial Office, and one, W.D. Ellis, in fact championed de
s4'; F.A. Swettenham, ‘Minute by the British Resident, Perak’, appended to Perak Land Regulations, p. 5. 
850 Statement by G.A.C. de Moubray, 26 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 62, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
8:11 Statement by G.A.C. de Moubray, 26 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 62, C 0 7 17/61:52432. 
s5~ H.W. Marriott to Colonial Office, 6 December 1928, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
263
Moubray’s statement as demonstrating the Sultan’s ‘tyranny’ and the benevolence o f 
British rule.‘S:"
British officials, including de Moubray despite his sympathy for the rakyat, 
could not see their own actions as displacing them or affecting their livelihoods. Indeed, 
Terengganu officials displayed a distinct lack o f familiarity with tenurial systems in 
Terengganu. Humphreys, for example, demonstrated in 1922 that he did not understand 
Haji Drahman’s critique. He wrote in his report on the Haji’s influence that Haji 
Drahman believed that the rakyat owned Terengganu’s land, that government claims 
were ‘contrary to Muhammadan Law’, and that government should be opposed. Yet 
Humphreys’ description was mistaken in some important respects. The Haji did argue 
that Terengganu’s land belonged to the rakyat, and that the British government’s claims 
on it were contrary to the syariah and Hadith. He did not, however, argue that any kind 
o f government was illegitimate, instead stating a principle that ‘enlivening dead land’, 
with which he characterised shifting cultivation, must be permitted. Later, in June 1928, 
J.D. Hall, the Acting Secretary to the High Commissioner in Singapore, also discussed 
land tenure with Haji Drahman. He had only half-remembered details to report:
I then asked him if it was wrong by Mohammedan law to pay land rent to 
Government. He said not at all, it was very right and proper to do so, but 
there [were] kinds o f lands on which it [was] wrong for Government to 
demand rents...He then began to get excited and broke into Arabic which I 
couldn’t understand; spoke o f three kinds o f land, one “Namas” on which no 
rent could be paid, two Membelah Khas (on which rent could be paid) and 
three Membelah Khan (I thought he said rent could be paid on this; Che 
Sudin’s recollection— questioned this morning on 7/6/28, was that “Khan”
o  c  c
couldn’t pay rent either.
Humphreys and Hall could not see that it was their government in particular 
that Haji Drahman did not wish to cooperate with. A month earlier, Bryson too 
demonstrated that he did not take the Islamist land politics seriously, and in front of a 
religious official. Bryson had been in charge o f land alienated under various royal grants 
in the state, and also the Kuala Berang and Marang Land Offices. In his statement to
853 W.D. Ellis, file note, 25 August 1928, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
854 J.L. Humphreys, Humphreys Report, p. 4, C0717/6L52432.
855 Enclosure 6 to Confidential Despatch, 6 December 1928, C0717/6E52432.
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Thomson, he described visiting land around the Terengganu River system, and 
travelling to inspect land, speak to penghulu, check remittances and meet with 
landowners. On 14 May, Bryson visited a number of hulu villages. He was informed 
that rakyat there would not pay for passes. In response, Bryson asserted to the imam in 
one village that the ‘Government was representing “Allah”, the real owner [of the 
land]’. The imam reportedly ‘snorted’ at Bryson in response. Another official, a 
Settlement Officer, had argued with Haji Tahir for two hours about the passes. Haji 
Tahir’s response to him was ‘It’s all very well. You are clever; we are stupid’. The 
following day, Bryson suggested to the District Officer that he wished to travel up the 
Telemong River. He was advised against this, however, in case he was targeted as a 
kafir. The Acting British Adviser, Mr. Simmons, had previously travelled there, and 
Tok Janggut had spat at him.856
The Uprising in Fragments
Despite not grasping the Haji’s argument, British officials were confident enough about 
his guilt to punish him immediately, and the decision was taken to banish him from 
Terengganu. Haji Drahman had risked his authority and livelihood on the uprising and 
lost. The Haji did not possess the mystique of say id status, or the courtly authority 
Tokku Paloh had enjoyed. Lacking these sources of authority, Haji Drahman had sought 
new authority by Islamising the ra k y a t'grievances, and he had left too many signs of 
his involvement. The Haji attended the palace on 27 May, having written the following 
to his disciples:
I now declare that I have surrendered myself to the Duli Yang Maha Mulia 
(Sultan) himself, because of thq fitnah derhaka rakyat-rakyat hula. I was 
not involved in any way and I profess my loyalty under the command (titah 
perintah) of the Duli Yang Maha Mulia. I am at the palace. Disciples, do not
856 Statement by H.P. Bryson, 26 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. XX, C 0717/61:52432.
857 There are two possible translations for this phrase, depending on how fitnah is understood. Fitna is an 
Arabic term indicating a test of believers’ faith emanating from external influences. It could therefore 
refer to a state of rebellion within an Islamic polity, which undermines Muslim unity. On the other hand, 
fitnah is often used in Malay to indicate slander or false accusations. On this basis, Haji Drahman could 
be referring to the undermining of Islamic unity caused by the rakyat's derhaka, or the slander circulating 
that they committed derhaka.
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create any disturbance or even hold any concern for me. I love our Raja very 
much [sangat-sangatlah kasihari]'.858
Millington arrived while the Sultan sat in audience with the Haji. He had been 
assuring the Sultan he felt great sympathy for him, and also denied any role in the 
uprising. In his letter to his disciples, he distanced himself from the movement, adopting 
the courtly label ‘derhaka’ to denounce the actions the rakyat had taken. These were the 
same rakyat he had embraced as a spokesperson in 1922. His role as translator and 
defender was over, as was any claim he had made to leadership in a future Terengganu 
rid of the British and Sultan Sulaiman. Instead, he now described himself in the terms 
authorised for Malay subjects by both sultans and British administrators in the colonial 
period—as a loyal supporter of his sultan, whose claim to power should always be 
respected.
Nevertheless, Millington advised the Sultan to terminate the interview, which 
he did. Not wishing to arrest and gaol the Haji, Millington then attempted to convince 
some Malay officials to keep him at one of their houses, but all refused. He eventually 
found the Qadi willing to hold him in his court in the palace compound, and three days 
later the Sultan signed a warrant for his banishment. The Haji was immediately sent 
to Singapore for detention until he could travel to Mecca, where he was to live. On 1 
June, a government notice was circulated, after Haji Drahman’s departure, announcing 
the banishment. Haji Drahman lived in Mecca on a Terengganu government pension for 
a year before he died.860
Haji Drahman had been removed from Terengganu before the Thomson 
Inquiry commenced. By late June 1928, the official colonial narrative of the uprising, 
however uneven, had been established. In the meanwhile, the Islamists, except for Mat 
Zin, had been arrested. The unity the uprising had achieved crumbled entirely during 
this time. Of the arrested rebels who were interviewed by Thomson, none offered any 
defence of their political vision. Instead, all of them attempted to distance themselves
858 Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid, 7 Zulhijjah 1346 [27 May 1346], SUK T 1295/1346.
859 Statement by W.M. Millington, [date], Thomson Report, p. 13, C0717/61:52432.
860 Enclosure 6, 7 June 1928, Thomson Report, C 0 7 17/61: 52432.
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from it, and many denied all knowledge of it, or o f any o f the other Islamists. For 
example, Mamat Tok Pitas denied having been at Kuala Telemong on 21 May, and also 
denied knowing Mat Zin, Tok Janggut, Haji Drahman or Sayid Sagaf. Yet others 
made patently false statements. Che Leh, for example, stated he had nothing to do with
the uprising, although he did know Mat Zin. He added that he had tied to Kelantan
862afterwards, but only because he had heard he was being hunted.
The denials went on. Abu Bakar Ceting again asserted that the crowd only 
wanted to ‘see’ the Sultan, and that he in fact wanted to pay for a pass. He also stated, 
‘[tjhere were no leaders of the rayat: each o f them followed his own inclination’.8'13 Haji 
Karia stated that he had advised Mat Zin, through his assistant Mahmud, to take out a 
pass and pay his quit-rent. Yet he admitted having been at Kuala Berang, although he 
did not know why the rakyat hulu were carrying weapons, and he thought the police 
gunshots were Chinese firecrackers. He did, however, admit that he was a disciple of 
Sayid Sagaf.864 Ismail Kuala Pueh even stated he was on his way to pay for a pass in 
Kuala Berang when he found himself caught up in the crowd of rebels. ' Abdullah 
Jurukaka claimed that, on seeing the crowd, he was frightened and ran away.866 Haji 
Tahir had not been there either, although he did admit to wanting relief from the cost of 
passes. Penghulu Salleh was not in Kuala Berang on the day o f the uprising. 
Another rebel, Isa bin Haji Mamat, blamed Mat Zin for summoning rakyat by corvee,869
861 Statement by Mat Pitas bin Muhammad, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 92, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
S(’“ Statement by Che Leh bin Haji Abdul Rahman, 29 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 197,
C 0 7 17/61:52432.
863 Statement by Abu Bakar bin Drahman, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 91, C0717/6L52432.
864 Statement by Haji Zakaria bin Haji Muhammad Hassan, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 89, 
C0717/6L52432.
865 Statement by Ismail bin Salleh, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 87, C0717/6L52432.
866 Statement by Abdullah Jurukaka bin Abu Bakar, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 86,
C 0 7 17/61:52432.
807 Statement by Haji Tahir bin Mat Din, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 85, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
868 Statement by Penghulu Mat Salleh bin Yusuf, 27 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 84, C0717/6L52432. 
8(>l) Statement by Isa bin Haji Mamat, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 92, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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a strategic claim to make given Mat Zin was still at large and not available for 
interview.
Despite all these denials, the Islamist group attracted no sympathy. A panel o f 
senior officials met to try them and consider their sentences. The panel consisted of the 
Sultan, Millington, Dato’ Amar, Appeals Court Magistrates Dato’ Indra Guru and Dato’ 
Kamala Wangsa, and High Court Magistrate Dato’ Bija Sura. The officials who fled 
Kuala Berang on 21 May, along with a group o f penghulu, served as witnesses against 
the accused.87(1 Mat Zin, who appears to have been arrested before the trial, was 
sentenced to fifteen years hard labour. Sentences o f ten years’ hard labour were handed 
down to Ismail Kuala Pueh, Abu Bakar Ceting and Abdullah Jurukaka. Haji Karia 
received seven years and Mat Puyuh, Haji Tahir, Mamat Tok Pitas and Lebai Hasan 
were sentenced to five years. All served their sentences in Singapore. Penghulu 
Salleh was found to have genuinely not been present at Kuala Berang and was released,
Q 'j'y
as were Che Leh and Penghulu Omar.
The punishment meted out to the Islamists was severe, but rakyat able to claim 
they had attended only because o f corvee were pardoned. Some rebels, who made 
statements at the Istana Maziah either voluntarily or under compulsion, used the congee 
letters to argue that they had never understood the uprising’ aims. One group— Mat 
Diah, Imam Abbas and Ismail bin Daud—described a letter from Mat Zin arriving in 
their village. In response, according to Mat Diah, these three, with two others, had 
travelled for two days to Mat Zin’s house. Having stopped to eat near his jetty, where 
they had landed their perahu, they saw Mat Zin, who told them they would all be 
leaving that very morning. They set off on foot, describing their arrival at a Chinese 
rubber kebun, where they heard the noise of a gun or cannon, and saw a large crowd
873running. Mat Diah ran from fear, and immediately commenced his journey home.
870 ‘List nama-nama orang yang hendak dibuat saksi’, n.d., SUK T 1295/1346.
871 S. Carre, file note, 17 October 1928, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
872 Peringatan Jawatan, ‘Perkara penderhaka rakyat-rakyat hulu itu telah dibicarakan’, n.d., SUK T 
1295/1346.
873 Statement by Mat Diah, 12 Zulhijjah 1346 [1 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
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Ismail, however, gave away a little more, and provided some sound effects for 
good measure. Twenty people had travelled from their village, Kampung Kuala Pueh, 
and met with twenty others at Mat Zin’s house. All forty had joined the crowd headed 
for Kuala Telemong. At the kuala, Ismail heard guns, ‘pong, pong’, and was afraid, 
repeating ‘Allah, Allah’. He could not understand what the crowd was saying and fled, 
eventually returning to Mat Zin’s place with twenty others from his village.874 The three 
were not believed, and the Sultan determined that they were guilty. Yet all three firmly 
asserted that they had not intended to commit derhaka, a sensible move when making a 
statement at the palace. For all these rebels, the Islamist leadership and the rakyat who 
joined them, either lying or claiming they did not understand the uprising was the only 
strategy available to them.
Sayid Sagaf, however, was a little more creative, attempting to shift the blame. 
He first stated he knew Haji Drahman only ‘slightly’. He also denied signing any of the 
secret letters. He added that he had heard about the ‘recent trouble’, but only from Haji 
Musa Minangkabau, as the rakyat themselves never mentioned their grievances to him. 
He also denied all knowledge of the Syarikat, and even added, T believe that Haji Musa 
was the origin of the disturbances’.875 Sayid Sagaf had left no traces of his involvement 
in the uprising, and emerged a winner. He continued to command great deference from 
the rakyat, and returned to his career of amassing land and wealth. As soon as July 
1929, it emerged that rakyat in Kampung Kubur Air and Kampung Banggol Dusun had 
given their landholdings to Sayid Sagaf, and he was called in to the Istana Maziah to 
explain himself.876
The sayid's response was to immediately blame the landowners, describing 
them essentially as scheming to avoid paying their taxes. He replied that he could only 
imagine that these ‘orang daraf (hinterland yokels) were gifting the land to him to 
force him to pay for surveying and settlement, and boundary markers. These would cost
874 Statement by Mat Diah, 12 Zulhijjah 1346 [1 June 1928], SUK T 1295/1346.
875 Statement by Sayid Sagaf bin Sayid Abdul Rahman, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, pp. 105-107,
C 0717/61:52432.
87<’ Commissioner of Lands, Trengganu, SUK T, 16 Safar 1348 [24 July 1929], SUK T 1261/1347.
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him a total o f three to four thousand ringgit. On the other hand, the rakyat would expect 
to keep the padi yield and Sayid Sagaf would not seize it from them as it would provide 
their only livelihood. On this basis, he stated he could not accept the land. The rakyat 
approached by Bryson had a different version o f the story. They stated that they had 
gifted the land to Sagaf s father, Tokku Paloh, before him, and now if Land Office 
officials wished to conduct a land census, they could go and talk to the sayid. All this 
was later denied by the Penghulu in Manir, who had heard that someone called Othman 
bin Mat was travelling around urging the rakyat to give their land to Sayid Sagaf. 
Othman had also asked the rakyat for their quit-rent payments on the pretext that he was 
gathering it for the Land Office. He collected $400 when the government was owed 
only $295.878 The Penghulu Manir feared the situation was similar to that before the 
uprising, referring to ‘provocation’ (asutan hantu) whipped up by instigators,879 and 
producing a list o f 200 people who had gifted up to seven lots each to Sayid Sagaf, or 
paid money to Mat Othman.880
The man Sagaf had blamed for the uprising, Haji Musa, denied all involvement 
in his own turn, although he did admit to writing a letter which the police had found at 
his house. Although he had stated in the letter that the government regulations were 
against the syariah, he now attempted to explain it away, stating T was only writing it as 
a story; I was not trying to make any trouble’. He also denied cooperating with Haji 
Drahman, stating he was not his disciple, or Sayid Sagaf— T do not follow him or his 
advice’. Perhaps Haji Musa’s involvement in preaching resistance in mosques in the 
Terengganu River system was intended to rival the teachings of Haji Drahman and 
Sayid Sagaf after all. The Sayid appears to have been willing to inform on him, and not 
on Haji Drahman. Yet Haji Musa appears not to have been sentenced for a part in the 
uprising.
877 Saqaf bin Abdul Rahman to SUK T, 18 Safar 1348 [26 July 1929], SUK T 1261/1347.
878 Statement by H.P. Bryson, 15 Zulhijjah 1347 [25 May 1929], SUK T 1261/1347.
879 Penghulu Manir to Collector of Land Revenue, 28 Syawal 1347 [9 April 1929], SUK T 1261/1347.
880 ‘List mereka-mereka yang sandaran tanah-tanahnya kepada Syed Saqaf, SUK T 1261/1347; ‘Mukim 
Kuala Nerus nama mereka yang sandar tanah-tanahnya kepada Syed Saqaf, SUK T 1261/1347; ‘List 
mereka yang telah membayar wang kepada Encik Othman bin Mat’, nd, SUK T 1261/1347.
881 Statement by Haji Musa bin Abdul Ghani, 28 June 1928, Thomson Report, pp. 95, C 0 7 17/61:52432. 
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The uprising had cost the Terengganu government $9,200,882 $160 of which 
was spent on feeding the arrested rebels in the police lock-up.883 Afterwards, the newly- 
installed Millington also had his own recriminations to face. His judgment was 
condemned by the Colonial Office, as he had not insisted on more European 
involvement in the hulu. He had not sent any British officers along, first to the Sultan’s 
meeting with the rakyat hulu, and then with the police who responded to the uprising in 
Kuala Telemong. Millington had argued to Thomson that he had made a decision to 
keep British officials away from the rebels. He stated that Dato’ Amar had advised him 
against his own involvement, for fear it would ‘precipitate trouble’.884 He added that he 
had wished for Malay officials to appear as the government’s face in the hulu, to avoid 
provoking the raky’at by sending along kafir.885 Millington’s thinking appears to have 
been a strategy for manipulating appearances which backfired.
High Commissioner Marriott did not approve of the decision to send a solely- 
Malay police force to Kuala Telemong, concluding that a European should have 
accompanied them as an encounter with the rebels was likely. 886 By the time the 
Thomson Report reached the Colonial Office, Millington’s strategy was facing serious 
condemnation, and Ellis wrote in his file notes that Millington might have played into 
the Sultan’s hands. Given his view that the Sultan’s land grants had caused more 
hardship than the British land and forest regulations, Ellis suspected the Sultan might 
have been manipulating the situation by attempting to hide the rakyaf s anger with his 
‘exactions’ when he met them before the uprising. For Ellis, the Sultan had made the 
British appear as ‘props of [his own] tyranny’.887 Millington was sacked in October 
1928, and a note on the file finished his career with the flourish, ‘ [t]his completes the
88-1 Peringatan Jawatan, ‘Perkara penderhaka rakyat-rakyat hulu itu telah dibicarakan’, n.d., SUK T 
1295/1346.
887 Commissioner of Police, Trengganu, SUK T, 9 Rabiulawal 1347 (26 August 1928), SUK T 406/1347: 
‘Belanja makan orang menderhaka dalam tahanan polisk
884 Statement by W.M. Millington, 22 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 1, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
888 Statement by W.M. Millington, 22 June 1928, Thomson Report, p. 3, C0717/6T52432.
886 Sir H Hayes Marriott to Colonial Office, 13 July 1928, in C 0 7 17/61:52432.
887 W.D. Ellis, file note, 25 August 1928, C 0 7 17/61:52432.
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story of the Trengganu disorders.. .Mr. Millington has been replaced by Mr. 
Sturrock’ .888
888 S. Carre, file note, 17 October 1928, C 0 7 17/61:52432. 
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There are no signs o f disaffection in the interior at present, nor does the Adviser
anticipate any in the future.
Sir Hayes Marriott, High Commissioner for the Malay States, 24 July 1929.SS4
The Terengganu rebels had audaciously merged local environmental claims with a 
universalist political discourse. Their bold political generalisation, however, did not 
protect them from police gunshots, arrests or hard labour after the uprising was 
defeated. Nor could they, in reality, unify a society containing diverse interests and 
loyalties under the rubric of the umat. The uprising fell away in disarray after Haji 
Drahman’s banishment, and individual rebels said and did whatever they could to avoid 
punishment—unsuccessfully in the case of the sentenced Islamists. Perhaps ironically, 
the movement’s collapse resulted in a greater colonial presence in the hulu, and 
increasingly successful efforts to territorialise the landscape and peasantise its subjects.
The government moved quickly to further increase its access to the rakyat 
hulu, and so the rakyafs visibility to the state also improved. The government amended 
the Land Enactment in 1929 to allow Collectors of Land Revenue to assess claims and 
evaluate disputes directly while in the field. They could now perform their work while 
attending hulu villages, and could afford to rely less on formal notices requiring rakyat 
to attend government centres like Kuala Berang.,s;" The government also moved to 
make the hulu's landscape more legible to its agents, and surveying efforts were stepped 
up dramatically. In 1931, the Malayan census reported the presence in Terengganu of 66 
‘civil engineers, architects and surveyors’. This number represented a heady 600 per 
cent expansion of employment in land-bounding since the previous census in 1921.
SSI) High Commissioner, Malay States to Colonial Office, 24 July 1929, CO 717/68: 62468: ‘Conditions in 
Trengganu’.
890 Land Enactment 1344, Amendment Enactment 1347, 11 July 1929; Land Enactment 1344, 
Amendment Enactment 1347 Objects and Reasons, 30 June 1929, CO 717/64:52433 ‘Terengganu 
Enactments 1347’.
Further, and demonstrating the government’s capacity for winning certain rakyat to its
o n  I
side, 51 members o f this occupational group were Malay.
After the uprising the government was also embolded in limiting royal 
concessions, gradually undermining the royal family’s pre-emptive count er- 
territorialisation in the hulu. British officials had hoped that all the cap kurnia would 
have been ‘dealt with’ by the end o f 1929. This expectation had been too ambitious, 
however, and only a dozen had been cancelled by that time, although the cancellations 
represented progress towards the government’s aims. The new legion o f surveyors also 
continued to move through the hulu, surveying smallholder plots for incorporation into 
the Torrens System.
Only a year after the uprising, British officials were satisfied that it had been 
permanently suppressed. After the Thomson Inquiry, all questions of who led the 
uprising, or how they had mobilised were quickly put aside. The government began a 
road-building drive to integrate the hulu into government structures, and 1,200 Malays 
o f both sexes were recruited to build a road between Kuala Terengganu and Kuala 
Berang. Kuala Berang itself was made the centre o f a new district called Ulu 
Terengganu, which incorporated the entire rebel stronghold. Ostensibly built for the 
‘relief o f the rakyat from their poverty and isolation, Marriott wrote in July 1929 that 
labouring on the road project was ‘instilling the working habit into a people naturally 
inclined to indolence’.892 Sultan Sulaiman also made use o f the road’s capacity to 
improve his own access to the hinterland. Seeking to rebuild his broken relationship 
with the rakyat, the Sultan visited the construction site and found 800 road labourers 
there to meet him. The Sultan had also improved his standing in the eyes of British
891 C. A. Vlieland, "British Malaya (the Colony of the Straits Settlements and the Malay States under 
British Protection, Namely the Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, 
and the States of Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis and Brunei). A Report on the 1931 Census 
and on Certain Problems of Vital Statistics," (Malayan Information Agency, 1932), 305-27.
892 High Commissioner, Malay States to Colonial Office, 24 July 1929, CO 717/68: 62468: ‘Conditions in 
Trengganu’.
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officials, and Marriott described him as now showing ‘a real interest in the work of the
O Q 1
State and of a sense of his own duty to take a more active share therein.’
The government was also sufficiently confident to attempt new methods of 
suppressing shifting cultivation, including experimenting with new planting methods 
and crops. By 1929 an Agricultural Department had been established, and plans were 
made to organise a visit by Terengganu padi growers to Perak to learn about harvesting 
operations there. British officials also tried softer methods of winning the rakyaf s 
cooperation, sending surveyors to map the rest of Terengganu first, and only then return 
to the hulu. As Marriott noted:
[b]y concentrating first, as has been done, on the areas where the rayat are 
more sophisticated and more appreciative of the security of tenure which 
they are now receiving, the way is being prepared to convince the 
inhabitants of the Interior of the advantages resulting from land settlement, 
and to make them anxious to share in them. The Adviser reports that already 
the rayat from this area with ever increasing frequency apply to him direct 
for advice and protection.’894
By 1929, therefore, the uprising’s claims had already faded away into the past. 
Yet the rakyat—Terengganu’s new peasants—had only recently demonstrated that 
Malaya’s Malay peasantry had been made in the colonial encounter. They had not been 
bom or lived that way since time immemorial. Their resistance to their own 
peasantisation had seen them launch themselves on a journey from Terengganu’s hulu 
to the centre of the Muslim world in Stambul and back again to their swiddens. The 
rakyat and the Islamists who led them had demonstrated their ability to move between 
local struggles and global claims, defying their portrayal as politically na'ive. They also 
narrated their environmental claims into a political language shaped by Islam, defending 
their land and livelihoods as ummatic, not national, subjects.
The rebels had begun by speaking of their local grievances and experiences as 
forest cultivators growing padi for consumption and rubber for market. They began
893 High Commissioner, Malay States to Colonial Office, 24 July 1929, CO 717/68: 62468: ‘Conditions in 
Trengganu’.
894 High Commissioner, Malay States to Colonial Office, 24 July 1929, CO 717/68: 62468: ‘Conditions in 
Trengganu’.
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their political participation in a demand to resist both sides in the 1920s contest to 
subject the hulu to government. At this level, both Islamists and other rakyat spoke of 
individual swiddens, rubber plots, and fruit orchards; of bark, leaves and timber. They 
spoke of individual penghulu, of Wan Mahmud, and bounded concessions which 
prevented them from clearing forest land for planting. Yet by May 1928 the rebels had 
threaded their fine, localised details into a broad and soaring claim. By consolidating 
themselves as the umat and pointing to government men as kafir, the rebels mapped 
their forest claim on to a global map of Islam against the British Empire.
They had also ‘borrowed’ the prestige of a great Muslim power and recast its 
emblem as a deterritorialised symbol of global Muslim sovereignty, bringing the 
challenge it represented to the British Empire down to earth in the Terengganu forest. 
As they ambushed individual forest guards and threatened police officers, the rebels 
imbued their small actions with grand, Caliphal meaning. They invested in their local 
actions the urgency of defending the Muslim umat against the kafir forces set against it. 
They met the arrival of colonial government in the Terengganu forest with resistance, 
which they narrated to the British and to themselves as ungovernable and irrepressible, 
even by the forces of British law. By resisting in the name of Islam and not adat, the 
rebels brought global concerns to the hulu forest, transforming it from their space for 
cultivation into a sovereign space for the umat.
The rebels’ ability to insert themselves and their local claims into such a bold 
narrative of resistance was enabled by their location within several circuits of 
connection. Through the Terengganu River system, they were connected to the capital, 
and to Islamists and scholars recognised even by the British as possessing significant 
religious and political prestige. Through the Islamists and scholars they knew, they were 
connected to an independent past, in which the scholars were connected to royal power, 
from which they had now broken. They were also connected to the region, throughout 
which Haji Drahman traded, and directly to Mecca, the spiritual and scholarly centre of 
the entire Muslim world. Through their use of the Bendera Stambul, they connected 
themselves to a historical chain of resistance and association with the Caliphate in the 
region around them, and to an imagined Muslim sovereignty with which they identified.
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The Terengganu rebels are usually portrayed as living out their lives on a small 
scale—at its smallest, that of the hulu, its forests and its villages, and at its largest, that 
of the state, Terengganu, and the proto-national geo-body, Malaya. Yet the rebels 
themselves produced a narrative which dwarfed both these scales, and the narrower 
political subjectivities associated with them. The rebels demonstrated a fundamentally 
different relationship between territory and identity, between spatiality and power, to 
that which was authorised for them by the colonial government. They also defied the 
relationships later authorised for them by nationalist historians.
The politics of the Terengganu uprising demonstrated the clash between their 
spatial imagination and those being ratified around them on varying scales by Britain, 
Siam and the royal family. Their alternative way of identifying politically was not 
erased by efforts to bound and border their world. The movement which so mysteriously 
mobilised thousands of rakyat was built around an umat which was local and global, in 
whose name they joined the forest contest. By rebelling as the umat, and not as Malay 
or colonial subjects, the movement was also rebelling against the rakyafs 
peasantisation. The rebels’ Islamic environmentality, upon which they built their 
struggle, informed their acts of sabotage against the territorial categories being built 
around them. It also disrupted their transformation into immobile peasant subjects, 
cultivators fixed to Torrens-titled plots.
British officials who quashed this creative, connected movement never folly 
appreciated the importance of the challenge it voiced against their technocratic 
rationality of government. Convinced they were dealing only with rustics led by 
fanatics, the archive they compiled both reveals and obscures the political life of the 
rakyat. Yet the fragments they left behind have demonstrated not only the bold agency 
of the rebels, but also their audacious claim to sovereignty in the name of Islam.
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SUK T Setiausaha Kerajaan Terengganu (Terengganu Government Secretariat),
1919-1930
MBT Menteri Besar Terengganu (Terengganu Chief Minister), 1919-1930
CoL Commissioner of Lands, Terengganu, 1919-1930
HCO Office of the High Commissioner for the Straits Settlements, Singapore,
1910-1930
CO 273 Straits Settlements Original Correspondence, 1910-1930
CO 717 Federated Malay States Original Correspondence, 1920-1930
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